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TO : C] OOO

DATE: 19 November 1951

FROM : Acting Chief, Regional Branch, BR/CD

SUBJECT: Your request No. 182 of 2 November 1951

- 1. Attached is a State RI report with a BR supplement on Amin al HUSSEINI, submitted in answer to subject request.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

FOR COORDINATION WITH State

SECRET/CONTROL U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY
 SECURITY INFORMATION
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 BIOGRAPHIC REPORT

NAME HUSSEINI, Amin al (Ha.)

CASE NO.
 DATE 14 Nov. 1951

NATIONALITY	Palestinian	BIRTHDATE	c. 1893
PRESENT POSITION	Political Exile (Former Mufti of Jerusalem)	BIRTHPLACE	Jerusalem
LOCATION	Villa Aida, Heliopolis (Cairo-Egypt)	RACE	White
GEN. OCCUPATION	Political leader	SEX	Male
EDUCATION	St. George's School in Jerusalem; Al-Azhar Univer- sity in Cairo.	MARITAL STATUS	Married
LANGUAGES	Arabic, French, English, German, Turkish	NAME OF SPOUSE	Unknown
HONORS		CHILDREN	6 children (1-20 year old boy) (5 girls-8-25 years of age)
		RELIGION	Sunnite- Moslem
		POLITICAL AFFILIATION	Close relations with Arab League.
		ATTITUDE TOWARDS:	U.S. Formerly neu- tral (now questionable) U.S.S.R. Questionable

CAREER:

1914-1918 Made Pilgrimage to Mecca; Enlisted in Turkish Army.1/
 1918-1919 Appointed to British Public Security Service in Palestine;1/
 Later transferred to French Secret Service, Damascus.1/
 1920 Implicated in anti-Jewish riots; fled to Transjordan;
 Sentenced to ten years in absentia by British.1/
 1921 Pardoned by Sir Herbert Samuel, British High Commissioner in
 Palestine; Selected as Mufti of Jerusalem by Arabs and
 British.1/
 1922 Elected, president of the Supreme Muslim Conference.1/
 1928-1935 Active in Arab Independence Movement opposing British Mandate.2/
 1930 Appointed Member of Arab Delegation to the London Shaw Inquiry
 Commission.1/
 1936 Elected President, Arab Higher Committee, 25 April.1/
 1936-1937 Arab Higher Committee and Supreme Council dissolved following
 Arab riots and assassination of British Commissioner;
 Mufti took refuge in Jerusalem Mosque.1/2/
 1937 Escaped to Jaffa, then to Lebanon, October;1/
 Offered asylum in Italian Libya.1/
 1939 Joined Rashid Ali Gailani in Baghdad.1/
 1941 Participated in Rashid Ali's revolt; Proclaimed himself Prime
 Minister of Iraq; Signed secret Treaty with Germany and Italy,
 10 April.1/
 -- -- -- Fled to Japanese Legation in Tehran, May.1/
 -- -- -- Disguised as Italian, fled to Rome, September.1/
 -- -- -- Joined Ali Gailani in Berlin; Began broadcasts to Arabs for
 Axis, 5 November.1/
 1943 Mufti ended pro-Axis Propaganda 15 June.1/

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HUSSEINI, Amin al (Haj)Career: (Continued)

- 1945 Fled to Austria; then to Switzerland; Deported to France, where he was placed under house arrest. 1/2/
- 1946 Mufti escaped incognito to Cairo; received by King Farouk, 29 May.1/
- 1948 Established seat of Palestine Arab Government in Gaza, September. 1/
- 1948-1949 Mufti fails to unite Arabs on Palestine Question. 1/
- 1949 Journeys to Saudi Arabia to obtain Ibn Saud's support, October. 1/
- -- Visited Damascus to prevent Iraqi-Syrian union. 1/
- 1951 Presides over the World Muslim Conference in Karachi, February. 1/3/8/5/
- -- Visits Tehran to contact leaders of Fedayan-i-Islam (Crusaders of Islam). 3/
- -- Reported with Paktunistan agents promoting defection of seven million Pathan tribesmen from Pakistan to Afghanistan, March. 1/3/
- -- Accompanied Ghulam Abbas, Supreme head of the Kashmir Liberation movement, to the cease-fire line in UNK sector, 26 March.6/
- -- Arrived in Levant as guest of President of Syrian Chamber, Harouf Devalabi, to rally support against Israelis, May. 3/1/
- -- Mufti praised by Prince Talal, June. 8/
- -- Mufti confers with Colonel Shishakli, Syrian Chief of Staff, in Beirut on recruitment of Palestinian veterans into Syrian and Egyptian armies, 4 June.9/
- -- Denounced by Syrian Foreign Office for interference in state affairs, 15 June.10/
- -- Calls for direct negotiation of Palestine Refugees for American aid; Mufti forced to quit Syria; Bail Ghuri to act as Mufti's agent, late June. 11/
- -- Mufti and revolutionary leader, Farzi al-Kawakji, reported in Druze village of Cornail, 16 July.12/13/
- -- Member of Mufti's "Jihad Mukadess" party assassinates King Abdullah, 20 July.14/ Accused of Communist affiliations. 15/
- -- Calls press conference in Cairo and denies complicity in plot against King Abdullah; Condemns British for seizure of Palestine for Jordan, 6 August.16/17/
- -- Plot to assassinate Haj Amin reported, 17 August.18/
- -- Mufti sends six Palestinian war veterans to Damascus to train under Colonel Shishakli, 24 August.19/
- -- Mufti reported ready to ally himself with Russia or US, 25 August.20/
- -- Mufti confers with Egyptian and Saudi Arabian Foreign Ministers at Semiramis Hotel in Cairo; gains prestige, 25 August.21/
- -- Suggests next Moslem Conference to be held in Tehran to Mullah Abd-al-Qasim Kashani, 28 September.22/23/
- -- Mufti said to offer terrorists to Moslem Brotherhood for sabotage against Trans Arabian Pipeline, 26 October.24/25/
- -- Urges sabotage against British, Americans, and French to show support of Egypt's abrogation move, 3 November.26/27/

HUSSEINI, Amin al (Haj)Remarks:

Haj Amin al-HUSSEINI is now living in the Villa Aida, a luxurious two-story 16 room house of pink stone in Heliopolis (City of the Sun) - a suburb of Cairo. There the ex-Mufti is protected by special Egyptian police in sentry boxes outside the garden wall and inside by 20 Palestinian bodyguards. The security Cordon has been tightened since the assassination of King Abdullah of Jordan, so that when he leaves this refuge he is ringed by his bodyguards, all well-armed.3/

The Ex-Mufti has a retinue of about 70 including his only wife, their five daughters ranging from 8 to 25 years (the youngest being Amina, his favorite) and their son Salah, a 20 year old law student in Cairo. He has four male private secretaries and three chauffeurs to drive his two limousines.3/

In February 1951 the ex-Mufti began a tour of many strategic points. His first visit was to Karachi, Pakistan, where he was made honorary Chairman of the World Moslem Conference. Although it was reported by a source that Soviet Moslems were invited, none attended.4/ Another source inferred collusion between a Soviet agent "Sinhorn" and the Mufti.5/(see footnote).

Early in March the Mufti traveled to Iran where he contacted members of the Fedayan - i - Islam, the Iranian counterpart of the Moslem Brotherhood. It was a member of this same organization who on the 7th of March assassinated the Pro-British Prime Minister, Ali Razmara.3/ About this same time the Mufti was reported conferring with Pushtunistan agents who were inciting Pathan tribesmen from Pakistan to join the Afghans. It was not until May however, that the Afghans began raiding the Pakistan border.3/ On 26 March, Haj Amin was also reported accompanying Ghulam Abbas, Supreme head of the Kashmir Liberation movement, to the cease fire line in the URI sector.6/

The Mufti's next major move was to the Levant, where Syrian forces were struggling with the Israelis over the question of draining the Huleh Swamp. As the guest of Ma'rouf Dawalabi, President of the Syrian Chamber, the Husseinis rallied Nationalists against any peace move with the Israelis.3/7/ It is interesting to note that, Syrian Chief of Staff, Lt. Colonel Adib Shishakli, traveled to Beirut, Lebanon to confer with the ex-Mufti about the possibility of incorporating Palestinian war veterans into the Syrian and Egyptian armies. This same Refugee Army plan was later presented to the Arab League with the suggestion that it be financed by Pan-Arab funds.3/ It was at this same meeting that the Egyptian Political Committee delegates proposed that the Mufti's Gaza government should be represented in the League.2/

Repercussions against the Mufti's interference in Syrian affairs were soon voiced by the Syrian Foreign Office. Contact was then made with the Syrian Embassy in Cairo to determine how he had entered Syria. Investigations indicated that he had used a passport issued in the Embassy at Paris four years ago in the name of Muhammad Tahir, family name of Haj Amin.10/ (This information could possibly disprove previous reports that the Mufti had used Ma'rouf Dawalabi's passport to escape from Paris in 1946.1/3/)

*No information in CIA files on a Russian Agent by the name of "Sinhorn."5/

MUSSEINI, Amin al (Ha.)

Remarks: (Continued)

Lebanon was also included in the Mufti's travels about this same time. Whether by coincidence or not, the pro-British Premier, Riad el Solh of Lebanon, was assassinated by a Syrian nationalist on 17 July at the end of his four day visit with King Abdullah. In Jordan, Riad el Solh was reported to have discussed means by which the Arab World could work out a modus vivendi with Israel.^{3/}

The Mufti's conniving in Damascus was suddenly halted when his opponents learned that he was encouraging the Palestinian Refugees to negotiate directly with the United States for aid, rather than allowing the Arab states to mediate for them. With the charge that the Mufti was undermining the Arab Cause, his opponents were able to force his departure from Damascus. Zamil Ghuri, the ex-Mufti's agent was appointed to handle future contacts with the Syrian Army.^{11/}

Urgent attempts were made by the State Department to locate the ex-Mufti after his departure, but it was not until the 16th of July that he was discovered in the Druze Settlement of Cornell in central Lebanon ^{12/} in the company of Fawzi Kawakji, the chief Arab Guerilla leader during the Palestinian War.^{13/}

The Mufti's complicity in the assassination of King Abdullah 20th July was immediately inferred from the identity of the assassin, Shakhir Ashou, a member of the Jihad Mukadess, an extremist Arab organization created by the Mufti in 1948.^{14/} A reign of terror followed as refugee camps were raided for possible persons involved in the plot.^{15/} The ex-Mufti then appealed to Ibn Saud for both financial aid and political mediation with the Jordan government to stop the "atrocities."^{16/} While funds were given to the ex-Mufti, the Saudi Arabian monarch refused to become involved in the dispute regarding the suspects and disorders.^{16/} As the ex-Mufti was employing every means possible to deliver four of the six sentenced men (two were sentenced to death in absentia),^{17/} it was reported that the Regent, Haif, Bilbasi Pasha and the Jordanian Prime Minister were equipping assassins to even the average with the Mufti.^{18/}

The Jordan Government's claims were formally answered by the ex-Mufti at a press conference held on 5 August in Cairo. There he denied complicity in the plot against King Abdullah and stated "Political assassinations are not in the interest of the Arab countries and could only have dire results."^{19/} At this press conference he also denied having a nephew named Musa Da'ud al Musseini, described in the Egyptian Gazette of 7 August as the principle person involved in the Plot.^{15/} (Other reports refer to Musa Da'ud as the ex-Mufti's cousin)^{19/20/21/22/} He also attacked the Jordan government for their note to Egypt demanding that his activities be stopped, and charged that foreign eye-witnesses could verify his claims that the major atrocities were committed by the Jordan Police and the Arab Legion.^{23/}

Early in September the Mufti renewed his efforts to bring about Muslim unity against the British by suggesting to Mullah Abd al Qasim Kashani of Iran, that a Moslem conference similar to the one held in Pakistan be held in Tehran.^{24/} (Mullah Kashani is the chief of the fanatical terrorist organization, Fedayan-i-Islam whose members are held responsible for six murders since approximately July 1950.)^{25/} Mullah Kashani has guaranteed the Mufti full protection and all the necessary travel visas for his entourage.^{24/}

HUSSEINI, Amin al (Haj)Remarks: (Continued)

According to the Beirut source, who received information third-hand from a Lebanese Communist, the Mufti is supposedly receiving money from the Communists. He suggests the possibility that the Soviet Union may have decided to use a Pan-Islamic movement to gain control of Iran rather than employ the obviously Communist Tudeh Party.^{24/} It should be noted however, in considering the working possibilities of the above leaders that the ex-Mufti is a Sunnite 1/ while Mullah Kashani is a prominent Shiite leader.^{25/}

A usually reliable source states that the former Grand Mufti has combined the forces of the Moslem Brotherhood with his own terrorists in order to sabotage the Trans-Arabian pipeline within ten days (report dated 26 October 1951). Motives for such sabotage may be questioned since there appears to be no proof that the Israelis are receiving oil from Sidon, and furthermore the Trans-Arabian Oil Co. has recently presented \$25,000 for the relief of the Arab refugees.^{26/}

The strength of Hussein's influence has fluctuated considerably in the last several years. In the winter of 1945 his prestige suffered by his inability to unite the Arab World on the Palestine Question 1/ but more recent reports indicate that his power is growing.

Hussein is said to command the loyalty of over 90% of the Palestinian refugees.^{27/} Another source indicates that his influence within the inner circle of the Arab League has weakened although his prestige in the Arab World at large is still high.^{9/} The latter opinion is substantiated by Arab League leaders prohibiting the Mufti from administering funds for the Arab refugees. It is reported they fear his possible connections with Moscow and the fact that he might use their funds for his own political purposes.^{9/} Possibly as a consequence, the Mufti encouraged the Palestinian refugees to negotiate directly with the US for aid as opposed to the Arab states administering such funds.^{11/8/} Whereupon he was accused of undermining the strength of the Arab Cause and forced to leave Syria.^{8/}

The Mufti's policies are clearly directed toward the maintenance of the Palestinian refugees as a political entity and has therefore expressed concern over those still in Lebanon 8/ and UNRWA's efforts to resettle the refugees abroad. He stated recently, however, that he would not oppose their reintegration into Syria where some are already in the Syrian Army.^{14/}

The major part of Hussein's bargaining strength now depends upon his political affiliations with the Arab states. One of his most persistent struggles has been against the Hashemites (rulers of Iraq and Jordan).^{1/} The ex-Mufti's antipathy has been aggravated by the Hashemites' consistently pro-British policies, which Hussein feels has delayed Arab independence and unity.^{1/}

Hussein realizes that Egypt's primacy among the Arab states depends upon the Hashemites' weakness.^{2/} His relations with King Farouk are superficially good. According to one source the ex-Mufti is distrusted by King Farouk, but the latter recognizes the Mufti's political prestige - especially enhanced by the assassination of King Abdullah, and feels he would be a valuable ally for the future.^{23/}

The ex-Mufti has also maintained good relations with anti-Hashemite Ibn

HUSSEINI, Amin al (Ha.)Remarks: (Continued)

Saudi, whose apprehension over the Jordan Arab Legion is well known.^{29/} Although King Ibn Saud distrusts the Mufti he feels that he is the only strong champion of a free Palestine. King Ibn Saud has openly favored the restoration of the independence of Eastern Palestine and the holding of an impartial plebiscite there.^{16/} This may be one of the reasons the Mufti insists on the entity of the Palestinian refugees.

The Mufti is no doubt aware that certain factions in Syria would oppose the union of Iraq and Jordan because it would isolate her from Egypt and Saudi Arabia.^{30/} Doubtless with this in mind, the ex-Mufti pressed for the training of the refugees under Colonel Shishakli, head of the Syrian Army, perhaps in preparation for future guerrilla warfare.^{31/}

The Mufti's relations with Jordan are undergoing a decided change due to both King Tal'al's anti-British reputation and his sympathy for the Mufti's cause.^{31/} It is also significant to note that one of Hussein's most active supporters, former commander of the Hussein al-Fatwah was elected recently to the Jordanian Parliament.^{32/} Furthermore Tal'al is now enroute to visit King Ibn Saud ostensibly to end their feud.^{33/} Hussein's participation in a conference with Saudi Arabian and Egyptian Foreign Minister, presumably to prevent a Hashemite merger, further indicates his political strength.^{28/}

His attitude toward the "West" has varied. He has remained adamantly opposed to British interference in the Islamic World,^{1/} but until recently had avoided any public statements against the US.^{34/} In August the American Embassy in Cairo reported that the ex-Mufti was prepared to ally himself with the Russians or the Americans. If he were to ally himself with the US he would expect support in the reestablishment of an Arab Palestine, and his family as its hereditary rulers. In return he promised to effect an anti-Communist front.^{34/}

Another source indicates the Mufti's ideas have changed with international developments, and though he hates the Zionists he must be realistic.^{34/} He feels that the Democratic elements in the Middle East are too weak to constitute an effective front against Communism and implied that only through an Islamic appeal could the US expect to gain the support of the Arab world.^{34/} Recently it was reported, however, that the ex-Mufti had urged his men to sabotage American, French and British interests, which may be a move protesting America's condemnation of Egypt's abrogation move.^{35/}

The ex-Mufti's connections with Russia have been skillfully camouflaged. There is little doubt he has had contacts with Soviet agents but other than reports that he is receiving money from Moscow, little is known about the nature of the affiliation.^{36/} One reliable source stated the Mufti had said "We Mohammedans will never be Bolsheviks" nevertheless he indicated that his best propaganda support was coming from the Soviets not the West.^{36/} Recently the ex-Mufti received assurances from the Soviets that they would not alter their stand for an Independent Arab Palestine.^{34/}

Musa Bey al-Alemi, a relative of the Mufti by marriage and a reliable source

HUJSCINI, Amin al (Naz)Remarks: (Continued)

stated that the Hufti is a cunning, shrewd politician who will go to any ends to obtain his goal and that he is capable of getting rid of his enemies "if this furthers the Arab Cause." 37/ Practically all sources concur that the ex-Hufti is one of the shrewdest of Arab leaders, rather unanimously distrusted, but none the less to be feared.

If a photograph is desired, inquiry may be directed to Graphics Register, OCD.

SOURCES:

- 1/ State HI Files Report, 24 April 1951, Confidential.
- 2/ International Who's Who-1949, Unclassified.
- 3/ Newsweek, 3 September 1951, Unclassified.
- 4/ State D-525, Damascus, 25 May 1951, Confidential.
- 5/ CIA, OO-B-38736, 5 September 1951, Secret/Control/US Officials Only.
- 6/ Army, MAR-13/15, Pakistan, 26 March 1951, Confidential.
- 7/ FBIS-147, 24 July 1951, Restricted.
- 8/ CIA, 30-66784, 28 June 1951, Confidential/Control/US Officials Only.
- 9/ CIA, 30-67026, 29 June 1951, Confidential/Control/US Officials Only.
- 10/ State D-728, Damascus, 13 June 1951, Confidential.
- 11/ CIA, 30-68999, 25 July 1951, Confidential.
- 12/ State D-47, Beirut, 16 July 1951, Confidential.
- 13/ CIA, OO-W-14383, 13 October 1950, Restricted.
- 14/ New York Times, 20 July 1951, Unclassified.
- 15/ State D-257, Cairo, 7 August 1951, Unclassified.
- 16/ CIA, 30-72220, 24 September 1951, Confidential/Control/US Officials Only.
- 17/ Army R-241-51, B-2, 10 September 1951, Restricted.
- 18/ CIA, PD-390, 17 August 1951, Secret/Control/US Officials Only.
- 19/ Time, 17 September 1951, Unclassified.
- 20/ New York Times, 8/21/51, Unclassified.
- 21/ CIA-OO-B-37977, 3-5 August 1951, Secret/Control/US Officials Only.
- 22/ CIA, 30-72714, 27 September 1951, Secret.
- 23/ Army, R-209-51, Israel, 7 August 1951, Unclassified.
- 24/ CIA, 30-72921, 23 September 1951, Secret.
- 25/ CIA, 30-67977, 16 July 1951, Secret/Control/US Officials Only.
- 26/ Syrian Minister to US-Oral, 17 October 1951, Secret/Control/US Officials Only.
- 27/ CIA, PD-66, 2 November 1951, Secret/Control/US Officials Only.
- 28/ CIA, OO-B-30366, 25 August 1951, Confidential/Control/US Officials Only.
- 29/ Army, Intelligence Review 125, October 1951, Secret/Control/US Officials Only.
- 30/ CIA, 30-70011, 14 August 1951, Secret/Control/US Officials Only.
- 31/ CIA, 30-67034, 17 August 1951, Secret/Control/US Officials Only.
- 32/ State D-25, Jerusalem, 22 August 1951, Unclassified.
- 33/ New York Times, 6 November 1951, Unclassified.
- 34/ State, D-326, Cairo, 10 August 1951, Secret.
- 35/ CIA, PD-655, 26 October 1951, Secret.
- 36/ CIA, OO-B-40993, 15 October 1951, Secret/Control/US Officials Only.
- 37/ Musa Al-Alami, Oral, July 1951, Secret/Control/US Officials Only.

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HAJ AMIN al-HUSAYNI, THE MUFTI OF JERUSALEM

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al-HUSAYNI, Haj Amin

PALESTINE

Haj Amin al-Husayni, the Mufti of Jerusalem, is one of the most controversial and notorious political leaders of the world. King of no country, having no army, exiled, forever poised for flight from one country to another in disguise, he has survived because of his remarkable ability to play the British against the French, the French against the British, and the Americans against both; and also because he has become a symbol among the Arabs for defending them against the Zionists. His suave penchant for intrigue, his delicate manipulation of one Arab faction against another, combined with the popularity of his slogan of a united Muslim world, has made him a symbol and a force in the Middle East that is difficult to cope with and well nigh impossible to destroy. The names of Machiavelli, Richelieu, and Metternich come to mind to describe him, yet none of these apply. Alone, without a state, he plays an international game on behalf of his fellow Muslims. That they are ungrateful, unprepared, and divided by complex and innumerable schisms, does not deter him from his dream.

The Mufti is a man of striking appearance. Vigorous, erect, and proud, like a number of Palestinian Arabs he has pink-white skin and blue eyes. His hair and beard, formerly a foxy red, is now grey. He always wears an ankle length black robe and a turban with a spotless turban. Part of his charm lies in his deep Oriental courtesy; he sees a visitor not only to the door, but to the gate as well, and speeds him on his way with blessings. Another of his assets is his well-modulated voice and his cultured Arabic vocabulary. He can both preach and argue effectively, and is well versed in all the problems of Islam and Arab nationalism. His mystical devotion to his cause, which is indivisibly bound up with his personal and family aggrandisement, has been unflagging, and he has never deviated from his theme. For his numerous illiterate followers, such political consistency and simplicity has its advantages. The Mufti has always known well how to exploit Muslim hatred of "infidel" rule.

The Mufti was born, Amin al-Husayni, at Jerusalem, probably in 1893. The Husaynis were one of the two most prominent Arab Palestinian families and claimed descent from the Prophet Muhammad. The rank of Mufti, bestowed upon Amin's father, Tahir al-Husayni, by the Ottoman Government, signified that the bearer was an elder religious leader in the community. Amin's elder half-brother, Kemal, was similarly honored.

Amin al-Husayni attended St. George's School in Jerusalem, then went to al-Azhar University in Cairo. He made the pilgrimage to Mecca, received the title of Haj, then went to Turkey where he served in the Turkish Army during World War I. After the capitulation of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, he was attached to the British Public Security Service in Palestine, changing over later to work for the French Secret Service in Damascus. He speaks English, French and Turkish in addition to his native Arabic.

As a writer and teacher in Jerusalem in 1920, Haj Amin was implicated in the anti-Jewish riots and had to flee to Transjordan. He was convicted by the court of the British Mandatory Government and sentenced in absentia to ten years in prison, but the High Commissioner for Palestine, Sir Herbert Samuel, granted him a pardon, and accepted Haj Amin as the Arabs' choice for the position of Mufti in 1921. In 1922 he was made president of the newly established Supreme Muslim Council, a position

al-HUSAYNI, Haj AminPALESTINE

which gave him charge of the finances of the Wakfs (Muslim pious endowments), in addition to some appointive patronage. If both the British and the Zionists hoped that these honors and positions of trust would neutralise Haj Amin's proclivities for intrigue, they were mistaken. He was even at that time a single-minded devotee of Arab nationalism, an unalterable opponent of Zionism, and a man willing to go to any lengths to attain his ends.

While living in Jerusalem, the Mufti married a woman who remains nameless and had five daughters and a son. His son Muhammad Salah-al-Din, born in 1924, was educated in Egypt, where he still resides as a sort of protégé of King Faruq.

As Mufti, Haj Amin led the Palestinian Arabs in the fight against Jewish immigration and against the sale of land to Jews. He was a member of many Arab delegations sent to London to discuss the Palestine problem, notably the Shaw Inquiry Commission in 1930. There he testified that he had refused an offer of a quarter of a million pounds offered him by a relative of Dr. Chaim Weizmann if he would not oppose the sale of Arab land. In May 1930 he appeared before the League of Nations in Geneva to protest further implementation of the Balfour Declaration. Within Palestine, he organized the Arabs and became president of the Arab Higher Committee formed April 25, 1936.

Discord and rioting between the Arabs and Jews continued in 1936 and 1937, climaxing in the assassination of the British Commissioner of Galilee in August 1937. The Mufti's political party, considered responsible for this outrage, was outlawed and the Supreme Muslim Council dissolved. The Mufti, in danger of arrest, took refuge in the Haram al-Sharif (The Dome of the Rock) in Jerusalem. In this sacred Muslim shrine he was protected by a fanatical bodyguard and the British did not dare invade the sanctuary. Moreover, certain officials in Whitehall maintained that the Mufti must not be completely alienated as he was the only outstanding leader in Palestine with whom they could negotiate. In October, disguised as a Bedouin, and under cover of night, he fled to Jaffa where a coastal sail boat smuggled him to the Lebanon. There his spiritual position, coupled with strained Franco-British relations, saved him from arrest by the French.

In the village of Juniah the Mufti set up a "citadel of intrigue", established communications with his henchmen in various parts of the Near East, and almost immediately became involved with agents of Italy and Germany. Mussolini, who had already proclaimed himself the protector of Islam, offered the Mufti asylum in Italian Libya, but the Mufti remained in the Lebanon until September 1939. When World War II began, the British requested the French to deliver the Mufti into their custody. While these negotiations were in progress the Mufti slipped away to Baghdad to join his friend and fellow-nationalist, Rashid Ali al-Gaylani, and there to plot for an Axis orientation of Iraq.

On April 10, 1941, Rashid Ali's coup succeeded. He proclaimed himself Prime Minister of Iraq, declared war against Britain, signed a secret treaty with Germany and Italy, and with the assistance of "The Golden Square" (an English term for four Colonels in the Iraq Army) attempted to eject the British from Iraq. The revolt was ill-timed and though it had considerable support from young nationalists, was quelled within six weeks.

al-HUSAYNI, Haj Amin

PALESTINE

by British troops. Rashid Ali fled with the Mufti to Iran. The Mufti took up residence in the Japanese Legation at Tehran. When the events of September 1941 necessitated the evacuation of the Axis diplomatic staffs from that city, permission was also granted by the Iranian Government for the evacuation of about 500 Italian citizens. Dr. Luigi Petrucci, the Italian Minister, realized that this was an excellent chance to evacuate the Mufti at the same time. Disguised as an Italian, Haj Amin travelled with the Italians by bus and truck to Erzerum, whence they continued their journey by train via Ankara and Istanbul to Rome. On November 5, 1941 the Mufti left Rome to join Rashid Ali al-Qaylani in Berlin.

The Mufti and Qaylani, both treated as guests of the Führer, were put under the special guardianship of Dr. Fritz Grobba, head of the Arab Political Bureau in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who, while Ambassador in Iraq, had planned the Rashid Ali revolt. The two Arabs were expected to be important pawns in the hands of the Germans, to be shuttled back and forth between Rome and Berlin and used as propagandists to win Muslim sympathy for the Axis cause. Dr. Edmund Veesenmayer, the former German Minister to Hungary, who knew the Mufti and Qaylani at this period felt that the Mufti was the less practical of the two Arabs. The Mufti saw all problems from the Muslim point of view and was obsessed with the dream of a united Islamic state which would stretch from Morocco to Bosnia and eastward to Pakistan. But the Germans found that the Mufti, in spite of his aspirations, was unable to arouse Islam. Although he broadcast in Arabic over the Axis radio, and toured Croatia and Bosnia, trying to rally Muslims to the German side, he was not an effective propagandist. Deluded by his own pan-Arab convictions, the Mufti made the mistake of appealing to the Arab world as if it were an entity. Another cause of his failure as a propagandist was his negative approach. He had many criticisms of British imperialism but nothing constructive to offer to the Arab world in its place. He gave his last Axis broadcast on June 15, 1943, calling upon the Arabs to rise against the British and the Jews. The British were not alarmed. All through this time BBC in London followed a policy of steady mild debunking of the Mufti, and refrained from open attack. The Germans from that time on considered him a liability and cut his subsidy to a subsistence level only. He had also come to loggerheads with Rashid Ali al-Qaylani and the two had ceased to have speaking acquaintance, so that they were kept far apart by the Germans. But Haj Amin al-Husayni had evidently secreted in Switzerland considerable sums which the Germans paid him between 1941 and 1943, and he has lived on these assets since 1949.

In May 1945 the Mufti went from Bad Gastein in Austria to Switzerland with some fifteen followers, but Swiss authorities, not caring to be responsible for so difficult and controversial a company, deported them at once to France. The group was housed in a suburb of Paris. Various Arab Governments appealed in vain for the Mufti's return to Jerusalem. The French wished to keep the Mufti, and the British, for their part, were not anxious to have him delivered into their custody. The arrest of the Mufti would force the embarrassing dilemma of whether to prosecute him for treason and incur Arab hatred, or to ignore his war record and risk the charge of favoritism.

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While living in Paris, the Mufti renewed his contacts with the complicated political machine which he maintained in various parts of the Muslim world, and, incidentally, renewed his feuds with certain Arab leaders. His principal henchmen in Palestine at that time included Jamal Husayni, Dr. Husayn Khalidi, Munif Husayni, Ishaq al-Darwish, Rassim al-Khalidi, Ahmad Hilmi, Izzat Darwasah and Emile Ghuri. Even within this inner circle there were quarrels over money and position. None gave their complete loyalty to the Mufti, although all feared him. Within the Arab Higher Committee, the Mufti and Musa Alami were completely at variance. The Mufti has never had any friendship for the members and supporters of the Hashimitic dynasty, and has always regarded King Abdullah of Jordan as a particular rival.

The Mufti, in spite of his genteel charm, is ruthless toward his opponents in the Arab group. He has a personal bodyguard of some twenty well disciplined and efficient gunmen who not only protect him but carry out his missions of assassination. The Nashashibi family has for centuries been a rival of the Husaynis in the Arab community of Jerusalem. In November 1941, Fakhri Bey Nashashibi was liquidated at the Mufti's orders while visiting Baghdad. Certain Arabs caught selling land to Jews were terrorized, and in 1947, a liberal labor leader, Sami Taha, was killed on the streets of Haifa. All sources attributed this murder to the Mufti. Yet, despite this effort to "discipline" Palestinian Arabs, he was unable to gain effective control over them. He was feared by his associates, who regretted his return to Cairo, but who dared not challenge his decisions. His followers existed in every Arab country, however, and constant intrigues was going on in his behalf in Egypt, Syria and the Lebanon.

In March 1946 there were rumors that the British wished to deport the Mufti to the Seychelles, and there were counter rumors that several Arab countries had offered him refuge. Foreign Secretary Bevin had reputedly made a request to the French Foreign Office for the extradition of the Mufti and had been refused. Bevin then requested that the Mufti be kept under surveillance so that he might not leave France. While members of the French, British and American Intelligence services were checking planes and visas under the suspicion that the Mufti might attempt to leave Paris, the Mufti boarded a TWA flight for Cairo on May 29. He had shaved his beard, dyed his hair, and was the bearer of a Syrian passport, issued to his friend Mar'uf Dawalibi. Dawalibi, then the legal counselor of the Syrian Legation in Paris, was a prominent anti-Western Arab nationalist and a firm collaborator with the Mufti. Before boarding the plane, Haj Amin kindly sent a letter to the British Embassy informing them that he was about to "fly the coop." The Syrian Minister to France, who had assisted in procuring the passport, left hastily and quietly for Geneva. The Mufti, accompanied by his secretary Ali Rushdi Inan, was soon safely in the air, while the real Dawalibi was still in Paris. It was several days before the British ascertained that the Mufti had arrived in Cairo. The British Ambassador then requested the Egyptian Government to give no publicity to the presence of the Mufti in Egypt. King Faruq replied that the notice would be in the papers the next day, and it was. In the opinion of American officials in Cairo, this move by King Faruq gave Egypt increased prestige with extreme nationalist leaders in the entire Near East, and served to strengthen Egyptian leadership of the Arab League States where the Mufti was considered the best available threat against the Zionists. In the meanwhile the Mufti's latest move was hailed in the Muslim press, and he was accorded an unrestrained welcome by the populace.

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Prayers were held for the occasion in al-Azhar Mosque, and cheers for the Mufti developed into anti-British, anti-Government manifestations which grew serious enough to require police interference to quiet the crowd.

After promising not to take part in any political activity, the Mufti with four of his followers was established in Villa Aida, at Alexandria on July 1, 1946. Arab leaders at once began to beat a path to his door, but were always received "unofficially". Said the Mufti, "if the Jewish Agency is permitted to spread propaganda, collect funds, prepare armies, and buy ammunition, then the Arabs at least have the right to meet and discuss their plans." Haj Amin al-Husayni was determined that the Arabs should take up arms in the event of the partition of Palestine. There were indications in the fall of 1946 that the Mufti was in touch with the British, and had their tacit consent for his activities. A Lebanese Christian who interviewed him then said that he had never seen the Mufti so pro-British. But the Mufti himself became increasingly discouraged with the situation. He deplored the weakness of the Arab League, blamed King Abdullah for creating dissension among the Arabs by his "Greater Syria" project, and felt that Communist agents had made great inroads in the entire Middle East.

The situation in Palestine grew more tense in 1947. The Mufti, under constant attack from Zionists and unalterably determined to fight the partition of Palestine, travelled to Beirut in October, without a Lebanese visa, to participate in an Arab League meeting called to consider the Palestine problem. At this meeting the Mufti met stiff opposition to his plea that all the Arab countries assist the Palestine Arabs to resist the partition of their country. In December he returned to Cairo. When the actual conflict between the Arabs and the Jews came, dissension and jealousy between the followers of the Mufti and the pro-Hashimite adherents of King Abdullah succeeded in negating much of the Arabs' military power. The Mufti's choice for leader of the Arab army was the Iraqi General Taha al-Hashimi, while the Syrians insisted on Fawzi Qawuqji; thus two commanders took the field at the start of the campaign, and later the situation was further complicated by the insistence of the Egyptians on still a third separate command.

A so-called Palestine Arab Government was set up in Gaza in September 1948, under the protection of the Egyptian Government. The position of President was left vacant, presumably for the Mufti to occupy at a future date. The personnel of the Gaza Government was composed of his followers, and it was believed that the Mufti had had much to do with their choice. If the Gaza Government was intended to rival the Jewish Agency, the Arabs were ambitious. This small group of Palestine Arabs could not in any way compete with the international organization of the Zionists. The Gaza Arab Government existed for a time, on paper only, and then folded its tents. Moreover, the Arabs in Palestine were divided in their allegiance. One group desired to be incorporated into Jordan, while the Mufti's group clung unrealistically to their dream of an independent Palestine Arab state. Gradually the chauvinistic appeal that the Mufti had had lost its attraction for the war-weary Arabs, and the Mufti's influence reached its nadir in the winter of 1948-1949. Haj Amin had alienated King Faruq and the members of the Egyptian Government; he had the support of no great power, he had been unable to weld together even the surrounding Arab countries into any unanimity of action or opinion and he had been unable to proclaim a Jihad.

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In October 1949, Haj Amin went to Saudi Arabia, endeavoring to obtain support from Ibn Sa'ud for the creation of an independent Arab Palestine. Messages from Whitehall were sent to the British Charge in Jidda, instructing him to inform the Saudi Arabian Government that the British Foreign Office did not in any way approve of the Mufti's plan. Shortly after this the Mufti left Jidda in King Ibn Sa'ud's plane on a mission to Damascus. He intended to dissuade the Syrian Government from its rumored project of union with Iraq.

In February 1951, Haj Amin presided over the World Muslim Conference held at Karachi. Although the Conference was unofficial in character, nearly forty delegates from Muslim countries attended. The principal resolution passed by the Conference was that "no power on earth can break the ties which bind the people of Pakistan and Kashmir", and all Muslim countries were to direct their representatives at the UN to support Pakistan's stand on Kashmir. Other resolutions dealt with Palestine, Africa, and Hyderabad, and all stressed the necessity for the cooperation of the Muslim world. From Karachi, Haj Amin went to Kabul in March 1951, where he attempted to resolve Afghan-Pakistan differences on the basis of private informal talks. He apparently hoped to encourage a settlement of the "Pushtoonistan" issue by again using the plea for Islamic unity, insisting that this unity is the only protection of the Muslim world against the evils of Communism. It is believed, however, that Haj Amin's excursion into the affairs of Afghanistan and Pakistan is merely a phase of his most earnest purpose to achieve Muslim unity in order to drive the Zionists out of Palestine.

Latest reports regarding the Mufti indicate that the British Foreign Office would like to effect a rapprochement between Abdullah and Haj Amin, or at least between Abdullah and the followers of Haj Amin, to stabilize and unify the enlarged state of Jordan. Whether such a plan can ever materialize or not, the Mufti is still a power in the Middle East. His small, but well organized group of henchmen penetrate every country in the Muslim world, and the popular appeal of his slogan for Muslim unity cannot be denied, however unrealistic it may appear to be. There is no tangible evidence that he has ever desired Soviet support for his plans, and it is out of character that he ever would. The German Foreign Office could never discern that he strove for anything more than pan-Arab union. While the Zionists consider him slightly worse than Mephistopheles and have used him as a symbol of Nazism, this is false. He cared nothing about Nazism and did not work well with Germans. He regarded them merely as instruments to be used for his own aims.

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April 10, 1951

OLI:BI:EGJackson:grm

Depts

NE - Mr. E. M. Wright (1)
Mr. John A. Waldo (1)

SY - (1)
DRN - (2)

Missions

Tel Aviv	(2)	Baghdad	(1)
Jerusalem	(2)	Karachi	(1)
Amman	(1)	Kabul	(1)
Cairo	(1)		

Others

CIA (2)
CL/BR (2)
ID (5)

ONI - Mr. Bernard Facteau, Rm. 5-C-739, The Pentagon.

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