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B6 2260793 ASR PAGE 001 TOT: 230459Z SEP 86 DIRECTOR 070123

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TO: [] []

WMINTEL [] INTEL []

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND AND REQUIREMENTS FOR [] REGARDING ALBANIA

REF: FR/[] 12773 2108546

1. FOLLOWING HQS AND HQS DISCUSSIONS WITH NEW CASE OFFICER OF [] WE OFFER THE FOLLOWING BACKGROUND AND REQUIREMENTS FOR [] USE WITH HIS ALBANIAN CONTACTS, ESPECIALLY IN THE EVENT OF A VISIT TO ALBANIA.

2. WITH THE DEATH OF LONG-TIME ALBANIAN STRONGMAN ENVER (HOXHA) IN 1985, ALBANIA IS IN THE MIDDLE OF A TRANSITION PERIOD. THE LIMITED INFORMATION WHICH WE HAVE AVAILABLE TO US SUGGESTS THAT ALBANIA IS CONTINUING TO MODIFY SLOWLY ITS LONG-HELD ISOLATIONIST AND OVERLY XENOPHOBIC VIEW VIS-A-VIS THE REMAINDER OF THE WORLD; THIS ACTIVITY CONTINUES EFFORTS BEGUN IN THE LAST DAYS OF THE HOXHA REGIME. THE INTELLIGENCE SIGNALS ARE FAIRLY CLEAR THAT ALBANIA SEEKS IMPROVEMENT WITH AT LEAST SOME OF ITS NEIGHBORS, ESPECIALLY GREECE AND ITALY. (AS THE STATION IS AWARE, RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA REMAIN QUITE STRAINED BECAUSE OF DIFFERENCES OF VIEW OVER THE ALBANIANS LIVING IN THE YUGOSLAV REGION OF KOSOVO, WHICH HAS A VERY SIZABLE ETHNIC ALBANIAN POPULATION. ASIDE FROM ITS IMMEDIATE NEIGHBORS, ALBANIA REPORTEDLY HAS TRIED TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH WEST GERMANY AND FRANCE.) HOXHA WAS REPLACED AS LEADER OF THE ALBANIAN WORKERS' PARTY BY RAMIZ (ALIA), BUT THE CONTINUED POLITICAL PROMINENCE OF HOXHA'S OLD ALLIES AND HOXHA'S WIDOW, NEXHAIJE (HOXHA), SUGGESTS TO SOME OBSERVERS THAT POLICIES OF THE DECEASED LEADER WILL NOT BE DISPOSED OF IN ANY WHOLESALE MANNER; CONTINUED INDICATIONS OF DEMARCHES TO OUTSIDERS ALSO SUGGEST THAT THE POLICIES OF THE FORMER ALBANIA LEADER ARE NOT SACROSANCT, HOWEVER.

3. IT IS AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND THAT CURRENT INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AGAINST ALBANIA MUST BE VIEWED. WHILE THERE ARE OBVIOUS OVERLAPPING OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS IN COLLECTING AGAINST ALBANIA, WE ARE SEPARATING SUGGESTED REQUIREMENTS INTO THE FOLLOWING AREAS:

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A. FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS, WHICH COULD BEST BE ANSWERED BY SENIOR-ECHELON OFFICIALS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OR SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE ALBANIAN PARTY, ESPECIALLY POLITBURO AND SECRETARIAT MEMBERS.

(i). IF ALBANIA IS, IN FACT, SEEKING TO ALTER ITS FOREIGN POLICY BY EXPANDING RELATIONS, WHAT ARE ITS BASIC GOALS AND OBJECTIVES? (FOR EXAMPLE, DOES IT SEEK ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL ASSISTANCE, TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTAL ASSISTANCE, OR POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR SOME REASON? IF THE LATTER, EXPLAIN FULLY. RECALL THAT ALBANIA HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST ACCEPTING FOREIGN CREDITS; ANY INDICATIONS THAT THIS POSITION MIGHT BE CHANGED IS OF INTEREST.)

(ii). WHAT IS THE THINKING OF THE ALBANIAN LEADERSHIP ON EXPANDING RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS OR OTHER EUROPEAN NATIONS, E.G., WEST GERMANY OR FRANCE? (NOTE ALSO THAT ALBANIA AND SPAIN HAVE JUST ESTABLISHED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.) WHAT FACTORS--BOTH POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE--ARE PIVOTAL IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS WITH REGARD TO EACH COUNTRY BEING CONSIDERED FOR EXPANDED RELATIONS? HOW DOES THE ALBANIAN LEADERSHIP RANK OTHER COUNTRIES FOR POSSIBLE EXPANSION OF FOREIGN RELATIONS? AND WHY?

(iii). TO WHAT EXTENT IS ANY SUCH DISCUSSION OF...

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy []
(2)(B) Methods/Sources []
(2)(G) Foreign Relations []

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EXPANDED FOREIGN RELATIONS CAUSING CONTENTION WITHIN THE ALBANIAN LEADERSHIP? WHICH OFFICIAL(S) HAS EMERGED AS PERHAPS CHAMPIONING SUCH A DEMARCHE(S)? AND WHO REPRESENTS THE KEY OPPOSITION?

(IV). TO WHAT EXTENT IS THERE EVIDENCE OF SOVIET MEDDLING IN EFFORTS TO CHANGE ALBANIAN FOREIGN POLICY, AS WELL TO SUPPORT OR TO UNDERMINE THE POSITIONS OF GOVERNMENTAL OR PARTY OFFICIALS INVOLVED IN MATTERS OF KEY CONCERN TO THE SOVIETS? (IT SHOULD BE RECALLED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE LONG COVETED A NAVAL BASE IN ALBANIA WHICH WOULD ALLOW BOTH A STRATEGIC Foothold IN THE MEDITERRANEAN BASIN AS WELL AS A POINT OF POLITICAL LEVERAGE FOR USE AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA.) IDENTIFY THOSE OCCUPYING LEADERSHIP POSITIONS WHO ARE SYMPATHETIC TO THE SOVIETS.

B. INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, WHICH COULD BEST BE ANSWERED BY SENIOR ALBANIAN PARTY OFFICIALS OR GOVERNMENTAL OFFICIALS WITH SENIOR PARTY CONTACTS:

(I). HOW POLITICALLY SOLID IS THE POSITION OF ALBANIAN FIRST SECRETARY ALIA? WHO ARE HIS KEY PARTY AND GOVERNMENTAL SUPPORTERS? TO THE EXTENT THAT ALIA IS STILL CONSOLIDATING HIS POLITICAL POWER AND POSITION, WHAT SENIOR-LEVEL PERSONNEL CHANGES WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT OR PARTY ARE IN THE OFFING? (OR PERHAPS THERE HAVE BEEN SUCH CHANGES WHICH HAVE NOT YET BECOME KNOWN IN THE WEST. NOTE THAT THE ALBANIAN PARTY CONGRESS IS SCHEDULED FOR EARLY NOVEMBER 1986, AND THIS EVENT WOULD LIKELY PROVIDE THE SETTING FOR PERSONNEL CHANGES WHICH ALIA DESIRES TO MAKE.) VIEWED SLIGHTLY DIFFERENTLY, A WELL-SOURCED CHARACTERIZATION OF ALIA'S CURRENT RELATIONS WITH KEY OFFICIALS--E.G., PREMIER ADIL ((CARGANI)), MINISTER OF DEFENSE PROKOP ((MURRA)), MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS HEKURAN ((ISA)), OR OTHER INFLUENTIAL PARTY LEADERS--WOULD BE USEFUL.

(II). WHAT IS THE POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ALIA AND MEKHMIIJE HOXHA?

(III). TO WHAT EXTENT IS THERE ANY "OPPOSITION FACTION" IN ALBANIA AT THIS JUNCTURE? WHO COMPRISES IT? AND WHAT ARE ITS POLITICAL GOALS? ARE CLAN RIVALRIES INVOLVED IN THIS MATTER?

(IV). HOW IMPORTANT A POLITICAL ROLE IS CURRENTLY PLAYED BY THE MILITARY? BY THE INTERNAL SECURITY APPARATUS?

(V). TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE SOVIET UNION--OR ONE OF ITS EASTERN EUROPEAN SURROGATES--ATTEMPTING TO INFLUENCE INTERNAL ALBANIAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS? TO WHAT END(S)?

C. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION, WHICH COULD BEST BE ADDRESSED BY KNOWLEDGEABLE OFFICIALS IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE, MINISTRY OF DOMESTIC TRADE, MINISTRY OF FINANCE, OR SENIOR PARTY OFFICIALS HAVING RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ECONOMIC POLICY-MAKING.

(I). WHO ARE ALBANIA'S PRINCIPAL CURRENT TRADING PARTNERS AND WHAT ARE THE TYPES AND LEVELS OF GOODS BEING TRADED?

(II). WHAT TYPES OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGY DOES ALBANIA SEEK TO ACQUIRE AND FROM WHOM? HOW SUCCESSFUL HAVE THE ALBANIANS BEEN IN FULFILLING THEIR NEEDS/DESIRES?

(III). ANY FIGURES ON THE ALBANIAN TRADE/FINANCIAL SITUATION WOULD BE USEFUL: EXPORT EARNINGS, GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (USUALLY RENDERED AS NATIONAL INCOME IN EASTERN EUROPEAN ECONOMIES), PER CAPITA INCOME.

-----TEAR LINE-----
 FROM: [] DEF QUERY ABOUT ACQUIRING USEFUL INTELLIGENCE FROM [] WE DO NOT [] (EVE (NOR DID WE STATE) THAT IT IS "UNRELIABLE" THAT [] COULD PROVIDE DISSEMINABLE INTELLIGENCE: BASED ON WHAT HE HAS PROVIDED TO DATE, HOWEVER, [] COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS ARE TOO SKETCHY OR REPRESENT BOILERPLATE VIEWS AND THUS ARE OF BACKGROUND INTEREST TO ANALYSTS. FOR EXAMPLE, FOR [] TO STATE THAT THE U.S. IS ATTEMPTING TO DESTABILIZE ALBANIA BEGS THE QUESTION OF SPECIFIC ACTIONS WHICH ARE GENERATING SUCH CONCERNS AMONG THE ALBANIAN LEADERSHIP. ADDITIONALLY, [] COMMENTS ABOUT THE INAUGURATION OF THE ALBANIAN--YUGOSLAV RAIL LINE, WHICH WAS OFFICIALLY OPENED ON 6 AUGUST, CLOSELY PARALLEL PRESS REPORTING AND COMMENTARY ABOUT THIS EVENT. IN SUM, [] COMMENTS HAVE PROVIDED NO TRULY PRIVILEGED INFORMATION ON ALBANIAN DEVELOPMENTS: RATHER, HE IS REINFORCING BASICALLY STANDARD ANALYTICAL VIEWS.

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