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AUTH: CG Third US Army

DATE: 16 July 1945

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
INTELLIGENCE CENTER
APO 403

#882

INTERROGATION REPORT No 18

Interrogation Section

16 July 1945

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1. The W/T Net of Gruppe VI E of the RSHA

(Based on a questionnaire submitted by
SCI, USFET)

~~FOR~~ COORDINATION WITH ^{ed}

Army

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 18

1. The W/T Net of Gruppe VI E of the RSHA

(This report was prepared in answer to a questionnaire submitted by SCI, US Forces, European Theater.)

Preamble. Dr Wilhelm HOEFTL, source for the answers to the questionnaire, has been a member of the SD since 1939. He is an Austrian and a former professor of modern history at the University of WIEN.

He was ousted from his position with the SD Leitabschnitt WIEN at the beginning of 1942, but was recalled by KALTENBRUNNER in February 1943. He became deputy chief of Gruppe VI E of the RSHA, and in March 1944 he was sent to HUNGARY as chief representative of Amt VI and political adviser to Ambassador VEESENHAYER.

Additional information on Amt VI given by HOEFTL has appeared in Third US Army Interrogation Reports Nos 15 and 16, and Third US Army Special Interrogation Report No 1.

Answers to the Questionnaire.

Did the Hauptbeauftragte of a given country always direct the W/T net?

Under the system used in the Southeast (Gruppe VI E), the Hauptbeauftragte always directed the W/T net of his respective country.

The institution of a Hauptbeauftragte dates back to the period when JOST was chief of Amt VI. At this time it had become a standing practice, especially in VI E, to post a Hauptbeauftragte with each country in which an intelligence net was to be operated.

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3. Ant III (Continued)

Occasionally in the General Survey of the Situation in Germany (Reichslagebericht), the most comprehensive report submitted by Ant III, gentle hints were dropped on the subject of "prostitution of the law in GERMANY."

An especially touchy subject was the well-known hobby of HITLER and HIMMLER to all lawyers and everything reminiscent of jurisprudence. Once the results of this stand had to be mentioned even in the cautious reports of Ant III. That was after HITLER's "speech against the lawyers," when the Lagebericht had to touch on the iniquitous failure of all those still engaged in the administration and maintenance of the law.

Generally the Referat committed many sins of omission. Especially the ever-increasing lawlessness, which finally became equivalent to absolute anarchy, was never commented on by this subsection.

THIERACK, the Minister of Justice, as well as FRUEHLER, the president of the People's Court, enjoyed the complete support of Ant III, and that in spite of continuous, strongly negative reports from the agencies collecting information.

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(3) Party

Activities of Referat III A 4, the NSDAP Referat, were surrounded with special secrecy. All intelligence involving party activities had to be kept a strict secret from the Gauleitungen, as well as the superior Party command echelons. The intention behind this activity was of course a supervision of all aspects of Party operations.

Reports were full of indications of unpopularity, inefficiency, and corruption. No action could be taken, however, since such reports could not be transmitted to the proper agencies. Material collected by III A 4 should be of considerable historical interest, however.

b. Gruppe III B

(1) Public Health

The Health-Referat was of no great importance and its personnel of rather poor quality. Reports were of a purely informative nature. Conclusions reached, until the very end, were that the German population in spite of the war and frequent bombings was in an excellent state of health. This was brought out especially in comparative studies with the first World War.

A pet project of III B was the mass X-ray survey (Identifizierungsaussuchung), carried out by Professor HORNBECKER. The good professor had a whole battery of motorized X-ray apparatus under his command and with their aid succeeded in X-raying the whole German population and even large sections of the German minority in the various Balkan countries. His findings were then submitted to the proper Health Office, which could supervise the work of curing the diseases and defects indicated by the X-ray studies. This method proved of great preventive value.

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3. Part III (Continued)

(2) Nationality

(a) Purpose and Guilt

When an allotment of criminal and moral guilt is made among the various sections of the SD, the Referat Nationality (Volksstum) should receive a large share. Behind the harmless title it was responsible for all crimes committed against foreigners within GERMANY and German-occupied EUROPE. This includes treatment of foreigners singly and in national minority groups.

In this field the SD had practically unlimited power, and also a large share of that executive control which is usually attributed to the police sections. The inhuman treatment meted out to national groups, such as Czechs and Poles, was based on recommendations made by the SD Referat, III B. The III B Referate in the various Abschnitte were also entrusted with the determination of national origin (Volksdeutsche).

(b) Applications

The inhuman and brutal application of these doctrines took two specific forms. On one hand we find the enforced extermination of part in national groups (either directly by physical extermination or indirectly by appropriate educational and psychological measures), and on the other hand the forced Germanization of other groups. A large share of the responsibility for all these measures rests with III B.

III B for instance decided, in the field of education, that in so-called "predominantly German" territories, Czech children could attend only grade-schools, while all intermediate and advanced schools were to be visited by Germans only. Conversely the decision as to who was Czech and who was German also rested with III B. These measures were designed to make the reappearance of Czech intellectuals impossible for all times.

We also find that the SD arbitrarily decided that certain families, which had long been absorbed by the Czechs and had accepted Czech nationality, had to move to GERMANY, and were forcibly re-made into Germans.

The SD followed similar lines in questions of the resettlement of minorities along the boundaries of GERMANY. Many sins were committed there as well (for instance, in the resettlement of Slovenes, etc.).

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(c) Results

In the question of the treatment of the slave laborers, III B and Stapo worked hand in hand. Many joint orders of Amt III and IV existed on these questions. Even in counter-intelligence close cooperation prevailed, counter to the usual practices. Many of the under-cover agents among foreigners worked both for Amt III and Amt IV. The *Legenberichte* concerning these topics indicated a perennially intransigent stand.

Strong criticisms of all organizations thinking along different lines was the recurring tenor of these reports. III B demanded a visible differentiation between German and foreign workers and treatment of the latter consistent with their alleged inferiority.

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Ant III (Continued)

When the Deutsche Arbeitsfront (the Nazi trade union) attempted to extend its benefits to foreign laborers, the SD denounced. Even the designation - non-German comrades-in-work (nicht-deutsche Werkkamaraden) - invented by the DaF to raise the morale of the slave laborers, was rejected by the SD.

III B was also the representative of the most radical point of view concerning the children of non-Germans. It was largely due to its insistence that the law concerning compulsory abortions in the case of pregnancy of a female slave-worker, was promulgated.

(3) III B and German Minorities

One of III B's main concerns was the fate of the German minorities in foreign countries. Here the SD worked on the principle that every German, no matter where he found himself, was entitled to preferential treatment as compared to other nationals.

For the future it was planned to create a continuous German strip extending from RUMANIA to the ADRIATIC Sea. This strip of all-German territory was to be the barrier across which no non-German nation could penetrate into the heart of Europe.

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The dislike and hatred of National Socialism and GERMANY evinced recently by many members of Southeastern European States is due to a large extent to an understanding of these imperialistic German aims.

(4) III B vs Amt VI

The strong preoccupation with national minority problems within Amt III can also be traced to a desire on the part of this agency to gain greater influence in foreign countries and on the conduct of German foreign policy. Certain countries, such as those of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, were always claimed by Amt III as belonging within its sector of responsibility. The same holds true for SLOVAKIA, which only very recently was taken over by Amt VI, and with that fell into the realm of foreign political intelligence.

The divergent opinions on these topics, as held by Amt III and VI, gave rise to continuous frictions and conflicts between the two branches of the SD. These frictions sometimes reached serious proportions as in the case of the various Befehlshaber der Sipo and des SD in the territories concerned.

While Amt VI considered all territory outside of the official German border as non-German, regardless of its occupation by German military forces, Amt III held fast to the tenet that HUNGARY, SLOVAKIA, certain parts of JUGOSLAVIA, etc were parts of GERMANY proper (Inland) and therefore falling under its jurisdiction. It therefore organized its intelligence net in these territories similar to its net within GERMANY itself. This of course gave rise to strong protests from the side of Amt VI and finally KALTENBRUNNER was prevailed upon to favor the latter.

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3. Ant III (Continued)

(5) The Men in Charge

The Gruppenleiter of III B, SS Standartenführer Dr. EILICH, was a man utterly without ability. His experience (in medicine without ever having had a practice) either in questions of public health or of medical problems was nil. In spite of his ignorance (or maybe because of it) his is the main responsibility for the crimes mentioned above.

c. Gruppe III C

(1) Extent

This section was indubitably the largest of the whole SD. It was of very great importance, especially during the war and the contingent necessity of preventing a cracking of the home-front. Its exhaustive surveys and reports (Lageberichte) included almost all phases of German life and have reached fantastic proportions.

(2) Efficacy of the SD as an Intelligence Service

Based on the Hauptauftraggen III/1 and III/2 of the SD-Hauptamt, the original purpose of internal intelligence was the uncovering of all the weaknesses, faults, and unexpected and undesirable results of an authoritarian regime. Lacking other means of popular expression and being aware that continued existence hinged on a combination of popularity of the dictatorship and brutal repression of all its opponents, the SD was to provide a means for the attainment of these two ends.

Success could have only come if this information service could not only point out these faults and weaknesses of the system, which made it unpopular, but at the same time could submit, and be assured of their acceptance, suggestions for alleviation of these unpopular measures as well as for other necessary reforms. Such a service could have been constructed properly within the framework of theoretical ideologically consistent Fascism but not of political National Socialism.

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The RSHA provided a level on which the measures of repression could be coordinated and carried out effectively. No similar echelon existed for the constructive part of the program. As a matter of fact very few of the positive suggestions and reforms ever suggested were ever approved by the highest authorities, and fewer still translated into actuality.

At the same time another factor must be considered and that is that strict adherents to a doctrine such as National Socialism cannot allow themselves to be swayed by popular opinion. And with such a static outlook pervading the minds of its officials, the SD could not hope to provide a receptive ear for the likes of the populace.

With these considerations in mind it becomes obvious why the internal SD, and especially III C, in spite of its extensive network and its large number of expert agents never succeeded in actually influencing the life of the German people. Where all decisions are made at the top, a constructive intelligence service is self-destructive and only the repressive aspects of such an agency can be permitted to subsist.

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3. Ant III (Continued)

A large proportion of III C reports were devoted to the ever-increasing educational level of German schools as well as to the ever-increasing amount of juvenile delinquency. This question was treated in detailed reports by all Abschnitte in 1942 under the title "Juvenile delinquency and lowered moral standards in the third year of the war" (Jugendverwahrlosung und sinkende Moral im Dritten Kriegsjahr).

The results of this survey were so damning that III C never did publish the comprehensive report it had planned. It can be imagined that with the further progress of the war conditions became even worse.

Ant III never did approve of the Hitler Youth movement and the doctrine represented by it of education by youth of the same age as those to be educated. The constant criticism of the HJ was the cause of ever-deteriorating relations between leaders of this movement and the SD and with it of the SS in general.

(5) Customs

Even after the outbreak of war, the SD still continued to give support to all engaged in the perpetuation of ancient customs. The Referat Volkskultur, concerned itself with all societies and clubs engaged in the practice and preservation of ancient customs and costumes.

(6) Spiritual Aid

Another separate Referat dealt with spiritual help to the population (Seelische Betreuung). Its main activities were directed against the DAF and the KdF Program (Strength through Joy), mainly at subordinate levels.

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(7) Press and Propaganda

Of special importance during wartime was the field of activity concerned with questions of press and propaganda. This sector was one of the most extensive concerns of the SD. Its apparatus was so large and so well organized that reaction to all measures of German and allied propaganda could be gauged almost instantaneously.

The main customer for reports of this sort was to be found in GOEBBELS and his Propaganda Ministry. He has been reported as having said upon several occasions that his work would have been impossible without the efficient service of the SD. In reality he paid very little attention to the findings of the SD and continued to conduct propaganda exactly as he pleased.

Still the information service in this Referat was excellent. The chief, SS Sturmbannfuhrer von KIELPINSKI, ran his organization like an efficiently-run newspaper of major importance and his results were accordingly good.

His influence was greatest in the field of the official weekly newspaper (Deutsche Wochenschau), put out by the Propaganda Ministry. But even here his influence was only short-lived. In 1944 an ordinance appeared stating that henceforth only positive criticism could appear from the press and propaganda Referat.

The Gruppenleiter III C, SS Standartenfuhrer in STETTIN, was a man of somewhat retiring demeanor, but with the soul of a fanatic. The position and measures taken by his Gruppe are his complete responsibility.

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3. Part III (Continued)

(3) Science

The Referat Science (Wissenschaft) had no constructive functions. Again it was only concerned with the effects of laws and ordinances as far as these concerned science and learning. Under consideration here was of course not objective science, but the bastard brood of 100 percent National Socialist Science. All attempts of German science however feeble to loosen the shackles met with the strictest opposition in the reports of III C.

Of the greatest importance for German science was the fact that III C had a great deal of influence in the selection of university professors. The appointment of all instructors, associates, and professors had to be approved first by III C. In this fashion the strictest control could be maintained and it was insured that only fanatical Nazis were appointed to these positions.

In problems concerning students, closest cooperation existed between III C and the NS Studentenbund (Nazi Student's League). This friendly relation was to a large extent due to the influence of the head of the Studentenbund, Dr SCHEEL, who at the same time was a member of the SD.

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(4) Education and Religious Life

The juxtaposition of education and religious life (Erziehung und religiöses Leben) within one of the Referate of III C did not make for homogeneity of subject. The religious life part of it was added only recently.

Before fall 1943 there existed a special Referat for church affairs (Kirchenreferat) which, however was transferred to the Stapo Amt at that time. The following year showed that under the new system the churches would be treated only from a police point of view, and no intelligence would be forthcoming from them.

Therefore a new Referat III C 5 was created in 1944, to take charge of the intelligence aspects of the problem, while all other considerations connected with religion came under the jurisdiction of III C 4, the Erziehungsreferat.

On questions of church problems, III C has always been completely intolerant, radical, and completely anti-religious. For once the SDs found common ground with the Party Chancery. HOLMANN and his adviser on church affairs, Ministerialrat Dr KRUGER, were of an opinion similar to that of III C.

III C made determined attempts to support all trends promising to take the place of the established churches and their services. Questions of neo-pagan festivals (harvest-thanksgiving celebrations - Erntedankfest; solstice celebrations - Sonnenwendfeiern, et al) received serious consideration and whole-hearted support. The Catholic Mass was to be replaced by a so-called morning-devotional (Morgengebeter).

Educational problems were further sub-divided into the sectors School and Hitler Youth (Schule und Hitlerjugend). An interesting point came up with the proposed introduction all over GERMANY of the Austrian-type Hauptschule instead of the Prussian Mittelschule. The former left a certain possibility for individual education, while the latter was the prototype of the strict, disciplined, mass institution, with military flavor. The SD of course favored the latter.

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3. Ant III (Continued)

d. Gruppe III D

(1) Field of action

III D was second only to III C in size. The field of economic intelligence had always been the personal province of GEBELER, the Chief of Ant III. His Gruppenleiter III D (SS Sturmbannführer) SEIBERT was an absolute zero and so he continued to exercise effective control over this sector until the end.

His organization was very extensive, especially on the lower levels (Abschnitte) and thus III D had its informants and agents in every single cranny of German economic life. The information reaching III D about German economic life was both profound and sound.

OHLENDORF, as was common within the SD, used the influence gained thereby for the enhancement of his personal power and glory. It was, however, unavoidable that in its control over German economic life the SD as well should gain in stature.

(2) First Nexus of SD and State

This was not so noticeable in the Ministry of Armaments (SPINDL) or the Ministry of Agriculture (BACKE), but became very pronounced in the Economic Ministry (FUNK). Here OHLENDORF was engaged in a systematic campaign, and finally even managed to become Secretary of State HEYLER's second in command.

This was the first case of an SD official gaining an important post within the machinery of the State proper. How such the enormous organization of the SD, especially in this field, aided him in the fulfillment of his official duties is difficult to judge. Generally OHLENDORF was liable to place his personal advantage in the foreground. Also it is hard to see what positive action he could have taken on the many reports criticizing the pitiful state of German economy.

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e. Gruppe III G

III G (Gesellschaftsnachrichtendienst - society intelligence service) was formed to provide intelligence by employing persons in "high society."

There were absolutely no factual justifications for the creation of this Gruppe in 1944. There already existed a section within Amt VI (VI Kult) with similar aims, and in Amt IV the Nachrichten or N-Referat fulfilled the same functions. The real reason for the creation of the new agency was once again an attempt by Amt III to gain some influence on foreign affairs.

At first III G, which originally had been called III N, was small. It was intended to be a trial balloon to test the reaction of Amt IV and VI. When these agencies chose to merely ignore an attempt which they considered childish and ridiculous, Amt III misconstrued their reaction as an indication of future non-interference and commenced to really start its enterprise in great style. Each Abschnitt was staffed with a Referent for III G. The aid of Referenten on other III topics was enlisted in order to obtain as large a number of contacts as possible. Still the expected results were not forthcoming.

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3. Ant III (Continued)

There were numerous reasons for this state of affairs. The leadership was incompetent. The opportunities were small. In 1944 GERMANY had almost no direct contact with the rest of EUROPE. The number of persons traveling into foreign countries from GERMANY was getting smaller. Similarly, fewer and fewer foreigners came to visit GERMANY. Thus opportunities to enlist members of International Society and similar groups (the purpose of the Referat) were few and far between.

VI Kult was suffering under similar disadvantages but at least, due to the excellent foreign information service of Amt VI, all persons travelling into Germany from foreign countries were known and could thus be tapped for intelligence purposes.

The chief of III G, SS Sturmbannfuhrer Dr WEGENER, an officer of mediocre ability, brought no qualification of background to his position. His right hand and driving force, SS Hauptsturmfuhrer GERN, was at best a second-rate confidence man.

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f. Evaluation of Results Achieved

(1) The Lageberichte

If an appreciation of the importance and influence of Art III on the conduct of German affairs is desired, the question of quality and objectivity of reports submitted looms large. The institution of the so-called Lageberichte dates back to the period immediately following the outbreak of the war. The Abschnitte were ordered at that time to submit a daily survey of the situation in their sector to the NSHQ at BERLIN. Later the periods elapsing between reports was extended considerably.

(2) Objectivity of Spot Reports

Those reports, based on the intelligence gathered by the Ausstellungen (smallest SD unit), and on information gleaned from the agents under the direct control of the Referent at Abschnitt-level, generally gave an absolutely correct and objective picture of the situation. This was true in the beginning, at least.

(3) Changes at the lower level

Later on some experienced Referenten learned that their objective reports never reached publication in their original form, but were changed, toned down, and made more palatable to those in power. Some of the Referenten therefore resigned themselves to the fact that truth was not wanted and so started to color their own reports and changed the trend of their recommendations. In this fashion they saved their superiors the trouble of having to do so later on.

Others reacted in exactly the opposite manner. Realizing that their reports would be toned down, no matter what they wrote, they decided to paint things blacker than they really were. Thus, they argued, even after the usual change at the next echelon enough of the truth would remain to provide an approximation to reality.

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B. Amt. III (Continued)

GOEBBELS and BORMANN evinced the most interest for these reports. They at least received them without any sections having been cut out. There even existed a liaison officer of the Wehr with BORMANN, one SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Lt Justus BEYER. His influence with BORMANN was non-existent.

(8) Fundamental Difficulties

A further important disadvantage can be found in the overdeveloped centralization of the Nazi State. Instead of allotting sufficient power to the Abschnittsleiter, so that certain hard to settle cases could be settled right then and there, everything had to go through the Wehr. Usually that was the end of the problem, but in some cases the difficulty simply disappeared while going through channels.

In the few cases where a decision was hard to come, for example involving the Gauleiter, the latter blamed the Abschnittsleiter for being bawled out and for all other difficulties, and his relation with the SD officer deteriorated even further. If there were any complaints from the Gauleiter, however, HEYDRICH simply used to fire his Abschnittsleiter.

KALTENBRUNNER followed a different line: He instructed his subordinates to establish good relations with the Gauleiter, at all costs, in order to be able to gain advantage of him at a later date (Im einzusitzen).

Certain special reports, usually classified Geheim Reichssache and with a very small distribution were slightly more successful. These reports were usually in the form of a memorandum, and KALTENBRUNNER usually did everything in his power to insure their receipt by the desired person (usually HITLER).

Another factor which must not be forgotten is the inadequacy of the human material involved. Most SD officers were young functionaries without the detachment and background necessary for the efficient conduct of an intelligence service.

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(9) Conclusions

Some of the results deriving from the factors discussed above have already been discussed. As a final conclusion one might say that not III had the inherent capability of serving as an instrument of collecting objective and factual intelligence as well as of evaluating and utilizing this intelligence effectively. The reasons preventing it from ever assuming that function, however, were stronger by their very nature than those favoring that development.

To put the same conclusion slightly differently: under the National Socialist regime some of the faults inherent in this regime made the collection and evaluation of objective internal intelligence as well as its utilization impossible. The most important of these reasons was the fact that such a service would carry in it the seed of its destruction (which leads to the discovery that effective internal intelligence in all its aspects is only possible under a system very far removed ideologically from the Nazi State. It would be idle to ask whether such a state would have any need of an effective internal intelligence service).

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Ant III (Continued)

(4) Coloring by Indoctrination

Such measures, of course, detracted from the objectivity of the Lage-berichte as handed down by the Abschmitte. As a rule, however, these reports still gave a correct estimate of the situation. This holds true only of the purely informative part of the report, the so-called morale report (Stimmungsbericht). The second part, dealing with suggestions and recommendations was no longer objective.

In conferences, directives, and by all other means, the various Referenten had been indoctrinated with official doctrine. Anything that did not meet with the full approval of the present line of Ant III had no chance of acceptance. Especially during HEIMLICH's reign no voices of opposition were suffered in the organization. Thus robbed of all individuality, Referenten became no more than mouthpieces for official Ant III policy.

(5) Muzzling to prevent offense to the highly

An added difficulty of great import was the fact that reports against leading personalities of the Reich or criticism of measures effected by them necessarily indicated the person under consideration. Officially no names were mentioned, but it was only too obvious who was meant at all times. But among the personalities leading HITLER's GERMANY, there was not one of sufficient stature to be able to bear criticism of his person.

Obviously the RSHA was in no position to change matters any. For that reason all reports had to go through HEIMLICH's hands. HEIMLICH as the supreme chief of all intelligence services then would have had the duty to inform HITLER, the final authority, of all short-comings of the system uncovered by this intelligence service.

But HEIMLICH was not the man to risk an open break with anybody who still had some vestige of power. Therefore no reports against leading personalities ever penetrated beyond HEIMLICH, unless it was for his own purposes.

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(6) HIMMLER takes a Hand

HIMMLER's strong adherence to certain prejudices was well known. It did not pay to annoy an opinionated boss with such power. Thus few reports ever left the RSHA without bearing the indirect but ever present imprint of HIMMLER's personality and ideas, even before reaching his exalted presence.

But even those few objective reports which went through the mill of the RSHA unscathed never created as much of a stir in official circles. They found their final resting place in HIMMLER's desk. They might be used for some future intrigue, but to accomplish the thing for which they were intended - very rarely indeed.

(7) Dissemination

All Lageberichte, provided they did not implicate any leading personalities, were sent to all Ministers, all Reichsleiter of the Party, and most other officials of equal rank. They were no longer objective in the least, and simply reproduced official policy in most cases. Even here enough of the truth remained to make them uncomfortable reading for some. Goebbels III resorted to the device of leaving out of the appropriate report all sections even vaguely connected with the Minister or official to whom a particular copy was sent.

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4. Ant IV (Continued)

Without any moral scruples, even without any conception of moral values, cunning to the point of brilliance, with socialist leanings and definite pathological tendencies, he was the prototype of the Gestapo man. He succeeded in eliminating from the leadership of the Stapo anybody who could possibly provide cause for conflicts. At the same time he succeeded in completely losing HIMMLER, to whom he bore a definite resemblance in his character.

d. Organization of Ant IV

Organizationally Ant IV was of slightly different structure than the other Acenter of the RSHA. It consisted of only three Gruppen - A, B, and C. Under the Gruppen there were subdivisions called Abteilungen, which were then followed by the usual Referate. The inclusion of Abteilungen within the organizational scheme has been attempted in other Acenter, but had never been officially adopted there.

5. Ant V

The Ant controlling the activities of the Criminal Police (Kripo) never became a full-fledged member of the Security Services of the State. It was mainly concerned with routine processing of criminal investigation. Although its members had been taken over into the SS and it had officially been made part of the Stapo in connection with HIMMLER's complete control of all police services, the amount of actual penetration remained slight. Especially in the lower levels the Kripo was still a police organization to the exclusion of all other tendencies.

There was a certain amount of cooperation between Ant IV and Ant V at intermediate and high echelons but until the end almost no connection existed between Ant V and the two SD Acenter.

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6. Ant VI

d. Early History (Foreign Intelligence under JOST)

(1) The Beginning

The beginnings of a political intelligence service outside the confines of GERMANY can be traced back to 1937. In this year Ant III of the SD Hauptamt began the establishment of an information net in various countries of South-Eastern EUROPE, as well as in CZECHOSLOVAKIA and AUSTRIA.

(2) Two Patterns

At that time SS Brigadefuehrer JOST was Chief of Ant III, while the newly formed Hauptabteilung III/3, charged with foreign intelligence, came under the command of Er FILBERT. His name is intimately connected with almost all phases of German intelligence operations during this first period.

Work in AUSTRIA and CZECHOSLOVAKIA was not organized according to a strict and uniform pattern, while activities in the other countries were planned according to a scheme which was to retain its validity for many years, in spite of many defects and shortcomings.

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4. Ant IV (formerly SD Hauptamt Gestapo)

a. Stapo Membership and Party Affiliation

Ant IV was by far the most dreaded section of the whole IGHA. As the high Command of the Stapo (Secret Police) its reputation inside and outside of Germany was probably the worst of all the institutions of the National Socialist State. It is a paradox, however, that originally its members were by no means selected for their adherence to the ideological tenets of Nazism.

On the contrary, the number of so-called elite recruits within the ranks, as well as former members of the para-military organizations of the NSDAP, such as SS, SA, NSKK, etc was comparatively small. This was changed only when all its officials were taken over into the SS in line with HIMMLER's attempts of complete SS domination of all police services.

b. Quality of Work performed

Nor did the Gestapo, contrary to popular belief, work particularly efficiently as a secret police. The former Austrian Secret Police, which was absorbed almost fully into Stapostelle WTM was a much more efficient organization.

The reason for the Gestapo's peculiar effectiveness must be sought in the type of personnel it employed. The average Stapo official was below average in intelligence, but endowed with cunning and filled with boundless brutality. Quite a few of this number were men with criminal or pathological records or tendencies.

All of them were united in the desire to be the willing tools of the state and to engage in the suppression and complete elimination of all opposition tendencies. The fact that the state happened to be a National Socialist one was purely incidental. They would have served any other master with the same loyalty, using the same means, as long as it would have given them the same power of life and death over the average citizen.

Of course National Socialism was particularly fitted to produce that atmosphere of utter lawlessness and all-pervading fear which made the Secret Police thrive and perpetuated its reputation.

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c. MUELLER, Typical Gestapo Man

All these tendencies can be easily observed by a consideration of Amt IV's last chief, SS Gruppenfuehrer MUELLER. With an undistinguished background, he had been a small official within the Bavarian Political Police, when somehow HEYDRICH's attention was directed to the little man. HEYDRICH, certain that here was a man who would do his bidding, took him to BERLIN with him.

He rose steadily and finally became the successor of Dr DEST, the previous head of the Stapo under HEYDRICH. While the Hungarian was still alive, MUELLER was his closest confidant and most willing creature. With his death he assumed complete control over his organization and succeeded in modeling it completely after his own ideas.

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6. Art VI (Continued)

The Hauptvertrauensleute in the other countries of the European SOUTH-EAST were not of such high caliber. Yet, during this time of easy military victories, even comparative bunglers at the game succeeded in working successfully in the lush field of the German-controlled Balkans.

Many German firms attempted to branch out into the SOUTH-EAST during this period and their activities provided added backdrops for intelligence operations.

A less far-reaching apparatus of high quality had been set up by the SD Leitabschnitt WIEN, which also controlled certain information-gathering activities in SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE in that period.

This uncoordinated and un-authorized activity was looked upon askance by the central office in BERLIN, and after the personnel changes in fall 1941, the net which had been established from WIEN was smashed by the appropriate Laendergruppe.

(b) Near East and RUSSIA.

Intelligence operations in the Near East were of minor importance at that time. Only when this region became the focal point of military operational planning and concrete preparations for moves in this area had been made by the General Staff did intelligence activities swing into high gear. Work against SOVIET RUSSIA had top priority.

The Gruppenleiter, Dr GRAEFE, with the RUSSLAND Referat SS Stabschef-fuehrer Dr HENGELHAUPT, had met with good initial successes in his work and had managed to establish several intelligence lines with contacts in the interior of the SOVIET UNION. This constituted a rather remarkable achievement, since only a year previously, at a meeting between SD and Abwehr representatives in PRAGUE, the observation had been made that not a single source of information within the USSR was available to the German intelligence services.

This prompted total intensification of effort, since, at that time (late 1940-early 1941), the military High Command needed certain information for their operational plans which could only be obtained through secret sources. In the SOUTH of the USSR, especially the UKRAINE, the VI Referat of the Leitabschnitt WIEN, had succeeded in establishing certain contact, with HUNGARY and RUMANIA as bases.

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(3) Progress to the Half Way Mark

The following paragraphs will attempt a rough survey of the state of German foreign intelligence operations as of fall 1941, the date of JOST's removal. These activities had come under Gen. VI since 1939 and can only be discussed very incompletely here. Several items in comparison between the work done under JOST and the completely different activities under SCHELLENBERG at a later date might be of certain interest.

(a) SOUTH-EAST

The greatest progress had been made in work in SOUTH-EAST EUROPE where all the prerequisites for successful operations could be found. Of added advantage was the fact that almost all these countries had come under German control or direct German influence and that therefore they proved sufficiently tractable, especially during this period of German military ascendancy.

Among the Balkan countries ROMANIA had risen already to the distinction of providing the most fertile ground for intelligence purposes. Here the very able SS Hauptsturmführer von BOLLINGBACH controlled operations in his capacity as Hauptvertrauensmann. He was ably assisted and later succeeded by the equally qualified SS Hauptsturmführer ADLER (now in Allied hands). BOHLSCHLINGH was removed at the instigation of the Foreign Office after the attempted revolt of the Iron Guard. Laboring under the disadvantage of having a mind and opinions of his own he suffered the usual fate, was degraded, and remained incarcerated for several months, as prisoner of the Stapo.

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(c) FAR EAST

No attempt had been made to prepare the ground for intelligence operations in the Far East while this would have still been possible. Therefore the accomplishment of this task, when required, was faced with insurmountable obstacles. It would have been necessary to operate across a part of the world controlled either by the Russian or the English enemy. To make things even worse the police attaché at TOKYO, SS Sturmbannführer MEISINGER, turned out to be a complete failure.

(d) SOUTH

There were absolutely no operations directed at the South of EUROPE. Here Amt VI was strictly limited by an order from HITLER stating that all espionage activity in the country of the Italian ally was prohibited. This also precluded all chances of penetrating into NORTH AFRICA. Only with the German move into TUNIS was this situation changed and an Einsatzkommando dispatched.

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6. Ant VI (Continued)

JOST and FILBERT—then Gruppenleiter VI A and JOST's closest collaborator and the most able man in the section as well as Obersturmbannführer VOLLHEIM, Gruppenleiter VI C, and another SS officer were accused of having accepted bribes. This trumped-up charge was used to remove them from office. JOST, after a long investigation, was found guilty and relieved in October 1941.

b. Ant VI under SCHELLENBERG

(1) SCHELLENBERG appears

(a) Background

JOST's removal had been planned by HEYDICH and had been expected for a long time previously. Shortly before, HEYDICH had placed SS Sturmbannführer SCHELLENBERG, one of his trusted underlings, into Ant VI as JOST's deputy. SCHELLENBERG had come from Ant IV (Stapo), where as Gruppenleiter IV E he had gained quite a reputation. Only thirty years old and of comparatively low rank, he had risen to great prominence and had become MUELLER's unofficial deputy.

This position had been founded on SCHELLENBERG's famous exploit known as the VENLO affair. In the course of this enterprise SCHELLENBERG and some officers of Ant VI had succeeded in kidnapping the two chief agents of the British Secret Service in HOLLAND (BEST and STEVENS) and in abducting them across the border into GERMANY.

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(b) Plans and Personality

SCHELLENBERG's posting to Amt VI marked a complete change in direction for this agency and it became obvious that JOSEF's days as its head were numbered. To fully understand the growth of Amt VI under SCHELLENBERG a comprehension of his personality is necessary.

He did not belong to the alte Kämpfer. He joined the NSDAP and SS at a relatively late date. He received his start as a subordinate HGO in Amt I in the personnel section. With a keen understanding of the potentialities of this section he knew how to place himself in the foreground and soon HEYDRICH's watchful eye had become aware of the young man.

The latter soon accepted SCHELLENBERG into his inner circle, in order to, as he put it, "train the youngster himself." The human relationship between the two became ever closer, SCHELLENBERG became one of HEYDRICH's most trusted confidants.

The boss also introduced his new protegee into the circle of his family, where SCHELLENBERG soon so ingratiated himself, that everybody expected him to marry HEYDRICH's widow (after the latter's assassination). But by then SCHELLENBERG had become far too clever. A dead HEYDRICH was no longer of any interest to him.

To fathom SCHELLENBERG's true character is not very easy. It is certain that he was driven by an all-consuming ambition. He did not hesitate to climb over the dead bodies of his adversaries and even of his friends, as long as this way led towards his goal. Concepts such as friendship, honesty, or sincerity were unknown ideals to him. Nor did he expect them from others.

On the other hand, as far as his personal life is concerned, he was utterly beyond reproach. His manner of life was almost that of an ascetic. He neither drank nor smoked, and worked twenty hours straight for days on end.

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6. Ant VI (Continued)

(e) WEST

In the West of EUROPE certain good work had been done. The occupation of FRANCE, HOLLAND, and BELGIUM simplified matters and provided new bases for future operations. This period was, however, comparatively rich in jurisdictional disputes between Ant VI, which insisted on its mission of controlling all political intelligence work, and certain local Sige agencies which did not wish to cede this prerogative.

Work of very high quality emanated from SPAIN and PORTUGAL, including TANGIER, where opportunities abounded at that time.

(f) NORTH

Results from the Scandinavian countries were not of such high level. Occupation of NORWAY and DENMARK did not bring with it a substantial improvement.

(g) US and UK

Intelligence operations outside of EUROPE had just begun. No results had come from NORTH AMERICA yet, while rather solid spade-work had been done in SOUTH AMERICA. Ant VI never succeeded in penetrating the UK proper.

(h) SWITZERLAND

Due to its unique geographical and political position, SWITZERLAND became a hotbed of intelligence operations. Nevertheless the net established by Ant VI was not of a very good quality. Exceptionally good work and connections were established by SS Hauptsturmführer GROEBL, then VI Referent at SD Abschnitt INNSBRUCK (later Hauptvertrammensmann ITALY). These activities were on his own hook and not with displeasure at the BERLIN office.

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(i) Conclusions

In concluding it may be said that as a general political information and intelligence service the SD at that time (approximately two years after the outbreak of the war) was a failure. It did not meet even the minimum requirements of the political or military high command.

On the other hand it must be said, that, contrary to popular belief, the German authorities did not then, or at any other time, particularly care for or appreciate the work done by this service. Certain agencies such as the Foreign Office, actually (if usually surreptitiously) sabotaged the intelligence services wherever and whenever possible. A further drawback was the fact that HEYDRICH considered evaluation of reports and their final dissemination his exclusive province. He failed to transmit certain important reports if these, for some reason or other, did not agree with his ideas.

(i) JOST and cohorts

Chief of Amt VI at that time, JOST was the personification of the "little man" and did not possess the stature necessary for the execution of the tasks required of him. He was easily influenced and his office was actually run by a small circle of close collaborators, whose prime consideration was their own importance and who were beset by professional jealousy. As a man he was absolutely straight, even probably too decent for a job such as his. Ironically enough, his downfall was caused by an accusation of personal dishonesty.

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6. Arit VI (Continued)

But he did succeed in bringing all the other sections of the Abwehr under his control, for the newly-created Amt III under Oberst HANSEN was practically under his own personal command. It probably would have taken years and not months to weld effectively the Abwehr and the political intelligence service together. The Abwehr had a great deal more personnel, and was disorganized, unwieldy, and difficult to control.

It is to SCHELLENBERG's credit as an executive that he managed to effect what measures of unification and control he did in so short and difficult a period.

(b) Removal of HANSEN

According to his own statement, he never trusted HANSEN. He saw in him an awkward competitor who would interfere with the achievement of his aims sooner or later. It is not so certain, however, that he saw through HANSEN completely.

SCHELLENBERG was certainly beset by suspicions long before 20 July 1944 and stated his opposition and dislike of HANSEN publicly before that time. The latter of course reciprocated these feelings most heartily. He would have certainly delighted in the planned liquidation of SCHELLENBERG in the course of the 20 July Revolt.

But SCHELLENBERG was on his guard, and even during the most critical hours he managed to keep a clear head and turn things to his own advantage. And at that he was anything but heroic. But by playing his cards right, he succeeded in arresting HANSEN (instead of, as it had been planned, the other way around) and to add spice to his triumph he followed this by the arrest of Admiral CANARIS.

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(1) SCHELLENBERG in Complete Control

After those experiences he never trusted anybody in Amt III who could possibly become dangerous to him. Of the old guard he only kept Oberst i G OHLETZ in his position, for he knew that in spite of doubtful ability, the latter would cheerfully do his bidding.

All the other survivors of 20 July, such as Oberstleutnant i G KLEYN-STUEBEN, never succeeded in gaining their chief's confidence. He removed them from their posts and dispatched them to agencies in the field. But now SCHELLENBERG had reached the threshold of his power. Now he was chief of the complete political and military foreign intelligence service. It now remained to reorganize this service according to his own plans.

c. Final Organization of Amt VI

(1) Gruppe VI A (Administration and Organization)

(a) Functions

The idea of this section originating with Dr FILBERT, who had already prepared the structure in somewhat similar form. After a period of inefficient and incapable management, SCHELLENBERG decided to call in a man who had made a reputation for himself in Amt I.

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6. Ant VI (Continued)

SCHELLENBERG was beyond any doubt the most capable of all the section chiefs in the NSHA. In some respects, such as his knowledge and appreciation of the human character, he was even the superior of KALTENBRUNNER, his chief.

SCHELLENBERG had one goal in mind from the very beginning: he wanted to become the head of the German intelligence service, but of an intelligence service of his own making and one that was to include all ramifications of his own ideas. To further this end he dedicated all his restless energy and sacrificed his health and his private happiness. It was as if he had become the personification of this idea. That in spite of all this he did not succeed can not be blamed on him. He failed because of the human inadequacy of his collaborators and the lack of understanding of his superiors.

(2) Ant VI Before the End

It would be beyond the framework of this report to discuss in detail all the various stages of development which Ant VI was subjected to under SCHELLENBERG. Only a survey of the organization immediately before the collapse will be given below. There is only one phase which will be given consideration in detail: the incorporation of the military intelligence service and the role played by SCHELLENBERG in this enterprise.

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(a) Absorption of Abwehr

It had always been HEYDRICH's great and undying ambition to obtain control over the Abwehr. In the same process he wanted to destroy its chief, Admiral CANARIS, whom he had always regarded as the personification of the military's hate against his person, his SD, and his secret office. SCHELLENBERG became his trusted helpmate in these designs. As a matter of fact it can be said that the latter really was the spiritus rector of the scheme, for no one but he could work so unflinchingly and with the steely determination necessary for carrying out this idea.

SCHELLENBERG had been collecting damning evidence against the Abwehr and against CANARIS and with HEYDRICH's death he decided to place all this evidence at HEYDRICH's successor's disposal. One can not be sure whether he really believed in this assertion, but he gave KATTEBACH to understand that the British Secret Service had managed to penetrate the highest councils of the Abwehr, supposedly with CANARIS's tacit approval. It now behooved him to back up these accusations with more concrete proof, since only certain circumstantial evidence had come to light so far.

His opportunity came when several Abwehr agents in TURKEY, who had been suborned by the British, officially switched their allegiance in favor of the Allies. With this material KATTEBACH succeeded in forcing CANARIS' removal and the creation of a unified German Secret Service (einheitlicher deutscher geheimer Waffendienst) under his command.

Now SCHELLENBERG's hour had struck and he readily proved himself adequate for the task of supervising the transfer and unification. He emerged victorious from the fight against MUELLER (head of Amt IV) who claimed large parts of Abwehr for his section. He had to agree to a certain compromise by which a part of III F—the only part of Abwehr so treated — came under the jurisdiction of Amt IV, 1031a.

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6. Ant VI (Continued)

As a Leitabschnittsfuehrer at STUTTGART for many years he and his VI Referent had managed to create a number of information channels to FRANCE and SWITZERLAND. Through this work he had come in actual contact with some of the problems of Western EUROPE and for this reason it did not take him long to grasp the essence of his new position in spite of his late arrival at Ant VI (1943).

(b) FRANCE

Gruppe VI B's intelligence net in FRANCE was excellent, but only prior to and during the German occupation of this country. In VICHY the Gruppe had Dr REICHELT, a very able man, as their representative. The chief agent stationed in PARIS was SS Standartenfuehrer BICKLER. He was very gifted and probably the greatest expert on French affairs in GERMANY. He had been born in ALSACE, had been the lawyer of HOOS, the leader of the Alsatian autonomy movement who had been executed by the French.

After the occupation of FRANCE, HITLER ordered him into the Waffen SS since he had his own opinion about GERMANY's policy towards FRANCE and made no bones about his convictions. He then came to the SD and became a very valuable man, in spite of having no particular ability for pure intelligence work.

But his profound knowledge of French affairs and his clear realization of GERMANY's mistakes in her dealings with FRANCE soon made him the most important expert on FRANCE in all of the NSDA. As could be expected his plans for a more reasonable policy towards FRANCE were not approved and so he found himself more and more in opposition. Exhaustive reports (Grossberichte) prepared by him were forwarded to HITLER, but did not cause any appreciable results.

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6. Act VI (Continued)

The different organization in AUSTRIA and CZECHOSLOVAKIA can be explained by the fact that operations there were entrusted to the indigenous Nazi or pro-Nazi parties, which frequently had a structure reminiscent of the NSDAP in GERMANY.

Intelligence organizations in other countries were usually activated as follows: an attempt was made to enlist the services of a thoroughly versed expert in the affairs and history of the country in for collaboration. This man usually had the complete confidence of Act III, and generally also was a member of the SS.

The operative was then dispatched to the country where he was to operate, with the title of Hauptvertrauensmann (chief confidential agent). His activities were camouflaged by the device of sending him in the guise of a businessman employed by the local branch of a German business establishment.

This method soon became stereotyped, and the usual mistake of always following the same pattern was made here as elsewhere German intelligence operations. Thus certain firms which were used for this purpose soon suffered under the reputation of being nothing more than cover agencies of the German secret service. (This disadvantage became especially acute since the Abwehr showed a similar lack of imagination and used the services of the identical enterprises).

Firms, such as the large house of SCHENKER & Co, the German Luftansa, the foreign branch offices of the Reichsbahn, and the offices of certain steamship lines, soon became known all over the world, and especially in the Balkans and the Near East as the centers of the German intelligence service.

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(c) SPAIN and PORTUGAL

The organization set up by VI B in SPAIN had become static and more or less inactive. A similar state of affairs existed in PORTUGAL. The man entrusted with its operation, a so-called police liaison officer (Polizeiverbindungs-fuehrer) - not a Police Atache since the Portuguese had not accredited such a position at the Embassy - proved completely incapable. He was a pure policeman with no ability or interest in intelligence work.

Furthermore work in all of the Iberian Peninsula, as well as at TANGIER suffered under ever increasing pressure from the side of the allies. SPAIN and PORTUGAL were asked to expell the German intelligence agents, some of whom had become rather well known through their activities.

STEINLE was also charged with command over Gruppe Mil B. This section controlled the intelligence network of the former Abwehr in SPAIN and PORTUGAL. This net was comparatively large but of poor quality. A reorganization of the KO in both countries had been planned and the first steps had already been taken and new operatives sent to the scene.

(d) SWITZERLAND

Not much progress had been made in SWITZERLAND. The Hauptvertrauensmann, SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Hans DUEFFELDT (captured), ex-attachee as Vice Consul at LAUSANNE, proved to be an absolute nincompoop. The Swiss Referat therefore only continued its existence because of a line operated by SCHELLENDENBEG himself, which produced excellent results. The Militaerisches Amt had suffered a very serious setback in SWITZERLAND. It had lost (in connection with the 20 July plot) the services of its most capable representative, Prince AUERSPERG. AUERSPERG had been displaced as the assistant air attache at BERNE.

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6. Amt VI (Continued)

As an expert for organizational and efficiency problems, SS Sturmbannfuhrer Dr SANLBERGER had become as famous as he had become feared. After his stay with Amt I he had served as assistant to the Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, ITALY, and then joined Amt VI. SANLBERGER was certainly very able and exceedingly ambitious but as Gruppenleiter VI A, he continued making his old mistake of over-organizing everything.

Gruppe VI A offered ample opportunity for this weakness. All the organizational plans for Amt VI originated with this Gruppe. Their schematic diagrams always represented some future ideal and never corresponded to the actual state of affairs. Otherwise SANLBERGER ran his show very efficiently. He managed to have his way in conflicts with other sections about personnel questions. The not inconsiderable foreign and domestic funds under his control (he was also in charge of the Kassenabteilung for the whole of Amt VI) were in tip-top shape at all times.

SHELLENBERG too took a very personal interest in the financial affairs of his section. He suffered from the fear that one day his position would be compromised by the machinations or even the negligence of one of his subordinates.

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(b) Referat VI Kult

After a short spell as an independent Gruppe, VI Kult became a Referat subordinated to Gruppe VI A. The reason for the establishment of VI Kult was to find new sources for Amt VI by the inclusion of persons active in cultural and educational endeavors traveling to and from GERMANY. Some of this personnel was then to be put at the disposal of the sub-sections dealing with the various countries (Ländergruppen).

The creation of such a service had only become necessary because all VI Referate at the various SD Abschnitte had been discontinued in order to make for a more central organization. By gaining in centralization they had lost out on the recruiting of new agents and a distinct gap had been created.

VI Kult therefore attempted to bridge this gap by dispatching representatives to the most important abschnitte. The quality of work done by VI Kult remained sub-standard until the end. The explanation for this is to be found in the inferior leadership at the top.

(c) Mil A

Towards the end of 1944 SANDBERGER also became head of the Gruppe Mil A. The duties of this section in Mil A corresponded exactly to those of VI A in Amt VI.

(2) Gruppe VI B (Western EUROPE)

(1) General

Gruppe VI B which dealt with the countries of Western EUROPE and Western AFRICA, was among the best sections in Amt VI. SS Standardbearer STEINLE, like SANDBERGER a member of the so-called SWISSIAN Clique in Amt VI, was an exceptionally gifted section chief. He had an uncanny gift for pure intelligence operations.

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S E C R E T

INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Ant VI (Continued)

It is fairly certain, however, that the same agent was employed by the British as well and received his pay from both sides (It is even possible that the Italians employed the identical man). His material is supposed to have been of great value, in spite of or perhaps because of his connections.

Great attention was paid to the emigres in GERMANY, such as the Grand Mufti HUSSEINI and the former Iraq premier, al-GAILANI. Close collaboration existed between these personages and the groups controlled by them in the field of intelligence operations. Whether any active work was done in connection with these groups could not be ascertained (by HOTTLE).

(d) IRAN

Ant VI succeeded in accomplishing an interesting experiment in IRAN. During 1940 two young SS officers, by the name of GEMOTHA and MAYER, were dispatched to TEHRAN as employees of SCHENKER in order to give them an opportunity to study language and country. This was done with the idea in mind of using these two as agents at some later date.

But the two young men soon had acclimated themselves, and now commenced to do some intelligence work on their own hook. They not only engaged in the collection of pure intelligence but also began to dabble in the political field, and achieved remarkable results, much to everybody's surprise.

A number of insurrections of the Iranians against the USSR was instigated by them. (MOLOTOV has stated that these activities were one of the main reasons for the move of the Red Army into IRAN). All these activities had been done on their own responsibility and without the previous knowledge or approval of Ant VI.

MAYER was later arrested by the British and sent to CANAL, while GEMOTHA managed to return to GERMANY. The intelligence net organized by them, however, continued in operation and close contact was maintained with IRAN. It is known that several groups were dropped over IRAN, and although some of their personnel were caught, the remainder succeeded in continuing operations.

GEMOTHA's successor in IRAN was SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Martin KURMIS. He had been dropped by parachute together with a group of agents. The Russians attempted to suborn KURMIS, but he refused their offer. Facing certain arrest he committed suicide.

Part of his group was taken into custody, but the remainder succeeded in evading capture and is thought to be still hiding among the various tribes with whom GEMOTHA worked.

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(e) FAR EAST

Similarly the Far East received systematic treatment within Amt VI. The Leiter, SS Sturmbannführer WEINLICH, now in Allied hands, created a separate institute and staffed it with a number of scientists and politicians who had been working on problems of this region and especially on JAPAN.

There was no direct intelligence connection with either JAPAN or CHINA, however. The only contact was the official one through the police attache at TOKYO, who in turn remained in contact with the police attache accredited to the puppet government at NANKING.

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S E C R E T

INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

Amt VI (Continued)

(3) Gruppe VI C (RUSSIA and NEAR EAST)

(a) SOVIET RUSSIA

As far as inherent importance was concerned, Gruppe VI C was considered the prime concern of Amt VI. Credit for this state of affairs was due largely to its former Leiter, SS Sturmbannfuhrer Dr GRAEFE. (GRAEFE and the best Gruppenleiter of Amt III, SS Sturmbannfuhrer Dr BERGERBACH were both killed in an automobile accident).

GRAEFE had built up his section systematically and concentrated his main effort against SOVIET RUSSIA. An organization for the collection of intelligence was created, which went far beyond the customary scope of Amt VI. All conceivable methods were employed to obtain information about the SOVIET UNION. A whole special organization was created which was to achieve these ends through the interrogation of PR and the employment of renegade Russians (Unternehmen Zeppelin). Led by SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Dr ROESER, an able and well-trained officer, this operation achieved very good results.

Not content to leave a good thing alone, GRAEFE changed the organization and leadership of Zeppelin constantly, so that finally it had only a fraction of its previous value.

The methodical work of GRAEFE, the long period of training of certain Russians employed by him, and their familiarity with radio operations really paid dividends. A number of successful parachute operations ensued, especially concentrated in the CAUCASUS. It is believed that radio connection with some of these agents continued until the end.

The Leiter of the Russia Referat, Dr HENGELHAUPT, was an exceedingly quiet and dispassionate man with a scientific turn of mind. He was indubitably the right man for work which had to be planned well in advance and from a long-range point of view. He possessed very good information about the USSR and had given his superiors an unadorned and - for GERMANY - unfavorable picture of the situation from the very beginning.

He was not listened to, of course, and HIMMLER even transferred him once, as punishment for his constant admonitions and destruction of the political leader's fond illusions. It is to be assumed that during the last months of the war the work of the Russia Referat was further intensified.

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(b) TURKEY

A similarly successful Referat had been established in TURKEY by the Referent, SS Sturmbannfuhrer SCHOBACK. He was assisted by two extremely able intelligence operatives, SS Sturmbannfuhrer WOYZISCH at ANKARA and SS Sturmbannfuhrer WOLF at ISTANBUL. Both had been camouflaged as members of the German diplomatic missions. They had succeeded in establishing an intelligence net which continued in operation even after GIBELNY had been forced to withdraw all official connection from TURKEY.

(c) Near East

The Near East never proved to be quite as fertile for German intelligence operations. During 1944 a lot of work was lavished on that sector without achieving commensurate results. The main source of information was a Levantine agent with an extensive organization under his control.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No. 15

6. Ant VI (Continued)

To show the state of affairs in the section the following example is indicative: VI D tried for five years to establish an intelligence net in EIRE, in order to use that country as a base for operations against the UK proper. The establishment of this EIRE net was never completed and VI D never had a single wireless connection with ENGLAND or with the UNITED STATES.

(b) SOUTH AMERICA

The picture looked slightly rosier in SOUTH AMERICA. Using SPAIN and PORTUGAL as relay bases, certain rather good connections could be established. The political developments in the countries of SOUTH AMERICA progressively weakened these contacts, however. Similar development ensued in SWEDEN. The government expelled all known German agents (that included operatives of both the Abwehr and the SD).

One contact, probably the best of the lot, was not affected by this order, however. This connection had been established by SCHILLERBACH personally and was through a Swedish newspaper publisher, who at the same time was owner of a shipping line. The newspaper was supported financially by both the SD and the Foreign Office.

(5) Gruppe VI E (Southeast EUROPE)

(a) General

As the oldest Gruppe in Ant VI, the section dealing with the countries of Southeastern EUROPE was in possession of a rather efficient intelligence net. These connections could be kept alive, at least partially, even after the Russian occupation of these countries.

Of prime importance in this context was the collaboration between the SD and the conservative and reactionary parties in these countries. Especially after occupation, when these parties were forced to go underground, this collaboration became very intimate and effective.

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(b) Post-hostilities Status

The men responsible for the intelligence connections, which in certain countries include ties with personalities in or near the governing circle were usually the Hauptvertramsleute in the various nations. Several of the intelligence nets, left behind after the German withdrawal, did not succeed in re-establishing radio communications with the central office. The net in BULGARIA, for instance, though still in existence, was no longer in contact with the communications control of VI E.

In other countries as well, only parts of the intelligence net were controlled by the local radio outlet, towards the end. The remainder had to continue operations without either receiving directions or being able to transmit findings and results.

(c) WANECK

The Leiter of Gruppe VI E, SS Obersturmbannfuhrer WANECK, played a disproportionately important role within unit VI. This was not so much due to his ability as it was to his close connections with Dr KALTENBUNNER. SCHELLENBERG was afraid of WANECK's influence, especially since the latter had been able to put something over on him on several occasions:

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Ant VI (Continued)

WEIRAUCH's most valuable collaborator was the former director of the propaganda office of the State Railway at TOKYO (Leiter der Reichsbahnwerbezentrale TOKYO), SS Obersturmfuehrer LEO. LEO was one of the foremost experts on Japanese affairs in GERMANY, perhaps even in EUROPE. He had studied in JAPAN for many years and had received his doctor's degree there, a rare achievement.

WEIRAUCH and LEO always followed a strongly anti-Japanese course. This inclination could also be detected from their reports. A number of memoranda submitted to the highest echelons of the government clearly expressed these leanings and warned the government not to have any illusions about the altruism of their allies.

These reports seem to have had a certain measure of success but caused the displeasure of HIMMLER.

WEIRAUCH and LEO's forte was not so much strict intelligence as it was thorough knowledge of JAPAN and all phases of Japanese life. During the last few months KALTENBRUNNER attempted to put the JAPAN Referat in direct contact with officials of the Japanese embassy. To further this end several meetings were held with both KALTENBRUNNER and OSHIMA in attendance.

(f) RAPP and Mil C

GRAEFE's successor as Leiter of VI C was SS Obersturmbannfuehrer RAPP. Contrary to usual practice he was not put in charge of obtaining MIL C, since the area of activity of this section did not correspond to that of VI C (MIL C included beside the USSR, the Near East, and the Far East, also South Eastern EUROPE and the Scandinavian countries).

RAPP, who was very ambitious without having any special qualifications, (he was formerly Leitabschnittsfuehrer WUENCHEN) attempted to gain control over these areas as well. He was stopped short, however, by the determined opposition of SS Obersturmbannfuehrer WANECK (now in allied hands), the Gruppenleiter of VI E.

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(4) Gruppe VI D (West)

(a) General

This sub-section was by far the weakest link in Amt VI. Its sphere of operation included ENGLAND and the British Empire as well as the Scandinavian Countries and the Americas. The personnel employed in the Gruppe was mediocre at best. The position of Leiter VI D was held for the first few years by SS Obersturmbannfuhrer DAUFELDT. He was a playboy whose only qualification for the job consisted of his good knowledge of the English language.

Successes in the two main fields - ENGLAND and the US - were non-existent under DAUFELDT. Not much improvement was noted after SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Dr PAEFFGEN had been appointed as DAUFELDT's successor. PAEFFGEN's qualifications were, if that is possible, even poorer than those of his predecessor.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Lat VI (Continued)

The radio section of VI F had always been its greatest concern. Especially during the war it became increasingly more difficult to obtain the proper personnel and material for an efficient operation of these services. The first Gruppenleiter VI F, SS Sturmbannführer RAUJCKS (later courtmartialed by HEYDRICH), had laid the foundations for an extensive wireless section.

With the great development of the foreign intelligence service the existing installation soon became insufficient and a new and enlarged system of radio transmitting and receiving stations had to be established.

(b) The HAVELINSTITUT

The first step was the creation of the HAVEL INSTITUT, under the direction of SS Sturmbannführer SIEMEN. Later the installations were enlarged even further. Before the collapse the following high-power transmitters, exclusively for intelligence broadcasts, were in operation:

- Central Transmitter WANNSEE
- KIRCHSASSEN
- MARIENBAD (MARIANSKE LAZNE)
- GDYNIA
- BABELSBERG
- RIGA - ASSERN
- OSWITZ
- NICKERSBERG
- BAISBERG
- KÄHLENSBERG

Each one of these transmitters was equipped with the latest improvements and could signal on as many as 20 channels simultaneously. Nevertheless this number was still not sufficient. Through the coadjutant of numerous agents by parachute, new radio nets had to be established almost daily.

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(c) New Developments

The Institut was not only concerned with these high-power transmitters. Its construction section (Bauteilung) manufactured radio sets for agents and produced these sets on an assembly line basis. Research was one of the section's prime concerns.

VI F had some of the top experts in the field of communications at its disposal. Certain inventions had been made, especially during the last few months which were really remarkable. In addition for the small (agent's) transmitter had been developed which permitted the transmission of whole pages of text within the space of only a few seconds. This would have revolutionized the whole field of agent's transmissions.

Another apparatus was an automatic scrambler and de-scrambler for secret transmissions. Great steps forward had been made in voice transmitter and receiver sets, as well. (A new set was developed of great value for the commitment of agents in rugged terrain, mountains etc). With the aid of the new set (range up to 50 km) airplanes could remain in touch with agents dropped over and hiding in this type of terrain. Also the establishment of contact with these agents and the exact location of their position was vastly facilitated.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Ant VI (Continued)

WANECK was one of the oldest members of the foreign intelligence service, but had no practical experience whatsoever. His activities were limited to executive desk work.

(d) ITALY

Until the end of 1944 the ITALY Referat, including the subsection dealing with the VATICAN, also belonged to Gruppe VI E. (These sub-sections were separated from VI E. when this office moved to WFF, and were then attached to VI B). Work in ITALY, in spite of great advantages, was handicapped for a very long time because it had to work in an underground fashion.

As has already been mentioned, a strict order by HITLER prohibited all intelligence activities in ITALY. Nevertheless after MUSSOLINI's overthrow several good sources of information were established in ROME. They were of no political consequence, however, since the reports received were completely anti-fascist and opposed MUSSOLINI's restitution.

This stand, of course, was counter to the official German policy and did not meet with approval in the eyes of the mighty. Excellent work was done by the former Hauptvertrauensmann of ITALY, SS Hauptsturmfuehrer in GROEBL (later killed by partisans), and by the police attache with the Embassy in ROME, SS Obersturmbannfuehrer KAPPLER.

After the loss of ROME the main effort of intelligence activities was transferred to the North. In this process these activities came under the control of the Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD in ITALIEN, SS Gruppenfuehrer Dr HARSTER. One of the greatest characteristics in the SS, HARSTER jealously guarded his rights and powers. But even during this period reports from ITALY were usually rather objective and exposed some illusions.

The time given for the establishment of an intelligence net to the VATICAN was too short to achieve telling results. An added disadvantage was the arrest of SS Obersturmbannfuehrer BELLING by the Americans. He had been slated to become the SD Vertrauensmann at the VATICAN.

In its political ideas the VATICAN Referat represented the opinions voiced by the German Ambassador von WEIZSACKER, i e, sharply opposed to those of the Foreign Office and of HIMMLER and HITLER.

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(6) Gruppe VI F

This Gruppe was entrusted with the provision of all technical prerequisites for all other sections of the Amt and was consequently of great importance. Its organization reflects its purely technical nature.

(a) Radio Sections

Referate VI F 1 and VI F 2 were both concerned with the radio receiving and transmitting stations serving the Amt. The former was charged with the operation of these installations, while the latter was entrusted with their construction and research in the field of wireless transmission. They jointly controlled the so-called HAVELINSTITUT, designated VI F (II).

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Ant VI (Continued)

(7) Gruppe VI G

(a) Purpose and Commander

Gruppe VI G was one of the most recent innovations in Ant VI. It bore the title of the Scientific Methodical Research Service (wissenschaftlich methodischer Forschungsdienst). Under this imposing title the section attempted to enlist German scientific research for intelligence purposes.

The man who was called upon to head the new section was a young Viennese scientist, SS Sturmabfuhrer Dr KRALLERT. He brought with him the highest qualifications for the position. As far as background and ability are concerned, KRALLERT indeed held a unique position in Ant VI and the whole RSHA.

In spite of the novel field and the relatively short time at his disposal, KRALLERT succeeded in achieving amazing results. His first job was the coordination of the maze of frequently conflicting research institutes and stations. Towards the end he had achieved complete control.

Simultaneously the SD had founded certain research agencies of its own, such as the already-mentioned Institut fuer Ostasien und Japan, the Forschungsdienst Ost (Germanic Institut under Dr SCHMIDTKE), another research section for the Near East, one for the Balkans, etc. All these research services were placed at KRALLERT's disposal.

INCOMING

SECURITY

171205

170930

171300

098

17 July 1945

TO: SPEARHEAD AMXON

FROM: SCARF THIRD ARMY

G-2

Your 423 refers

A. Think can brief BEETZ here but copy CHERUB's report written WIESBADEN be most helpful. Send with body.

B. Wednesday arrival FREISING okay.

C. FELIX house part of quiz center FREISING where special cases housed. Lt. FLEX must be contacted before BEETZ delivered there. Phone Monster 583 ask for FLEX.

D. What disposition planned for BEETZ after present exploitation?

(423 is OSS OUT 2479)

882

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2000 2008

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2000 2008

G-2

PARIS FOR BERN SWITZERLAND

18 July 1945

SECRET

SPARRHEAD AMZON

ROUTINE

- A. HOETEL reported during interrogation, Fred MEYER, American parachutist caught early April Innsbruck. His wireless operator escaped
- B. Gauleiter HOERER wanted use MEYER contact Tyrol anti-Nazi resistance movement and probably Americans also.
- C. Ostufel REBER of Innsbruck Stapo offered turn over American operator previously captured to help MEYER contact Americans.
- D. MEYER and W/P operator, not clear whether same as in para C, were helped by HOETEL to reach Swiss border.
- E. HOETEL does not know whether they arrived safely and does not know details of attempted contacts resistance movement or Americans.
- F. No trace MEYER in London.
- G. Could MEYER be agent of Vandenberg, sent Innsbruck early April?

TEP
BER

COORDINATION WITH Army

SOURCE: HOETEL interrogation and Paris C 15, Dulles.

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0915

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DATE 2000 2008

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
US FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER
INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 655

PRELIMINARY INTERROGATION REPORT (PIR) NO 27

PRISONER: BEETZ, Hildogard, nee BURKHARDT

DATE: 19 July 1945

1. PERSONAL DATA

Frau BEETZ was an agent of Amt VI, RSHA. Born in OBERNISSA nr WEIMAR in 1919, she graduated from high school in 1938 and subsequently attended a private interpreters' school in ERFZIG. She entered the SD in 1939, serving in WEIMAR until March 1940 when she was transferred to Amt VI, RSHA. She worked as interpreter and translator of Italian at both the ROHE and BERLIN offices up to September 1943, when she was chosen to become an agent. BEETZ was assigned as secretary to CIANO, then under house arrest at ALLMANNSHAUSEN/Starnberger See, MUENCHEN, with instructions to report his activities to Amt VI.

BEETZ grew fond of CIANO, who had been transferred to a prison at VERONA, Italy, and in October 1943 she decided to help him. Through her efforts she claims CIANO's diary and several documents pertaining to Italo-German relations were kept from falling into the hands of the SD and she was able to assist EDDA MURROLINI in her escape to SWITZERLAND. Upon her own request, BEETZ was transferred back to WEIMAR in October 1944 where she continued her original work of translating and interpreting.

2. ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

BEETZ was arrested in WEIMAR, on 19 Jun 45, by 208 CIC Det. She arrived at USFET Interrogation Center on 20 Jun 45 and was accepted at the request of Chief G-2 (CIB), HQ USFET. Arrest report and SIAEF Card were not available. Reports forwarded with BEETZ were the following: HQ 12th Army Group SCI Det Report dated 18 Jun 45
SCI Det WEIMAR Report dated 14, 16 and 17 Jun 45
SCI Notes, SCI Det WEIMAR dated 25 Jun 45
A number of translations made by BEETZ

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3. KNOWLEDGE BRIEF

- a. Organization and personnel of WEIMAR, BERLIN and ROME offices of Amt VI, RSHA.
- b. Methods and agents employed by the SD in ITALY.
- c. SD methods for infiltrating personnel into SWITZERLAND.
- d. SD contacts in SWITZERLAND and ITALY.
- e. Information concerning Italo-German relations.

4. INTERROGATION PLAN

The interrogation will be conducted according to the knowledge brief.

5. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

BEEZ appears to be fully cooperative and should release information on the subjects mentioned in the knowledge brief.

The recipients of this report are requested to submit special briefs of any subjects upon which this prisoner should be interrogated and to indicate the desired distribution of the resultant report.

For Colonel PHILP:

Harry K. Lennon

HARRY K. LENNON
Captain, Inf
B & E Section

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DISTRIBUTION: "B"

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
INTELLIGENCE CENTER
INTERROGATION SECTION
APO 403

2 August 1945

SUBJECT : Frau Hildegard BEETZ
TO : SCI Det., Munich, 12th Army Group

Frau BEETZ was questioned in accordance with Special Brief of SCI Det., Munich, 12th Army Group, dated 21 July 45, and the following information obtained:

1. PRAGER, alleged German agent and Captain of the SS. Frau BEETZ met PRAGER for the first time in January 1944 at CERNOBBIO vic CCMC. She went to CERNOBBIO in the company of SS Sturm-bannfuhrer Dr. HOTTL in order to arrange for permission to enter Switzerland. Her ostensible mission in SWITZERLAND was to work for the German Consul General at LUGANO. Actually she was to continue her original mission, viz to secure CIANO's diary and other important papers supposed to be in the hands of CIANO's widow who was detained by the Swiss. During her stay in Switzerland Frau BEETZ received frequent visits by PRAGER who brought her the official mail from the RSHA and who picked up her reports which he took back to Italy whence they were mailed to the RSHA. Frau BEETZ met PRAGER the second time in May 1944. At that time she again enlisted PRAGER's help to get her a permit of entry into Switzerland. She stayed at CERNOBBIO until end of June 1944 at which time her application was definitely turned down. During this period of time she had frequent personal contacts with PRAGER. Although he showed a great deal of reticence in talking about personal matters, Frau BEETZ was able to gain a fairly reliable picture of the position he held. She is less sure about his personal and professional background.

a) Grenzbefehlsstelle West

PRAGER is neither a member of the SS (information to the contrary notwithstanding) nor does he belong to the SD. He worked directly for the 'Grenzbefehlsstelle West' (GBW), the executive arm of the Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei in Italy and as such embodying elements of Stapo, Kripo and SD. The GBW, as the name indicates, was charged with the security of the border districts separating Italy from Switzerland and from France. Commander of the GBW was SS Hauptsturmfuhrer VOETTERL who received his orders directly from the Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei HASTER.

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b) Position

PRAGER served the GEW in the capacity both of a confidential agent (V-mann) and liaison functionary (Verbindungs-mann). Frau BEETZ believes that PRAGER, who is an affluent businessman, was not on the payroll of the SD but acted in an honorary capacity.

c) Private Business

PRAGER owned some commercial enterprise in the town of CHIASSO on the Swiss side of the Italo-Swiss border. Frau BEETZ does not know what branch of business PRAGER engaged in. The name of his firm was GIUSVOR. At the occasion of her first trip to Switzerland Frau BEETZ got Swiss currency through PRAGER and she believes that he engaged in currency transactions on a big scale. PRAGER told Frau BEETZ that he was frequently consulted by the German Chamber of Commerce in MILANO in respect to complications arising out of Allied pressure brought to bear on Switzerland with the aim to curtail transit of German resp Italian goods through that country.

d) Work for the GEW

PRAGER whose residence was in the vic of CHIASSO, however on the Italian side of the border, could cross into Switzerland and back into Italy as often as he wanted. This freedom of movement across the border aided him of course considerably in discharging the missions assigned him by GEW. As an example he could visit with the German Consul General at LUGANO or the Chamber of Commerce at ZURICH just any day without arousing any undue suspicion inasmuch as he was known to be a prominent businessman and presumably acting in pursuance of legitimate interests. Under this cloak he was able to aid in the maintenance of liaison between the SD and its representatives in Switzerland. About the latter he should be exceptionally well informed.

e) Special Qualifications

PRAGER's activities in behalf of the GEW were apparently closely linked with his economic interests. He was considered an authority on the Swiss border district called TESSIN. His knowledge of personalities playing an economic or political role in Switzerland was considered both prolific and reliable. By virtue of his knowledge and experience PRAGER wielded considerable influence in the GEW and even SS Hauptsturmfuhrer VOETTERL found himself reduced to a second string position. According to Frau BEETZ, PRAGER was the will and the brains of GEW.

f) Agent Net

Frau BEETZ has not heard anything indicating that

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PRAGER had an information net in Switzerland. At any rate he never mentioned the use of confidential agents. From all indications PRAGER confined himself to rendering opinions and occasionally to running errands into Switzerland.

g) Personal Data

PRAGER is married to a Swiss who is a native of the French speaking part of Switzerland. His father-in-law is a prominent physician in Lausanne and is rumored to have furnished his son-in-law with some valuable connections. There is an unsubstantiated rumor that PRAGER, an Austrian by birth, served as an Intelligence officer in the old Austro-Hungarian army. PRAGER is 60 years of age. He suffers from a severe case of diabetes.

2. MUSSOLINI ON GERMANY

a) Circumstances of find

The original of MUSSOLINI's expose of Germany (often referred to as his diary) was found by sheer accident contained in a small notebook among his personal effects during the GRAN SASSO raid. An alert SD man had a photostatic copy made, whereupon the original was returned to MUSSOLINI.

b) Translation

Where other translators in the RSHA failed, viz to decipher MUSSOLINI's all but illegible handwriting from an inferior photostatic copy, Frau BEETZ succeeded. Great precautions were taken to preclude any leakage. Frau BEETZ was sworn to secrecy and expressly forbidden to make any carbon copies. Despite very elaborate precautions Frau BEETZ managed to copy the main points in their original Italian version. As to the whereabouts of the photostatic copy SS Hauptsturmfuhrer KRALLERT should be questioned (group VI G, RSHA).

c) PUCCI

Frau BEETZ mentioned the existence of the expose and the fact of her having copied it in part to PUCCI in January 1944 when she looked him up in a Swiss hospital. PUCCI told Father PANCINO about it who in turn broached the matter to Frau BEETZ. She denied everything and passed it off as a product of PUCCI's febrile imagination. Frau BEETZ does not believe that Father PANCINO notified the SD.

d) Whereabouts of digest

The digest was among the other papers turned over by Frau BEETZ to Lt. FRENCH, SCI, in WEIMAR. She claims that, at the request of Lt. FRENCH, she translated it into English and

7

retained her own handwritten Italian copy which should be with her personal effects in WIESBADEN.

/s/ EDMUND L KING
Major, Inf.
COMMANDING

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2000 2000

SECRET

18.8.45

SECRET

ROUTINE

ROUTINE

AT 0-2 RECEIVED MESSAGE FROM THE DEPARTMENT AND DEANE TODAY
RE: MESSAGE NO. 1 FROM 0-2 CHECKING ON MATTER OF HOATEL CASE.

B. THE DEPARTMENT REPLY SAYS THAT ALL PERTINENT INFORMATION
RELEVANT TO THE MATTER IS JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 7 AUGUST FOR
THEIR CONSIDERATION BY JOINT CHIEFS STAFF.

C. DEANE'S TELEGRAM SAYS HE RECEIVED LETTER FROM GENERAL
YOUNG ON 11 AUGUST RECEIVED WAS DEPARTURE TELEGRAM EXPRESSING
HIS INTEREST IN THE MATTER.

D. THE DEPARTMENT ASKED FOR OTHER FURTHER INFORMATION AND
FOR THE DEPARTMENT TO THE CHIEFS.

E. THE DEPARTMENT HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT THE DEPARTMENT
WILL BE ADVISED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF THE MATTER.

F. THE DEPARTMENT HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT THE DEPARTMENT
WILL BE ADVISED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF THE MATTER.

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DOCUMENT FILED AT CRFF HOLABIRD
MD. UPON COMPLETION OF ACTION DE.
STRUCTION WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH AR 380-5

ed
COORDINATED WITH Army

THE PROVISIONS of Para 6 & 7, AR 381 - 130, apply

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Reference No 2270
No of copies 40
Copy No 13

APPRO: CG Third US Army
DATE: 25 August 1945
INIT: 246

D 887

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THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2
INTELLIGENCE CENTER
INTERROGATION SECTION
APO 403

C

Source: HOETTL, Wilhelm, AIC 894

SPECIAL INTERROGATION REPORT No 4

Because of the nature of the subject matter, the following information has been extracted from a routine interrogation report and is published for limited distribution.

In evaluating the information, it should be borne in mind that the source, although now apparently friendly, co-operative and truthful, was until recently a faithful servant of the Nazis. And although he may have forsworn his allegiance, he makes no pretense of having forsworn his prejudices.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2000 2006

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1. Jesuit Intelligence Activities

Proposed Jesuit-RSHA Intelligence Exchange 2

Soviet-Vatican Anti-Nazi Plot 2

Jesuit Roll of Interest in Overthrowing HITLER 3

CO: [REDACTED]

Classification (as authorized) to
 [REDACTED]
 Date 12 Aug 1952

My. Bugger *Cherell*

10 SEP 1952
 INT. SEC.
 2903

00063

CIC LOG
 2-3566

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SPECIAL INTERROGATION REPORT No 4

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1. Jesuit Intelligence Activities (Continued)

From the sketchy information that leaked out, Dr HOETTL was able to piece together the following story: The center of the conspiracy in GERMANY was the General-Kommando in MUENCHEN (GSGS 4346/W 49/Y 8556). Investigations revealed that certain members of scientific institutes in ROME, Italy, had offered their services as liaison between German military circles and the Society of Jesus.

Most deeply implicated were several officers from Abwehrstelle MUENCHEN, and certain former leaders of the Bayerische Volkspartei, some of whom were residing in MUENCHEN and some of whom were living as emigres in ROME. The conspiracy was by no means confined to Army circles. Prominent German Foreign Office personalities (like Gesandter SCHELIAN, who was later executed) and certain officials of the Reichswirtschaftsministerium were also involved.

Jesuit Poll of Interest in Overthrowing HITLER. HOETTL relates an unconfirmed rumor to the effect that certain Army circles, prior to the abortive coup of 20 July 1944, commissioned the Society of Jesus to conduct a poll to determine whether German public sentiment would favor an overthrow of the HITLER regime. According to HOETTL's source, the poll indicated general apathy, and little sentiment in favor of an uprising was encountered.

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SPECIAL INTERROGATION REPORT No 4

1. Jesuit Intelligence Activities

Source. SS Sturmbannfuehrer Dr HOETTTL, Hauptreferent in Gruppe VI E of the RSHA. For further details about HOETTTL see Third US Army Interrogation Reports Nos 10, 15, 16, 18, 21, and 22, and Third US Army Special Interrogation Reports Nos 1 and 2.

Summary. This report deals with several instances in which the Jesuits are believed to have taken an active part, both in collaboration with and in opposition to the Nazis.

Proposed Jesuit-RSHA Intelligence Exchange. In 1939 Dr HOETTTL sent the pan-European propagandist, Prince ROHAN, as his emissary to the VATICAN. HOETTTL was at that time Amt VI referent in WIEN (OSG 4546/O 49/X 4094).

Prince ROHAN was well enough acquainted with Count LEDOCHOVSKY, Vicar General of the Society of Jesus, to sound him out on the possibilities of an information exchange. It was argued that this would implement the mutual interests of both the SD and the VATICAN in eradicating Communism from EUROPE. LEDOCHOVSKY accepted the proposition with a great deal of enthusiasm and promised to submit the matter to the Pope.

The Vicar General showed ROHAN some of the reports he received regularly from SOBEL VONICA through Jesuit circles. These reports described the activities of Comintern agents in certain Latin American countries with a wealth of detail unparalleled in any Amt VI reports on the same subject. LEDOCHOVSKY said he was willing to collaborate with the Germans to the extent that he would pass on to Amt VI all intelligence material at his disposal. He expected in return to receive all pertinent information obtained by the RSHA as the result of SD activities in the USSR. This intelligence exchange was to go into effect as soon as the Pope's consent could be obtained. In the end all plans foundered on the Pope's refusal to countenance any kind of co-operation with the SD, and on the objections of SS Gruppenfuehrer JOST, Amtchef VI, who dared not submit the scheme to HEYDRICH.

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Soviet-Vatican Anti-Nazi Plot. In 1943 a special commission of Amt IV of the RSHA investigated an anti-Nazi conspiracy of considerable dimensions, the ramifications of which were traced to both Soviet and Vatican circles. The two-fold nature of the plot is reflected in the fact that the Amt IV investigators had to split into two groups. One followed up Russian leads under the covername of Rote Kapelle. (See Third US Army Interrogation Report No 8, 14 June 1945, paragraph 2, and 6824 DIC (MIS)/CI - 14) The other operation, under the covername Schwarze Kapelle, followed leads which implicated the VATICAN. All investigations were co-ordinated by SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr SCHMITZ, who later became the personal aide of SCHELLENBERG, Amtschef VI.

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For the AC of S, G-2:

Edmund L King
EDMUND L KING
Major, Infantry
Chief of Interrogation Section

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29 AUG 45

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2000 2006

TO: AB/000 AMZON

FROM: AB/012, 3RD

1. LUCKY IC SAY WILL FINISH HOETTL BY 14 SEPT.
2. THEY WISH DISPOSE BODYS ON NEXT.
3. HOETTL SUSPICIOUS DOUBLE CROSS BY US AND PRESENT SECURITY PROBLEM TO IC.
4. SUGGEST BODY BE TAKEN USFET IC WAIT FINAL DECISION ON CASE.
5. ADVISE DISPOSITION SOONEST.

882

Act: Miss Wens Cow
Before meeting will
be made with
3/1/4

COORDINATED WITH Army

00064
OSS IN 6399

SAINT
EXEC

Hoettle to be put in USFET IC
Specs will be prepared
Training is USFET IC

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Vassus, den 30. August 1945.

Sehr geehrter Herr Doktor !

Ich freue mich aus Ihrem w. Schreiben vom 27. ds. zu entnehmen, dass es Ihnen soweit gut geht. Ich glaube, dass Alois einen Brief von Ihnen erhalten hat, jedenfalls habe schon vor einiger Zeit gehört, dass Sie in Freising sind und habe diese Nachricht auch Fritz weiter gegeben. Dieser konnte bisher noch keine Einreisebewilligung weder für die Schweiz noch für Liechtenstein bekommen.

Er war die ganze Zeit in Lech A.A. hatte aber meines Wissens, bis vor etwa 3 Wochen, noch keine direkte Nachricht von Ihnen erhalten. Er ist nun vor etwa 14 Tagen aufgebrochen und wollte versuchen seinen Bruder in Millstatt und auch Ihre Familie in Alt-Ausssee zu erreichen. Einen Erfolg seiner Reise habe bisher noch nicht erfahren, da er bis gestern noch nicht zurück war. Ich habe ihm übrigens, aus dem Päckchen, über seinen Wunsch einen Teil zugestellt und er hat mir auch den Empfang bestätigt, meines Wissens wollte er das nach Alt-Ausssee mitnehmen.

Von Ihrem Graf Alfred gegenüber geäußerten Wunsch bezüglich Alois höre das erste von Ihnen. Ersterer war längere Zeit in Vulpera und ist erst seit etwa 14 Tagen wieder hier. Habe ihm Ihren Brief übergeben, er sagte mir aber keine frühere Nachricht erhalten zu haben. Sollte er mir einen Brief für Sie übergeben, so werde denselben sofort an Sie weiter gehen lassen.


Eine Umwandlung in Fr. war bisher nicht möglich und daran dürfte sich auch sobald nichts ändern. untersuchte Exemplare wurden mit 90 % Sicherheit als unecht erklärt und ich habe es abgelehnt irgend etwas damit zu unternehmen. Auch Alois hat meines Wissens keinerlei weitere Schritte diesbezüglich unternommen.

Kisten mit Lebensmitteln habe seinerzeit von Zürich bekommen und auch an Fritz weiter geleitet. Ich hoffe, dass Sie diese meinen.

Die Adresse von Onkel August ist Clinique La Lignière in Gland (Vaud). Jene von Alois war noch richtig, sodass ich Ihren Brief weiter leiten konnte, doch höre ich, dass er Mitte ~~des~~ ~~des~~ ~~des~~ September hofft nach Oesterreich reisen zu können, vielleicht ist es ihm dann möglich, ausser mit Fritz, auch mit Ihnen zusammen zu kommen.

Mit den besten Grüßen

Ihr ergebener



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Villem 31. VII. 45

Siehe den Hölle!

Zustolge des Erhalt Ihres Schreibens
vom 27. VII. und habe mich gefreut
so weit gute Nachrichten von Ihnen zu
erhalten. Ich bedauere dass Ihre letzten
mythenartigen Aussagen über Kapitulationen
betreffend nicht mehr zum Tragen gekommen
sind, da sie gerade durch die Ereignisse
überholt waren, hingegen bedauere ich
nicht dass Sie hier gemachten Vorlesungen
zur Vertiefung der Redaktionsbildung
Vorlesungen bleiben da dieses gollte
nicht mehr zu stehen kam. Ich würde
gerne Ihren Wunsch entsprechen und
den genannten Herrn der amerikanischen
und österreichischen Stellen mitteilen
da bei den geplanten Kundgebungen
Ihre Aktionen hier in Kontakt waren

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2000 2006

control

von Blumen besiedelt, und G-Samen hat
sich schon des öfteren nach Blumen kolonisiert
Mit allen guten Wünschen für die
Zukunft und besten Grüßen

Herz

Herzog

Control

SECRET

210

311157
311100
311310

31 August 1945

TO: AB 000, AMZON

FROM: AB 12, Third Army

1. GAMBIT STILL WORKING HOSTILE EXPLOITATION.
2. LUCKY IC SAYS HENRIOD (HET WORK?) COMPLETE THREAT.
3. DO YOU WISH REMOVE BEFORE DISPOSITION HOSTILE.
4. RE HOSTILE LUCKY IC REITERATE BODY SHOULD NOT BE PLACED
MOCS BERG OR AUSTRIAN CIE.
5. ADVISE SOONEST.

*Comments on file
Wagon*

*Wagon: Maj. Sade
a. prep as I am
Will you schedule
this for 1/9
802*

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FOR COORDINATION WITH Army

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AUTH: CG Third US Army

DATE: 31 August 1945

INIT: ECJ

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THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Interrogation Center (Provisional)
APO 403

INTERROGATION REPORT No 36

Source: HOETTL, Wilhelm, SIC 094

31 August 1945

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S E C R E T

INTERROGATION REPORT No 36

Japanese Intelligence Activities in EUROPE

Preamble. The source for the following report is SS Sturmbannfuhrer HOETTL, former chief consultant (Hauptreferent) of the RSHA, Amt VI B (South-East), who also furnished the material for Third US Army Interrogation Reports Nos 10, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22, and for Third US Army Special Interrogation Reports Nos 1, 2, and 4.

ITALY. The Japanese and Italian intelligence services had certain common spheres of interest, particularly in the NEAR EAST and in INDIA. This led to an unusually great degree of co-operation, and several missions initiated by the Italians appear to have been planned and executed in conjunction with the Japanese. In 1944, HOETTL was told by an Italian military intelligence officer that ITALY had some 300 agents working in INDIA alone.

USSR. The important Japanese espionage network in the USSR was mainly controlled from bases in South-Eastern EUROPE, particularly in GERMANY and TURKEY. The chief agents were members of the Japanese press and diplomatic corps.

From the CAUCASUS region, HOETTL's sources reported particularly strong Japanese activity, and several Caucasian groups in GERMANY, especially Georgians, were reported to draw substantial Japanese subsidies. A prominent Georgian (whom HOETTL claims he is no longer able to identify) once explained to HOETTL that the Japanese consider the CAUCASUS the boundary of their Western sphere of interest.

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GERMANY. In GERMANY, the activities of the Japanese Intelligence Service were marked by a lack of scruples in the choice of means and by a technical proficiency in the execution of missions.

In summer 1945 the Japanese succeeded in acquiring the plans of German Army Group NORD's strategic operations against the USSR, which was an outstanding feat in the eyes of experts and without precedent in the annals of German military history. The plans were found to have been photographed on micro-film, part of which had been wrapped tightly around a thin slice of wire and inserted into the rim of a condom (rubber contraceptive). Other parts of the film had been inserted into the bristle sockets of a wooden brush. The films were about the size of a pin-head.

This particular espionage mission was directed by the Manchurian Legation in BERLIN, and was executed by Poles loyal to the LONDON Polish government, posing as handymen of the legation. Generally, the Japanese intelligence appeared to employ "LONDON" Poles quite extensively.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 36

Japanese Intelligence Activities in EUROPE (Continued)

HOETTL states that it was incomprehensible to the German authorities that the Japanese should spy on their German allies, in particular since Ambassador OSHIMA was constantly informed of GERMANY's plans by HITLER personally.

HOETTL's explanation for the major act of Japanese espionage is that OSHIMA was distrusted by his own government and that this act was merely an attempt to check up on OSHIMA's information.

There were no diplomatic consequences as a result of the discovery of the act.

EDMUND L KING
Major, Infantry
Commanding

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AB12, THIRD ARMY

1 September 1945
SECRET

AB21, AMSON

ROUTINE

- 1) AB4 trying get HOEFEL brought USMT IC or local internment center soonest.
- 2) Suggest GARNIT remain LUCKY IC till after his transfer.

B.R.W.
T.F.P.

FOR COORDINATION WITH Army

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IN

~~SECRET~~

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031208
031100
031415

3 SEPT 1945

TO: AB/004, AMZON
FROM: AB/012, 3RD ARMY

REFOEITL AB/021 MESSAGE 16. HOETTL

LUCKY IC ADVISES QUIZ NOW COMPLETE. BODY AVAILABLE YR
DISPOSITION AT ONCE.

~~FOR~~ COORDINATION WITH Army

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00068

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EXEC

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AUTH: CG THIRD US ARMY
DATE: 9 September 1945
INIT: *clb*

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Interrogation Center (Provisional)
APO 403

INTERROGATION REPORT No 38

Sources: AMENDE, Hermann, AIC 1533 9 September 1945
STOGER, Anton, AIC 1587
OBERBEIL, Wilhelm, AIC 1762
HOETTL, Wilhelm, AIC 894

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S E C R E T

INTERROGATION REPORT No 38

I. THE ASTEHR AND THE SD IN SPAIN

Preamble

The information in this report was obtained from Hermann AMENDE, Anton STOEGER, and Wilhelm OBERBEIL.

AMENDE was born in 1903 in REHDORF (GSGS 4346/K 51/F 8902), Kreis COELENZ. After studying economics at the University of LEIPZIG (GSGS 4346/K 52/S 2415), he worked for various coal firms and finally obtained a managerial position. He lost his job in 1932 and, unable to find work, he joined the RAD in 1933. He was discharged from the RAD in 1935 with the rank of Unterfeldwebel. He entered the German Army in January 1936 and was discharged in May of the same year with the rank of Gefreiter.

Unable to obtain suitable employment in Germany, AMENDE went to SPAIN in the spring of 1937. He claims that upon reaching the border he was told that he could not enter the country unless he first joined the Italian Brigade, a unit of the insurgent army. Seeing no other course open, he joined, received some training, and found himself on the ELDRID front in March 1937. He claims that he had no desire to fight and managed to get out of the Italian Brigade with the help of a German consul.

During the fall of 1937 AMENDE worked in SAN SEBASTIAN, Spain, as an accountant for a man called KURZ, an agent for various German construction firms. From April 1938 until the beginning of 1939, AMENDE claims to have worked in TOLOSA, Spain, for a paper manufacturer called Vicente GONZALES. He went to LEIPZIG (GSGS 4346/K 52/S 2415) in the spring of 1939 with some Spanish industrialists and secured contracts for them at the industrial exposition in that city.

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In October 1939 A WENDE began working for the German vice consul in BARCELONA, Spain, performing general clerical duties. He was sent to MADRID, on various errands and there became acquainted with Emilio LANG, an employee of the Abwehr Kriegsorganisation. LANG asked him to get in touch with members of the Falange to see whether some of them could be engaged to work as German agents abroad.

In the fall of 1940 A WENDE went to work for the Abwehr in MADRID, and stayed there until September 1941, when he was discharged for refusing to undertake a mission to MEXICO and the UNITED STATES.

A WENDE then returned to GERMANY and obtained a position as Abteilungsleiter in Abteilung Versorgung in the Ukrainian regional headquarters of the Zentral Handelsgesellschaft Ost (Central Trading Corporation for the East), an organization that sold chemical fertilizers and other necessities to the farmers, and bought their products. When Russian advances destroyed his field of activity he returned to Germany to seek a new job.

S E C R E T

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I. THE ABTEHR AND THE SD IN SPAIN (Continued)

In GERMANY he met Fliegerstabsoberleutnant KURTZ - a member of Abwehrstelle MÜNSTER (CGGS 4346/N 52/1 9374) - who thought that MENDE might help him make contacts in SPAIN. MENDE went to SPAIN in April 1943 to prepare the ground, then returned to GERMANY to pick up KURTZ. They visited BILBAO and BARCELONA, Spain, and then returned to MÜNSTER. MENDE went to SPAIN again in March 1944, but when he returned to MÜNSTER he found that a change in plans and personnel had taken place and that his mission had been a waste of effort. He never returned to SPAIN.

Anton STOEGER was born in 1913 in HOTTENKLEBER (CGGS 4346/N 49/Y 8089), Kreis ERFURT. He entered the Bavarian civil service in 1936 as a Staatsdiplomatareiter with the Landrat of ERBING (CGGS 4346/1 49/1 0927). He transferred to the German Foreign Office in April 1939 and after four months' apprenticeship in BERLIN (CGGS 4346/N 53/1 8550) he was assigned to the consulate in GRESZCZYN, Poland, as Konsulatspraktikant.

STOEGER returned to BERLIN (CGGS 4346/N 53/1 8550) in October 1939 and worked in the Rechtsabteilung, collecting data on the sinkings of Allied ships. He was assigned to the German consulate in MALMÖ, Sweden, in April 1940 but returned to BERLIN (CGGS 4346/N 53/1 8550) in September to work in the cryptographic department of the Foreign Office.

In August 1941 STOEGER was transferred to the German Embassy in MADRID, Spain. He was put in charge of the financial section which made payments to needy German residents and which paid the family allotments for Germans who were drafted from SPAIN. He left MADRID in March 1945 in order to join the German Army but managed to avoid induction by applying for a furlough through the Foreign Office.

Wilhelm OBERBEIL was born in 1914 in MÜNCHEN (CGGS 4346/N 49/Y 8556). He went to ARGENTINA in 1934 and worked there as a farm hand and later as an employee of the Deutsche Bank in BUENOS AIRES. When war broke out in 1939 he returned to GERMANY to join the German Army. In 1941 he was made a Lieutenant. Because of his knowledge of Spanish, he was assigned to the Dolmetscher Kompanie MÜNCHEN (Y 8556), AOK VII, in the fall of 1943. After a minor assignment in ITALY, OBERBEIL was sent to KOZLOVA in December 1943. There he worked in Referat I H, translating and checking incoming messages. In November 1944 he returned to GERMANY and was put in charge of FM 153, which was to operate on the Italian front but was never committed.

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S E C R E T

INTERROGATION REPORT No 39

I. THE ABWEHR AND THE SD IN SPAIN (Continued)

KO SPANIEN

Organization. The following list shows the organization of KO SPANIEN as of November 1944, according to Lieutenant OBERBEIL.

Leiter

Fregattenkapitän LEISNER, alias WENZ, alias SOLNER

Referat I

Oberstleutnant KIEKEBUSCH	Leiter
Hauptmann Dr SCHÖNE	I M
Sonderführer (?) CANARIS	"
Leutnant OBERBEIL (source)	"
Kapitän OBERMUELLER	I M
BUGGE, rank unknown	"
Korvettenkapitän GELDERN	"
Fregattenkapitän BALZER	"
Korvettenkapitän KELLER	"
Oberstleutnant von WENCKSTERN	I L
Gefreiter von BUCH	"
Hauptmann KREH	I I (?)

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Fliegerstabstechniker (?) WEISS

I T/LT

Sonderfuehrer COLLEMAN

"

Konsul RUEGGENBERG

I Vi (office in BARCELONA)

Referat II

Hauptmann KUNDEL

Leiter until early in 1944

Hauptmann M. UHAR

KUNDEL'S successor

Sonderfuehrer BAUMANN (BLAU)

WABER, rank unknown

Referat III

Oberstleutnant von MOHRSCHIEDT

Leiter

Sonderfuehrer GROMER

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S E C R E T

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 38

I. THE ABWEHR AND THE SD IN SPAIN (Continued)

Referat KUEHLENTHAL

This section employed agents for all other Referate.

KUEHLENTHAL, rank unknown Leiter

KNITTEL, rank unknown

Sonderfuehrer KLAEPPE

AMENDE (see Preamble)

Emilio LING, civilian

According to AMENDE and STOEGER, Tragattenkapitain LEISNER was succeeded some time in 1945 by Oberstleutnant von ROHRSCHMIDT.

Dienststelle PLANKERT

This office apparently contained the radio station from which Abwehr messages were sent to BERLIN and to the various agents. The transmitter was located on the third floor of the consular building at Castellana 18, MADRID, Spain.

Dr PLANKERT, rank unknown, Leiter in 1945.

AMBERG, Hans, rank unknown, active in 1945.

Dienststelle SEITEL

This office appears to have dealt in economic espionage. It had good connections with several Spanish ministries. It is uncertain whether it belonged to the SD or the Abwehr. The Dienststelle employed about twelve persons and was located on the second floor of the house at Castellana 18.

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Hauptmann SEIDEL, Leiter of this agency, was succeeded by a Dr GERSTUNG in the early part of 1945.

Mexican Mission. In the summer of 1941, BLUM of Referat II, Kriegssora direction BRUNNEN, told AMENDE that he was to go on a mission to MEXICO. He was sent to BERLIN to prepare for the mission and took a course in the Physikalische Reichsinstitut in the JOHANNESWITTE, northwest of BERLIN.

This course lasted ten days and dealt with the preparation of improvised explosives. No practical experiments were conducted and there were no practice demolitions. No regular classes were held and AMENDE believes that there was never more than a handful of students there.

When AMENDE returned to MADRID, Spain, BLUM gave him a suitcase which was supposed to contain 15,000 US dollars. Emilio LANG had procured him a steamship ticket and a Spanish passport in the name of Eduardo Ernesto FERRER MARTIN. AMENDE claims that he was not given any specific briefing, but was told merely to photograph ships sailing from MEXICO and to transmit whatever information of interest he might find. He had the addresses of five or six Mexican fascists

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Sabotaging of Allied Shipping. STOEGER believes that some Allied ships were blown up in the harbors of MALAGA or SEVILLA, Spain, late in 1943 or early in 1944. The ships were being loaded with oranges destined for the British Isles and the Buca HUBBEL managed to smuggle some explosives aboard with the fruit.

When the German ambassador at MADRID, Spain, heard of these incidents he was very displeased, especially since these actions were undertaken without his knowledge. Hauptmann HUBBEL, the organizer of these sabotage missions, was later recalled to GERMANY where he received the Ritterkreuz for his services in Spain.

Supplying of German U-Boats. ROTHEFRITZ, the proprietor of the RESTAURANT at Jovellanos 7, MADRID, Spain, frequently sold German canned goods to his friends in the city. ROTHEFRITZ told STOEGER that these cans had originally been destined for use aboard German U-Boats but were rejected as being of poor quality. STOEGER does not know how ROTHEFRITZ managed to get in them, but believes that the firm of Deposito de Carbonos de TENERIFE, owned by a man called JENSEN, figured in the deal. This firm supplied German ships in Spanish harbors with coal before the war.

Co-operation of Spanish Officials. MENDE believes that the Spanish secret police had very close ties with the Abwehr and the SI. He cannot give any specific information but claims that this was common knowledge. He further believes that the foreign branch of the Falange submitted reports of various kinds to the Abwehr. Carlos PEREYRA, an

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I. THE ABWEHR AND THE SD IN SPAIN (continued)

which he had obtained from a Mexican major who had visited SPAIN in the spring of 1941.

This major, whose name AEBEL claims to have forgotten, had come to EUROPE to interest Spanish or German agencies in sabotage operations which could be aimed at the UNITED STATES through MEXICO. He claimed to be the leader of a strong fascist organization in MEXICO, which AEBEL believes to be the Comisas de Oro movement which was active in VERACRUZ, Mexico.

The ship which was to take AEBEL to MEXICO was to leave from BILBAO, Spain. AEBEL claims that he suddenly realized the dangerous nature of his mission while he was on his way to the port, and while he was vacillating over whether or not to go through with the undertaking, the vessel left without him. A few days later he was picked up by the police, turned over to the SO at MADRID, Spain, and ordered to report to EISENHORN. He was interrogated at the OKW Abwehr office, cleared of a charge of treason, and ordered to join Regiment BRANDBURG. He refused and was thereupon prohibited from ever working for the Abwehr in the future.

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INTERVIEW REPORT No 38

I. THE ABWEHR AND THE SD IN SPAIN (Continued)

agent for the Mexican motion picture industry, residing in MADRID, Spain, seems to have been the liaison agent between the Abwehr and the Falange.

An Agent Retires. In August 1944 OBERBEIL was told to take to GERMANY a Spanish agent who had been in ENGLAND on Abwehr business, in order to keep him from being arrested by Spanish authorities.

OBERBEIL took charge of ALCAZAR DE VELLASCO, the Spanish agent, at HENDAYE on the Franco-Spanish border, where he had been brought by FERCH, an Abwehr and SD agent in SEBASTIAN, Spain. OBERBEIL and DE VELLASCO flew aboard a German Air Force plane from HENDAYE to MUNICH, and then proceeded to MUNICHEN (Y 8556) by rail. There OBERBEIL received instructions from Ast MUNICHEN to take the agent to GERMISCH (D 5282), to the house of Frau KEHRELMAN. She was told that the Spaniard was a guest of the German government who had come to the mountains to write a book. OBERBEIL also provided the agent with a false passport, made out in the name of Juan GOMEZ-PEREZ, journalist.

In December 1944 OBERBEIL returned to GERMISCH (D 5282) and then he found that his friend was not satisfied with his lodgings at Frau KEHRELMAN's, he arranged for him to live in a hotel, the name of which he claims to have forgotten.

ALCAZAR DE VELLASCO received 600 Marks a month from Ast MUNICHEN, in recognition of his past Abwehr services.

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The SD in SPAIN

STOEGER believes that the chief of the SD in SPAIN was undoubtedly the policeattaché at the German Embassy. Kriminalrat SS Sturmbauführer WINZER held this position from 1941 until September 1944 and was succeeded by Kriminalkommissar SS Sturmbauführer HANNES. STOEGER and MENDEL have furnished the names of a number of SD agents in SPAIN but they claim not to know their exact functions.

SD Personnel in SPAIN.

MADRID

Kriminalkommissar KULLMANN
Kriminalkommissar GINGER
Kriminalsekretär BÄLCK
Kriminalsekretär KOENNECKE
Kriminalsekretär SCHMITT
Kriminalassistent GUTBIER
Kriminalassistent WIOFCZEK
Polizeiinspektor VEY
JUNG, rank unknown
MOSEK, rank unknown
SCHWARZ, rank unknown

BAD JOZ

SS Hauptscharführer DONKE

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SD Personnel in SPAIN.

MADRID

Kriminalkommissar KULLMANN
Kriminalkommissar SINGER
Kriminalsekretar BALLCK
Kriminalsekretar KOENNECKE
Kriminalsekretar SCHMITT
Kriminalassistent GUTRIER
Kriminalassistent WIONCZEK
Polizeinspektor VEY-
JUNG, rank unknown
MOSEK, rank unknown
SCHWARZ, rank unknown

BADAJOS

SS Hauptsturmfuhrer DOMKE

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I. THE ABWEHR AND THE SD IN SPAIN (Continued)

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ALCAZAR DE VELASCO received 600 Marks a month from 1st MUENCHEN, in recognition of his past Abwehr services.

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Age : 33 Hair: Dark blond, thinning
Height: 1.82 m Face: Round
Build : Athletic
(Identification: STOEGER)

BALCK, Robert

Kriminalsekretär. SS Hauptscharführer. Came to MADRID, Spain from BILBAO, Spain in the spring of 1944 and worked under Kriminalkommissar SINGER in SD MADRID. He is a native of HILDEBURG (GSGS 4346/L 54/S 5954).

Age : 35 Hair: Blond, thinning
Height: 1.70 m Face: Round and swollen
Build : Stocky
(Identification: STOEGER)

BALZER, Fregattenkapitän

Was in Referat I M, KO SPANIEN from 1942 until September 1944. Last seen in VERONA, Italy, in April 1945. He was then on some abwehr mission, possibly with a MAT. Comes from Northern GERMANY.

Age : 50 Build: Slim
Height: 1.80 m Hair : Light
(Identification: ODERBEIL)

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 38

I. THE ABTEHR AND THE SD IN SPAIN (Continued)

BAUMANN, alias BLAU, Friedrich, Sonderfuehrer

According to OBERBEIL: Began to work in Referat II, KO SPANIEN in 1942. Speaks Spanish without accent, also good English. An excellent tennis player.
According to AMENDE: Was put in charge of Referat II in September 1944. Had a brother in Abwehr II, BERLIN (Z 8550). See SLEEF cards 1559 (white) and 4512 (pink).

Age : 35 Build: Slender
Height: 1.75 m Face : Round
(Identification: OBERBEIL and AMENDE)

BERGER

Hauptmann. Visited SPAIN with von BOMIN in the fall of 1941, worked later at Post BERLIN (Z 8550).

Age : 48 Build: Slender
Height: 1.80 m Hair : Blond, thinning
(Identification: AMENDE)

BEUER

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SS Hauptsturmführer. An SD agent in ITALY, apparently engaged in investigating SPEER Ministry personnel.

Age : 35 Build: Slender
Height: 1.75 m Hair : Brown
(Identification: AMENDE)

von DOMIN, alias BOHM

Kapitän zur See. Operated in MADRID and BARCELONA, Spain, after serving with the Abwehr in FRANCE. See SHAFER Card.

Age : 50 Build: Slender
Height: 1.65 m Hair : Grey, thinning
(Identification: AMENDE)

BORCHERT, alias BOHM, Roberto

Lieutenant. Worked for KO SPANIEN in BARCELONA until 1941 and then transferred to the AFRIKA Korps. See SHAFER Card.

Age : 29 Build: Slender
Height: 1.70 m Hair : Blond
(Identification: AMENDE)

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Sonderfuehrer. Nephew of Admiral CAMERIS. Worked in Kriegsorganisation SP.NIEN in 1941. See SHLEF Card.

Age : 35 Hair: Dark blond
Height: 1.75 m Build: Slim
(Identification: MENDE)

COLLMANN

Sonderfuehrer. Began to work in Referat I T/LW, KO SP.NIEN in 1943.

Age : 50 Build: Thin
Height: 1.75 m Hair : Dark, thinning
(Identification: OBERBEIL)

DOMKE

SS Hauptscharfuehrer. Served with the SD in B.D.002, Spain, in 1941. See SHLEF Card.

Age : 35 Build: Powerful
Height: 1.90 m Hair : Dark, thinning
(Identification: MICHLE)

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Age : 50 Hair: Dark, thinning
Height: 1.73 m Eyes: Dark, uses glasses
Build: Broad-shouldered for reading
(Identification: SCHREIBL)

GERLICH

In charge of the Deutsche Reichsbahn Zentrale MADRID, but had some sort of connection with the SD. He served in the German Army for a year and then returned to MADRID, Spain.

Age : 33 Build: Slender
Height: 1.75 m Hair : Blond
(Identification: WENDE and STOESER)

GERSTUNG

Came to MADRID late in 1944 and worked at the Dienststelle SEIDNER. He may still be in SPAIN.

Age : 55 Hair: Dark blond, graying
Height: 1.75 m Face: Thin
Build: Slender
(Identification: STOLGER)

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I. THE ARBEHR AND THE SD IN SPAIN (Continued)

GROBIN

Sonderfuehrer. In Referat III, KO SPANIEN as of 1942. From Northern GERMANY, he speaks with a HAMBURG accent.

Age : 35 Hair: Blond
Height: 1.75 m Eyes: light, wears glasses
Build : Slender
(Identification: OBERBEIL)

GROSS, alias GRANDE

SD agent working in SPAIN. Although he is a native of BERLIN (GSGS 4346/N 53/3 75) he speaks perfect Spanish and could pass as a Spaniard. See SHLEF Card.

Age : 32 Build: Slender
Height: 1.70 m Hair : Dark
(Identification: MENDE)

GUDE

Korvettenkapitaen. He served in Referat II of KO SPANIEN until September, 1943. He is a North German. See SHLEF Card.

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Age : 52 Build: Stocky
Height: 1.75 m Hair : Dark, thinning
(Identification: STONGER)

GUTRIER

Kriminalassistent. Formerly a musician, he joined the BRESLAU (GSGS 4346/P 52/C 4919) police in 1933. He came to MADRID, Spain, in the fall of 1943 to work in the photostatic reproduction office of the SD there.

Age : 48 Build: Heavy
Height: 1.69 m Hair : Blond, almost bald
(Identification: STONGER)

HACK, or HLAG

Lived in the UNITED STATES for some time. He worked for 1st MÜNSTER (GSGS 4346/K 52/A 9374) in 1943. See SILEY Card.

Age : 45 Build: Slim
Height: 1.70 m Hair : Brown
He suffers from a skin disease which makes him scratch incessantly.
(Identification: ARONDE)

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HORNIGL

Hauptmann. He was writer of Referat II of KO SPMIEN until April 1944 and then returned to GERMANY where he was awarded the Ritterkreuz. He was last reported working in KOBLEN (GSGS 4346/K 51/F 4560).

Age : 42 Build: Slender
Height: 1.80 m
(Identification: AMBUE and STOEGER)

JUNG, Hermann

A journalist who contributed to various FRANKFURT and MAIN (GSGS 4346/L 51/G 6868) newspapers, but was actually an SD agent operating in MADRID, Spain. He came to GERMANY in 1944 and may still be there.

Age : 53 Build: Stocky
Height: 1.60 m Hair : Thin, blond
(Identification: STOEGER)

JUERGENSEN

Sonderfuehrer with 1st STETTIN (GSGS 4346/O 54/O 5358) in 1943. He was a merchant in WELLSBURG (GSGS 4346/L 55/C 2395) in civilian life.

Age : 39 Build: Slender
Height: 1.80 m Hair : Blond
(Identification: AMBUE)

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I. THE WEHR AND THE SD IN SPAIN (Continued)

KELLER

Korvettenkapitän: Was active on behalf of Referat I M, KO SP.NIEM in AFRICA. Seen in MADRID in fall 1944, in BERLIN (Z 8550) in December 1944.

Age : 45 Hair: Brown, thinning
Height: 1.70 m
(Identification: BEREBE)

KESSEMEIER, Theodor

Travelled around EUROPE engaged in propaganda work on behalf of the German Foreign Office. He owns the Falkenverlag printing firm in HILDESBURG and resides at RITZBURG (GSC 4346/RT 54/20 221), near HILDESBURG.

Age : 40 Build: Slender
Height: 1.80 m Hair: Blond
(Identification: HENDE)

KIEKEBUSCH, Eberhard (?)

Oberstleutnant. Became Leiter of Referat I, KO SP.NIEM in 1942. Was in SPAIN during the civil war, then returned to GERMANY for some staff assignment.

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Age : 45 Hair: Brown, thinning
Height: 1.75 m
(Identification: OBERBEIL)

KOL. PFM

Defraiter or hoodlum. Worked with KUSCHENTHAL
in MADRID. Based in SPAIN for a long time, married
to Spanish woman. See SHLEF Card 60297 (pink).

Age : 30 Hair: Dark
Height: 1.74 m Eyes: Dark
Build: Slender
(Identification: OBERBEIL)

KNITTEL, Gustav

Worked in the office of Korvettenkapitän GUDE at
RO SPANIER in MADRID, Spain from the summer of 1943
until 1945 and may still be in SPAIN.

Age : 43 Build: Heavy
Height: 1.70 m Hair : Dark
(Identification: STOEGER)

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I. THE WEHR AND THE SD IN SPAIN (Continued)

KOENNECKE, Rudolf

Kriminalsekretar and SS Hauptscharfuehrer. Worked with the SD in BILBAO, Spain, in 1941 and also served as deputy NSDAP Ortsgruppenleiter. He entered the office of the police attache in MELILLA in 1942. He may still be in SPAIN.

Age : 35 Build: Slender
Height: 1.75 m Hair: Blond
(Identification: MENDE and STOEGER)

KRAEMER

Was German consul at MELILLA, Spanish Morocco, until fall 1944, then came to TANGIER. From MELILLA he had controlled agents for KOENNECKE, was apparently expelled.

Age : 48 Hair: Dark
Height: 1.70 m Other characteristics:
Build: Stout One hand crippled
(Identification: OBERBEIL)

KREH

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Hauptmann. Was in charge of Referat 1 I, KO SPANIEN from 1942 until October 1944. See SHLEF card 1098 (pink).

Age : 40 Build: Slender
Height: 1.72 m Hair : Dark
(Identification: OBERPFEIL)

KUBER WITTELL, Günther

In charge of reports for KO SPANIEN. He had an electrical appliance business in MADRID, Spain, before the war. His father, a retired Generalmajor, resides at GARMISCH-PARTENKIRCHEN (GSGS 4346/M 48/G 5383).

Age : 40 Build: Slender
Height: 1.75 m Hair : Dark
(Identification: ANZENDE and STOEGER)

KULLMANN

Kriminalkommissar. Worked with SD in MADRID, Spain, until October 1944. A native of MÜNCHEN (GSGS 4346/M 49/Y 8596) he worked with the Gestapo there for ten years.

Age : 37 Build: powerful
Height: 1.85 m Hair : dark
(Identification: STOEGER)

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LINDNER, Horst

SS Unterscharfuhrer. SD agent at CERBERE (GSGS 4148/S 0972/6020), France, in 1941. He is a native of North GERMANY.

Age : 30 Build: Slender
Height: 1.75 m Hair: Dark
(Identification: UNKNOWN)

LUETH, Heinz

Served with 1st LIEBOW, Portugal, from 1940 to 1941, and later worked in the Technisches Amt der Waffen SS in BERLIN. He is a native of EUTIN (GSGS 4346/M 55/N 8920) in SCHLESWIG,

Age : 42 Build: Slender
Height: 1.85 m Hair: Blond

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German vice consul in BARCELONA, Spain, and in charge of Abwehr activities there (I 71). He was in the Abwehr in the last war, then went to SPAIN as a representative of IG Farbenindustrie.

Age : 62 Build: Heavy
Height: 1.70 m Hair: White
(Identification: MENDE)

SCHMIDT

Oberst. Officer of 1st BREXSTER (GSGS 4346/K 52/L 9374) in 1943, then transferred to 1st NURNBERG (GSGS 4345/L 50/O 4209).

Age : 52 Build: Slender
Height: Medium Hair: Grey, balding
(Identification: MENDE)

SCHMIDT, Engelberg

Kriminalsekretar and SS Hauptscharfuhrer. Came from the Kripo to work for the SD in ALDRID, Spain, in 1943. He worked mostly on passports and cases of involuntary restriction.

Age : 39 Build: Athletic
Height: 1.76 m Hair: Blond
(Identification: STOEGER)

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 38

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 38

I. THE ABWEHR AND THE SD IN SPAIN (Continued)

PFLEGER, Emmerich

SS Hauptscharfuehrer. In charge of the SD office at CERBERE, France (GSGS 4140/C 3822/6020). Native Viennese, he was formerly employed by the police in WIEN (GSGS 4346/C 49/4094).

Age : 37 Build: Stocky
Height: 1.70 m Hair: Blond
(Identification: KLENDE)

PLANKERT, Hans (?)

In charge of Dienststelle in LEROU, Spain. He arrived from BERLIN (GSGS 4740/W 53/3 75) in 1941. He comes from North GERMANY.

Age : 27 Hair: Light blond
Height: 1.65 m Face: Oval
Build : Stocky Complexion: Ruddy
(Identification: STOEGER)

RUEGGERBERG

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Age : 33 Hair: Dark
Height: 1.65 m
(Identification: SPOEGER)

SEITNER, Karl (P)

Worked for the Gestapo in SEBASTIAN, Spain, was drafted
in the Granzeled in 1943. His father owns a large
book store in BARRONDOLE, Spain.

Age : 32 Build: Slender
Height: 1.75 m Hair : Dark
(Identification: LAENDE)

SIMBER, Heinz

Secretary to KUNZELMEIER. -- SWEDEN German and a
fanatical Nazi.

Age : 40 Hair: Brown
Height: 1.80 m
(Identification: LAENDE)

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 38

I. THE ABWHER AND THE SD IN SPAIN (Continued)

SCHOENE

Hauptmann. Joined Referat I B in 1943. A lawyer, probably from BERLIN (Z 8550).

Age : 40 Hair: Blond
Height: 1.69 m Eyes: Light
Build : Stocky
(Identification: OBERWIL)

SCHLURZ, Karl

Worked for Kriminalkommissar BUNGER at SD MADRID, Spain. He was deported by the Spanish authorities in late 1944 but returned to MADRID in January 1945 under a different name and with dyed hair. He paints for a hobby, owns a house in BARRIO de LA JORCA, Spain.

Age : 45 Hair: Gray
Height: 1.75 m Nose : Thin, scar on left
Slightly lame in one leg cheek.
(Identification: BUEGER) Build: Frail

SEIFEL, Hans

Oberleutnant or Hauptmann. Came to MADRID, Spain, in 1944 and founded Dienststelle SEIDEL.

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Age : 37 Hair: Dark, thinning
Height: 1.75 m Face: Round
(Identification: STOEGER)

WEBER

Worked in Bureau WEBER in MADRID, Spain, until March 1945, then flew with STOEGER to BRNO (GSGS 4345/L 49/Y 8553) and proceeded to AUSTRIA.

Age : 28 Face : Thin
Height: 1.70 m Eyebrows : Bushy
Hair : Blond Mustache: Small
(Identification: STOEGER)

WEBER, Kurt

Performed ND functions at the German vice consulate in BARCELONA, Spain, from 1940 to 1941. He joined the embassy in MADRID, Spain, early in 1943 to take charge of the food rationing office there. He is a native of MÜNCHEN (GSGS 4346/L 54/S 5054).

Age : 55 Build: Heavy
Height: 1.65 m Hair : Reddish
(Identification: WENDE and STOEGER)

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I. THE ABTEHR AND THE SD IN SPAIN (Continued)

SINGER

Kriminalkommissar. SS Hauptsturmfuehrer. Came from RSHA BERLIN (GSGS 4346/N 04/179) to work for SD MADRID, Spain at the end of 1942. He comes from the RHEINLAND.

Age : 35
Height: 1.70 m
(Identification: STOEGER)

Hair: Blond
Eyes: Oval

TRETTNER, Gustav (?)

He is said to have worked for the SD in VALENCIA, Spain, and BARCELONA, Spain. He spent some time in IRON, Spain.

Age : 35
Height: 1.73 m
(Identification: LEBNIE)

Hair: Dark

VEY, Georg

Polizeiinspektor and SS Obersturmfuehrer. He worked for the SD in MADRID, Spain in 1941, was liaison officer to the Spanish AZUL Division in RUSSIA in 1943 and 1944, then returned to SPAIN.

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WIONCZEK

Kriminalassistent. Came to MADRID in spring 1944 from the RSM in BERLIN (N 53/3 75). He was in charge of registration. He is a native of OBERSCHLESIEEN.

Age : 35 Hair: Blond, thinning
Height: 1.80 m Face: Oval
Build : Slender
(Identification: WIONCZEK)

RAUPE

SS Standartenfuhrer. In charge of SD in Northern ITALY 1944-1945. Wore the insignia of the AFRIKA Korps.

Age : 35 Build: Stocky
Height: 1.75 m Hair : Blond
(Identification: RAUPE)

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I. THE ABWEHR AND THE SD IN SPAIN (Continued)

WEISS

Fliegerstabsingenieur (?). Joined KO SPANIER in 1941, was in charge of Referat I T/L.

Age : 40 Build: Stout
Height: 1.70 m Hair: Dark
(Identification: OBERBEIL)

von ENCKSTERN

Oberst. Was for many years in charge of Referat I L, KO SPANIER. Is said to own a home on one of the BALEARIC Islands.

Age : Over 50 Hair: Light
Height: 1.75 m Eyes: Wears glasses
(Identification: OBERBEIL)

WINZER, Paul

Kriminalrat and SS Obersturmbannführer. Served as police attache in MADRID, Spain from 1942 until September 1944, then flew to BERLIN (CGCS 4346/E 53/3 25). He is supposed to have lived in SWITZ since 1937.

Age : 37 Hair: Dark
Height: 1.82 m Eyes: Wears glasses
Build : heavy
(Identification: STOEGER)

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Spaniards suspected of having worked for the SD or the Abwehr. (Source: 226022)

AGUILLO, Alfonso

Worked for WEISNER at Kriessorganisation SPANIEN in MADRID, Spain. Was formerly the secretary of a Spanish admiral in the Naval Ministry.

Age : 35
Height: 1.82 m

Build: Slender
Hair: Dark

ALCAZAR DE VELASCO, Manuel

He worked actively in SPAIN for the Abwehr from the beginning of the war, recruiting agents in close collaboration with Sonderführer KUCHMENTHAL up to the beginning of 1944. He has also been identified with Japanese intelligence circles as early as January 1941. He was present here to the Spanish Embassy in LONDON, England, in January 1941. He went to GERMANY in the middle of July 1944 and was reported in MÜNCHEN (CGCS 4346/W 42/7 8596) in August 1944.

Age : 35
Height: 1.70 m

Build: Slender
Hair : Dark

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del CAMPO, Jose

He went abroad for KO SPANIER in 1940. Cuban, he was formerly in the Cuban Army.

Age : 43
Height: 1.70 m

Build: Slender

CASINEIRA, Pedro

He worked with BUNIGAS in the procurement of agents. Was an intimate friend of the former Spanish Foreign Secretary, SERRANO SUNER. He has practiced law in OVIEDO, Spain.

Age : 53
Height: 1.78 m

Build: Heavy
Hair : Greying

de CASERO, Fernando

Was a Palencia leader in BELGIUM, North Africa, for a long time and worked for the Spanish Foreign Office. He performed some missions for KO SPANIER and assisted KESSEMEIER.

Age : 45
Height: 1.75 m

Hair : Dark
Complexion: Dark

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Age : 38
Height: 1.70 m
Build : Stout

Hair: Dark
Eyes: Wears glasses

de JUAN, Luciano

Spanish police official who worked in the supervision of foreigners, he assisted Herr HUBER of Referat III, KO'STANJIN.

Age : 35
Height: 1.69 m

Build: Slight
Hair : Dark and wavy

KARL, Mauricio

Served in the Spanish security office in MADRID, Spain. He is said to have worked for Abwehr agent Emilio LANG. He is not personally known to MENDE.

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Height: 1.75 m

Build: Slender
Hair : Dark and wavy

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 38

I. THE AMBER AND THE RED CAMELION (Continued)

MORENO BRAVO, Gregorio

Worked for Vice Consul RUEGGEBERG in BARCELONA, Spain. He introduced AMBER to all sorts of officials in that city. He works as a writer.

Age : Early 30's Build: Slender
Height: 1.39 m Hair : Dark and wavy

PEREYRA, Carlos

Mexican resident of MADRID, Spain, represented Mexican movie industry, made his Mexican connections available to RED CAMELION.

Age : 40 Build: Slender
Height : 1.70 m Hair : Dark

POBLADOR, Jose Maria

A lawyer in BARCELONA, Spain, he contacted agents for German Vice Consul RUEGGEBERG.

Age : 40 Build: Stout
Height: 1.75 m Hair : Dark

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MICHAEL, Jose

Inspector of the border police at PORT BOU, Spain. He worked with FLEGER and other SD officials. He has a brother in the Spanish police administration in MADRID, Spain.

Age : 52
Height: 1.70 m

Build: Stout

QUEROL, Rudesindo

A former journalist, he served Vice Consul RIEGGERBERG as contact man for agents on ships in BARCELONA and VALENCIA, Spain.

Age : 43
Height: 1.70 m

Build: Slender
Hair : Dark

REVILLA, Manuel

Worked for von BONIN in 1941. Owns a factory near SAN SEBASTIAN, Spain.

Age : 32
Height: 1.75 m

Build: Slender
Hair : Dark and wavy

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 38

I. THE ABTEHR AND THE SD IN SPAIN (Continued)

SALCES, Jose Luis

Worked for Emilio LING in MADRID, Spain and PFLEGER at PORT BOU, Spain. He worked in the BILBAO, Spain police force.

Age : 32 Build: Slender
Height: 1.65 m Eyes: wears glasses

da SILV.

Portuguese. Went to SOUTH AMERICA in 1941 for KO SPNIEN, then returned and is said to have served in the Spanish AVUL Division in RUSSIA. See SHEET Card 19392 (pink) and, under the name of ALEXANDER, Jean Charles Alexandre, see SHEET pink cards 19281, 19282, 19283, 19284.

SOL, Alfonso

Engaged in the import and export business at FORT BOU, Spain. He worked for Sergeant PFLEGER.

Age : 30 Build: Slender
Height: 1.65 m Hair: Dark

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del VALLE, Ruiz

Belonged to Captain CHAMORRO's unit at FIGUERAS,
Spain. He also worked for Vice Consul RUEGGENBERG
at BARCELONA, Spain. He has lived in the UNITED STATES
for some years.

Age : 35

Height: 1.85 m

Build: Slender

Hair : Dark

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II. AMT VI PLANS FOR POST-WAR ACTIVITIES IN SPAIN

Suggestion for Allied Intelligence Control. As a means of checking on the activities of Amt VI personnel still at large in SPAIN, ROEFEL suggests the re-activation of the pipeline which consisted of the former Hungarian General Staff (Werc-Linie). Well connected in Falangist circles and exceptionally well informed on German intelligence activities in SPAIN, this agency relied on, among other sources, the services of a Hungarian General Staff officer and honorary member of the FALANGE, apparently the only prominent Hungarian who fought actively on FRANCO's side during the civil war.

Since the members of the Hungarian Intelligence Service usually enjoyed diplomatic status and for the most part did not identify themselves with the SZALASI regime, they might still be available for Allied intelligence purposes.

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
INTERROGATION REPORT IC 43

Source: SCETTL, Wilhelm AIC 894 10 September 1945

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AUSTRIAN POLITICS FROM 1918 TO THE PRESENT TIME

I. INTRODUCTION

The source for this report is Dr. Wilhelm ... 904. As deputy chief of Gruppe VI E, RSHA, and ... of the three separate for ... and ... and ... had access to great funds of information, and now that the war is over he is attempting to review his knowledge objectively. An apparently repentant Austrian Nazi, ... displays a natural but not excessive bias in his ideas.

Other information obtained from ... has appeared in Third United States Army Interrogation Reports Nos 10, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22, and 30; and in Third United States Army Special Interrogation Reports Nos 1, 2, and 4.

II. BACKGROUND

After the dissolution of the ... as a result of World War I, the Austrian members of the old imperial parliament ... a provisional national assembly. This body was composed of the representatives of the three main political parties: the Sozialdemokratische Partei Oesterreichs, the Christlichsozialer Partei, and the Alldeutsche Volkspartei. On 12 November 1918 the representatives of all three parties united in issuing a sole declaration to the effect that ... was an integral part of the German Republic. From that time on, until the Anschluss of 1938, these parties guided the fortunes of Austria and their influence is discernible even today. A short survey of Austrian politics before the two wars may therefore assist in an understanding of present-day events.

III. THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY

The Sozialdemokratische Partei Oesterreichs was at one time considered the most progressive and highly developed labor party in the world. A large number of industrial workers had already been organized prior to World War I and as time went on the unions penetrated all fields of endeavor. The Sozialdemokratische Partei was constructed upon a solid foundation of strong unions, and the leaders of the Freie Gewerkschaften (free unions) actively controlled the policies of their party.

The party ... in the so-called Linz ... indicated that the Austrian Social Democrats were a good deal more radical than their German counterparts. ... this rather extreme stand on the part of the Social Democrats that caused the almost total elimination of the ... the ... brief period of power in the fall of 1918, found themselves opposed by an all ... almost as ... considerably more certain of ... was not long before the Communist Party lost ...

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III. THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS (Continued)

Without ever losing sight of their ultimate radical aims, the leaders of the Sozialdemokratische Partei steered a course along constitutional rather than revolutionary lines. Revolutionary agencies such as the soldiers' Soviets were transformed into constructive organizations or dissolved. Many problems, however, were bypassed when they appeared too difficult of solution and the leadership became cautious and hesitant. When the party found itself without a majority in the newly elected Parliament of 1930, it abandoned, more or less voluntarily, the executive power. Rather than take part in an uncertain and shaky coalition government, the Social Democrats relinquished the reins and the party joined the parliamentary opposition.

The new aim of the Social Democrats was to gain complete control of WEIM (GGGS 4346/3 49/X 4049), the seat of one-third of WEIM's population. With this fortress as a base, they planned to undertake a systematic conquest of the provinces and the remaining two-thirds of the population. The first part of this project was carried out with complete success. The ultimate goal, however, remained at all times just beyond their grasp. In every election the party fell short of a majority by ten percent of the total vote.

This socialist hegemony over WEIM (049/X 4094) has left even to this day a deep impression upon the political complexion of its citizens. It was completely true when the May Day paraders used to chant in unison "Weimar is red and Weimar will stay red!" (Weim ist rot und Weim bleibt rot!). It was here that the Sozialdemokratische Partei had its central offices and many of the national leaders of the party became active in the city administration. After the death of the old labor leader, ADOLPH DUBAUER, Nationalist Dr. Carl GILKE became Oberbürgermeister of WEIM (049/X 4094) and grew in this capacity to become one of the most beloved figures in WEIM.

The task of the new city of Weimar is indeed a gigantic one. The capital of WEIM, located on the edge of a new state of six million inhabitants, and without an agricultural hinterland of its own, could never, by itself, provide enough work and sustenance for its two million citizens. The fact that the Social Democrats were able to remain in power until 1933, weathering even the economic crisis of 1930 and 1931, is a tribute to their efficiency and ingenuity. They were, of course, unable to solve all the economic and social problems that troubled the unbalanced city, and the eventual collapse of the Socialist administration was recognized by all as being inevitable.

At their peak the Social Democratic unions numbered some 80,000 members, and it was this body of faithful followers that enabled the party to weather all storms until 1933. Most of these members lived in WEIM (049/X 4094), and the Sozialdemokratische Partei with its subordination was never strong in the provinces. A few

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III. THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS (Continued)

islands of support may be found in the industrial districts to the South of Wien and in the Saxon industrial district of SAIG. In the SAIG (GCS 4346/C 48/B 6857), ... (GCS 4346/C 48/B 6999), and the suburbs of Vienna (GCS 4346/C 48/B 8298). There were only two Socialists in the holds in eastern Austria: the factory town of St. Pölten (GCS 4346/C 48/B 8588) and Linz (GCS 4346/C 48/B 8689). SAIG (GCS 4346/C 48/T 9961), ... its main center of the Austrian Empire, was politically inactive but may have become a scene of underground operations after the outbreak of World War II brought it back into the industrial limelight.

Thus, while the party succeeded in dominating SAIG (A 4094) it failed to gain sufficient support in the provinces and made no attempt to broaden its base by including in its ranks the bourgeois and peasant elements of the population. The Sozialdemokratische Partei is also open to criticism in that it refused to accept any part of the governmental responsibility and preferred to remain in constitutional opposition to the national administration.

IV. THE CHRISTIAN SOCIALISTS

The Christlichsozialer Partei never attained the popular support and organizational perfection that characterized the Sozialdemokratische Partei. The Christian Socialist party was, naturally, the voice of the Catholic Church, yet the Austrian ecclesiastical element never reached the dominant position attained by the German Catholics in the Zentrumspartei and the Bayerische Volkspartei.

The party had two periods of great popularity and unqualified support by the Church: the first was just before World War I under Oberbauer Minister MULLER, and the second was during the chancellorship of the prelate GLEIBER from 1924 until 1928. At all other times, the Christlichsozialer Partei had very little popular support and was governed and controlled by a group of church politicians and devout parliamentarians. It had the complete support of the rural peasantry, but during the postwar years the urban petit bourgeoisie drifted into the ranks of the extreme right, the Heimatschutz and the NSDAP.

The Christlichsozialer Partei never adapted its program to the dictates of a new and rapidly changing economic and political situation, but simply expressed a desire to return to the status quo of 1918. The party, however, led by a group of exceedingly clever politicians, served as a rallying point for the conservative forces within the country, and managed to obtain a substantial number of votes in every national election. The combination of a certain number of votes from those whose interests were protected, plus the support of the rural districts, was sufficient to insure the party's perpetual control of the national government. This was made possible by the fact that the Social Democrats refused to form a minority government and to join a coalition.

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IV. THE CHRISTIAN SOCIALISTS (Continued)

The Christlichsozialer Partei was never a political homogeneous organization. Its base was the political passive rural population, which was organized into the Landbund. Then there was the party's ultraclerical wing led by the clergy and supported by a variety of Catholic organizations such as the Katholische Aktion, the Katholische Vereine, and several laymen's societies. Still additional party support came from a liberal wing composed of the Catholic workers' leagues under AUBACLER. The monarchists also voted the Christian Socialist ticket.

The Heimwehr, at first a bitter opponent of the Christlichsozialer Partei, later added its forces to the clerical movement. The Heimwehr had its origin in the local home-guard units which had been formed to control the excesses of the communistic elements among the returning soldiers after World War I. These groups were consolidated and later combined with a number of veterans' organizations to form a powerful reactionary pressure bloc.

Inner disagreements and fundamentally divergent political attitudes during the late twenties, split the Heimwehr into several factions. One large group was centered in STEIERMARK under Dr. HUBER and adopted a decidedly Nazi doctrine. It was later dissolved and most of its members joined the NSDAP. Another important group under Dr. HUBER existed in the TIROL and in NIEDER-ÖSTERREICH and stood for the nationalistic Catholic program. Facilitating first on the fringes of the one group and then of the other was a third smaller faction led by Prince STARHUBER, a great admirer of Adolf HITLER. All three groups were definitely anti-democratic and authoritarian.

STARHUBER, the Christian Socialist politician par excellence, used the Heimwehr movement for his own ends, playing one faction against the other and never actually ceding any of his power to these militant reactionaries. STARHUBER's successors, however were not so adept at the game and were forced to make definite commitments. Although the regular Christian Socialists had no sympathy for the ideology propounded by the Heimwehr, the party needed new blood if it was to be kept alive. STARHUBER was the decisive factor in forcing the Christian Socialists to include the Heimwehr in their ranks.

STARHUBER had always been sympathetic toward the semi-fascist Heimwehr and he indicated to the Austrian Government that a fusion of STARHUBER's wing of the Heimwehr with the Christian Social Party (and thereby the Government) would meet with approval. Since the political situation made Austrian support essential, this wish was soon translated into action. In 1932 STARHUBER was elected Landesführer of the Österreichische Heimatschutz, as the newly consolidated and reorganized Heimwehr was called, and this militant group joined the Government and became an agency of the Christlichsozialer Partei. At this time the presence of ITALY in Austrian foreign affairs became a factor, and the inclusion of the Heimwehr as an internal affair was

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IV. CHRISTIAN SOCIALIST (Continued)

thoroughgoing. Some sort of modus vivendi had to be established. This was attempted in the so-called protocols of MOE, a system of treaties which legalized the Italian hegemony in Austrian affairs, desired by ITALY to offset the growing power of Nazi GERMANY.

This coalition had been an unnatural one from the very beginning. The Austrian government during 1932 and 1933 was shaken by one crisis after another, and the Heimwehr camp was a hotbed of plot and counterplot. In the continuous sequence of intrigues one of the Heimwehr leaders finally gained the upper hand. This was FEY, a war hero of the old imperial army.

The only concept that FEY understood was that of power, and he possessed the hardness and brutality to ride roughshod over all opposition. As Secretary of State for Security and later as Minister of the Interior under DOLLFUSS he set himself the task of eliminating the opposition of the Right and the Left with every means at his disposal. It was he who directed the suppression of the Socialist revolution of 12 February 1934 and the Nazi uprising of 25 July 1934. He was neither a monarchist nor a Nazi nor even strongly clerical, but was interested only in having the power to run AUSTRIA as he saw fit.

It was a surprise to most observers that the Heimwehr should rise to such height of power under Chancellor DOLLFUSS who was considered a representative of the moderate faction in the Christlichsoziale Partei. DOLLFUSS rose to the chancellery from the position of Secretary General of the Bundbund, the peasants' branch of the party. When he first took office he enjoyed considerable popularity because of a series of successful economic discussions which he arranged with the Western Powers. He suddenly revealed himself in a different light when he gave the Reichswehr a free hand in the organization of his secret police system, the necessary prerequisite for a fascist state. His reign was abruptly severed by his murder in July 1934.

The only man who could stand up to FEY was SCHUSCHNIGG, who later succeeded DOLLFUSS as Chancellor. SCHUSCHNIGG was determined to break the power of the Heimwehr and by playing one faction against the other he managed to split the movement and to counter it with his own paramilitary organization, the Osterreichische Sturmcharen. He finally emasculated all the militant groups by organizing them into a militia which was subordinate to the Army and commanded by a non-political general.

At the same time that SCHUSCHNIGG was waging an internal pro-front war against the Austrian rightists and leftists, he maintained an external struggle against Nazi GERMANY. All this was done without any visible support from the Western democracies and with only a 25% minority of the Austrian population behind him.

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(Continued)

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The Catholic clergy gradually gained influence in underground circles after the Nazi excesses became more extreme. The Austrian priests had at first not been especially anti-Nazi. Bishop Hudal, director of the Anzio attack, Italy, had written a book which attempted to create a synthesis between Catholicism and National Socialism, and a large number of Austrian priests found the arguments valid. As time went on, however, the anti-clerical manipulations of the Nazis became more obvious and the Austrian prelates realized that there could be no compromise with Hitler.

Underground collaboration between the rightist and leftist groups was never close. Members of the clergy were prohibited from working actively with Communist-controlled organizations. The Catholic leader, Fr. Hudal, declared that one cannot fight fire with fire (der Teufel durch Teufelstüb austreiben) and the prevention of the spread of Communism in Austria was considered just as vital as the sustenance of the Nazis. (Shortly before the entry of the Red Army into Vienna (X 4094), the Vatican sent Cardinal Hudal a letter embodying the following precepts: Complete reserve in dealings with the occupying forces; no attempts at rapprochement between the Russians and representatives of the Church; intensified ecclesiastical activities to counteract the pernicious Communist influence upon the faithful.)

The Alldeutsche party, as it was later known the Grossdeutsche Volkspartei was the third great party which influenced the political life of the Austrian Republic. This party had its origin in the Austrian world war veterans' organization, and under the party's leadership advocated a Greater Austria under the leadership of an emperor of the house of Habsburg. SCHNEIDER had taken over the slogan of the Volkspartei and became the leader of the "Army from Austria" movement in Austria.

The Nazi German party, which almost consistently captured ten and twenty percent of the total vote, thus making its support indispensable to the party controlling the government of the time. With the Christian Socialists and the Social Democrats, which between thirty and forty percent of the total vote. The Österreichische Volkspartei provided a pool of support for all nationalist movements which arose in the course of time, but its vote was eventually almost entirely absorbed by the Nazis.

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THE RISE AND THE NAZIS (Continued)

Many of HITLER's ideas can be traced directly to the Heimwehr and the Pan-Germans. When the Reich absorbed Austria in 1938, the ideal of the Grossdeutsche Volkspartei had been fulfilled, and the party then lost its reason for further existence. The Pan-Germans and the Heimwehr extremists had been drifting over to the Nazism as early as 1937. At that time, the year of the last free elections in Austria, the National Socialists were behind only the Social Democrats in number of votes, and were the second strongest group in the country. It is estimated that if an election had been held just before the Anschluss in 1938, the Nazis would have polled 40% of the vote, the Social Democrats would have polled 40%, and SCHUSCHNIG's Vaterlaendische Front would have received the remaining twenty percent.

VI. THE REVOLUTION OF 12 FEBRUARY 1934

Having traced the backgrounds and fortunes of the major parties of the Austrian Republic, this survey will now review the events of the last twelve years in Austria and in the losing fight of the liberal elements against the forces of reaction.

In 1933, spurred on by the easy successes which had greeted HITLER in GERMANY, the Christian Socialists, abetted by the Heimwehr, organized an authoritarian regime for Austria. The president and both vice presidents of the Austrian parliament had resigned because of a petty squabble and the Christian Socialist chancellor, DOLLFUSS, took over the reins of government and reigned by executive edicts and proclamations based on the Kriegswirtschaftliche Ermachtigungsgesetz. This law, which some hair-splitting lawyer had dug out of the archives, where it had been resting since its enactment in 1917, had never been officially revoked and thus became a part of the Austrian constitution.

The Kriegswirtschaftliche Ermachtigungsgesetz gave the chancellor the right to govern without sanction of parliament. It was originally intended to provide the executive with a means of tidying over the economic life of the country during emergency periods and during the periods preceding the election of a new parliamentary president. This same law was later used to dissolve parliament and to foist a new constitution on the people, thus making the transition from constitutional democracy to an authoritarian dictatorship complete.

The DOLLFUSS government had little popular support. The opposition was recruited from both extremes: the Sozialdemokratische Partei on the left and the OeGB on the right. The Christian Socialist minority, however, hoped to prevail with the aid of the small but well-organized army, the police force, and the support of SCHUSCHNIG. The real power behind the throne as well as its guiding genius was not DOLLFUSS but SCHUSCHNIG.

This, too, was the alignment of forces when the leaders of the Sozialdemokratische Partei, by no means unanimous in their opinion, decided to combat force with force and issued a call to arms to the Austrian proletariat. The main tactic to be used was not an armed coup d'etat but a general

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REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA (Continued)

strike. The use of the general strike had been perfected by the leadership as the most powerful weapon during the strike for some time. The mere threat of a general strike had previously been sufficient to force upon the government the adoption of a number of measures which the Social Democrats considered of vital importance.

In anticipation of an unexpected and unavoidable clash of arms, a considerable stock of weapons had been placed at the disposal of the party's para-military organization, the Schutzbund. These weapons were mainly a part of the enormous pile which had been hidden from the disarmament commissions and which had been transferred to the arsenals of the military auxiliaries of both parties.

The Social Democrats' plans were no secret to FEY, the Christian Socialist Minister of Security. His secret police network was highly efficient. As a matter of fact, one of the members of the Supreme Council of the Sozialdemokratische Partei was in FEY's employ and kept him informed of all the decisions of this body. FEY was aware of the divergence of opinion and indecision which prevailed among the liberal leaders, and he made use of this situation.

Without giving the Socialists time to complete their plans FEY managed to bring the revolt to a premature head. The most radical branch of the Sozialdemokratische Partei was met in ISE (N 4094) but in LIL (V 8489), and it was there that the Minister of the Interior decided to strike. The police confiscated some small arms at a workers' settlement in LIL and provoked a gun battle with members of the Schutzbund, setting off the signal for a general revolt. Commencing in 537, the conflict soon spread to ISE (N 4094) and succeeded in enrolling all Austrian Social Democrats.

The revolt of 12 February 1934 seemed at first to have every chance of success and even the commitment of units of the Austrian Army would not have sufficed to put it down if the general strike had been confined to a successful conclusion. But the power of the old labor unions was no longer the same. Success had brought complacency and the Christian Socialists and for some time had infiltrating small detachments of their henchmen into most of the vital industrial concentrations of the nation. These small detachments provided a skeleton force for the operation of the important utilities and rendered to bring the strike.

The Army High Command, operating the railroads under military guard, was able to keep traffic from any threatened areas in the part of the revolution was totally crushed. Thousands of men were killed or wounded at the barricades, a great many of them were injured, and ten of the leaders were captured. The capture of the heads of all Social Democrats and even the important socialist machine in ISE (N 4094/ K 1004) was brought under the control of the authoritarian Ministry of Defense, a system of military reactionaries and supporters of the Christian Socialist Party was appointed to replace the leaders of ISE (N 4094).

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VII. THE REVOLUTION OF 12 FEBRUARY 1934 (Continued)

The Sozialdemokratische Partei never recovered from this blow. Its leaders in exile, mainly in CZECHOSLOVAKIA, never succeeded in organizing an underground structure of any importance. Many a Social Democrat shelved his principles and decided to continue the struggle against the Austrian dictatorship in the ranks of the Nazis, who at least had an efficient organization designed to survive long years of suppression. A number of Socialists also joined forces with the Communists, but the Third International never succeeded in establishing a strong and truly popular underground movement.

VII. AFTER THE ANSCHLUS OF 1938

The German annexation of AUSTRIA in 1938 found the Austrian liberals inactive and apathetic. A great many sincere Social Democrats were actually glad to see the hated SOZIALISMUS regime get its just due and hoped that with this change there would come an alleviation of the atrocious economic conditions then prevailing. The German Nazis were greeted as the lesser of two evils.

The first period immediately after 1938 seemed indeed to be a chance for the better. The strong German controls did not at first concern the Austrian worker, who saw no profound difference between an Austrian and a German fascist. The unemployment problem was solved within a matter of months by the familiar Nazi method of embarking on a general rearmament program. The Alpine provinces also achieved a certain measure of prosperity, for the German tourist traffic, their principal source of income, increased by leaps and bounds. The German administrative and judicial measures were no radical change for the Austrian people, who had been suffering under a similar system for four years prior to Austria's conquest.

The Nazis were rather skillful in the field of communal politics. The first Oberbuergermeister of WIEN (X 4094) under the new regime was one HUBSCHER, a former Social Democrat. When he reappointed some of the functionaries who had served under exile in the old city administration, a certain satisfaction was felt even among the most intransigent Social Democrats. This tact in local administration, combined with the careful application of all measures of terror and repression wherever they were indicated, succeeded in keeping the population in line and forestalled the organization of an effective resistance movement.

Until 1942 there was little active opposition to the National Socialist dictatorship in AUSTRIA. It was the deterioration of the military situation, combined with a simultaneous change in the material welfare of the individual, that brought about the birth of an underground resistance movement of considerable proportions. This underground fight was largely led and encouraged by the Communists, although most of the participants were former Social Democrats.

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The underground was never an organized force because many groups of its activity were independent of a set of distinct events and incidents. The highly efficient secret police of the Nazis had been successfully incorporated into the underground. Another reason for the inefficiency of the resistance movement lies in the fact that the several underground organizations were never able to agree on a uniform program and to subordinate themselves to a firm and coordinated leadership. Instead of conducting an effective resistance, the various steering committees busied themselves with the preparation of blacklists of their enemies and whitelists of their friends, who were to be placed in positions of power after the overthrow of the Nazi regime by someone else. The abortive coup of 21 July 1944 was executed with little enthusiasm by the Austrian Socialists since the perpetrators of the plot, the Russian officers, were hardly more popular than the Nazis.

It was only with the approach of the Russians in the spring of 1945 that the various resistance groups finally decided on active collaboration with each other in a supreme congress. The "unified" underground, "U-5," was never a symbol than an active organization. Even under the most favorable circumstances, in a true community of interests in the fight against a universally-hated foe, the various political groups were unable to forget their old differences. It is to be expected that with the external pressure of Nazi dictatorship removed, these groups will again take up their struggle for power.

The Austrian political groups are united only in the more fundamental aspects of foreign policy, which means primarily that they favor a definite orientation toward the West. This is to be explained by the rather high standard of living enjoyed by the Austrian worker before the war. Even the Austrian Communists frequently look toward their western comrades for support. According to informants, the leaders of the Austrian Communist underground expressed the wish in the beginning of 1945 that the Red Army would obtain from occupying Russia, but would rather allow the nation to organize its own reconstruction.

Dr. Nikolaus HARTL, one of the authors of this report, claims that the leader of the left wing of the Austrian Liberation Committee, "KREJCI," asked him to establish contact with American agents in Switzerland in order to arrange for an American occupation force to check the Russian advance. Dr. KREJCI, the Austrian underground representative in Switzerland, expressed, according to HARTL, similar sentiments.

VIII. EVACUATION OF AUSTRIAN SOVIET PRISONERS

The arrival of Soviet troops in Linz (N 4094) was preceded by a flood of atrocities against the civilian population. Although the population was much distressed, there was no mass exodus from the city, owing partly to the fact that there was no means of transportation available. The population was entirely inactive and the underground activists found little opportunity to harass the Soviet troops. Only a few SS troops under the command of a German officer did small resistance attempts and the Russians in the pursuit of dispersed units had the elimination of local centers of resistance.

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VIII. DEALING WITH RUSSIAN OCCUPATION (Continued)

When the time came for the establishment of a new government, the Austrian Communists soon realized that they could fill only a fraction of the positions from their own meager ranks. The renascent Sozialdemokratische Partei became the gathering point for all those who wished to cooperate with the occupying forces without necessarily accepting the Soviet political creed. The Russians were well aware that this was the only truly popular party in Austria, and no Communists were appointed to key positions in the new administration. Some observers thought that this was merely a clever move on the part of the Russians to win British and American recognition for their Austrian coalition government.

Selected as head of the new administration was the universally respected Dr. Karl RENNER, the patriarch of Austrian socialism. RENNER also holds the Foreign Affairs portfolio, a rather superfluous office at the present time. It is important to note that RENNER is a man of more than seventy and has not for some years been in possession of his full mental and physical faculties.

The same may be said for KUNSCHEIN, who was chosen as the Christian Socialist representative in the cabinet. This old, exhausted man was the leader of the liberal wing of the Christlichsozialer Partei and became well known as the organizer of its powerless labor unions.

The Ministry of Commerce is held by LINDL, a shrewd politician who held the same post in several pre-1938 governments. Politically affiliated with the Christian Socialists, he was never able to win their complete support or liking. He has the reputation of being one of those men whose political success has not been unattended by a corresponding rise in their material fortunes.

The Minister of Agriculture, SCHUMBERG, was active in the Bauernbund in Austria for a good many years and his qualifications as an agrarian expert are of the best.

The Minister of Justice, SEINE, was a prosecuting attorney until 1938, when he was forced to leave Austria because of his Jewish extraction and because of the fact that he had prosecuted many National Socialists in court. He only became politically active during his period of exile.

As Oberbuergermeister of VIENNA (X 4004) the Russians selected the popular Socialist, General Theodor KORNBLAU. As commander of the Sozialdemokratische Militarische Schutzbund before 1934 he shows ability and great organizational talent. Today, however, General KORNBLAU is in his eighties and may be senile. His vice mayors are the septuagenarian KUNSCHEIN and the young Communist underground fighter, SIBERKIN.

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VIII. THE REAL ASSASSINATION (Continued)

In close examination, the Soviet-appointed Government presents a peculiar aspect. Behind "Ustalin's" great historic figures, most of whom have one foot in the grave, stand the real administrators of the regime, the underground activists, the true color and worth of whom is yet to be shown. It is still too early to predict what will happen when the mask falls.

Edmund L. King
EDMUND L. KING *USA*
Major, Infantry
Commanding

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
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adoption and realization. It was not long before the Communist Party lost most of its supporters.

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III. THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS (Continued)

Without ever losing sight of their ultimate radical aims, the leaders of the Sozialdemokratische Partei steered a course along constitutional rather than revolutionary lines. Revolutionary agencies such as the soldiers' soviets were transformed into constructive organizations or dissolved. Many problems, however, were bypassed when they appeared too difficult of solution and the leadership became cautious and hesitant. When the party found itself without a majority in the newly elected parliament of 1920, it abandoned, more or less voluntarily, the executive power. Rather than take part in an uncertain and shaky coalition government, the Social Democrats relinquished the reins and the party joined the parliamentary opposition.

The new plan of the Social Democrats was to gain complete control of WIEN (GOWS 48740/1-49/X 4049), the seat of one-third of AUSTRIA's population. With this fortress as a base, they planned to undertake a systematic conquest of the provinces and the remaining two-thirds of the population. The first part of this project was carried out with complete success. The ultimate goal, however, remained at all times just beyond their grasp. In every election the party fell short of a majority by ten percent of the total vote.

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This socialist hegemony over WIEN (049/X 4094) has left even to this day a deep impression upon the political complexion of its citizens. It was completely true when the May Day paraders used to chant in unison "VIENNA is red and VIENNA will stay red!" (WIEN ist rot und WIEN bleibt rot!). At that time the Sozialdemokratische Partei had its central offices and many of the national leaders of the party became active in the city administration. After the death of the old labor leader, RABENAU, Nationalist Dr. Karl SEITZ became Oberbuergermeister of WIEN (049/X 4094) and grew in this capacity to become one of the most beloved figures in AUSTRIA.

The task of the new city administration was indeed a gigantic one. The capital of AUSTRIA, located on the edge of a new state of six million inhabitants, and without an agricultural hinterland of its own, could never, by itself, provide enough work and sustenance for its two million citizens. The fact that the Social Democrats were able to remain in power until 1934, weathering even the economic crisis of 1930 and 1931, is a tribute to their efficiency and ingenuity. They were, of course, unable to solve all the economic and social problems that troubled the unbalanced city, and the eventual collapse of the Socialist administration was recognized by all as being inevitable.

At their peak the Social Democratic unions numbered some 800,000 members, and it was this body of faithful followers that enabled the party to weather all storms until 1934. Most of these adherents lived in WIEN (X 4094), for the Sozialdemokratische Partei with its subsidiaries was never strong in the provinces. A few

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IV. THE CHRISTIAN SOCIALISTS (Continued)

The Christlichsoziale Partei was never a politically homogeneous organization. Its base was the politically passive rural population, which was organized into the Landbund. Then there was the party's ultraclerical wing led by the clergy and supported by a variety of Church organizations such as the Katholische Aktion, the Kolpings-Vereine, and several laymen's societies. Still additional party support came from a liberal wing composed of the Catholic workers' leagues under KUNSCHEK. The monarchists also voted the Christian Socialist ticket.

The Heimwehr, at first a bitter opponent of the Christlichsoziale Partei, later added its forces to the clerical movement. The Heimwehr had its origin in the local home-guard units which had been formed to control the excesses of the communistic elements among the returning soldiers after World War I. These groups were consolidated and later combined with a number of veterans' organizations to form a powerful reactionary pressure bloc.

Inner disagreements and fundamentally divergent political attitudes during the late twenties, split the Heimwehr into several factions. One large group was centered in STEIERMARK under Dr. FEILNER and adopted a decidedly Nazi doctrine. It was later dissolved and most of its members joined the NSDAP. Another important group under Dr. STEIDLER existed in the TIROL and in NIEDERÖSTERREICH and stood for the nationalistic Catholic program. Vacillating first on the fringe of the one group and then of the other was a third smaller faction led by Prince STARHemberg, a great admirer of Adolf Hitler. All three groups were definitely anti-democratic and authoritarian.

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SMITHEL, the Christian Socialist politician par excellence, used the Heimwehr movement for his own ends, playing one faction against the other and never actually ceding any of his power to these militant reactionaries. SMITHEL's successors, however were not so adept at the game and were forced to make definite commitments. Although the regular Christian Socialists had no sympathy for the ideology propounded by the Heimwehr, the party needed new blood if it was to be kept alive. MUSSOLINI was the decisive factor in forcing the Christian Socialists to include the Heimwehr in their ranks.

MUSSOLINI had always been sympathetic toward the semi-Fascist Heimwehr and he indicated to the Austrian government that a fusion of STARHEMBERG's wing of the Heimwehr with the Christian Socialist party (and thereby the government) would be met with approval. Since the political situation made Italian support essential, this wish was soon translated into action. In 1932 STARHEMBERG was elected Bundesfuehrer of the Oesterreichische Heimwehrschutz, as the newly consolidated and reorganized Heimwehr was called, and this militant group joined the government and became an agency of the Christlichsoziale Partei. At this time the predominance of ITALY in Austrian foreign affairs became absolute, and the influence of the Italian embassy on internal affairs was

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V. THE FAN-GERMANS AND THE NAXIS (Continued)

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V. THE FAN-GERMANS AND THE NAZIS

The Alldutsche or, as it was later known the Grossdeutsche Volkspartei was the third great party which influenced the political life of the Austrian Republic. This party had already passed its prime prior to World War I. An admirer of BISMARCK, SCHÖNERER, the party's leader advocated a Greater GERMANY under the leadership of an emperor of the house of HAPSBURG. SCHÖNERER had taken over the slogans of the Kulturkampf and became the leader of the "Away from ROME" movement in AUSTRIA.

The Fan-German party polled almost consistently between ten and twenty percent of the total vote, thus making its support indispensable to the party controlling the government at the time. Both the Christian Socialists and the Social Democrats polled between thirty and forty-five percent of the total vote. The Grossdeutsche Volkspartei provided a pool of supporters for all nationalist movements which arose in the course of time, but its adherents were eventually almost entirely absorbed by the NSDAP.

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The Kriegswirtschaftliche Ermächtigungsgesetz gave the chancellor the right to govern without sanction of parliament. It was originally intended to provide the executive with a means of tidying over the economic life of the country during emergency periods and during the periods preceding the election of a new parliamentary president. This same law was later used to dissolve parliament and to foist a new constitution on the people, thus making the transition from a constitutional democracy to an authoritarian dictatorship complete.

The DOLLFUSS government had little popular support. The opposition was recruited from both extremes: the Sozialdemokratische Partei on the left and the NSDAP on the right. The Christian Socialist minority, however, hoped to prevail with the aid of the small but well-organized army, the police force, and the support of MUSSOLINI. The real power behind the throne as well as its guiding genius was not DOLLFUSS but SCHUSCHNIGG.

This, then, was the alignment of forces when the leaders of the Sozialdemokratische Partei, by no means unanimous in their resolve, decided to combat force with force and issued a call to arms to the Austrian proletariat. The main method to be used was not an armed coup d'etat but a general

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S E C R E T

INTERROGATION REPORT No 43

VI. THE REVOLUTION OF 12 FEBRUARY 1934 (Continued)

The Sozialdemokratische Partei never recovered from this blow. Its leaders in exile, mainly in CZECHOSLOVAKIA, never succeeded in organizing an underground structure of any importance. Many a Socialist leader shelved his principles and decided to continue the struggle against the Austrian dictatorship in the ranks of the Nazis, who at least had an efficient organization designed to survive long years of suppression. A number of Socialists also joined forces with the Communists, but the Third International never succeeded in establishing a strong and truly popular underground movement.

VII. AFTER THE ANSCHLUSS OF 1938

The German annexation of AUSTRIA in 1938 found the Austrian liberals inactive and apathetic. A great many sincere Social Democrats were actually glad to see the hated SCHUSCHNIGG regime get its just due and hoped that with this change there would come an alleviation of the atrocious economic conditions then prevailing. The German Nazis were greeted as the lesser of two evils.

The first period immediately after 1938 seemed indeed to be a change for the better. The strong German controls did not at first concern the Austrian worker, who saw no profound difference between an Austrian and a German fascist. The unemployment problem was solved within a matter of months by the familiar Nazi method of embarking on a general rearmament program. The Alpine provinces also achieved a certain measure of prosperity, for the German tourist traffic, their principal source of income, increased by leaps and bounds. The German administrative and judicial measures were no radical change for the Austrian people, who had been suffering under a similar system for four years prior to HITLER's conquest.

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The Nazis were rather skillful in the field of communal politics. The first Oberbuergermeister of WIEN (X 4094) under the new regime was one WUEBACHER, a former Social Democrat. When he reappointed some of the functionaries who had served under SCHIZ in the old city administration, a certain satisfaction was felt even among the most intransigent Social Democrats. This tact in local administration, combined with the ruthless application of all measures of terror and repression wherever they were indicated, succeeded in keeping the population in line and forestalled the organization of an effective resistance movement.

Until 1942 there was little active opposition to the National Socialist dictatorship in AUSTRIA. It was the deterioration of the military situation, combined with a simultaneous change in the material welfare of the individual, that brought about growth of an underground resistance movement of considerable proportions. This underground fight was largely led and encouraged by the Communists, although most of the participants were former Social Democrats.

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S E C R E T

INTERROGATION REPORT No 43

VI. THE REVOLUTION OF 12 FEBRUARY 1934 (Continued)

strike. The use of the general strike had been perfected by the party leadership as its most powerful weapon during the struggle for power. The mere threat of a general strike had previously been sufficient to force upon the government the adoption or dismissal of measures which the Social Democrats considered of vital importance.

In anticipation of an unexpected and unavoidable clash of arms, a considerable stock of weapons had been placed at the disposal of the party's para-military organization, the Schutzbund. These weapons were mainly a part of the enormous pile which had been hidden from the disarmament commissions and which had been transferred to the arsenals of the military auxiliaries of both parties.

The Social Democrats' plans were no secret to FEY, the Christian Socialist Minister of Security. His secret police network was highly efficient. As a matter of fact, one of the members of the Supreme Council of the Sozialdemokratische Partei was in FEY's employ and kept him informed of all the decisions of this body. FEY was aware of the divergence of opinion and indecision which prevailed among the liberal leaders, and he made use of this situation.

Without giving the Socialists time to complete their plans FEY managed to bring the revolt to a premature head. The most radical branch of the Sozialdemokratische Partei was not in WIEN (X 4094) but in LINZ (V 8489), and it was there that the Minister of the Interior decided to strike. The police confiscated some small arms at a workers' settlement in LINZ and provoked a gun battle with members of the Schutzbund, setting off the signal for a general revolt. Commencing in OBERCESTERALICH the conflict soon spread to WIEN (X 4094) and succeeded in overthrowing all Austrian Social Democrats.

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The revolt of 12 February 1934 seemed at first to have every chance of success and even the commitment of units of the Austrian Army would not have sufficed to put it down if the general strike had been carried to a successful conclusion. But the power of the old labor unions was no longer the same. Success had brought complacency and the Christian Socialists had for some time been infiltrating small detachments of their henchmen into most of the vital industrial enterprises of the nation. These scab detachments provided a skeleton force for the operation of the important utilities and managed to break the strike.

The Army High Command, operating the railroads under military guard, was able to move troops from one threatened area to the next and the revolution was totally crushed. Thousands of workers were killed or wounded at the barricades, a great many unionists were interned, and ten of the leaders were hanged. The government was purged of all social Democrats and even the German socialist machine in VIEN (C 49/X 4094) was brought under the control of the authoritarian minority. SCHUBERT, a spokesman of the most reactionary and repressive wing of the Christlichsoziale Partei, was appointed Oberbuergermeister of VIEN (X 4094).

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The Ministry of Commerce is held by HEINL, a shrewd politician who held the same post in several pre-1938 governments. Politically affiliated with the Christian Socialists, he was never able to gain their complete support or liking. He has the reputation of being one of those men whose political success has not been unattended by a corresponding rise in their material fortunes.

The Minister of Agriculture, BUCHINGER, was active in the Bauernbund in SALZBURG for a good many years and his qualifications as an agrarian expert are of the best.

The Minister of Justice, GENCE, was a prosecuting attorney until 1938, when he was forced to leave AUSTRIA because of his Jewish extraction and because of the fact that he had prosecuted many National Socialists in court. He only became politically active during his period of exile.

As Oberbuergermeister of WIEN (X 4004) the Russians selected the popular Socialist, General Theodor KOERNER. As commander of the Sozialdemokratische Militaerische Schutzbund before 1938 he showed ability and great organizational talent. Today, however, General KOERNER is in his eighties and may be feeble. His vice mayors are the septuagenarian KUNZ and the young Communist underground fighter, STEINER.

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S E C R E T

INTERROGATION REPORT No 43

VIII. DURING THE RUSSIAN OCCUPATION (Continued)

When the time came for the establishment of a new government, the Austrian Communists soon realized that they could fill only a fraction of the positions from their own meager ranks. The re nascent Sozialdemokratische Partei became the gathering point for all those who wished to cooperate with the occupying forces without necessarily accepting the Soviet political creed. The Russians were well aware that this was the only truly popular party in AUSTRIA, and no Communists were appointed to key positions in the new administration. Some observers thought that this was merely a clever move on the part of the Russians to wangle British and American recognition for their Austrian coalition government.

Selected as head of the new administration was the universally respected Dr Karl RENNER, the patriarch of Austrian socialism. RENNER also holds the Foreign Affairs portfolio, a rather superfluous office at the present time. It is important to note that RENNER is a man of more than seventy and has not for some years been in possession of his full mental and physical faculties.

The same may be said for KUNDOCHAK, who was chosen as the Christian Socialist representative in the cabinet. This old, exhausted man was the leader of the liberal wing of the Christlichsoziale Partei and became well known as the organizer of its powerless labor unions.

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The Austrian political groups are united only in the more fundamental aspects of foreign policy, which means primarily that they favor a definite orientation toward the West. This is to be explained by the rather high standard of living enjoyed by the Austrian worker before the war. Even the Austrian Communists frequently look toward their Western comrades for support. According to informants, the leaders of the Austrian Communist underground expressed the wish in the beginning of 1945 that the Red Army would obtain from occupying AUSTRIA but would rather allow the nation to organize its own reconstruction.

Dr. Wilhelm H. BOETTL, source of this report, claims that the leader of the left wing of the Austrian Liberation Committee, "BOGNER," asked him to establish contact with American agents in SWITZERLAND in order to arrange for an American occupation force to check the Russian advance. Dr. G. G. G. G., the Austrian underground representative in SWITZERLAND, expressed, according to BOETTL, similar sentiments.

VIII. DURING THE RUSSIAN OCCUPATION

The arrival of Soviet troops in WIEN (X 4094) was preceded by a flood of atrocity stories spread by soldiers fleeing from HUNGARY. Although the population was much distressed, there was no mass exodus from the city, owing partly to the fact that there was no means of transportation available. The Volksturm was entirely inactive and the underground activists found little opportunity to harass the hated Nazis. Only when the SS troops under Sepp DIETRICH withdrew from WIEN (X 4094) did small resistance detachments aid the guerrillas in the pursuit of dispersed units and the elimination of local centers of resistance.

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S E C R E T

INTERROGATION REPORT No 43

VII. AFTER THE ANSCHLUSS OF 1938 (Continued)

The underground was never an outstanding success, because many phases of its activity were under the observation of a net of Gestapo agents and informants. The highly efficient secret police of the SOVIET regime had been successfully incorporated into the Gestapo. Another reason for the inefficiency of the resistance movement lies in the fact that the several underground organizations were never able to agree on a uniform program and to subordinate themselves to a firm and coordinated leadership. Instead of conducting an effective resistance, the various steering committees busied themselves with the preparation of blacklists of their enemies and whitelists of their friends, who were to be placed in positions of power after the overthrow of the Nazi regime by someone else. The abortive coup of 20 July 1944 was greeted with little enthusiasm by the Austrian Socialists since the perpetrators of the plot, the Russian officers, were hardly more popular than the Nazis.

It was only with the approach of the Russians in the spring of 1945 that the various resistance groups finally decided on active collaboration with each other in a supreme congress. The "unified" underground, "C-5", was more a symbol than an active organization. Even under the most favorable circumstances, in a true community of interests in the fight against a universally-hated foe, the various political groups were unable to forget their old differences. It is to be expected that with the external pressure of Nazi dictatorship removed, these groups will again take up their struggle for power.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No. 43

VIII. DURING THE RUSSIAN OCCUPATION (Continued)

On close examination, the Soviet-appointed government presents a peculiar aspect. Behind AUSA's great historic figures, most of whom have one foot in the grave, stand the real administrators of the regime, the underground activists, the true color and worth of whom is yet to be shown. It is still too early to predict what will happen when the mask falls.

Richard A. Feathers
WILLIAM L KING 11/14 S, C
Major, Infantry
Commanding

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12 September 1945

TO: AM, AMZOW
FROM: AM 12, THIRD ARMY

- A. Re wire to EDKEY IG from USFET to return HOLTTL at once.
- B. Removal desired here as he got word from STARKLING show closed.
- C. Capt. DICKENHOFF Office US Chief Counsel asks HOLTTL as war crimes witness KUHNENBERG.
- D. Can we release him

COORDINATION WITH CR

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INCOMING

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12 September 1945

TO: AM, ALZON
FROM: AB 12, THIRD ARMY

- A. Re wire to LUCKY IG from USFET to return MOLTIL at once.
- B. Removal desired here as he got word from GYMPLERLID show closed.
- C. Capt. DICKENHOFF Office US Chief Counsel asks HOKSTL as war crimes witness KUNENBERG.
- D. Can we release him

COORDINATED WITH CK

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U.S. FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER
INCOMING MESSAGE

TO: STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL USRET MAIN 509/9
INFO 091235Z OCT TOR 091735A OCT

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PRIORITY



FROM : UK BASE FROM CIMAR
NO FOR ACTION : USRET MAIN FOR G-2 FOR SANDS
REF NO : UK-56009, 9 OCT 1945

Reference Third Army report number 43 on HCETTL.

A. Para 1 refers. Reports number 10, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22 and 39 and special reports 1, 2 and 4 on HOSTTL.

B. Those reports not held by War Room. If spare copies available would appreciate early receipt.

Please advise.

ACTION : G-2

INFORMATION : AG RECORDS

SIG IN 1853A 1853A EBH/mt REF NO: UK-56009

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

461 (G1/C1M/cps)

(Info) AFM 777
16 October 1945

SUBJECT: Interrogation Reports on HENTZ, Dr. William

TO : Counter Intelligence War Team, c/o United Kingdom Base, APO 415,
U S Army.

1. Reference cable your office UK - 56009, dated 9 October 1945.
2. Third United States Army Interrogation Reports numbers 1 and 15 sent to your office on 11 September 1945. Reference letter this office, 421 (G1/C1M/cps).
3. Enclosed herewith in one copy each of the following reports:
 - a. Headquarters Third United States Army Intelligence Center Interrogation Report Number 12 on The W/P Det of Gruppe VI B of the NSDF, dated 16 July 1945.
 - b. Headquarters Third United States Army Interrogation Center (Provisional) Interrogation Report Number 90 on The Absent and the EP in Spain and Plans of Axis VI for Post-war Activities in Spain, dated 9 September 1945.
4. Third United States Army has been directed to send you the other interrogation reports requested in reference cable.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

2 Incls: As stated above.

DWIGHT SARGENT
Lt. Col., G-2
Executive

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S E C R E T

INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

3. Art III (Continued)

Occasionally in the General Survey of the Situation in Germany (Reichslagebericht), the most comprehensive report submitted by Art III, gentle hints were dropped on the subject of "prostitution of the law in GERMANY."

An especially touchy subject was the well-known hostility of HITLER and HIMMLER to all lawyers and everything reminiscent of jurisprudence. Once the results of this stand had to be mentioned even in the cautious reports of Art III. That was after HITLER's "speech against the lawyers," when the Lagebericht had to touch on the indignation and ire of all those still engaged in the administration and maintenance of the law.

Generally the Referat committed many sins of omission. Especially the ever-increasing lawlessness, which finally became equivalent to absolute anarchy, was never commented on by this subsection.

THIERACK, the Minister of Justice, as well as FRIMMELER, the president of the People's Court, enjoyed the complete support of Art III, and that in spite of continuous, strongly negative reports from the agencies collecting information.

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(3) Party

Activities of Referat III A 4, the NSDAP Referat, were surrounded with special secrecy. All intelligence involving party activities had to be kept a strict secret from the Gauleitungen, as well as the superior Party command echelons. The intention behind this activity was of course a supervision of all aspects of Party operations.

Reports were full of indications of unpopularity, inefficiency, and corruption. No action could be taken, however, since such reports could not be transmitted to the proper agencies. Material collected by III A 4 should be of considerable historical interest, however.

b. Gruppe III B

(1) Public Health

The Health-Referat was of no great importance and its personnel of rather poor quality. Reports were of a purely informative nature. Conclusions reached, until the very end, were that the German population in spite of the war and frequent bombings was in an excellent state of health. This was brought out especially in comparative studies with the first World War.

A pet project of III B was the mass X-ray survey (Identifizierungssuntersuchung), carried out by Professor NOHLFELDER. The good professor had a whole battery of motorized X-ray apparatus under his command and with their aid succeeded in X-raying the whole German population and even large sections of the German minority in the various Balkan countries. His findings were then submitted to the proper Health Office, which could supervise the work of curing the diseases and defects indicated by the X-ray studies. This method proved of great preventive value.

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S E C R E T

INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

3. Art III (Continued)

(2) Nationality

(a) Purpose and Guilt

When an allotment of criminal and moral guilt is made among the various sections of the SD, the Referat Nationality (Volksstum) should receive a large share. Behind the human title it was responsible for all crimes committed against foreigners within GERMANY and German-occupied EUROPE. This includes treatment of foreigners singly and in national minority groups.

In this field the SD had practically unlimited power, and also a large share of that executive control which is usually attributed to the police sections. The inhuman treatment meted out to national groups, such as Czechs and Poles, was based on recommendations made by the SD Referat, III B. The III B Referate in the various Beschnitte were also entrusted with the determination of national origin (Volksdeutsche).

(b) Applications

The inhuman and brutal application of these doctrines took two specific forms. On one hand we find the enforced elimination of part in national groups (either directly by physical extermination or indirectly by appropriate educational and psychological measures), and on the other hand the forced Germanization of other groups. A large share of the responsibility for all these measures rests with III B.

III B for instance decided, in the field of education, that in so-called "predominantly German" territories, German children could attend only grade-schools, while all intermediate and advanced schools were to be visited by Germans only. Conversely the decision as to who was Czech and who was German also rested with the SD. These measures were designed to make the reappearance of Czech intellectuals impossible for all times.

We also find that the SD arbitrarily decided that certain families, which had long been absorbed by the Czechs and had accepted Czech nationality, were declared Germans, had to move to GERMANY, and were forcibly re-made into Germans.

The SD followed similar lines in questions of the resettlement of minorities along the boundaries of GERMANY. Many sins were committed there as well (for instance, in the resettlement of Slovacs, etc.).

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(c) Results

In the question of the treatment of the slave laborers, III B and Stape worked hand in hand. Many joint orders of Amt III and IV existed on these questions. Even in counter-intelligence close cooperation prevailed, counter to the usual practices. Many of the under-cover agents among foreigners worked both for Amt III and Amt IV. The Lage-berichte concerning these topics indicated a perennially intransigent stand.

Strong criticisms of all organizations thinking along different lines was the recurring tenor of these reports. III B demanded a visible differentiation between German and foreign workers and treatment of the latter consistent with their alleged inferiority.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

B. Ant III (Continued)

When the Deutsche Arbeitsfront (the Nazi trade union) attempted to extend its benefits to foreign laborers, the SD demurred. Even the designation - non-German comrades-in-work (nicht-deutsche Werkkammeraden) - invented by the DaF to raise the morale of the slave laborers, was rejected by the SD.

III B was also the representative of the most radical point of view concerning the children of non-Germans. It was largely due to its insistence that the law concerning compulsory abortions in the case of pregnancy of a female slave-worker, was promulgated.

(3) III B and German Minorities

One of III B's main concerns was the fate of the German minorities in foreign countries. Here the SD worked on the principle that every German, no matter where he found himself, was entitled to preferential treatment as compared to other nationals.

For the future it was planned to create a continuous German area extending from RUMANIA to the ADRIATIC Sea. This strip of all-German territory was to be the barrier across which no non-German nation could penetrate into the heart of Europe.

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The dislike and hatred of National Socialism and GERMANY evinced recently by many members of Southeastern European States is due to a large extent to an understanding of these imperialistic German aims.

(4) III B vs Amt VI

The strong preoccupation with national minority problems within Amt III can also be traced to a desire on the part of this agency to gain greater influence in foreign countries and on the conduct of German foreign policy. Certain countries, such as those of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, were always claimed by Amt III as belonging within its sector of responsibility. The same holds true for SLOVAKIA, which only very recently was taken over by Amt VI, and with that fell into the realm of foreign political intelligence.

The divergent opinions on these topics, as held by Aemter III and VI, gave rise to continuous frictions and conflicts between the two branches of the SD. These frictions sometimes reached serious proportions as in the case of the various Befehlshaber der SD and des SD in the territories concerned.

While Amt VI considered all territory outside of the official German border as non-German, regardless of its occupation by German military forces, Amt III held fast to the tenet that HUNGARY, SLOVAKIA, certain parts of JUGOSLAVIA, etc were parts of GERMANY proper (Inland) and therefore falling under its jurisdiction. It therefore organized its intelligence net in these territories similar to its net within GERMANY itself. This of course gave rise to strong protests from the side of Amt VI and finally KALTENBRUNNER was prevailed upon to favor the latter.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

3. Ant III (Continued)

(5) The Man in Charge

The Gruppenleiter of III B, SS Standarte Ia was Dr. EILICH, was a man utterly without ability. His experience (he began without ever having had a practice) either in questions of public health or of nationality problems was nil. In spite of his ignorance (or maybe because of it) his is the main responsibility for the crimes mentioned above.

c. Gruppe III C

(1) Extent

This section was indubitably the largest of the whole SD. It was of very great importance, especially during the war and the contingent necessity of preventing a cracking of the home-front. Its exhaustive surveys and reports (Lageberichte) included almost all phases of German life and have reached fantastic proportions.

(2) Efficacy of the SD as an Intelligence Service

Based on the Hauptabteilungen II/1 and II/2 of the old SD-Hauptamt, the original purpose of internal intelligence was the uncovering of all the weaknesses, faults, and unexpected and undesirable results of an authoritarian regime. Lacking other means of popular expression and being aware that continued existence hinged on a combination of popularity of the dictatorship and brutal repression of all its opponents, the SD was to provide a means for the attainment of these two ends.

Success could have only come if this information service could not only point out these faults and weaknesses of the system, which made it unpopular, but at the same time could submit, and be assured of their acceptance, suggestions for alleviation of these unpopular measures as well as for other necessary reforms. Such a service could have been constructed properly within the framework of theoretical ideologically consistent Fascism but not of political National Socialism.

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The RSHA provided a level on which the measures of repression could be coordinated and carried out effectively. No similar scheme existed for the constructive part of the program. As a matter of fact very few of the positive suggestions and reforms ever suggested were ever approved by the highest authorities, and fewer still translated into actuality.

At the same time another factor must be considered and that is that strict adherents to a doctrine such as National Socialism cannot allow themselves to be swayed by popular opinion. And with such a static outlook pervading the minds of its officials, the SD could not hope to provide a receptive ear for the likes of the populace.

With these considerations in mind it becomes obvious why the internal SD, and especially III C, in spite of its extensive network and its large number of expert agents never succeeded in actually influencing the fate of the German people. Where all decisions are made at the top, a constructive intelligence service is selfdestructive and only the repressive aspects of such an agency can be permitted to subsist.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No. 15

3. Ant III (Continued)

(3) Science

The Referat Science (Wissenschaft) had no constructive functions. Again it was only concerned with the effects of laws and ordinances so far as these concerned science and learning. Under consideration here was of course not objective science, but the bastard brood of 100 percent National Socialist Science. All attempts of German science however feeble to loosen the shackles met with the strictest opposition in the reports of III C.

Of the greatest importance for German science was the fact that III C had a great deal of influence in the selection of university professors. The appointment of all instructors, assistants, and professors had to be approved first by III C. In this fashion the strictest control could be maintained and it was insured that only fanatical Nazis were appointed to these positions.

In problems concerning students, closest cooperation existed between III C and the NS Studentenbund (Nazi Student's League). This friendly relation was to a large extent due to the influence of the head of the Studentenbund, Dr SCHEEL, who at the same time was a member of the SD.

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(4) Education and Religious Life

The juxtaposition of education and religious life (Erziehung und religioeses Leben) within one of the Referate of III C did not make for homogeneity of subject. The religious life part of it was added only recently.

Before fall 1943 there existed a special Referat for church affairs (Kirchenreferat) which, however was transferred to the Stapo Amt at that time. The following year showed that under the new system the churches would be treated only from a police point of view, and no intelligence would be forthcoming from them.

Therefore a new Referat III C 5 was created in 1944, to take charge of the intelligence aspects of the problem, while all other considerations connected with religion came under the jurisdiction of III C 4, the Erziehungsreferat.

On questions of church problems, III C has always been completely intolerant, radical, and completely anti-religious. For once the NSDAP found common ground with the Party Chancery. BOLLMANN and his adviser on church affairs, Ministerialrat Dr KRUEGER, were of an opinion similar to that of III C.

III C made determined attempts to support all trends promising to take the place of the established churches and their services. Questions of neo-pagan festivals (harvest-thanksgiving, celebrations - Erntedankfest; solstice celebrations - Sonnenwendfeiern, et al) received serious consideration and whole-hearted support. The Catholic Mass was to be replaced by a so-called morning-devotional (Morgenfeier).

Educational problems were further sub-divided into the sectors School and Hitler Youth (Schule und Hitlerjugend). An interesting point came up with the proposed introduction all over GERMANY of the Austrian-type Hauptschule instead of the Prussian Mittelschule. The former left a certain possibility for individual education, while the latter was the prototype of the strict, disciplined, mass institution, with military flavor. The SD of course favored the latter.

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3. Ant III (Continued)

A large proportion of III C reports were devoted to the ever-decreasing educational level of German schools as well as to the ever-increasing amount of juvenile delinquency. This question was treated in detailed reports by all Abschnitte in 1942 under the title "Juvenile delinquency and lowered moral standards in the third year of the war" (Jugendverwahrlosung und sinkende Moral im dritten Kriegsjahr).

The results of this survey were so degrading that III C never did publish the comprehensive report it had planned. It can be imagined that with the further progress of the war conditions became even worse.

Ant III never did approve of the Hitler Youth movement and the doctrine represented by it of education by youth of the same age as those to be educated. The constant criticism of the HJ was the cause of ever-deteriorating relations between leaders of this movement and the SD and with it of the SS in general.

(5) Customs

Even after the outbreak of war, the SD still continued to give support to all engaged in the perpetuation of ancient customs. The Referat Volkskultur, concerned itself with all societies and clubs engaged in the practice and preservation of ancient customs and costumes.

(6) Spiritual Aid

Another separate Referat dealt with spiritual help to the population (Seelische Betreuung). Its main activities were diatribes against the DAF and the KdF Program (Strength through Joy), mainly at subordinate levels.

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(7) Press and Propaganda

Of special importance during wartime was the field of activity concerned with questions of press and propaganda. This sector was one of the most extensive concerns of the SD. Its apparatus was so large and so well organized that reaction to all measures of German and allied propaganda could be gauged almost instantaneously.

The main customer for reports of this sort was to be found in GOEBBELS and his Propaganda Ministry. He has been reported as having said upon several occasions that his work would have been impossible without the efficient service of the SD. In reality he paid very little attention to the findings of the SD and continued to conduct propaganda exactly as he pleased.

Still the information service in this regard was excellent. The chief, SS Sturmbannfuhrer von KIELPINSKI, ran his organization like an efficiently-run newspaper of major importance and his results were accordingly good.

His influence was greatest in the field of the official weekly newspaper (Deutsche Wochenschau), put out by the Propaganda Ministry. But even here his influence was only short-lived. In 1944 an ordinance appeared stating that henceforth only positive criticism could appear from the press and propaganda Referat.

The Gruppenleiter III C, SS Standartenfuhrer Dr. STERNIG, was a man of somewhat retiring demeanor, but with the soul of a fanatic. The position and measures taken by his Gruppe are his complete responsibility.

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3. Amt III (Continued)

d. Gruppe III D

(1) Field of action

III D was second only to III C in size. The field of economic intelligence had always been the personal province of OHLENDORF, the Chief of Amt III. His Gruppenleiter III D (SS-Standartenfuhrer Dr SEIBERT) was an absolute zero and so he continued to exercise effective control over this sector until the end.

His organization was very extensive, especially on the lower levels (Abschnitte) and thus III D had its informants and agents in every single cranny of German economic life. The information reaching III D about German economic life was both profound and sound.

OHLENDORF, as was common within the SD, used the influence gained thereby for the enhancement of his personal power and glory. It was, however, unavoidable that in its control over German economic life the SD as well should gain in stature.

(2) First Nexus of SD and State

This was not so noticeable in the Ministry of Economics (GITTA) or the Ministry of Agriculture (BACKE, but became very pronounced in the Economic Ministry (FUNK). Here OHLENDORF was engaged in a systematic campaign, and finally even managed to become Secretary of State HEYDE's second in command.

This was the first case of an SD official gaining an important post within the machinery of the State proper. How much the enormous organization of the SD, especially in this field, aided him in the fulfillment of his official duties is difficult to judge. Generally OHLENDORF was liable to place his personal advantage in the foreground. Also it is hard to see what positive action he could have taken on the many reports criticizing the pitiful state of German economy.

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e. Gruppe III G

III G (Gesellschaftsnachrichtendienst - society intelligence service) was formed to provide intelligence by employing persons in "high society." There were absolutely no factual justifications for the creation of this Gruppe in 1944. There already existed a section within Amt VI (VI Kult) with similar aims, and in Amt IV the Nachrichten or H-Referat fulfilled the same functions. The real reason for the creation of the new agency was once again an attempt by Amt III to gain some influence on foreign affairs.

At first III G, which originally had been called III B, was small. It was intended to be a trial balloon to test the reaction of Amt IV and VI. When these agencies chose to merely ignore an attempt which they considered childish and ridiculous, Amt III misconstrued their reaction as an indication of future non-interference and commenced to really start its enterprise in great style. Each Abschnitt was staffed with a Referent for III G. The aid of Referenten on other III topics was enlisted in order to obtain as large a number of contacts as possible. Still the expected results were not forthcoming.

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3. Ant III (Continued)

There were numerous reasons for this state of affairs. The leadership was incompetent. The opportunities were small. In 1944 GERMANY had almost no direct contact with the rest of EUROPE. The number of persons traveling into foreign countries from GERMANY was getting smaller. Similarly, fewer and fewer foreigners came to visit GERMANY. Thus opportunities to enlist members of International Society and similar groups (the purpose of the Referat) were few and far between.

VI Kult was suffering under similar disadvantages but at least, due to the excellent foreign information service of Ant VI, all persons travelling into Germany from foreign countries were known and could thus be tapped for intelligence purposes.

The chief of III G, SS Sturabannfuhrer Dr WEGNER, an officer of mediocre ability, brought no qualification of background to his position. His right hand and driving force, SS Hauptsturmfuhrer GERN, was at best a second-rate confidence man.

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f. Evaluation of Results Achieved

(1) The Lageberichte

If an appreciation of the importance and influence of Art III on the conduct of German affairs is desired, the question of quality and objectivity of reports submitted looms large. The institution of the so-called Lageberichte dates back to the period immediately following the outbreak of the war. The Abschnitte were ordered at that time to submit a daily survey of the situation in their sector to the GCHQ at DEERLIN. Later the periods elapsing between reports was extended considerably.

(2) Objectivity of Spot Reports

Those reports, based on the intelligence gathered by the Aussonstelingen (smallest SD unit), and on information gleaned from the agents under the direct control of the Referent at Abschnitt-level, generally gave an absolutely correct and objective picture of the situation. This was true in the beginning, at least.

(3) Changes at the Lower Level

Later on some experienced Referenten learned that their objective reports never reached publication in their original form, but were changed, toned down, and made more palatable to those in power. Some of the Referenten therefore resigned themselves to the fact that truth was not wanted and so started to color their own reports and changed the trend of their recommendations. In this fashion they saved their superiors the trouble of having to do so later on.

Others reacted in exactly the opposite manner. Realizing that their reports would be toned down, no matter what they wrote, they decided to paint things blacker than they really were. Thus, they argued, even after the usual change at the next echelon enough of the truth would remain to provide an approximation to reality.

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Part III (Continued)

(4) Coloring by Indoctrination

Such measures, of course, detracted from the objectivity of the Lage-berichte as handed down by the abschnitte. As a rule, however, these reports still gave a correct estimate of the situation. This holds true only of the purely informative part of the report, the so-called morale report (Stimmungsbbericht). The second part, dealing with suggestions and recommendations was no longer objective.

In conferences, directives, and by all other means, the various Referenten had been indoctrinated with official doctrine. Anything that did not meet with the full approval of the general line of Part III had no chance of acceptance. Especially during HITLER's reign no voices of opposition were suffered in the organization. Thus robbed of all individuality, Referenten became no more than mouthpieces for official Part III policy.

(5) Muzzling to prevent offense to the highly

An added difficulty of great import was the fact that reports against leading personalities of the Reich or criticism of measures effected by them necessarily indicated the person under consideration. Officially no names were mentioned, but it was only too obvious who was meant at all times. But among the personalities leading HITLER'S GERMANY, there was not one of sufficient stature to be able to bear criticism of his person.

Obviously the RSHA was in no position to change matters any. For that reason all reports had to go through HIMMLER'S hands. HIMMLER as the supreme chief of all intelligence services then would have had the duty to inform HITLER, the final authority, of all short-comings of the system uncovered by this intelligence service.

But HIMMLER was not the man to risk an open break with anybody who still had some vestige of power. Therefore no reports against leading personalities ever penetrated beyond HIMMLER, unless it was for his own purposes.

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(6) HITLER takes a Hand

HITLER's strong adherence to certain prejudices was well known. It did not pay to annoy an opinionated boss with such power. Thus few reports ever left the RSHA without bearing the indirect but ever present imprint of HITLER's personality and ideas, even before reaching his exalted presence.

But even those few objective reports which went through the mill of the RSHA unscathed never created as much as a stir in official circles. They found their final resting place in HITLER's desk. They might be used for some future intrigue, but to accomplish the thing for which they were intended - very rarely indeed.

(7) Dissemination

All Lageberichte, provided they did not implicate any leading personalities, were sent to all Ministers, all Reichleiter of the Party, and most other officials of equal rank. They were no longer objective in the least, and simply reproduced official policy in most cases. Even here enough of the truth remained to make them uncomfortable reading for some. Goebbels III resorted to the device of leaving out of the appropriate report all sections even vaguely connected with the Minister or official to whom a particular copy was sent.

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B. Part III (Continued)

GOEBBELS and BORRMAN evinced the most interest for these reports. They at least received them without any sections having been cut out. There even existed a liaison officer of the NSDAP with BORRMAN, an SS Obersturmbannfuhrer, Dr Justus BEYER. His influence with BORRMAN was non-existent.

(8) Fundamental Difficulties

A further important disadvantage can be found in the overdeveloped centralization of the Nazi State. Instead of allotting sufficient power to the Abschnittsleiter, so that certain level of facilities could be settled right then and there, every thing had to go through the NSDAP. Usually that was the end of the problem, because as the difficulty simply disappeared while going through channels.

In the few cases where a decision was made, for example involving the Gauleiter, the latter blamed the Abschnittsleiter for being bawled out and for all other difficulties, and his relation with the SD officer deteriorated even further. If there were any complaints from the Gauleiter, however, HEINRICH simply used to fire his Abschnittsleiter.

KALTENBRUNNER followed a different line: he instructed his subordinates to establish good relations with the Gauleiter, at all costs, in order to be able to gain advantage of him at a later date (Hinterzukunft).

Certain special reports, usually classified Geheim Reichssache and with a very small distribution were slightly more successful. These reports were usually in the form of a memorandum, and KALTENBRUNNER usually did everything in his power to insure their receipt by the desired person (usually HITLER).

Another factor which must not be forgotten is the inadequacy of the human material involved. Most SD officers were young functionaries without the detachment and background necessary for the efficient conduct of an intelligence service.

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(9) Conclusions

Some of the results deriving from the factors discussed above have already been discussed. As a final conclusion one might say that the III had the inherent capability of serving as an instrument of collecting objective and factual intelligence as well as of evaluating and utilizing this intelligence effectively. The reasons preventing it from over assuming that function, however, were stronger by their very nature than those favoring that development.

To put the same conclusion slightly differently: under the National Socialist regime some of the faults inherent in this regime made the collation and evaluation of objective internal intelligence as well as its utilization impossible. The most important of these reasons was the fact that such a service would carry in it the seed of self-destruction (which leads to the discovery that effective internal intelligence in all its aspects is only possible under a system very far removed ideologically from the Nazi State. It would be idle to ask whether such a state would have any need of an effective internal intelligence service).

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

4. Ant IV (formerly SD Hauptamt Gestapo)

a. Stapo Membership and Party Affiliation

Ant IV was by far the most dreaded section of the whole RSHA. As the high Command of the Stapo (Secret Police) its reputation inside and outside of Germany was probably the worst of all the institutions of the National Socialist State. It is a paradox, however, that originally its members were by no means selected for their adherence to the ideological tenets of Nazism.

On the contrary, the number of so-called elite Kämpfer within its ranks, as well as former members of the para-military organizations of the NSDAP, such as SS, SA, NSKK, etc was comparatively small. This was changed only when all its officials were taken over into the SS in line with HIMMLER's attempts of complete SS domination of all police services.

b. Quality of Work performed

Nor did the Gestapo, contrary to popular belief, work particularly efficiently as a secret police. The former Austrian Secret Police, which was absorbed almost fully into Stapostelle Wien was a much more efficient organization.

The reason for the Gestapo's peculiar effectiveness must be sought in the type of personnel it employed. The average Stapo official was below average in intelligence, but endowed with cunning and filled with boundless brutality. Quite a few of this number were men with criminal or pathological records or tendencies.

All of them were united in the desire to be the willing tools of the state and to engage in the suppression and complete elimination of all opposition tendencies. The fact that the state happened to be a National Socialist one was purely incidental. They would have served any other master with the same loyalty, using the same means, as long as it would have given them the same power of life and death over the average citizen.

Of course National Socialism was particularly fitted to produce that atmosphere of utter lawlessness and all-pervading fear which made the Secret Police thrive and perpetuated its reputation.

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c. MUELLER, Typical Gestapo Man

All these tendencies can be easily observed by a consideration of Amt IV's last chief, SS Gruppenfuehrer MUELLER. With an undistinguished background, he had been a small official within the Bavarian Political Police, when somehow HEYDRICH's attention was directed to the little man. HEYDRICH, certain that here was a man who would do his bidding, took him to BERLIN with him.

He rose steadily and finally became the successor of Dr BERT, the previous head of the Stapo under HEYDRICH. While the Hermann was still alive, MUELLER was his closest confidant and most willing creature. With his death he assumed complete control over his organization and succeeded in modeling it completely after his own ideas.

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4. Amt IV (Continued)

Without any moral scruples, even without any conception of moral values, cunning to the point of brilliance, with socialist leanings and definite pathological tendencies, he was the prototype of the Gestapo man. He succeeded in eliminating from the leadership of the Stapo anybody who could possibly provide cause for conflicts. At the same time he succeeded in completely pleasing HIMMLER, to whom he bore a definite resemblance in his character.

d. Organization of Amt IV

Organizationally Amt IV was of slightly different structure than the other Aemter of the RSHA. It consisted of only three Gruppen - A, B, and G. Under the Gruppen there were subdivisions called Abteilungen, which were then followed by the usual Referate. The inclusion of Abteilungen within the organizational scheme has been attempted in other Aemter, but had never been officially adopted there.

5. Amt V

The Amt controlling the activities of the Criminal Police (Kripa) never became a full-fledged member of the Security Services of the State. It was mainly concerned with routine processing of criminal investigation. Although its members had been taken over into the SD and it had officially been made part of the Stapo in connection with HIMMLER's complete control of all police services, the amount of actual penetration remained slight. Especially in the lower levels the Kripa was still a police organization to the exclusion of all other tendencies.

There was a certain amount of cooperation between Amt IV and Amt V at intermediate and high echelons but until the end almost no connection existed between Amt V and the two SD Aemter.

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6. Ant VI

d. Early History (Foreign Intelligence under JOST)

(1) The Beginning

The beginnings of a political intelligence service outside the confines of GERMANY can be traced back to 1937. In this year Ant III of the SD Hauptamt began the establishment of an Information net in various countries of South-Eastern EUROPE, as well as in CZECHOSLOVAKIA and AUSTRIA.

(2) Two Patterns

At that time SS Brigadefuehrer JOST was Chief of Ant III, while the newly formed Hauptabteilung III/3, charged with foreign intelligence, came under the command of Dr FILBERT. His name is intimately connected with almost all phases of German intelligence operations during this first period.

Work in AUSTRIA and CZECHOSLOVAKIA was not organized according to a strict and uniform pattern, while activities in the other countries were planned according to a scheme which was to retain its validity for many years, in spite of many defects and shortcomings.

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6. Ant VI (Continued)

The Hauptvertrauensleute in the other countries of the European SOUTH-EAST were not of such high caliber. Yet, during this time of easy military victories, even cooperative bunglers at the game succeeded in working successfully in the lush field of the German-controlled Balkans.

Many German firms attempted to branch out into the SOUTH-EAST during this period and their activities provided added backdrops for intelligence operations.

A less far-reaching apparatus of high quality had been set up by the SD Leitabschnitt WIEN, which also controlled certain information-gathering activities in SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE in that period.

This uncoordinated and un-authorized activity was looked upon askance by the central office in BERLIN, and after the personnel changes in fall 1941, the net which had been established from WIEN was smashed by the appropriate Laendergruppe.

(b) Near East and RUSSIA

Intelligence operations in the Near East were of minor importance at that time. Only when this region became the focal point of military operational planning and concrete preparations for moves in this area had been made by the General Staff did intelligence activities swing into high gear. Work against SOVIET RUSSIA had top priority.

The Gruppenleiter, Dr GRAEFE, with the RUSSELAND Referat SS Stabsgruppenfuhrer Dr HENGELHAUPT, had met with good initial successes in his work and had managed to establish several intelligence lines with contacts in the interior of the SOVIET UNION. This constituted a rather remarkable achievement, since only a year previously, at a meeting between SD and Abwehr representatives in PRAGUE, the observation had been made that not a single source of information within the USSR was available to the German intelligence services.

This prompted total intensification of effort, since, at that time (late 1940-early 1941), the military High Command needed certain information for their operational plans which could only be obtained through secret sources. In the SOUTH of the USSR, especially the UKRAINE, the VI Referat of the Leitabschnitt WIEN, had succeeded in establishing certain contact, with HUNGARY and RUMANIA as bases.

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(3) Progress to the Half Way Mark

The following paragraphs will attempt a rough survey of the state of German foreign intelligence operations as of fall 1941, the date of JOST's removal. These activities had come under Genl. VI since 1939 and can only be discussed very incompletely here. As with less a comparison between the work done under JOST and the completely different activities under SCHELLENBERG at a later date might be of certain interest.

(a) SOUTH-EAST

The greatest progress had been made in work in SOUTH-EAST EUROPE where all the prerequisites for successful operations could be found. Of added advantage was the fact that almost all these countries had come under German control or direct German influence and that therefore they proved sufficiently tractable, especially during this period of German military ascendancy.

Among the Balkan countries ROMANIA had risen already to the distinction of providing the most fertile ground for intelligence purposes. Here the very able SS Hauptsturmführer von BOHLSCHLINGH controlled operations in his capacity as Hauptvertrauensmann. He was ably assisted and later succeeded by the equally qualified SS Hauptsturmführer ADLER (now in Allied hands). BOHLSCHLINGH was removed at the instigation of the Foreign Office after the attempted revolt of the Iron Guard. Laboring under the disadvantage of having a mind and opinions of his own he suffered the usual fate, was degraded, and remained incarcerated for several months, as prisoner of the Stapo.

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(c) FAR EAST

No attempt had been made to prepare the ground for intelligence operations in the Far East while this would have still been possible. Therefore the accomplishment of this task, when required, was faced with insurmountable obstacles. It would have been necessary to operate across a part of the world controlled either by the Russian or the English enemy. To make things even worse the police attaché at TOKYO, SS Standartenführer MEISINGER, turned out to be a complete failure.

(d) SOUTH

There were absolutely no operations directed at the South of EUROPE. Here Amt VI was strictly limited by an order from HITLER stating that all espionage activity in the country of the Italian ally was prohibited. This also precluded all chances of penetrating into NORTH AFRICA. Only with the German move into TUNIS was this situation changed and an Einsatzkommando dispatched.

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6. Ant VI (Continued)

(e) WEST

In the West of EUROPE certain good work had been done. The occupation of FRANCE, HOLLAND, and BELGIUM simplified matters and provided new bases for future operations. This period was, however, comparatively rich in jurisdictional disputes between Ant VI, which insisted on its mission of controlling all political intelligence work, and certain local Sipo agencies which did not wish to cede this prerogative.

Work of very high quality emanated from SPAIN and PORTUGAL, including TANGIER, where opportunities abounded at that time.

(f) NORTH

Results from the Scandinavian countries were not of such high level. Occupation of NORWAY and DENMARK did not bring with it a substantial improvement.

(g) US and UK

Intelligence operations outside of EUROPE had just begun. No results had come from NORTH AMERICA yet, while rather solid spade-work had been done in SOUTH AMERICA. Ant VI never succeeded in penetrating the UK proper.

(h) SWITZERLAND

Due to its unique geographical and political position, SWITZERLAND became a hotbed of intelligence operations. Nevertheless the net established by Ant VI was not of a very good quality. Exceptionally good work and connections were established by SS Hauptsturmfuehrer GROEHL, then VI Referent at SD Abschnitt IMNSBRUCK (later Hauptvertrauensmann ITALY). These activities were on his own hook and met with displeasure at the BERLIN office.

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(i) Conclusions

In concluding it may be said that as a general political information and intelligence service the SE at that time (approximately two years after the outbreak of the war) was a failure. It did not meet even the minimum requirements of the political or military high command.

On the other hand it must be said that, contrary to popular belief, the German authorities did not then, or at any other time, particularly care for or appreciate the work done by this service. Certain agencies such as the Foreign Office, actually (if usually surreptitiously) sabotaged the intelligence services wherever and whenever possible. A further drawback was the fact that HEYDRICH considered evaluation of reports and their final dissemination his exclusive province. He failed to transmit certain important reports if these, for some reason or other, did not agree with his ideas.

(j) JOST and cohorts

Chief of Amt VI at that time, JOST was the personification of the "little man" and did not possess the stature necessary for the execution of the tasks required of him. He was easily influenced and his officers actually ran by a small circle of close collaborators, whose prime consideration was their own importance and who were beset by professional jealousy. As a man he was absolutely straight, even probably too decent for a job such as his. Ironically enough, his downfall was caused by an accusation of personal dishonesty.

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6. Ant VI (Continued)

JOST and FILBERT--then Gruppenleiter VI A and JOST's closest collaborator and the most able man in the section--as well as Obersturmbannfuhrer VOLLHEIM, Gruppenleiter VI C, and another SS officer were accused of having accepted bribes. This trumped-up charge was used to remove them from office. JOST, after a long investigation, was found guilty and relieved in October 1941.

b. Ant VI under SCHELLENBERG

(1) SCHELLENBERG appears

(a) Background

JOST's removal had been planned by HEYDRICH and had been expected for a long time previously. Shortly before, HEYDRICH had placed SS Sturmbannfuhrer SCHELLENBERG, one of his trusted underlings, into Ant VI as JOST's deputy. SCHELLENBERG had come from Ant IV (Stapa), where as Gruppenleiter IV E he had gained quite a reputation. Only thirty years old and of comparatively low rank, he had risen to great prominence and had become HUELLER's unofficial deputy.

This position had been founded on SCHELLENBERG's famous exploit known as the VENLO affair. In the course of this enterprise SCHELLENBERG and some officers of Ant VI had succeeded in kidnapping the two chief agents of the British Secret Service in HOLLAND (BEST and STEVENS) and in abducting them across the border into GERMANY.

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(b) Plans and Personality

SCHELLENBERG's posting to Amt VI marked a complete change in direction for this agency and it became obvious that JOSEF's days as its head were numbered. To fully understand the growth of Amt VI under SCHELLENBERG a comprehension of his personality is necessary.

He did not belong to the alte Kämpfer. He joined the NSDAP and SS at a relatively late date. He received his start as a subordinate NCO in Amt I in the personnel section. With a keen understanding of the potentialities of this section he knew how to place himself in the foreground and soon HEYDRICH's watchful eye had become aware of the young man.

The latter soon accepted SCHELLENBERG into his inner circle, in order to, as he put it, "train the youngster himself." The human relationship between the two became ever closer, SCHELLENBERG became one of HEYDRICH's most trusted confidants.

The boss also introduced his new protegee into the circle of his family, where SCHELLENBERG soon so ingratiated himself, that everybody expected him to marry HEYDRICH's widow (after the latter's assassination). But by then SCHELLENBERG had become far too clever. A dead HEYDRICH was no longer of any interest to him.

To fathom SCHELLENBERG's true character is not very easy. It is certain that he was driven by an all-consuming ambition. He did not hesitate to climb over the dead bodies of his adversaries and even of his friends, as long as this way led towards his goal. Concepts such as friendship, honesty, or sincerity were unknown ideals to him. Nor did he expect them from others.

On the other hand, as far as his personal life is concerned, he was utterly beyond reproach. His manner of life was almost that of an ascetic. He neither drank nor smoked, and worked twenty hours straight for days on end.

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6. Ant VI (Continued)

SCELLENBERG was beyond any doubt the most capable of all the section chiefs in the NSHA. In some respects, such as his knowledge and appreciation of the human character, he was even the superior of KALTENBRUNNER, his chief.

SCELLENBERG had one goal in mind from the very beginning: he wanted to become the head of the German intelligence service, but of an intelligence service of his own making and one that was to include all modifications of his own ideas. To further this end he dedicated all his restless energy and sacrificed his health and his private happiness. It was as if he had become the personification of this idea. That in spite of all this he did not succeed can not be blamed on him. He failed because of the human inadequacy of his collaborators and the lack of understanding of his superiors.

(2) Ant VI Before the End

It would be beyond the framework of this report to discuss in detail all the various stages of development which Ant VI was subjected to under SCHELLENBERG. Only a survey of the organization immediately before the collapse will be given below. There is only one phase which will be given consideration in detail: the incorporation of the military intelligence service and the role played by SCHELLENBERG in this enterprise.

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(a) Absorption of Abwehr

It had always been HEYDRICH's great and unyielding ambition to obtain control over the Abwehr. In the same process he wanted to destroy its chief, Admiral CANARIS, whom he had always regarded as the personification of the military's hate against his person, his SD, and his secret office. SCHELLENBERG became his trusted helpmate in these designs. As a matter of fact it can be said that the latter really was the spiritus rector of the scheme, for no one but he could work so unflinchingly and with the steely determination necessary for carrying out this idea.

SCHELLENBERG had been collecting damning evidence against the Abwehr and against CANARIS and with HEYDRICH's death he decided to place all this evidence at HEYDRICH's successor's disposal. One can not be sure whether he really believed in this assertion, but he gave KALTBRENNER to understand that the British Secret Service had managed to penetrate to the highest councils of the Abwehr, supposedly with CANARIS's tacit approval. It now behooved him to back up these accusations with more concrete proof, since only certain circumstantial evidence had come to light so far.

His opportunity came when several Abwehr agents in TURKEY, who had been suborned by the British, officially switched their allegiance in favor of the Allies. With this material KALTBRENNER succeeded in forcing CANARIS' removal and the creation of a unified German Secret Service (einheitlicher deutscher geheimer Nachrichtendienst) under his command.

Now SCHELLENBERG's hour had struck and he really proved himself adequate for the task of supervising the transfer and unification. He emerged victorious from the fight against HUELLER (head of Amt IV) who claimed large parts of Abwehr for his section. He had to agree to a certain compromise by which a part of III F--the only part of Abwehr so treated - came under the jurisdiction of Amt IV, IG31a.

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6. Part VI (Continued)

But he did succeed in bringing all the other sections of the Abwehr under his control, for the newly-created Amt III under Oberst HANSEN was practically under his own personal command. It probably would have taken years and not months to weld effectively the Abwehr and the political intelligence service together. The Abwehr had a great deal more personnel, and was disorganized, unwieldy, and difficult to control.

It is to SCHELLENBERG's credit as an executive that he managed to effect what measures of unification and control he did in so short and difficult a period.

(b) Removal of HANSEN

According to his own statement, he never trusted HANSEN. He saw in him an awkward competitor who would interfere with the achievement of his aims sooner or later. It is not so certain, however, that he saw through HANSEN completely.

SCHELLENBERG was certainly beset by suspicions long before 20 July 1944 and stated his opposition and dislike of HANSEN publicly before that time. The latter of course reciprocated these feelings most heartily. He would have certainly delighted in the planned liquidation of SCHELLENBERG in the course of the 20 July Revolt.

But SCHELLENBERG was on his guard, and even during the most critical hours he managed to keep a clear head and turn things to his own advantage. And at that he was anything but heroic. But by playing his cards right, he succeeded in arresting HANSEN (instead of, as it had been planned, the other way around) and to add spice to his triumph he followed this by the arrest of Admiral CANARIS.

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(1) SCHELLENBERG in Complete Control

After these experiences he never trusted anybody in Amt III who could possibly become dangerous to him. Of the old guard he only kept Oberst i G OHLETZ in his position, for he knew that in spite of doubtful ability, the latter would cheerfully do his bidding.

All the other survivors of 20 July, such as Oberstleutnant i G KLEIN-STUEBBER, never succeeded in gaining their chief's confidence. He removed them from their posts and dispatched them to agencies in the field. But now SCHELLENBERG had reached the threshold of his power. Now he was chief of the complete political and military foreign intelligence service. It now remained to reorganize this service according to his own plans.

c. Final Organization of Amt VI

(1) Gruppe VI A (Administration and Organization)

(a) Functions

The idea of this section originated with Dr. FILBERT, who had already prepared the structure in somewhat similar form. After a period of inefficient and incapable management, SCHELLENBERG decided to call in a man who had made a reputation for himself in Amt I.

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6. Ant VI (Continued)

As a Leitabschnittsfuehrer at STUTTGART for many years he and his VI Referent had managed to create a number of information channels to FRANCE and SWITZERLAND. Through this work he had come in actual contact with some of the problems of Western EUROPE and for this reason it did not take him long to grasp the essence of his new position in spite of his late arrival at Ant VI (1943).

(b) FRANCE

Gruppe VI B's intelligence net in FRANCE was excellent, but only prior to and during the German occupation of this country. In VICHY the Gruppe had Dr REICHEL, a very able man, as their representative. The chief agent stationed in PARIS was SS Standartenfuehrer HICKLER. He was very gifted and probably the greatest expert on French affairs in GERMANY. He had been born in ALSACE, had been the lawyer of ROOS, the leader of the Alsatian autonomy movement who had been executed by the French.

After the occupation of FRANCE, HICKLER ordered him into the Waffen SS since he had his own opinion about GERMANY's policy towards FRANCE and made no bones about his convictions. He then came to the SD and became a very valuable man, in spite of having no particular ability for pure intelligence work.

But his profound knowledge of French affairs and his clear realization of GERMANY's mistakes in her dealings with FRANCE soon made him the most important expert on FRANCE in all of the NSDA. As could be expected his plans for a more reasonable policy towards FRANCE were not approved and so he found himself more and more in opposition. Exhaustive reports (Grossberichte) prepared by him were forwarded to HITLER, but did not cause any appreciable results.

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6. Amt VI (Continued)

As an expert for organizational and efficiency problems, SS Standartenfuehrer Dr SANDBERGER had become as famous as he had become feared. After his stay with Amt I he had served as assistant to the Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, ITALY, and then joined Amt VI. SANDBERGER was certainly very able and exceedingly ambitious but as Gruppenfuehrer VI A, he continued making his old mistake of over-organizing everything.

Gruppe VI A offered ample opportunity for this weakness. All the organizational plans for Amt VI originated with this Gruppe. Their schematic diagrams always represented some future ideal and never corresponded to the actual state of affairs. Obviously SANDBERGER can show very efficiently. He managed to have his way in conflicts with other sections about personnel questions. The not inconsiderable foreign and domestic funds under his control (he was also in charge of the Kassenabteilung for the whole of Amt VI) were in tip-top shape at all times.

SCELLENBERG too took a very personal interest in the financial affairs of his section. He suffered from the fear that one day his position would be compromised by the machinations or even the negligence of one of his subordinates.

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(b) Referat VI Kult

After a short spell as an independent Gruppe, VI Kult became a Referat subordinated to Gruppe VI A. The reason for the establishment of VI Kult was to find new sources for Amt VI by the inclusion of persons active in cultural and educational endeavors travelling to and from GERMANY. Some of this personnel was then to be put at the disposal of the sub-sections dealing with the various countries (Ländergruppen).

The creation of such a service had only become necessary because all VI Referate at the various SD abschnitte had been discontinued in order to make for a more central organization. By gaining in centralization they had lost out on the recruiting of new agents and a distinct gap had been created.

VI Kult therefore attempted to bridge this gap by dispatching representatives to the most important abschnitte. The quality of work done by VI Kult remained sub-standard until the end. The explanation for this is to be found in the inferior leadership at the top.

(c) Mil A

Towards the end of 1944 SANDBERGER also became head of the Gruppe Mil A. The duties of this section in Mil A corresponded exactly to those of VI A in Amt VI.

(2) Gruppe VI B (Western EUROPE)

(1) General

Gruppe VI B which dealt with the countries of Western EUROPE and Western AFRICA, was among the best sections in Amt VI. SS Standardführer STEINLE, like SANDBERGER a member of the so-called SWABIAN Clique in Amt VI, was an exceptionally gifted section chief. He had an uncanny gift for pure intelligence operations.

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6. Part VI (Continued)

The different organization in AUSTRIA and CZECHOSLOVAKIA can be explained by the fact that operations there were entrusted to the indigenous Nazi or pro-Nazi parties, which frequently had a structure reminiscent of the NSDAP in GERMANY.

Intelligence organizations in other countries were usually activated as follows: an attempt was made to enlist the services of a thoroughly versed expert in the affairs and history of the country under consideration. This man usually had the complete confidence of Gest III, and frequently also was a member of the SS.

The operative was then dispatched to the country where he was to operate, with the title of Hauptvertrauensmann (chief confidential agent). His activities were camouflaged by the device of sending him in the guise of a businessman employed by the local branch of a German business establishment.

This method soon became stereotyped, and the usual mistake of always following the same pattern was made here as well as in other German intelligence operations. Thus certain firms which were used for this purpose soon suffered under the reputation of being nothing more than cover agencies of the German secret service. (This disadvantage became especially acute since the Abwehr showed a similar lack of imagination and used the services of the identical enterprises).

Firms, such as the large house of SCHWENKER & Co, the German Luftansa, the foreign branch offices of the Reichsbahn, and the offices of certain steamship lines, soon became known all over the world, and especially in the Balkans and the Near East as the centers of the German intelligence service.

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(c) SPAIN and PORTUGAL

The organization set up by VI B in SPAIN had become static and more or less inactive. A similar state of affairs existed in PORTUGAL. The man entrusted with its operation, a so-called police liaison officer (Polizeiverbindungs-fuehrer) - not a Police Attoche since the Portuguese had not accredited such a position at the Embassy - proved completely incapable. He was a pure policeman with no ability or interest in intelligence work.

Furthermore work in all of the Iberian Peninsula, as well as at TRIER suffered under ever increasing pressure from the side of the allies. SPAIN and PORTUGAL were asked to expell the German Intelligence agents, some of whom had become rather well known through their activities.

STEINLE was also charged with command over Gruppe Mil B. This section controlled the intelligence network of the former Abwehr in SPAIN and PORTUGAL. This net was comparatively large but of poor quality. A reorganization of the KO in both countries had been planned and the first steps had already been taken and new operatives sent to the scene.

(d) SWITZERLAND

Not much progress had been made in SWITZERLAND. The Hauptvertrauensmann, SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Hans DUFFLOT (captured), employed as Vice Consul at LAUSANNE, proved to be an absolute nincompoop. The Swiss Referat therefore only continued its existence because of a line operated by SCHELLENBERG himself, which produced excellent results. The Militaerisches Amt had suffered a very serious setback in SWITZERLAND. It had lost (in connection with the 20 July plot) the services of its most capable representative, Prince AUERSPERG. AUERSPERG had been disguised as the assistant air attache at BERNE.

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Ant VI (Continued)

(3) Gruppe VI C (RUSSIA and NEAR EAST)

(a) SOVIET RUSSIA

As far as inherent importance was concerned, Gruppe VI C was considered the prime concern of Ant VI. Credit for this state of affairs was due largely to its former Leiter, SS Standartenfuhrer Dr GRAEFE. (GRAEFE and the best Gruppenleiter of Ant III, SS Standartenfuhrer Dr GEIGERBACH were both killed in an automobile accident).

GRAEFE had built up his section systematically and concentrated his main effort against SOVIET RUSSIA. An organization for the collection of intelligence was created, which went far beyond the customary scope of Ant VI. All conceivable methods were employed to obtain information about the SOVIET UNION. A whole special organization was created which was to achieve these ends through the interrogation of PW and the employment of renegade Russians (Unternehmen Zeppelin). Led by SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Dr ROSENER, an able and well-trained officer, this operation achieved very good results.

Not content to leave a good thing alone, GRAEFE changed the organization and leadership of Zeppelin constantly, so that finally it had only a fraction of its previous value.

The methodical work of GRAEFE, the long period of training of certain Russians employed by him, and their familiarity with radio operations really paid dividends. A number of successful parachute operations ensued, especially concentrated in the CAUCASUS. It is believed that radio communication with some of these agents continued until the end.

The Leiter of the Russia Referat, Dr HENGEHEUFT, was an exceedingly quiet and dispassionate man with a scientific turn of mind. He was undoubtedly the right man for work which had to be planned well in advance and from a long-range point of view. He possessed very good information about the USSR and had given his superiors an unadorned and - for GERMANY - unfavorable picture of the situation from the very beginning.

He was not listened to, of course, and HIMMLER even transferred him once, as punishment for his constant admonitions and destruction of the political leader's fond illusions. It is to be assumed that during the last months of the war the work of the Russia Referat was further intensified.

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(b) TURKEY

A similarly successful Referat had been established in TURKEY by the Referent, SS Sturmbannfuhrer SCHUBACK. He was assisted by two extremely able intelligence operatives, SS Sturmbannfuhrer BOYZIGCH at ANKARA and SS Sturmbannfuhrer WOLF at ISTANBUL. Both had been camouflaged as members of the German diplomatic missions. They had succeeded in establishing an intelligence net which continued in operation even after GERMANY had been forced to withdraw all official connection from TURKEY.

(c) Near East

The Near East never proved to be quite as fertile for German intelligence operations. During 1944 a lot of work was lavished on that sector without achieving commensurate results. The main source of information was a Levantine agent with an extensive organization under his control.

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6. Ant VI (Continued)

It is fairly certain, however, that the same agent was employed by the British as well and received his pay from both sides (It is even possible that the Italians employed the identical man). His material is supposed to have been of great value, in spite of or perhaps because of his connections.

Great attention was paid to the emigrants in GERMANY, such as the Grand Mufti HUSSEINI and the former Iraq president al-GILANI. Close collaboration existed between these persons and the groups controlled by them in the field of intelligence operations. Whether any active work was done in connection with these groups could not be ascertained (by HOETTL).

(d) IRAN

Ant VI succeeded in accomplishing an interesting experiment in IRAN. During 1940 two young SS officers, by the name of GANOTHA and MAYER, were dispatched to TEHRAN as employees of SCHENKER in order to give them an opportunity to study language and country. This was done with the idea in mind of using these two men as agents at some later date.

But the two young men soon had acclimated themselves, and now commenced to do some intelligence work on their own hook. They not only engaged in the collection of pure intelligence but also began to dabble in the political field, and achieved remarkable results, much to everybody's surprise.

A number of insurrections of the Iranians against the USSR was instigated by them. (MOLOTOV has stated that these activities were one of the main reasons for the move of the Red Army into Iran). All these activities had been done on their own responsibility and without the previous knowledge or approval of Ant VI.

MAYER was later arrested by the British and sent to Cairo, while GANOTHA managed to return to GERMANY. The intelligence net organized by them, however, continued in operation and close contact was maintained with IRAN. It is known that several groups were dropped over Iran, and although some of their personnel were caught, the remainder succeeded in continuing operations.

GANOTHA's successor in IRAN was SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Martin KURMIS. He had been dropped by parachute together with a group of agents. The Russians attempted to suborn KURMIS, but he refused their offer. Facing certain arrest he committed suicide.

Part of his group was taken into custody, but the remainder succeeded in evading capture and is thought to be still hiding among the various tribes with whom GANOTHA worked.

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(e) FAR EAST

Similarly the Far East received systematic treatment within Art VI. The Leiter, SS Sturmbannfuhrer WEITZBUCH, now in Allied hands, created a separate institute and staffed it with a number of scientists and politicians who had been working on problems of this region and especially on JAPAN.

There was no direct intelligence connection with either JAPAN or CHINA, however. The only contact was the official one through the police attache at TOKYO, who in turn remained in contact with the police attache accredited to the puppet government at NANKING.

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6. Ant VI (Continued)

WEIRAUCH's most valuable collaborator was the former director of the propaganda office of the State Railway at TOKYO (Leiter der Reichsbahnwerbezentrale TOKIO), SS Obersturmfuehrer LEO. LEO was one of the foremost experts on Japanese affairs in GERMANY, perhaps even in EUROPE. He had studied in JAPAN for many years and had received his doctor's degree there, a rare achievement.

WEIRAUCH and LEO always followed a strongly anti-Japanese course. This inclination could also be detected from their reports. A number of memoranda submitted to the highest echelons of the government clearly expressed these leanings and warned the government not to have any illusions about the altruism of their allies.

These reports seem to have had a certain measure of success but caused the displeasure of HIMMLER.

WEIRAUCH and LEO's forte was not so much strict intelligence as it was thorough knowledge of JAPAN and all phases of Japanese life. During the last few months KALTENBRUNNER attempted to put the JAPAN Referat in direct contact with officials of the Japanese embassy. To further this end several meetings were held with both KALTENBRUNNER and OSHIMA in attendance.

(f) RAPP and Mil C

GRAEFE's successor as Leiter of VI C was SS Obersturmbannfuehrer RAPP. Contrary to usual practice he was not put in charge of Abteilung Mil C, since the area of activity of this section did not correspond to that of VI C (Mil C included beside the USSR, the Near East, and the Far East, also South Eastern EUROPE and the Scandinavian countries).

RAPP, who was very ambitious without having any special qualifications, (he was formerly Leitabschnittsfuehrer MUECHTER) attempted to gain control over these areas as well. He was stopped short, however, by the determined opposition of SS Obersturmbannfuehrer WANECK (now in Allied hands), the Gruppenleiter of VI E.

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(4) Gruppe VI D (West)

(a) General

This sub-section was by far the weakest link in Asst VI. Its sphere of operation included ENGLAND and the British Empire as well as the Scandinavian Countries and the Americas. The personnel employed in the Gruppe was mediocre at best. The position of Leiter VI D was held for the first few years by SS Obersturmbannführer DAUFELDT. He was a playboy whose only qualification for the job consisted of his good knowledge of the English language.

Successes in the two main fields - ENGLAND and the US - were non-existent under DAUFELDT. Not much improvement was noted after SS Obersturmbannführer Dr PAEFFGEN had been appointed as DAUFELDT's successor. PAEFFGEN's qualifications were, if that is possible, even poorer than those of his predecessor.

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6. Art VI (Continued)

To show the state of affairs in the section the following example is indicative: VI D tried for five years to establish an intelligence net in EIRE, in order to use that country as a base for operations against the UK proper. The establishment of this EIRE net was never completed and VI D never had a single wireless connection with ENGLAND or with the UNITED STATES.

(b) SOUTH AMERICA

The picture looked slightly rosier in SOUTH AMERICA. Using SPAIN and PORTUGAL as relay bases, certain rather good connections could be established. The political developments in the countries of SOUTH AMERICA progressively weakened these contacts, however. Similar development ensued in SWEDEN. The government expelled all known German agents (that included operatives of both the Abwehr and the SD).

One contact, probably the best of the lot, was not affected by this order, however. This connection had been established by ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ personally and was through a Swedish newspaper publisher, who at the same time was owner of a shipping line. The newspaper was supported financially by both the SD and the Foreign Office.

(5) Gruppe VI E (Southeast EUROPE)

(a) General

As the oldest Gruppe in Art VI, the section dealing with the countries of Southeastern EUROPE was in possession of a rather efficient intelligence net. These connections could be kept alive, at least partially, even after the Russian occupation of these countries.

Of prime importance in this context was the collaboration between the SD and the conservative and reactionary parties in these countries. Especially after occupation, when these parties were forced to go underground, this collaboration became very intimate and effective.

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(b) Post-hostilities Status

The men responsible for the intelligence connections, which in certain countries include ties with personalities in or near the governing circle were usually the Hauptvertrauensleute in the various nations. Several of the intelligence nets, left behind after the German withdrawal, did not succeed in re-establishing radio communications with the central office. The net in BULGARIA, for instance, though still in existence, was no longer in contact with the communications control of VI E.

In other countries as well, only parts of the intelligence net were controlled by the local radio outlet, towards the end. The remainder had to continue operations without either receiving directions or being able to transmit findings and results.

(c) WANECK

The Leiter of Gruppe VI E, SS Obersturmbannführer WANECK, played a disproportionately important role within Unit VI. This was not so much due to his ability as it was to his close connections with Dr KALTENBUNNER. SCHELLENBERG was afraid of WANECK's influence, especially since the latter had been able to put something over on him on several occasions.

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6. Art VI (Continued)

WANECK was one of the oldest members of the foreign intelligence service, but had no practical experience whatsoever. His activities were limited to executive desk work.

(d) ITALY

Until the end of 1944 the ITALY Referat, including the subsection dealing with the VATICAN, also belonged to Gruppe VI E. (These subsections were separated from VI E. when this office moved to MEM, and were then attached to VI B). Work in ITALY, in spite of great advantages, was handicapped for a very long time because it had to work in an underground fashion.

As has already been mentioned, a strict order by HITLER prohibited all intelligence activities in ITALY. Nevertheless after MUSSOLINI's overthrow several good sources of information were established in ROME. They were of no political consequence, however, since the reports received were completely anti-fascist and opposed MUSSOLINI's restoration.

This stand, of course, was counter to the official German policy and did not meet with approval in the eyes of the mighty. Excellent work was done by the former Hauptvertrauensmann of ITALY, the Hauptsturmfuehrer in GROEBEL (later killed by partisans), and by the police attache with the Embassy in ROME, SS Obersturmbannfuehrer KATTLER.

After the loss of ROME the main effort of intelligence activities was transferred to the North. In this process these activities came under the control of the Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD in ITALIEN, SS Gruppenfuehrer Dr HARSTER. One of the greatest career men in the SS, HARSTER jealously guarded his rights and powers. But even during this period reports from ITALY were usually rather objective and exposed some illusions.

The time given for the establishment of an intelligence net to the VATICAN was too short to achieve telling results. An added disadvantage was the arrest of SS Obersturmbannfuehrer BELLING by the Americans. He had been slated to become the SD Vertrauensmann at the VATICAN.

In its political ideas the VATICAN Referat represented the opinions voiced by the German Ambassador von WEIZSACKER, i e, sharply opposed to those of the Foreign Office and of HIMMLER and HITLER.

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(6) Gruppe VI F

This Gruppe was entrusted with the provision of all technical prerequisites for all other sections of the Amt and was consequently of great importance. Its organization reflects its purely technical nature.

(a) Radio Sections

Referate VI F 1 and VI F 2 were both concerned with the radio receiving and transmitting stations serving the Amt. The former was charged with the operation of these installations, while the latter was entrusted with their construction and research in the field of wireless transmission. They jointly controlled the so-called HAVELINSTITUT, designated VI F (II).

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6. Lat VI (Continued)

The radio section of VI F had always been its greatest concern. Especially during the war it became increasingly more difficult to obtain the proper personnel and material for an efficient operation of these services. The first Gruppenleiter VI F, SS Sturmbannfuhrer SAJUCKS (later courtmartialed by HEYDRICH), had laid the foundations for an extensive wireless section.

With the great development of the foreign intelligence service the existing installation soon became insufficient and a new and enlarged system of radio transmitting and receiving stations had to be established.

(b) The HAVELINSTITUT

The first step was the creation of the HAVEL INSTITUT, under the direction of SS Sturmbannfuhrer SIEPER. Later the installations were enlarged even further. Before the collapse the following high-power transmitters, exclusively for intelligence broadcasts, were in operation:

- Central Transmitter WANNSEE
- KIRCHSASSEN
- MARLENBAD (MARLANSKE LAZNE)
- GDYNIA
- BABELSBERG
- RIGA - ASSERN
- OSWITZ
- NICKERSBERG
- BAEBERG
- KAHLENBERG

Each one of these transmitters was equipped with the latest improvements and could signal on as many as 20 channels simultaneously. Nevertheless this number was still not sufficient. Through the assistance of numerous agents by parachute, new radio nets had to be established almost daily.

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(c) New Developments

The Institut was not only concerned with these high-power transmitters. Its construction section (Bauteilung) manufactured radio sets for agents and produced these sets on an assembly line basis. Research was one of the section's prime concerns.

VI F had some of the top experts in the field of communications at its disposal. Certain inventions had been made, especially during the last few months which were really remarkable. In addition for the small (agent's) transmitter had been developed which permitted the transmission of whole pages of text within the space of only a few seconds. This would have revolutionized the whole field of agent's transmissions.

Another apparatus was an automatic scribbler and decipherer for secret transmissions. Great steps forward had been made in voice transmitter and receiver sets, as well. (a new set was developed of great value for the commitment of agents in rugged terrain, mountains etc). With the aid of the new set (range up to 50 km) airplanes could remain in touch with agents dropped over and hiding in this type of terrain. Also the establishment of contact with these agents and the exact location of their position was vastly facilitated.

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S E C R E T

INTERROGATION REPORT No. 15

6. Ant VI (Continued)

The ablest man in this section was Dr SCHAEFFNER (none in HEIDENBERG) who was able to produce amazing results in spite of the inadequate means at his disposal. SIEPEN's successor was SS Stabsamfuhrer FROESS, not quite as efficient a man as his predecessor.

(c) Other Technical Aids

Referat VI F 3 was concerned with the production of all other technical aids, necessary for the operation of an intelligence service. To this field belonged all sabotage devices, such as bombs, infernal machines, etc; also special weapons, devices for obtaining entry and exit, etc.

During the most recent period several new inventions were made: a special pistol with tracer device (Leuchtstrahl) for firing at night, a miniature pistol for assassinations (20 rounds, caliber 6.35 mm), etc. VI F 3 also controlled a chemical sub-section. It was concerned with the manufacture of secret inks, poisons, etc. Referat VI F 3 was SS Stabsamfuhrer LASSIG, an old hand with considerable experience.

(e) False Papers

Referat VI F 4 was charged with the manufacture of all false documents, such as passports, etc. The falsification of passports had been developed to a fine art. Upon several occasions agents with counterfeit passports were sent out to foreign police and consular agencies, with the only purpose of testing the quality of their false papers. Not once was suspicion aroused.

The best samples of workmanship were to be found in false Swedish passports, also in the passports of certain South American countries. VI F 4 also contained a photographic laboratory, engaged in the development of miniature cameras, as well as in microphotography.

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(f) Signal Intelligence and Cryptanalysis

A separate signal intelligence service under VI F was discontinued in 1943. All long range intercept work was henceforth to be done by the Foreign Office (Sechhausdienst). With the discontinuation of signal intercept, the deciphering section as well lost much of its value. This section was staffed by men trained in the tradition of the famed Buero RONGE (RONGE was the celebrated head of espionage in the Austro-Hungarian Empire). His pupil, Oberst FIGL, employed in VI F was known as the best cryptanalyst in GERMANY. The task of this section, after it had been narrowed down considerably was the development of new radio codes, which were of the highest quality.

(g) Mil E and Mil G

After the absorption of the Abwehr, the corresponding apparatus of just Mil was combined with that of Amt VI (Abteilungen Mil E and Mil G). The quality of the Abwehr's services in this field was not high. In extent, however, they were much larger, since each Amt had its own technical section.

At the end, Gruppe VI F as well as the Abteilungen Mil E and G were headed by Oberstleutnant BOENING. He was an experienced scientist, with a long but undistinguished record with the technical services of the Abwehr.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Lat VI (Continued)

(7) Gruppe VI G

(a) Purpose and Commander

Gruppe VI G was one of the most recent formations in Lat VI. It bore the title of the Scientific Methodical Research Service (wissenschaftlich methodischer Forschungsdienst). Under this imposing title the section attempted to enlist German scientific research for intelligence purposes.

The man who was called upon to head the new section was a young Viennese scientist, SS Sturmabfuhrer Dr KRALLERT. He brought with him the highest qualifications for the position. As far as background and ability are concerned, KRALLERT indeed held a unique position in Lat VI and the whole RSHA.

In spite of the novel field and the relatively short time at his disposal, KRALLERT succeeded in achieving amazing results. His first job was the coordination of the maze of frequently conflicting research institutes and stations. Towards the end he had achieved complete control.

Simultaneously the SD had founded certain research agencies of its own, such as the already-mentioned Institut fuer Ostasien und Japan, the Forschungsdienst Ost (Germanic Institut under Dr SCHNEIDER), another research section for the Near East, one for the Balkans, etc. All these research services were placed at KRALLERT's disposal.

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(b) Planned Operations

All this work was just the beginning, the laying of the foundation for the German Intelligence Service of the future. To this end the aid of all scientists and experts who were in any way connected with the study of foreign countries and their peoples was to be enlisted. A certain amount of this work had already been done

For instance, the Reichsstiftung fuer Landeskunde (State Endowment for Geographical Science) had been formed to include all societies, institutes, and research agencies for geography, geopolitics, foreign economics, and political science generally. SCHEELEMEIER had been appointed Chairman of the Endowment and had named KRALLENT its executive manager. Its implicit purpose was the placing of the combined knowledge of all its experts at the disposal of German intelligence.

The scientists, philosophers, and economists who could not be enlisted immediately were registered and their names placed on file. A similar sifting process was going on in German economic life, so that all experts on foreign politics, geography, history, culture, and economics could be put to use. In the case of East ASIA and JAPAN, for instance, this process had already become fairly well advanced.

At the same time VI G collaborated actively with the few remaining foreign institutes in GERMANY, and those in other countries which could still be contacted. A concrete result of this collaboration was the compilation of a collection of maps which did not have their equal anywhere else in GERMANY. KRALLENT's special maps, collected and surveyed in the USSR and the SOUTH EAST as part of a special military mission, are probably unique.

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INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 15

6. Part VI (Continued)

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INTERROGATION REPORT No. 15

6. Amt VI (Continued)

Not only the already-mentioned disorganization within the central office contributed to this state of affairs, but also the nature of the operations. It frequently happened that subordinate agencies planned and executed an operation completely on their own, without any coordination with other similar agencies or with the central office.

Most of the operations were still in the planning stage and the agents were still being trained in the various sabotage and radio schools at the moment of collapse. Nevertheless it is fairly certain that a number of operations had already started in various countries. All these activities, as far as is known, were purely of a sabotage nature (called Z - Zerstörung, destruction). So far no actions of the other kind (assassinations) have become known.

(d) Material at SKORZENY's Disposal

SKORZENY's equipment was fabulous. The best modern weapons and explosives were at his disposal. What he could not get through channels was got through extra-legal means. His reputation and prestige gave him privileges not accorded to others. Even during the period of acute gasoline shortage, SKORZENY always could call on as many airplanes as he needed for his operations.

The human material which came under SKORZENY's control belonged to the elite units of the German Armed Forces. Hundreds of fanatical veterans from Waffen SS and the Army (Brandenburg Division) belonged to the special organizations of VI S (Jagdverbande, etc). To this pool were added the selected units controlled by Mil D (PaK, etc).

SKORZENY wanted to model his troops on the corresponding institutions of the British Service, completely forgetting, however, that these institutions had been the result of an organic development which had lasted for centuries. Modeled along British lines, preparations were also made for so-called commando operations (Kommando Unternehmen). Their purpose was to be the execution of extremely dangerous and difficult tasks, in cooperation with the various services of the armed forces.

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(c) SKORZENY and the Werwolf

SKORZENY was also given a special task in the organization of the WERWOLF. It is to be expected that, contrary to his chief in this enterprise, SS Obergruppenfuehrer PRUETZMANN, SKORZENY had managed to make thorough preparations for such activities. His organization would of course have been the most fitted for such activities. In the last analysis their capabilities rest on the establishment of large dumps for weapons and explosives.

It is almost beyond any question that such underground dumps do exist in various parts of GERMANY and in those parts of EUROPE previously occupied by the Germans. With such storage sites at their disposal an organization can put its predetermined plans into operation even without central direction.

(f) SKORZENY's Personality

As far as SKORZENY's personality is concerned, he is a rather primitive type. He has neither exceptional talents, nor unusual political experience or ideals. He is a soldier who is brave to the point of reckless defiance of death and who has succeeded in gathering around himself a group of young and similarly disposed men who blindly followed him in whatever he did.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Ant VI (Continued)

(8) Gruppe VI S

(a) General Appreciation

S in this designation is an abbreviation of sabotage and as such defines the functions of this section. The Gruppe had been founded in 1943, and was therefore comparatively undeveloped, but had already reached a position of considerable importance. This can be explained by the fact that VI S had at its disposal a considerably larger and better pool of materiel and personnel than any other section in the ICIIIa.

Main credit for the attainment of these lavish appropriations goes to the Gruppenleiter, SS Obersturmbannfuhrer SKORZENY. After the abdication of MUSSOLINI, SKORZENY became one of the most popular men in Germany by means of very skillful propoganda. He was shrewd enough to use this popularity for the enlargement of his section. He succeeded in continuously increasing his influence, in drawing on personnel inside and outside of the SS, but failed to give his section a feasible organizational structure.

All the activities of VI S, as well as Mil D, which was added later, gave the impression of utter confusion, where nobody knew what anybody else was doing. Thus VI S never reached that effectiveness, even in its largest enterprises, which might have been expected from the means at its disposal.

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(b) VI S and SKORZENY

To make matters even worse, SKORZENY's was, let's say, made his HITLER's declared favorite and so he continuously received orders from HITLER over the head of HIMMLER and KALTENBRUNNER, for a veritable stream of operations. These special tasks, of course, drew him away from methodical work and so the disorganization in VI S grew worse and worse.

SKORZENY was entrusted with special military tasks during the desperate offensives in the West and later again in the East, at which time he had whole divisions, with their generals under his command. All this of course was quite conducive to the development of SKORZENY's negotiating, which had already reached dangerous proportions under the influence of GOEBBELS's propaganda after the GRAF SASSO operation.

(c) Scope of Operations

The real field of operations, which was to come under control of VI S was of an exceedingly varied nature. Its main task was to be the creation of disturbances and panic in the rear areas of military operations. This was to be achieved by the execution of sabotage actions, as well as by the removal of important personages by assassination.

In addition VI S was called on to furnish personnel and plans for a number of military operations of an especially difficult nature. To give an example, when BUDAPEST was under siege by the Red Army and had become completely encircled, river boats were to break through the blockade and bring ammunition and supplies into the beleaguered city. Incidentally, the operation turned out to be a complete failure.

As far as other commitments behind the lines is concerned, it would be exceedingly difficult to give an exact appreciation. It is even doubtful whether SKORZENY himself would be able to give an account of all operations conducted under the auspices of VI S.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Ant VI (Continued)

(h) Jagdverbände

SKORZENY was not particularly interested in the above sections of VI S. His particular fondness was for the Jagdverbände, units organized along military lines. Their origin dates back to 1944, when SKORZENY was ordered by HITLER to establish organs of underground resistance throughout EUROPE.

SKORZENY visualized the Jagdverbände in this role and conducted a large expansion program. Their organization was as follows: Immediately below SKORZENY was a Chief of Staff (SS Obersturmführer von FÖRSTERMANN, killed in action on the Eastern front at the beginning of 1945), with an I-a (G-3), I-b (G-4) and I-c (G-2).

This staff controlled the so-called Jagdkommandos:

Jagdkommando MITTE
Jagdkommando SÜDWEST
Jagdkommando NORD
Jagdkommando OST
Jagdkommando SÜDOST
and the SS-Fallschirmjäger Btl 500 and 600.

Each Jagdkommando in turn was subdivided into Jagdeinsatz according to geographical subdivisions. Jagdkommando SÜDOST, for instance, had the following sub-units

Jagdeinsatz UNGARN (HUNGARY)
Jagdeinsatz SLOWAKEI (SLOVAKIA)
Jagdeinsatz SERBIEN-KROATIEN (SERBIA-CROATIA)
Jagdeinsatz BULGARIEN (BULGARIA)
Jagdeinsatz ALBANIEN (ALBANIA)
Jagdeinsatz RUMÄNIEN (ROMANIA)
Jagdeinsatz GRIECHENLAND (GREECE)
Jagdeinsatz TÜRKEI (TURKEY)

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Commanders of Jagdkommandos were equivalent to battalion commanders.

The extent of the activity of Jagdverbände was larger than that of the regular organizations of VI S. The training of personnel was accomplished by the various Jagdkommandos, frequently even of the smaller Jagdeinsatz on their own responsibility.

The aim of establishing an all-European resistance movement was never fulfilled. Reasons were the insufficient time allotted and the fact that SKORZENY and his officers considered all problems from a purely military angle and showed no understanding or skill in the treatment of the alignment of political forces. This was enhanced by the insistence of the various sub-sections of unit VI on their exclusive privilege of doing political work in foreign countries.

WANECK succeeded in having KALTENBRUNNER issue a directive instructing VI S and Mil D to come to full agreement with VI E on all operations in South Eastern EUROPE. This was to prevent the Jagdverbände from committing political blunders in this area.

The problem was very acute since all intelligence agencies, that is VI E, VI S, and the Leitstelle II Suedost (the Mil D successor of Abwehr II in the Balkans) had to draw on the same pool of national groups in the Balkans for their operatives.

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6. Ant VI (Continued)

(g) Organization

Referat VI S 1 - Administration - was commanded by SS Hauptsturmfuehrer SCHMIED. He was called on to head the actual commitments in the South Eastern sector.

Referat VI S 2 was headed by SS Hauptsturmfuehrer RADL, who was also SKORZENY's deputy. VI S 2 was charged with the operational planning and actual execution of all operations.

VI S 3 under SS Hauptsturmfuehrer BRAMFELDT was in charge of all schools.

VI S 4 was to be the headquarters for all small operations. Its functions and those of S 2 were combined to an increasing extent. It was commanded by SS Hauptsturmfuehrer BESEKOW.

The most important part of VI S was that commanded by RADL. Central control over all commitments was to be maintained through this section, not always feasible under the existing disorganization. RADL was not only SKORZENY's administrative assistant but also his closest collaborator. He was informed of all the latter's plans and intentions.

He was no great light in his chosen fields, and so sections VI S 2 and VI S 4 lost more and more ground to their competitors, the SS Jagdverbaende. RADL did not particularly object to this state of affairs, for although not under command of VI S 2, the Jagdverbaende were still SKORZENY's babies and subject to RADL's indirect influence in this manner.

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VI S 2's objective was the commitment of small groups behind the Allied lines (either by infiltration or by air drop). These groups were to be coordinated with measures of the Army to assist and were thus to be of assistance to military operations. Oddly enough all these operations were planned for some future time when the German armies would once more be on the offensive. The personnel for these sabotage groups was mainly recruited from among nationals of the countries in which the future operations were to take place.

These men were then trained in the special schools of VI C 3 (such as instruction in demolitions, special weapons, radio transmission, etc). No very large commitments had been started by 9 May 1945, but the first phase of operations in various countries commenced by that time.

The system of schools, as has already been mentioned, was rather extensive, but was dwarfed by that of the Japerverbände. Instruction was usually very short and training was not particularly thorough (especially wireless communications). VI B for instance, gave such more thorough training.

BRUMFELDT, the head of the school system was a convicted ignoramus. He had been chosen by SKORZENY because of his record as having been German pistol and pentathlon champion, and then a popular figure in GERMANY.

The most efficient section was the small one of VI S 4. BECKER was not brilliant, but diligent and energetic and thus had quite a bit of success. His Kleineinsatz were generally individual operations, involving one man or very small groups. Their purpose was either operational reconnaissance or sabotage. Acts of terrorism were also primarily controlled by this section. Not much had to be done in this field outside of planning, however.

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6. Ant VI (Continued)

Although, after the reorganization, all penetration activities and suborning of agents and their utilization (Punkspiele) were to be controlled by Ant IV, VI Z nevertheless continued certain activities in this connection. In spite of these unauthorized activities, FREUND succeeded in executing his mission to the satisfaction of all concerned.

(1) Gruppe VI H

This Gruppe was very short-lived. It was dissolved in 1942. Its function had been the collection of intelligence through the penetration of political opposition parties and movements. Its head had been SS Standartenfuehrer Dr KNOCHEN.

d. Reports and Conclusions

(1) General Appreciation

There is no doubt that of the reports submitted by the NSR to the highest German authorities those of Ant VI were the most numerous. These reports were as a rule in a completely objective vein and also succeeded in presenting a thoroughly correct appreciation of the situation in the countries under consideration. Considering this wealth of superior intelligence material it is completely incomprehensible for the uninitiated why the German authorities persisted in committing political and military blunders of a catastrophic variety. A description of the tenor and distribution of Ant VI reports may be of help in the solution of this puzzle.

(2) Lageberichte

Two kinds of reports are of interest in this connection. The first were certain periodic reports of a comprehensive nature concerning events and the situation in their respective countries by the various Referenten. These reports were usually of a routine nature and sent out through channels. From Referent to Gruppenleiter to KALTBRUNNEN to HINDELER.

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(3) Special Reports

The other, and far more important type of report, were the special reports. These were written by the Referent whenever he considered a political occurrence of sufficient importance to warrant drawing his superior's attention to this happening and its consequences.

Usually these reports were based on the factual material sent in by the agents resident in the country in question. This material was then sifted, collated and edited and usually condensed upon by the Referent.

The latter based his comments on his knowledge and experience of the questions and his general background as an expert on the country under consideration. Conclusions reached, lessons to be learned, and future action to be taken generally were part of the Referent's commentary. The special report was addressed to the Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (KALTENBRUNNER) through the appropriate Gruppenteller.

Experienced Referentian, whose work had already earned the writer a certain reputation, marked the so-called action-copy (Verfugung, the first copy of the original report) with a suggestion as to when the report was to be distributed to by KALTENBRUNNER.

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6. Ant VI (Continued)

In conclusion it can be said that the Jagdverbände were of no political importance and had only started to emerge in military value. Only preliminary steps, such as the construction of dumps and explosives, had been accomplished. Some of the scattered groups maintained radio communication with their Jagdkommando until the very end.

Within the framework of the Jagdkommando tactical work had progressed the furthest in CROATIA. There close ties had been established with the projected underground organizations of OSTARICA. Towards the end relations were no longer quite as cordial. The commander of the Jagdeinsatz was a man without any political acumen and had lost the approval of Col. LUNORIC, the Croat representative.

(i) Mil D

The last of SKORZENY's wide-flung activities was his command of Mil D (the successor to Abwehr II). In spite of this identity on the top, relations between the agencies of VI S and Mil D were by no means without friction. SKORZENY appointed Major LOOS as his Deputy for Mil D and attempted the complete elimination of all opposition within this agency.

He paid special attention to the technical sub-section of Mil D since he regarded it as the core of the anti-Nazi opposition (this was the agency which had supplied the explosive used in the attempt of 20 July 1944). In spite of his appointment of Major EHMANN, one of his closest confidants, as its commander,, the situation did not change materially until the very end.

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(9) Gruppe VI Wi T

In 1942 SCHELLENBERG founded a special Referat - VI Wirtschaft - which was later enlarged to the status of a Gruppe. Called Wirtschaft und Technik (Economics and Technology), this section was under the command of SS Standartenfuhrer SCHMIED. The original plan was to utilize German internal economy for intelligence purposes, but later the stress was switched to problems of inventions and technical improvements. Comparatively little is known about these activities.

The original function of VI Wi was a simple one. Under SS Hauptsturmfuhrer Dr ZEIDLER it consisted in using connections to German business establishments in the placing of members of the SD in foreign countries. Thus camouflaged as German business representatives, the agents would then engage in their intelligence activities.

Abteilung III Wi of the Abwehr was also incorporated into VI Wi T. This was true only for the central office. The IV Wi Referate of the various Apts were absorbed by the appropriate Stapo Station.

(10) Referat VI Z

This was a Sonderreferat concerned with those activities of Abteilung III F, Abwehr, not incorporated into act IV (Stapo), WSA. Commanded by Oberstleutnant WILF FRIED, a narrow-minded but ambitious intelligence officer, this section tried to regain part of its lost ground. Its main task was to conduct security checks of the German intelligence services and to counter-act, utilize, and destroy operations of allied intelligence agencies.

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6. Amt VI (Continued)

As has already been mentioned these agreements were broken in short order. Very few members of the SD had the advantage of diplomatic immunity, while Amt VI found its sweet revenge in further publicizing its opinion of German foreign policy and its representatives.

Here we see one of the weakest points in the whole structure of the German intelligence service. A competent agency, the Foreign Office, was not interested in the information service operated by the SD. And on the other hand HIMMLER operated the SD merely as some kind of personal information bureau.

(b) The Liaison Officers

To counteract these tendencies to a certain extent the Office of Liaison Officers was created. The material collected by the SD was to be presented to SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Gebelard WAGNER, as representative of the SD with the Foreign Office. His opposite number was SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Dr ROEDER, as representative of the Foreign Office with the RSHA.

The post of SD Liaison Officer with the Foreign Office had existed for some years, while that of the Foreign Office Liaison Officer with the RSHA was a comparatively new creation. It was an upshot of one of the already mentioned armistice conferences.

This particular conference had been called after a few months of intensive conflict. In the course of the meeting KALTSCHNIGER agreed to ROEDER's appointment and promised better cooperation in the future. WAGNER was one of the most shady and disgusting characters within the SD, while ROEDER on the contrary was a very capable and fair-minded officer.

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(c) Subterfuge as Solution

KALTENBRUNNER realized very soon that the regular methods of presenting foreign intelligence material (as described above) would not lead to any concrete results. He therefore decided to use the indirect approach and to contact HITLER (who after all was the only man with sufficient power to order any radical changes).

He ordered that Ambassador HEWEL was to be included in the distribution of all important reports. HEWEL, as the Liaison Officer of the Foreign Office with HITLER's Headquarters, wielded considerable influence, and could usually count on HITLER's listening to what he had to say. KALTENBRUNNER was a personal friend of HEWEL's and all important reports emanating from West VI now reached the latter with a personal note of his friend. The Ambassador then submitted these reports to HITLER at a propitious moment.

After HEWEL became incapacitated as the result of an automobile accident, KALTENBRUNNER established a new contact. He used SS Groupenfuhrer FEGELEIN, who as HEWEL's personal liaison officer with HITLER's Headquarters played a similar role.

Contrary to HEWEL, who was a capable diplomat, however, FEGELEIN was nothing but a good-looking cavalry officer. KALTENBRUNNER flattered his vanity by convincing him that these reports could change GELBART's fate and that thus the sole responsibility had been placed in his (FEGELEIN's) hands. Hellowed, FEGELEIN henceforth did KALTENBRUNNER's bidding.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Part VI (Continued)

It is important to note that there was no standard distribution and that HIMMLER was the final recipient of all reports (every report sent to KALTENBRUNNER had to be transmitted by him to HIMMLER). HIMMLER was under no compunction to re-transmit these reports either up (to HITLER), across (to other Reich Ministers or their equivalents) or down (to other agencies of the SS or the RSHA).

(4) HIMMLER as the final arbiter

From the above it can be seen that HIMMLER was the best and most correctly informed man with regards to the foreign political situation within GERMANY. He rarely used the proper use of this powerful knowledge. This was a question of personal character.

He knew very well that the SD (especially its foreign branch) was exceedingly well informed and that this information had been channelled to him in objective and undisguised fashion. That he did not utilize this information to any great extent is to be explained by HIMMLER's fundamental nature.

His prime objective was the strengthening of his power within GERMANY, without, however, openly interfering with anybody who was in HITLER's good graces.

The classic example of this behavior is the relation between HIMMLER and RIBBENTROP. The latter had come into conflict with HIMMLER on numerous occasions. As SS Obergruppenfuhrer, he was of course subordinate to the Reichsfuhrer SS, but did not let a single occasion pass without showing open insubordination.

Nevertheless HIMMLER never contacted RIBBENTROP openly. The Foreign Minister had HITLER's unqualified support (for reasons unknown to anybody), and that was sufficient for HIMMLER. That does not mean that HIMMLER did not use every method of intrigue and activities behind the scenes against his adversary.

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(5) SD and Foreign Office

(a) General Atmosphere

Due to HIMMLER's methods, most reports sent to him by Amt VI did not produce any results. A similar situation prevailed with regard to the reports sent to the Foreign Office. Ever since the SD had started to create a foreign intelligence organization, perennial conflict existed between this service and the Foreign Office. This constant state of open warfare was interrupted by occasional periods of external amity.

Whenever the situation became so acute that no further work could be done by either partner, the two chiefs, - STUBENBERG and REYDICH or KALTENBRUNNER - met in conference and agreed to some sort of temporary cessation of hostilities. Nobody took these agreements very seriously and a short time later merry sniping had again been resumed by all concerned. The basis for these agreements was usually permission by the Foreign Office to install SD agents under the cover of diplomatic immunity, while Amt VI agreed to soft-pedal its criticisms of German foreign policy as practiced by RIBBENTROP and his cronies.

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INTERROGATION REPORT 10115

6. Ant VI (Continued)


Thus HIMMLER usually was the first man in GERMANY to obtain a complete picture of important developments. His information preceded RIBBENTROP's usually by a matter of hours. HIMMLER used this time lag to his own advantage. Usually he singly handed such confidential news to HITLER in a pointed manner, but without any further remarks.

Ant Mil had the usual distribution for its reports, but also included in its lists the OKW, the Wehrmachtsfuhrungsstab, the General Staff and the Commanders of Army, Navy, and Air Force.

The following diagram indicates the channels of dissemination for routine Periodic and Special Reports of Ant VI.

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Channels of Distribution for ant VI Reports



—— Regular channel
 - - - - Special or irregular channel

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6. Part VI (Continued)

(6) HITLER'S Appreciation of Intelligence Reports

In this fashion a true and unvarnished picture of the situation was presented to HITLER occasionally. Nevertheless he rarely took advantage of this opportunity and hardly ever adjusted the conduct of Foreign affairs accordingly. The main reason for this behavior was to be found in HITLER'S nature. He really believed he was appointed by fate and did not need the counsel of mere human beings.

Another reason for his disregard of SD reports was his ignorance of the true importance of intelligence work as a whole and his dislike of such activities. On the few occasions when he followed the recommendations made by the SD, things turned out entirely to his advantage. For instance his original plan for the complete occupation of RUMANIA, the action of 19 March 1944, called for active military participation by RUMANIA and SLOVAKIA. Promises to that effect had already been given to ANTONESCU and presumably to TISO. Such action by her arch-enemies would, beyond any doubt, have brought RUMANIA to offer active resistance to this occupation.

The SD submitted a report embodying these considerations, and for once HITLER followed its recommendations. The occupation was carried on by German troops exclusively, and no armed Hungarian resistance was offered.

(7) Distribution to other agencies

A certain number of reports were also submitted to GOERING (their number decreased considerably during the last few months) and to ROHM. After the increase in GOEBBEL'S power after 30 July he too was included in the distribution list. This was also done from considerations of pure expediency. GOEBBELS was known to be ready to join any anti-RIBBENTROP coalition and thus was considered a potential ally in the SD-Foreign Office controversy.

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(8) The "BLAU" Reports

Besides these regular reports, a type of periodic and comprehensive survey had been instituted recently. These surveys, called BLAU Berichte, went to a very small number of top-echelon personalities. They were written by the well-known journalist SS Stabsamfuehrer Dr Giselher WIRSING (now in allied hands) who had been called to Amt VI by SCHELLENBERG.

In his reports WIRSING used and collated the information obtained from various sources in all countries. The BLAU reports appeared once a month on the average, and in their clear and objective way of considering world affairs belong among the best material which came from the NSDAP.

(9) Speed of Dissemination of Spot Reports

One of the great advantages of Amt VI information was its speed. Since the Referenten had radio communication with their chief groups, speedy transmission of important news items was guaranteed. These flash reports were sent by wireless to the Referent, and then immediately handed on to the Gruppenleiter. Hence, messages were sent on by high-priority teletype (Blitzfernschreiben) to SCHELLENBERG and KATZBERGNER. Intelligence transmission was very rapid even during the period of heavy air attacks within GERMANY proper as well (in this case radio and not teletype was used).


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
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7. Ant Mil (Continued)

The Reorganization of the Abwehr
(Line of Reorganization is towards the right)



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_____ Direction of change, contribution, or absorption
 - - - - - New agency

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INTERROGATION REPORT, No. 15

7. Ant Mil

a. Formation

Ant Mil was created during the spring and summer of 1944 to absorb those parts of the Abwehr which still retained a semblance of independence (other parts had been annexed outright by already existing agencies of the RSHA). Its formation was the culmination of a campaign which the SD had been waging for years to obtain complete control of all German intelligence agencies.

With the absorption of Abwehr, military intelligence as well as political intelligence had come under control of the RSHA, and shortly thereafter under the direct command of SCHENKELBERG.

Oberst HANSEN, the Chief of Abwehr I, was appointed First Chief of Ant Mil. After a few weeks, however, the events of 10 July gave SCHENKELBERG his long expected opportunity. HANSEN was removed and the holder of Ant VI assumed complete control over all intelligence operations.

b. The Old Abwehr

As long as the Abwehr had been independent under Admiral CANARIS and under the aegis of the OKW it had consisted of two parts. The first, Ausland Abwehr, an agency of only theoretical importance under Admiral BUERKNER, and the Ant Abwehr, the real military intelligence branch under Admiral CANARIS.

c. Transformation

The following chart shows the final result of the various reorganizations of Abwehr during Spring and Summer of 1944. Wherever possible the original and the final form are indicated.

During this reorganization, the Abwehr (with the exception of Ant Ausland Abwehr, which was transferred into the Redogruppe Ausland and remained under OKW control) was transferred almost entirely to the RSHA, where an agency was taken over intact, or was split up among several new agencies, or parts of an agency were absorbed by already existing agencies of the RSHA.

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REMOVED AND FORWARDED TO THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

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7. Ant Mil (Continued)

This organization and designation was mirrored in the Frontaufklarungs-kommandos with Army and the Frontaufklarungsgruppen with Corps. All these various Frontaufklarungs units were controlled by the appropriate military echelons, ie, for a frontaufklarungskommando, the I-c with the appropriate Army. At the same time a certain amount of administrative control was exercised by Mil F.

The process of reorganization of these short-range tactical intelligence units had been by no means completed. All sorts of intermediate organizational forms existed. For instance Army Group SOUTH and Army Group E were both served by the same Leitstelle II. Certain divisions controlled Frontaufklarungsgruppen, etc.

In the higher echelons there existed discrepancies between III B and Mil F, between Mil F and VI F and VI S, and between the RSHA and the OKW.

(d) In Neutral Countries

No reorganization took place in the ROs. These abwehr agencies in countries allied to or controlled by Germany continued in existence in their old form. The only difference was that they now reported to Ant Mil and the RSHA instead of to Ant abwehr and the OKW.

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Ant VII

During the past few years Ant VII led such a shadowy life that many people began to doubt its very existence. It did lose a lot of personnel in the course of the war and its dissolution had been planned several times, but was never carried through. Its organization was rather unfortunate. It owed its creation, like many other institutions within the Rigo, to personal considerations.

After the reorganization of the RSMA, the former Amtschef of Ant II, SS Oberfuehrer Dr SIX, found himself without a job. The new Inlandsamt (Ant III) was headed by his former subordinate GULEBONN. Not to offend SIX a new Amt was created, and he was made head of Ant VII, also called Amt Wissenschaft (Science).

Practically, of course, science in GERMANY was represented in III C, and science in foreign countries in VI C. Therefore there never was any real justification for the creation of Ant VII at all, other than to give SIX a proper position.

It is therefore not surprising that SIX, his three Gruppenleiter, and all their personnel (men who had been with SIX in the old Ant II) really had no other job than to take care of the library, the files, and the available maps.

The library was of excellent quality, however, and the files were very comprehensive and useful. They had been compiled from the card-indices of all the various Aemter.

After SIX's transfer to the Foreign Office no successor was appointed. SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr DITTEL was entrusted with the direction of the Amt, as Vertreter.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

7. Ant Mil: (Continued)

(1) Ant Abwehr

The chart shows that in the course of the reorganization, the I and II branches of Ant Abwehr, as well as part of Abwehr III were formed into Mil Ant. The remaining parts of Abwehr III were absorbed by Ant IV and Ant VI.

In detail Abwehr I was transformed into Mil B and Mil C. The administrative branches of Abwehr, called Abwehr 2 became Mil A. Abwehr II was made into Mil D. As for Abwehr III, most of it went to Ant IV. Certain parts of Abwehr III F (penetration of Allied intelligence services) were subordinated to VI Z, while Abwehr III VI was united with Federal VI Wi T. The Frontaufklarungstruppen were centrally controlled by a Section called Gruppe VI F in Ant VI and by Abteilung Mil F of Ant III, which were identical agencies.

(2) Abwehr agencies in the Field

At the next lower level the old Abwehr had controlled the following agencies:

- Abwehrstellen (ast) and Abwehrleitstellen (alst) in occupied territory.
- Abwehrstellen and Abwehrleitstellen in each Wehrkreis
- Abwehrstellen with each Army Group
- Kriegsorganisationen (K O) in neutral countries friendly to or controlled by GERMANY.

The above four types of agencies were all subdivided into sections I, II, and III, called Gruppen. These Gruppen corresponded functionally to those Abteilungen of Ant Abwehr bearing the same Roman numeral. In the reorganization the following changes were made:

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(a) In Occupied Territory

Asts and Alsts in occupied countries, where still existing, were dissolved. They were to be reorganized along the lines outlined below for agencies within the Wehrkreis.

(b) At Wehrkreis Headquarters

Asts and Alsts in the various Wehrkreise were dissolved. In their stead a new organization, called Kommandonachrichtendienst (KND) was created. It took over all I-type activities of the old ast or alst.

No substitute for Gruppe II was envisaged. Gruppe III was split. Its purely military functions were taken over by the abwehr officer (AO, Counter-Intelligence Officer) with Wehrkreis Headquarters. All other functions were transferred to the appropriate Stabs (Staff) Stellen (especially III F - penetration and III hi). Personnel was divided up accordingly.

(c) At Army Group

Abwehrstellen with Army Groups had always carried the designation I, II, or III, according to their function. Reorganization here merely took the form of a change in designation. Abwehrstellen I became Leitstellen fuer Frontaufklaerung I, Abwehrstellen II were called Leitstellen fuer Frontaufklaerung II, and Abwehrstellen III received the designation Leitstellen fuer Frontaufklaerung III.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No. 15

11. The Staff of the Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (Continued)

The latter finally acceded to these requests and appointed his friend, SS Stabsamfuehrer Dr DILLERSPERGER, a former judge in BREITENBURG. Though slightly more reasonable than his predecessor, DILLERSPERGER continued their policy of having each small infraction punished by his courts.

The court was very severe. Small misdemeanors, which would have been disregarded by other courts, were punished in the Sipo Court by long prison sentences or by transfer to the so-called rehabilitation units of the Waffen SS. The nature of these organizations is too well known to be discussed here. They were supplied by all organizations within the Police, the SD, and the SS.

Final review of all cases rested with HIMMLER. He made it his policy to review automatically all cases involving SS or police officers. Any mild sentence was changed to a more severe one. He also instituted the nice custom of punishing the judge who had pronounced a mild sentence as well. Thus it has happened that an officer sentenced to disciplinary action by the RSHA Court had his sentence revoked by HIMMLER, and the accused, judge, and prosecutor sent to the penal unit. It can easily be understood that no SS judge dared to go counter to these clearly-expressed wishes of his lord and master.

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b. Schools

The problems of education and of obtaining suitable new blood were considered very important in the Security Police. Only the last few years of the war brought first a reduction and finally a complete stoppage of these endeavors. Plans, however, continued to be worked on.

Planning reached considerable proportions with the reorganization of the various levels (Laufbahn) in Sicherheitspolizei and SD, as propounded in 1943. This reorganization permitted the following four levels:

- The intermediate (Mittlere)
- The intermediate-upper (Mittlere Gehobene)
- The upper (Gehobene)
- The leading (Leitende).

(1) The intermediate

The Mittlere Laufbahn included all small officials, as well as the Unterfuehrer (NCOs) in the SD. The last stage of this level was SS Sturmscharfuehrer, or the corresponding civil-service rank.

(2) The intermediate-upper

The Mittlere gehobene Laufbahn included most of the officials with a high-school education, as well as the corresponding SS and SD officers. It corresponded to that of the company officer in the army. The final rank was that of SS Hauptsturmfuehrer or the appropriate civil service position.

(3) The upper

The gehobene Laufbahn had as its prerequisite a certain amount of university education. The highest rank was that of SS Sturmbannfuehrer or the corresponding civil service rank.

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9. Ant N

This Ant was a very recent creation. It had been formed during 1944, while previously its tasks had been assigned to a Gruppe in Ant II (CI D). With the extension of the communications network of the RSHA, the creation of a special staff section meeting these requirements had become necessary. Ant N had under its control all communications nets used by the RSHA or any of its agencies. The main means used were radio, teletype, and telephone.

During the time of its greatest expansion, the teletype net alone had several hundred extensions. This does not include the numerous Geheimschreiber automatic encoding and decoding teletype machines. The radio net reached its greatest extent with the greatest advance of the German troops. Sipo units were attached to various military detachments and frequently their only means of contact with the central office was by radio communication. The telephone net was also well developed.

An interesting innovation was the so-called Konferenzapparat. KALTENBRUNNER and all his Autschefts had one of these telephones, as had several ministers and other high functionaries. The number of extensions was very small (maybe about 50). There was only one central, automatic switchboard, and by dialing a two-figure number any of the other subscribers could be contacted, without having to go over the various office switchboards. This ensured both speed and secrecy of the conversations on this net.

The personnel in this section consisted of technical experts. The Autsleiter, SS Standartenfuehrer SIBSONI, was a communications specialist, while two Referenten, WALTHER and HARKS, were experts on teletype and radio, respectively.

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10. Ant Sen

Ant Sen was of even more recent origin than Ant II. It never had a chance to develop and so no appreciation of the work of the Medical Section, or of its chief, SS Obersturmbannführer Dr STROHSCHNEIDER, can be given. STROHSCHNEIDER was a close personal friend of KALTENBRUNNER and had come to the RSHA from the Waffen SS.

11. The Staff of the Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD

The following four institutions were under the direct command of the Chef der Sicherheitspolizei:

- The Court (Gericht)
- The Schools (Schulen)
- The Attaches (Attachegruppe)
- The Aides (Adjutantur)

a. Court

The court with jurisdiction over all members of the RSHA and its agencies had been previously under the control of the chief of Ant I. This had given rise to complaints and friction. Due to the great power and legally unrestricted functioning of the court, the Attachef I had a most potent weapon in his hand. The other section chiefs protested about this inequitable distribution of power and wanted the creation of a court responsible only to KALTENBRUNNER.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No. 15

11. The Staff of the Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (Continued)

In SOFIA, SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Dr HOFFMANN, an official of average intelligence but with sound political information.

In BUCHAREST, SS Sturmbannfuhrer RICHTER. He had first been adviser for Jewish affairs at the legation. As such he gained the confidence of the German minister, von KILLINGER, and was appointed police attache.

In BRATISLAVA, SS Sturmbannfuhrer GOLTZ, a second police man, of less than average ability.

The police attaches at TOKYO and NANKING have already been mentioned.

In LISBON, the office of police liaison officer (Verbindungsoffizier) had been created, since the Portuguese government did not approve of the presence of a police attache. The duties of the liaison officer were equivalent to those of an attache. However, SS Hauptsturmfuhrer STEINAT, who had been appointed to the post, proved a total failure and had to be recalled.

All police attaches had been with the Gestapo previously. It proved very difficult therefore to enlist their aid for intelligence purposes. Even if they showed interest and understanding for this field, it was not so easy to receive permission to work for Amt VI, since Amt IV guarded its prerogatives jealously.

Yet, with KALTENBRUNNER's assistance, it was possible to obtain their cooperation for political intelligence work. Since all of them had rather extensive intelligence nets with trusted agents at their disposal, results obtained through this source were usually of good quality.

Leiter of the attache Gruppe was SS Standartenfuhrer Dr ZINDEL. He was also Secretary General of the Internationale Kriminalpolitische Kommission (IKPA, International Commission for Criminal Police, a non-political, international association for the furthering of methods and operations of the criminal police).

Most European states were members of the association. KALTENBRUNNER was its last president. ZINDEL was a very unimportant person, and had nothing to say either in his position as the head of the Attachegruppe, or as Secretary General of the IKPA.

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d. The Adjutantur des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD

HEYDRICH, who was a great lover of pomp, always insisted that he have a large and well staffed section of personal adjutants and aides. These aides all had to resemble him in appearance, i.e., they were tall, blond, and handsome. In HEYDRICH's time the adjutants had great influence and power.

With KALTENBRUNNER's advent this situation was changed radically. All the old personnel was removed with the exception of SS Obersturmbannführer SCHEIDLER, previously concerned with the administration of funds. Elevation to the position of adjutant gave no corresponding increase in influence. KALTENBRUNNER's personal aid, SS Obersturmbannführer Dr. WOLZ, who had his desk in front of his chief's office also was utterly without power or influence. His main job was to bring various reports to KALTENBRUNNER for his signature.

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3. Befehlshaber and Kommandeure der Sipo und des SD (Continued)

In certain cases a certain special task could be handled by a special section, especially for distinct military sectors (for instance VI Z). Besides these VI Abteilungen, the office of the Untersuchungsfuhrer (Investigating Officer) was created, who in turn reported to SS Richter DILLERSPENGER.

In this type of organization the Befehlshaber wielded considerable power, since all the Kommandeure were responsible to him and he controlled all field agencies of Stapo, Kripo, and SD through them. This new institution of Befehlshaber was to be organized within GERMANY as well. The organization was completed first in the frontier Wehrkreis and towards the end had been accomplished in the remainder of GERMANY.

At the moment of collapse, therefore, a Befehlshaber had been appointed for each Wehrkreis, who in turn controlled several Kommandeure for the various subdivisions of his region. (The office of Inspekteur had been abolished and replaced by that of Befehlshaber). The Stapo (Leit) Stellen, Kripo (Leit) Stellen, and SD (Leit) Abschnitte were maintained for the time being, but subordinated to the headquarters of the Kommandeure.

4. Hochere SS und Polizei Fuhrer (HSSPF)

As has already been mentioned the Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD were under control not only of the RSHA, but also of the local Hochere SS- und Polizeifuhrer. (with exception of ITALY where there existed the specially created office of Hochster SS und Polizeifuhrer, held by HITLER's long-term chief of staff, SS Obergruppenfuhrer WULF).

The Hochere SS und Polizeifuhrer in turn controlled, besides the Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, a Befehlshaber der Ordnungspolizei (BdO - controlling Schutzpolizei, rural police, fire police and water police, as well as other routine police installations). They were responsible to HITLER exclusively and have as a matter of fact been called "little HITLERS."

All SS Hauptamtschefs could, however, issue directives. This was of practical importance only in the case of the Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (RSHA) and of the Chef der Ordnungspolizei (Hauptamt Ordnungspolizei). Theoretically the other SS Hauptamtschefs, such as Wirtschafts- und Verwaltungshauptamt, Hauptamt SS Gericht, and Fuhrungshauptamt, were on the same command level.

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5. Subordinate Agencies

a. Types of Agencies

The smallest administrative unit within the Sipo was the Abschnittelle. This terminology was used for Stapo, Kripo, as well as SD. These Abschnittellen were controlled by the already discussed (Leit) Stelle of Kripo and Stapo and (Leit) Abschnitte of the SD.

The border police, which also belonged to the Sipo was organized into Grenzpolizeikommissariate, and at certain border control posts Grenzpolizeistellen. These border police agencies were in turn controlled by the local Stapo (Leit) Stelle. The next higher echelon was known as the Inspektor der Grenzpolizei, who however was usually identical with the appropriate Befehlshaber der Sipo and des SD.

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III. High Command Echelon of the SD

1. First Phase

During the first organizational phase the echelon immediately subordinate to the SD Hauptamt was that of the SD Oberabschnitt, headed by an SD Oberabschnittsfuehrer. During this stage there was no direct command relationship between such headquarters and the Stapo and Kripo. The Secret Police as well as the Criminal Police received their orders directly from their respective headquarters in BERLIN.

2. Inspektore der Sipo und des SD (IDS)

In the course of the first reorganization and with the creation of the RSHA new agencies were formed to take charge of the coordination between SD and Sipo at the level below that of the national headquarters. These were the offices of the Inspektore der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (Inspectorates of the Security Police and the SD).

The jurisdictional area of such inspectorates corresponded to that of the former Oberabschnitte, which was generally equivalent to that of a Wehrkreis.

Theoretically the Inspekteur had complete control over the Stapo-polizei (Leit) Stellen, Kriminalpolizei (Leit) Stellen, as well as the SD (Leit) abschnitte within his region. Since, however, the unification had been completed only on paper, the various former headquarters still continued to exercise their influence on their subordinate agencies directly. (ie, the Stapo Stellen continued to receive their orders directly from Amt IV or its Gruppen, without any regard to the Inspekteur, and Amt III and V continued to control their agencies in a similar fashion).

Thus the Inspekteur was used only as a transmitting agency or a staff center, without having any powers of command. In this respect their headquarters resembled those of the Hoehere SS- und Polizeifuehrer, which had but an administrative function at that time. (This situation was changed at a later date). The Inspekteur, incidentally, was on the staff of the Hoehere SS - und Polizeifuehrer.

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3. Befehlshaber and Kommandeure der Sipos und des SD

In the course of the occupation of foreign countries Einsatzkommandos der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD were put into operation. These Einsatzkommandos were attached to each army in the form of Einsatzgruppen.

After the consolidation of the military position and the complete occupation of these countries a new agency was created. This was called the Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (BKS). This was the highest Police and Security Echelon in the country and in turn controlled a number of Kommandeure der Sipos und des SD in various parts of the country (KAS).

The headquarters of these Befehlshaber and Kommandeure were organized along new lines and no longer simply controlled the various Stabs and Kripo Stellen or SD abschnitte. They were organized along the lines of the RSHA, and were subdivided into so-called Abteilungen, I, II, III, IV, V and VI, with a function similar to those of the respective A-stabs within the corresponding echelon. The center Mil, VII, N, and San had no direct representation with the Befehlshaber and Kommandeure.

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5. Subordinate Agencies (Continued)

The leading personalities within foreign countries were all ehrenamtliche Mitarbeiter, or V-Leute.

c. Oath

The so-called Verpflichtungserklärungen (Oaths of Office) were of two kinds. One was for the use of hauptamtliche or ehrenamtliche Mitarbeiter, while the other was used for V-Leute.

The first part of the oath was identical in both cases. It included a statement that no use whatsoever would be made of information or experience gained while serving with the SD. Then followed the declaration:

In the first case: "If I should commit a treasonable act, either consciously, or unconsciously, in spite of this solemn oath, then I give my superiors the right to punish me in any way (they see fit)."

("Werde ich trotz des Schwures bewusst oder unbewusst zum Verräter, so gebe ich meinen Vorgesetzten das Recht mich in jeder Weise zu bestrafen").

In the second case: "If I should commit a treasonable act, either consciously, or unconsciously, in spite of this solemn oath, I do so in the knowledge that I should expect measures by the Secret Police."

("Werde ich trotz des Schwures bewusst oder unbewusst zum Verräter, so weiss ich, dass ich staatspolizeiliche Massnahmen zu erwarten habe.")

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Towards the end a so-called Sonderverpflichtung (Special Contract) was created. It was to be used for persons high in public life. At the end of this declaration the following formula was included:

"I furthermore realize that in case I should meet with difficulties because of this activity, the Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD and his subordinate agencies will take me under his protection." ("Weiteren wird mir bekannt gegeben, dass der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD mit seinen Dienststellen mich im Falle von Schwierigkeiten, die ich durch diese Tätigkeit bekomme, in seinen Schutz nimmt.")

Towards the end, these oaths and declarations were no longer taken seriously. Because of the many solemn oaths which every German had been subjected to in the course of existence, even this, unusual one lost its importance.

Generally, it can be said that obedience depended on the persons in question. Some of the most important agents of the SD had never been asked to sign any declaration of this kind, since their relation was based on a personal one to some member of the SD proper. This was especially true in foreign countries. It was prohibited to take any written declarations whatsoever outside of GERMANY.

For this reason most of the V-Leute had never signed this oath. Here too it was of no importance, for usually the Hauptvertragsmann had selected his own collaborators and organized his intelligence net with their help.

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for KCHH
AC of S, G-2

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5. Subordinate Agencies (Continued)

Collaboration between the various Befehlshaber and their headquarters, the RSHA, was not always of the best. Conflicts of responsibility between the various Aemter were quite common. This led to constant friction.

An added obstacle were these Befehlshaber, who, trusting in their own omnipotence, decided to skip their next echelon and to report directly to KALTENBRUNNER, in order to prove their great shillity and meadity. They decided to make up to the HSSPF and to conspire against the RSHA. Since HIMMLER's approval was necessary for appointment or removal of a Befehlshaber, KALTENBRUNNER could not always prevail against his rebellious subordinates.

Similar difficulties arose with various Hoehere SS- und Polizeifuehrer. They reported directly to HIMMLER, using the material which they had obtained from the Befehlshaber der Sipo und des SD. This parallelism was not abolished by HIMMLER. On the contrary, he rather furthered this divergence. It was entirely according to his motto Divide et Impera.

b. Classification of Officials and Informants

The following categories of collaborators existed in the SD:

- Hauptamtliche SD-Angehoerige (full time members of the SD, including auxiliaries)
- Ehrenamtliche Mitarbeiter (part time, non-paid collaborators)
- Vertrauensleute (Operatives)
- Zutraeger (called Agenten in foreign countries) (Agents)

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(1) Hauptamtliche Mitarbeiter

The first type included all members of the SD (also members of the SS), while the auxiliaries included men drafted for the duration of the war, so-called SD-Angestellte (employees), who were full time employees of the SD without being members of the SS as well as officials on detached service from other branches. This category also included the female office help.

(2) Ehrenamtliche Mitarbeiter

The second type consisted of members of the SS, who had been detached for service with the SD (operationally, but not administratively). They were unpaid, and generally followed a civilian profession. There were also some men in this category who had been retained in their original SS units.

(3) Vertrauensleute

The third category included all those persons who, after a solemn oath, had been accepted into the service of the SD. Their activities resembled those of the ehrenamtliche Mitarbeiter, with the exception that they did not belong to the SS. (It did occur however that trusted and successful V-Leute were taken into the SS).

(4) Zuträger und Agenten

The fourth group was the most numerous one. as a rule it consisted of paid agents, while groups (2) and (3) usually served from idealism. These paid agents were more important in the services of Amt IV and VI, while Amt III usually tended to employ ehrenamtliche Mitarbeiter and V-Leute.

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Organization of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt. (RSHA)

Chef des Reichssicherheitshauptamtes

Attache Gruppe

SS Standartenfuehrer Dr ZINDEL

Gericht

SS Sturmabannfuehrer Dr DILLENSPERGER

Schulen

SS Oberfuehrer Dr FISCHER

Adjutantur

SS Sturmabannfuehrer SCHEIDLER

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Amt I

SS Oberfuehrer und Oberst der Polizei FUHLINGER

Geschaeftsfuehrer

SS Hauptsturmfuehrer ERGENZINGER

Gruppenleiter I A

SS Sturmbannfuehrer WANNINGER

Gruppenleiter I B

SS Sturmbannfuehrer ZIRPINS

Gruppenleiter I C

SS Obersturmbannfuehrer GSCHWEND

I Militaerisches Personal

Oberstlt HUEBNER

Amt II

SS Oberfuehrer SPACIL

Geschaeftsfuehrer

SS Sturmbannfuehrer GRAETZ

Gruppenleiter II A

SS Sturmbannfuehrer KREKLOW

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Ant: II (Continued)

Gruppenleiter II B

SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Dr BERGMANN

Gruppenleiter II C

SS Obersturmbannfuhrer HAFKE

Ant III

SS Gruppenfuhrer und Genlt der Polizei OHLENDORF

Geschaeftsfuhrer

SS Obersturmbannfuhrer SCHAEFER

Gruppenleiter III A

SS Obersturmbannfuhrer HOEPPNER

Gruppenleiter III B

SS Standartenfuhrer Dr EHLICH

Gruppenleiter III C

SS Standartenfuhrer Dr SPENGLER

Gruppenleiter III D

SS standartenfuhrer SEIBERT

Gruppenleiter III G

SS Sturmbannfuhrer WEGENER

NOV 14 1945
RESEARCH
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Ant IV

SS Gruppenfuehrer und Genlt der Polizei MUELLER

Geschaeftsfuehrer

SS Sturmbannfuehrer PIEPER

Gruppenleiter IV A

MUELLER

Gruppenleiter IV B

SS Obersturmbannfuehrer LISCHKA

Gruppenleiter IV C

SS Oberfuehrer und Oberst der Polizei SOMANN

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Ant V

i V SS Oberfuehrer und Oberst der Polizei PANZINGER (i V: in Vertretung or deputy)

Geschaeftsfuehrer

SS Sturmbannfuehrer KANT

Gruppenleiter V A

SS Standartenfuehrer und Oberst der Polizei WEINER

Gruppenleiter V B

SS Standartenfuehrer und Oberst WEINER

Gruppenleiter V C

SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr SCHULZE

Gruppenleiter V D

SS Standartenfuehrer Dr ing HEESS

Gruppenleiter V Wi

SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr FILBERT

Kriminalpolizei Institut

Kriminalbiologisches Institut

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Ant VI

SS Brigadefuehrer und Gemaj der Polizei SCHEIDENBERG

Geschaeftsfuehrer

SS Hauptsturmfuehrer HARTMANN

Gruppenleiter VI A

SS Standartenfuehrer Dr SANDBERGER

Gruppenleiter VI B

SS Standartenfuehrer STEIMLE

Gruppenleiter VI C

SS Obersturmbannfuehrer RAPP

Gruppenleiter VI D

SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr PAEFFGEN

Gruppenleiter VI E

SS Obersturmbannfuehrer WANCK

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Gruppenleiter VI F

Oberstlt BOENING

Gruppenleiter VI G

SS Sturmbannfuehrer Dr KRALLERT

Gruppenleiter VI S

SS Obersturmbannfuehrer SKORZENY

Gruppenleiter VI VI T

SS Standartenfuehrer Dr SCHMIED

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Amt Mil

SCHELLENBERG

Geschaeftsfuehrer

HARTMANN

Abteilungschef Mil A

SANDBERGER

Abteilungschef Mil B

STEIMLE

Abteilungschef Mil C

Major i G OHLETZ

Abteilungschef Mil D

SKORZENY

Abteilungschef Mil E

Oberstlt BOENING

Abteilungschef Mil F

Oberst i G BUNTROCK (Frontaufklarungstruppen)

Abteilungschef Mil G

BOENING (?)

Lehrregiment Kurfuerst

Major PARTL

Sonderkommando Dora

Major GERICKE

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Ant VII

i V SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Dr DITTEL

Geschäftsfuhrer

SS Untersturmfuhrer BRUEDERLE

Gruppenleiter VII A

SS Sturmbannfuhrer BURMESTER

Gruppenleiter VII B

SS Sturmbannfuhrer MUEHLER

Gruppenleiter VII C

SS Sturmbannfuhrer RICHTER

Ant N

SS Standartenfuhrer SANSONI

Geschäftsfuhrer

SS Hauptsturmfuhrer MAUSOLF

Referent N/Fe

SS Sturmbannfuhrer WALTHER

Referent N/Fu

SS Hauptsturmfuhrer MARKS

Ant Sanitaet

SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Dr STROHSCHNEIDER

Geschäftsfuhrer

SS Untersturmfuhrer SCHERZINGER

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ANNEX B

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Organization of Sicherheitspolizei and SD

Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD
Adjutantur, Gericht, Attachegruppe, Schulungswesen

Reichssicherheitshauptamt
Art I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, MII, N, Son

Befehlshaber (Inspektoren) der
Sicherheitspolizei und des SD

Kommandeure der Sicherheitspolizei
und des SD

Staatspolizei(leit)stellen
Kriminalpolizei(leit)stellen
SD - (Leit) Abschnitte

Aussenstellen der Staatspolizei
Aussenstellen der Kriminalpolizei
Aussenstellen des SD
Grenzpolizeikommissariate
Grenzpolizeistellen

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