

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET
DETACHMENT 35

1213

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Contact Report

SUBJECT: Project SHOSHONE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2000 2006

1. On 25 January 1952 the undersigned and 35727 had lunch with SPRAGUE/201 at the Till Eugenspiegel, Salzburg. The purpose of this meeting was for 35753 to become acquainted with source and discuss with him the possibilities of setting up a project designed to furnish much needed operational details for penetration in the BADEN and WIENER NEUSTADT area.

2. Salient impressions of SPRAGUE/201 were the following:

a. He is a sportsman; ran a 100-meters with KOERNER in 1928 and was Norddeutscher Meister holding records in sprinting, broadjump, etc. He is very active physically. Said he often ran home from the railroad station to get exercise. He is active in many other sports.

b. He likes to drink; refilled his glass many times from wine flasks making statement that it was one of his vices.

c. He is an excellent linguist; speaks Italian, English and Dutch. He is well versed in local habits of Europeans.

d. He is obviously a keen observer and a highly trained intelligence man. When the plan of SHOSHONE operation was outlined to him, he stated that this was a familiar pattern and standard procedure in some of operations he performed in the SD.

3. He was told that he had been chosen for this job because of his reputation as a reliable person and because of actions with members of US intelligence. He would head up an effort to systematize penetration of Soviet personnel and units. His targets would be BADEN and WIENER NEUSTADT. His operation would be under administrative control of LINZ personnel with whom he was acquainted.

4. He should establish himself, under the cover of an "Agentur" of an Italian firm in LINZ and organize a fairly respectable office. The representation should be genuine and goods should actually be received from Italy and handled and sold in this office. He should set up this office in such a way as to either dispose of his classified material daily, or arrange for adequate safe facilities to keep maps, card files, etc. Payment was not settled, though it was indicated that sufficient funds were available to take an active part in purchasing goods imported from Italy. It was stressed that the business front would have to be foolproof and that if such front could be successfully established, agents working under his control could possibly use identical business cover.

5. He was told that money for a vehicle would be made available. He will continue living in Lambach and commute to LINZ as required.

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6. To get him started on the project, he was told to:
 - a. Locate a suitable office;
 - b. Arrange for business connections;
 - c. Make official report about his cover business intentions to Austrian authorities;
 - d. Acquire adequate office equipment;
 - e. Put into writing his own views of operations;
 - f. Have interview with prospective sub-sources (7059 and Sprague/245, about whom he knows nothing as yet);
 - g. Acquire basic reference material, card files, etc., to record minutest details of operational interest;
 - h. Submit weekly progress reports on his project;
 - i. Initiate courier trips to BADEN and WIENER NEUSTADT.

7. Throughout the discussion, the most significant reaction on the part of source was an apparent gratefulness that we had taken him into our confidence on such sensitive work. He repeated several times: "Vielen Dank fuer das Vertrauen dass Sie mir schenken". He further indicated great interest in getting the project launched and seems to have complete comprehension of what is desired.

8. It is recommended that his sources contact with members of LINZ Field Unit or other Detachment 35 personnel be kept to a minimum. Administration of his own office should be closely watched but not through direct personal contact. Operational instructions should be passed to him in such a manner as not to reveal contact with US authorities. Operational instructions will in most cases be passed from Staff Group through Linz Field Unit, though it is expected that some personal contact between source and Staff Group personnel will be maintained.

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