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10 June 1945

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SPECIAL INTERROGATION OF GEBHARDT GLEITER, ALLENBERG AND MANDL

1. CAREER

ALLENBURG saw no point in his repeating his biography for the third time. As for recent activities, he stated he was given special tasks for the Ausserer Amt in Bulgaria after his retirement from Greece in November 1943; he was sick for six weeks from the end of July 1944, and at home in Heiningen; then he went to Vienna, where he remained almost till the Russians entered; 1-2 April he moved to Alt-Aussee, and then tried at the end of April to go to Puchsl. He speaks with indignation of being picked up by the Americans, who "Lindberghweise" did not tell him he was being arrested, and of the fact that the members of his Dienststelle -- KLOTZ, ROTHE, THUM, BERTL, J. CARUS, and SCHULTZ, who were picked up with him, have all, except ROTHE, apparently been released.

2. Dienststelle ALLENBURG

ROTHE was ALLENBURG's representative (deputy) there. The Dienststelle was organized 5-5 and whose task was to take care primarily (!) of finding quarters for and feeding the members of the exile governments, first in Vienna, then, in the course of the winter, for members of them who went to Kitzbuehl and Semmering, and finally in February to Alt-Aussee.

The Dienststelle stayed in Vienna officially till 1-2 April, though most of the people had gone. In addition to the dreary activities mentioned above it of course got some information from new arrivals from the Balkans; numerous Communists came over during the winter, and very few Bulgarians.

3. THE GOVERNMENTS IN EXILE

Each of the two governments -- Bulgarian and Rumanian -- had six to eight members; perhaps 100-150 members-on came from each country, and went to Kitzbuehl or Kirchbuehl.

ALLENBURG says that the Protokollstelle of the Ausserer Amt helped in quartering the people. KLOTZ was also at Aussee.

The Bulgarian Government were supposed to be to train their people, and to take care of Bulgarian interests. There were plans to operate military units against the Russians, but nothing came of it because of lack of arms; some units were to be in the Waffen SS, and were trained (at least the Germans) at Doellersheim. Hstuf. STIER was liaison officer for the Waffen SS to the Bulgars and Rumanians in this matter.

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The governments had the political task of getting together their nationals in the Reich, and doing jobs of listening to Soviet broadcasts from Bucharest or Sofia and monitoring them.

4. Dienststelle Altenburg -- Information and Communications

The Dienststelle supplied the government with its information, received from the press, prisoners, and persons crossing from the Balkans; and also from SD reports, which were given to the Dienststelle through LAECK, though not in their entirety. This SD information was given quite informally. It was intended that ZIICHKA would be the liaison man between SD and Dienststelle at Alt-Aussee.

The Dienststelle had 16 people at Vienna, including secretaries and messengers; about ten were still together at Aussee.

There was little activity there, but a W/T net was established, which had poor connections with Berlin, and passed up reports from the various press services -- Reuters, etc. -- they also had a sender which they destroyed after one or two weeks; they sent one message to Berlin, asking for money, but got no answer. Previously they had W/T contact from Vienna with Berlin.

5. Auswaertiges Amt and Dienststelle

To the question whether KITTENBERGER's assumption of power for the South had affected the Dienststelle, ALTEK said indignantly that it had nothing to do with the Dienststelle; that there was no question of his acting independently of the Auswaertiges Amt at the end, but simply of his lacking contact with it.

6. Comment on ALTEK

This person is thoroughly disagreeable and uncooperative; his information, as evidenced in this report, is probably worthless; his main aim is to turn an interview into a lecture on the shortcomings of the Americans in their dealings with him, and on the evils of Russian occupation.

7. HAEDL and VI P - Special Interrogation

HAEDL was with VI P from July 42 to the end of 44, with some intervening trips to Italy. VI P was still in Unter den Eichenstrasse 6a. HAEDL was working on training -- there was a school at Hohenbünde near Berlin, which became a stormhouse and a small W/T training school, and eventually was moved to Presidential.

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2. 8. SKORZENY VS. DOERNER

There was a dispute about leadership between SKORZENY and DOERNER, which ended with SCHILLERSBERG's backing SKORZENY and with DOERNER's being reduced to procuring material and taking care of technical matters.

KLEIDL's own work was general training and sifting of personnel.

The school actually opened 3 October 43.

3. 9. KLEIDL IN VI E

People disputed about what KLEIDL's next job should be; finally he was ordered to Vienna by SCHILLERSBERG to work for VI E in setting up information sources in Austrian industries (?). Then he was given a special job at Agram at the beginning of 1944, to find out where TITO was, and in general to get information on Communist circles. He was at Agram till the beginning of December 1944.

For communications, he used a courier (frequently himself), teletype, or W/T.

SKORZENY was to indulge in an operation against TITO in May, and KLEIDL was to prepare the plan, but nothing came of it.

The 2nd Panzer Army Corps tried an operation, with Brandenburg Division personnel, in June 44, but lost most of the men.

4. 10. VI E-S

In December 44, KLEIDL came to VI E, after the customary row about his job, since VI E wanted him, and was given a new Referat VI E-S, in which he was to combine information from the various Landesreferate on the feasibility of operations in the Southeast. He had contacts with the NS 100 (Info. Office), and was supposed to take care of technical preparations for operations.

There followed a discussion of various alternatives:

5. 11. OPERATIONS IN ALBANIA

a) Operation with TETA.

With SCHWABEVA, who was in Vienna, an operation for north-east Albania was planned under Ref. TETA, in Albania, in the Skanderbeg Division, with a Kommando of 3-4 men, plus a W/T man supplied by KLEIDL, a Norwegian named HANSEN, who had been

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trained at the school in Berlin. Arrangements were made with Kdo. Klara to drop the men at the beginning of March, but there were no planes, until the end of April, so nothing came of it.

Numerous Albanians had remained there, under agreement with SCHAVEDAVA to fight against the Bolsheviks (these were men of the Skanderbeg Division). Contact with them was lost.

TELA left Vienna with 3 of his men, went to Klayonfurt, and tried to get through to Croatia (ultimate goal Albania): HEINRICH left for Tyrol, possibly Schwaz.

TELA was supposed to meet people in the Skoplje-Uskueb-Histrovica area, where ADJIF BIJUPI and DALIJ were active. This whole group were Mohammedans: TELA was to contact them.

b) ALI DRAGA Operation

This man, son of a leading Mohammedan of Kosovo, Merad BEG DRAGA, who had retired into the mountains, was to go to Albania, but nothing came of this. MASH, N/T man, who speaks Albanian and Serbian, and is a Volkdeutscher, was sent to Berlin and was to go with this operation.

c) SHLJISI PARI Operation

This was also to go to Kosovo. Its head was a youth leader from there, who had unfortunately enriched himself in politics, but anyway had a big following. He was in Vienna, to which he had come with Hgr. M. No N/T operator was ready for this operation, but two Albanians were being trained for it.

d) TOPTANI Operation

This was to go to the Scutari-Tirana area. Its leader, TOPTANI, had been with the Wehrmacht, and worked with Hauptmann LANGE. The operation was not sent because of inadequate preparation.

6. 18. OPERATIONS IN SERBIA

a) NIKOLAJEVIC (GASPAROVIC)

A Serb captain GASPAROVIC (cover name Gali Orlan), plus SS Ustaf SCHMERTY and 50 Serbs, were to run this operation. They were equipped with MP's and MG's, 3 N/T sets, 3 operators, one a Serb (MOK) with cover name NIK. The group started from Sarajevo. A Cetnik Colonel BOZOVIC, commander of the East Bosnia Cetniks, shipped them through. They were to use MIL-OVIC's N/T nets - stations at Belgrade and high and with his Commandos.

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Not many reports came from them; mostly they were military, discussing their fights with the partisans. The operation was run in mid-January, and the people are still there. They had 250 gold napoleons, and were well equipped with W/T.

b) BECAREVIC Operation

This one was planned but not run. BECAREVIC was chief of the Serb Special Police, in charge of the anti-Communist section, and so worked willingly with the Germans. 40 of his police agents, from various Serbian cities, were to go with him. But the plan was held up by a three-cornered scrap among MILIJOVIC, LJOTIC, and MEDIC, and BECAREVIC refused to wait for the end, and was sent to Istria. MEDIC told him to set up there an intelligence network to work against TITO. He is there now, with W/T and arms.

c) JANKO Operation

JANKO went alone to the Belgrade area to set up contact points; but he had no W/T set, and no information from his base came in since he went in January.

d) VUKOVIC Operation

He belongs to the LJOTIC strongly anti-Communist direction. His 30 Serbs and two W/T men were to go out in two groups and set up information reporting-points, but they stayed in Vienna till near the end, and then went west.

e) ILASSLJAGIC Operation (cover name: Dikandi)

This man, a leading Mohammedan youth movement man from the Sandjak, was an old fighter with STANJOKOVIC. He was to form points d'appui and arrange for slipping through persons to Montenegro, Albania, and to MILIJOVIC. He was in the police HQ, Vienna. He got as far as Sarajevo, and MEDIC received frequent W/T reports from him -- e.g. that he had sent 6 or 7 of his people through from Sarajevo. Then came the retreat, and he went to Lgram, where he made an agreement with MEDIC to cooperate with MILIJOVIC, an old school pal of his at Belgrade, in the struggle against Bolshevism. MEDIC offered him the command over the East Bosnia Ustaschi army, which was Mohammedan, and ordered him to organize this army and to make contact with Albania. This was planned for this spring. MEDIC does not know that ILASSLJAGIC is working for the Germans.

With the last possible plane, MEDIC sent to MILIJOVIC a Volksdeutscher from Serbia named FRANZOSI, a student friend of ILASSLJAGIC. No news has been received since it was heard that FRANZOSI had got through to the Sandjak and made contact with STROH, a MEDIC stay-behind man who was an Ustaschi captain

in Sarajevo, and was occupied in combatting partisans. FRANKOSKI was to set up contacts from the Croatian border.

f) KURGEL Operation (KURLEC)

This man was of German descent, came from near Belgrade, had studied there and at Berlin, was in the Yugoslav Army, lived in Agram, knows Yugoslavia excellently. KURLEC got him to Agram, Austria. He was supposed to work with PAVANOVIC, a V-Lass from Montenegro, and was supported by DRJILOVIC, Montenegrin Prime Minister, at Agram. Dr. SILEMIJA, DRJILOVIC's secretary, is an expert on Montenegro. These people are in Croatia, with I/T outfits: their last reports were from Agram, about the beginning of May.

g) KARTUS Operation

This was an operation in Croatia, headed by Count MEISER, an ex-Communist, half-Jewish, who had fought with the Reds in Spain (and had been a member of the Intelligence Service), then went to France, where he worked for the Austrian State Police under Dr. MEISER; and he continued his intelligence work after the Anschluss. He is a very able man. Shortly after the Anschluss he went to Yugoslavia, where he was active from 1941 to 1944. He is acquainted with the heads of the Ustača, e.g. Col. LUBORIC, who had contact with KASSABER (which KASABER might be exploited), and who had been ordered by KURLEC to set up a resistance group; and Col. KURLEC, who wanted an understanding with the Western powers; and Col. KURLEC, (chief of the Croatian Intelligence), who had to accompany the Croatian Ministry of the Interior, evidently because of a report that he had been negotiating with the Western Powers.

h) KLOPP (KURLEC) Operation

(This is presumably the operation of that name discussed in Para 30 of the Annex to Report 3 MAR on KURLEC). It was a plan for an operation, via Agram, to place a liaison man with DR. GA MILILOVIC. The agent was from the coast, had studied at the Welthandelhochschule in Vienna, and was married to a relative of KURLEC. The agent had one I/T operator, I/T equipment, and money. His last report was from Agram, a request to go for the exact location of MILILOVIC (with whom VE was in contact still). KASABER thinks the operation may not have got through.

i) ERLICH (cover name) Operation

Two Croats, one of them with the cover name ERLICH, and a I/T operator (cover name KASABER), a Croat student, were to operate at Trieste, signalling to Agram, to get information about VE. The operation was later changed to one of finding out about Communist activities in Istria. The men were in contact with Agram, whence messages were sent to Vienna by teletype.

j) NOTE ON WEISS OPERATIONS

REINDL remarks that HILSCHER would not have approved of sending KONRAD (KLASER) out; the operations in general were directed by HOETTL, who gave REINDL a special task re Yugoslavia early in 1944.

7. OPERATIONS IN SLOVAKIA

Only recently (summer 1941) had Slovakia been transferred from Amt III to VI E. Contacts there were few. Later, efforts were made by the Jagdkommandos to build there; they had a "resistance line" in Eastern Slovakia, but they were short of I/T equipment, and REINDL supplied them with batteries, and they agreed to send intelligence reports for the VI E people there, as well as any political information picked up by themselves, to VI E direct. This agreement was made in February 1944. VI E had five agents in Slovakia who used this method.

The Jagdkommandos had orders to stay behind in Slovakia, and may still be there. Their orders were extended to include also Moravia.

Dr. REINDL was a collaborator of the Jagdeinsatz Kommando there; REINDL does not remember the name of the Kommando. The Jagdeinsatz numbered 50-60 men, and had an agreement with the HUNTER Guard, by which some hundreds of HUNTER people were to be added to them. All these people were under Jagdkommando Suedost, center in Vienna.

8. ORGANIZATION OF THE SLOVAKIA

REINDL emphasizes the military nature of this organization, with SKORZENY as chief, BESKON his Chief of Staff, and Lt. Ib, Ic officers under them. The various Jagdkommandos coordinated with the corresponding Gruppen of Amt VI: Haupt Jagdkommando Suedost with SMITHS of VI B; Jagdkommando Nordost with LAGG-GM of VI D, Jagdkommando Ost with HART of VI C; Jagdkommando Suedost with VI B, and also with the Turkey Section of VI C.

REINDL was liaison man between VI B, VI C, and Jagdkommando Suedost from the beginning of December 1944. He does not feel that the coordination worked well, primarily because of SKORZENY's essentially military interest in the operations.

9. ACTIVITIES AND TRAINING OF JAGDKOMMANDOS

In August or September 1944 SKORZENY received Hitler's orders to set up resistance movements and stay-behind groups in occupied (or liberated) Europe.

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SKORZENY was supposed to collaborate in political matters with VI.

For the Southeast, SKORZENY set up Jagdeinsatzes for Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia-Serbia, (combined), Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Turkey. There was none for Greece. KASSEL cannot give exact figures on these; he estimates that they averaged a few hundred men each, but he points out that it is hard to say, e.g. whether a group of Ustacha operating with the Jagdverbände were actually part of a Jagdeinsatz or not.

Men in the Jagdeinsatzes were trained primarily in arms, sabotage, guerilla warfare etc.; there was practically no political training.

10. ~~10.~~ TRAINING FOR THE WILHELMSTRAE OPERATIONS (SARAJEVO)

Hscharf HALLERSTADL, one of KASSEL's men, was teacher at the evacuation quarters in an old Kaiser Service Camp on the Neusiedlersee (exact location forgotten), where training for this operation was given from mid-November 1944 to the end of January. HALLERSTADL supervised the school; the people being trained in it had been with him at an SS school in the Reich.

11. ~~11.~~ Jaidhof <sup>Gschl</sup> - HQ OF JAGDKOMMANDO SÜDLAST

This is located about 20 km. north of Vienna, on the Danube, from the end of October 1944, when the Jagdkommandos were formed (from specialists formerly with the Brandenburg Division, most of whom voluntarily joined the Jagdkommandos and with them the SS), until about 1 April 1945, when the staff moved to Admont.

Most of the W/T operators for Jagdkommando Südlast were trained at Jaidhof -- c. 20-30 men, under a signals officer.

KASSEL says that training in weapons was given by each Jagdeinsatz by itself, not through a central school.

12. ~~12.~~ ARRIVAL OPERATION UNDER JUREK'S

The Jagdeinsatz Albanien, which had been located at Vienna, was ordered by Ostufur HANSEN at the last minute to march via Croatia to Albania, with JUREK'S conducting them. There were about 20 men, who, KASSEL thinks, have gone into the mountains, but probably did not get far on their way. He had to provide a W/T operator for them at the last moment.

13. ~~13.~~ FURTHER RE-TRAINING OF JAGDVERBÄNDE

There was a training school for Bulgarians at Nikolsdorf on the Neusiedlersee, which was moved to a place (name unknown) northwest of Vienna.



REINDL insists that there was no political training, and that even the leaders of the Jagdverbände had little or not any political qualification; he points to MURKES of the Jagdeinsatz Albanien as an example -- a man from Hamburg who knew little about the Balkans. REINDL was supposed to supply the political coordination for operations, but the people he dealt with were military people, little concerned with politics.

Only in Slovakia, where Dr. PAVLOVSKY and REINDL were active, and in Rumania, did the Jagdverbände show much political sense.

14. ~~20.~~ JAGDVERBÄNDE AS A SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE

REINDL was much interested in procuring for VI E intelligence from the Jagdverbände, but had little luck. He did make a deal once to get information from Croatia, and there was some success with Slovakia. HARMAGIC had contact with a man whom REINDL had planted for VI E in a Jagdkommando, and thus some information was procured.

15. ~~21.~~ SKORZENY and BESSCH

REINDL recalls that SKORZENY came twice to the Jaldhof, and spoke with MAREK. Normally BESSCH, who was directly under SKORZENY, would go to Berlin to report to him. BESSCH had been a Major of the Luftwaffe, and had an assimilated rank of Oberst in the SS. He moved with the staff to Weizel at the beginning of April.

16. ~~22.~~ RESISTANCE PLANS

REINDL claims that the plans for resistance by the Jagdverbände were connected with military expectations in the Balkans, where e.g., HILFAR prophesied in mid-December that by mid-January they would again be in Belgrade (he kept repeating the prophecy, with variations in the date).

In the event that Germany won the war, REINDL hypothesizes that the Jagdverbände, especially Jagdkommando Mitte, would have been used for a "Grossreinigung" -- a general clean-up -- within Germany, where he expected that the returning front fighters would have been in a mood to settle accounts with the NSDAP home front boys. In that case, the Jagdverbände would have become a palace guard for the Party. In Jagdkommando Mitte, he points out, the members are mostly young go-getters, of the SKORZENY desperado type, without political sense.

He says that after 20 July 1944, the Jagdkommando Mitte et Berlin went out under SKORZENY on a clean-up job, which he said (or implied) was that of an Unlegokommando.

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17. 5. JAGDKOMMANDO PLANS IN AUSTRIA

MENDL says he never discussed with SKORZENY his role in the Werewolf, but assumes he had some special position in it.

Jagdkommando Sudost was to stay behind in Upper and Lower Austria and form a resistance nucleus (which might be a Werewolf one) against the Russians. He does not know how many members actually remained behind, but he knows that GRESCH and his whole group had orders to stay there and be overrun.

MENDL heard from STEINERT (under GRESCH) at Admont that they intended to stay in the occupied zone, and that GRESCH was hunting for points d'appui there. MENDL is sure that some caches at least are there. He insists that there were no similar arrangements for the other parts of Austria not occupied by Russians. He does not know Brif GIBBEL, and he knows of no Werewolf representatives (unless SKORZENY could be so regarded) who came to Jagdkommando sudost.

18. 5. BESSEKOW: VI S 2 and VI S 4

These were the referate that trained small-scale operations. VI S 2 had originally been under RADL, but was transferred to BESSEKOW when RADL became SKORZENY's adjutant. BESSEKOW already headed VI S 4.

Such training was developed prior to the invasion of Eastern Europe, and in particular from October 1943, after the return of SKORZENY from Italy and the feat of recapturing Mussolini. The maximum size of the groups would be 10-20 men, and usually they would include not more than a couple of men.

19. 5. ASSASSINATION PLANS

BESSEKOW had left behind him a small organization of this type in France, the name of which MENDL does not know, and this group tried to assassinate DE GAULLE.

About a year ago, BESSEKOW planned an operation to assassinate STALIN; this was to start from Berlin, and had some connection with a Russian courier pilot -- obviously working for the Germans -- who arrived about that time with a lot of documents. MENDL claims not to know details, or whether the operation actually was tried.

MENDL added that his chief activity in 1944 was to prepare a similar operation against TITO (he speaks of it in this regard, but the interrogator doubts that this was all that was involved). He says that individual agents were dropped to prepare for this operation, and that some had not been heard from.

VI S 2 originally controlled all operations for VI S, before the Jagdverbände were formed; then it was reduced to handling small-scale operations. VI S 4 had originally the task of preparing a stay-behind network in the expectation of invasion.

20. SCHLEIBERBERG

SCHLEIBERBERG, according to HENDL, was very much opposed to SKORZHEY, who in his unorthodox way used to bypass SCHLEIBERBERG and go to KALLENBURNER directly (as he bypassed KALLENBURNER for HINZLER, and HINZLER for HITLER!)

HENDL knew well a student-friend of SCHLEIBERBERG, and has known SCHLEIBERBERG personally since he came to the GEMA (after starting a legal career as Regierungsrat). SCHLEIBERBERG was about 26 at the time, had rank of Oberst, but actually was running skilfully a Zentralabteilung in Amt I, issuing orders, and generally showing his outstanding ability. HENDL's eye fell on him, he went to HENDL's adjutant, continued to enjoy the favor of the Cds, and then became Gruppenleiter IV B, where he ran counter-espionage within Germany.

He was transferred to Amt VI, and, after JOSEF's dismissal, appeared as acting head of Amt VI (designated "VI V" - i.e. V Vertreter). After HENDL's death, SCHLEIBERBERG began to report every two weeks or so to HENDL, whose favor he thus won, and eventually under KALLENBURNER he was confirmed as head of Amt VI.

SCHLEIBERBERG, like HENDL, is a master at getting off possible rivals, a "teile und herrsche" man, who would never let anyone else grow too strong.

21. VI F; MICROFILMS

Microfilming was in charge of Oberst. "Heinz" VOIGT, an expert photographer, who was at the evacuation quarters of VI F in Marienbad, and who HENDL thinks went south.

Description of VOIGT: age 35/36; 1.75 meters, prominent, blue-gray eyes, regular features, medium build, a "schonher Mann"; Saxon, with strong Saxon accent.

The Reforont of VI F 4, Stuf. KROBACH, expert on passport forgeries and money forgery, would also know about this. HENDL mentioned in passing a forgery operation called Untereichen

BERNHARD (the matter was not further discussed). BERNHARD stayed in Berlin, then moved to evacuation quarters in Thuringia. BERNDI claims not to know details of the microfilming, but says in any case it was done only for Amt VI by VI P. He mentioned the good technical setup of the Kriminaltechnisches Institut, and says that in a dispute re competence between this and VI P, KUBITZ- BRUNNER decided not only to maintain VI P but to expand it.

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