

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2000 2008

THIS IS A COPY OF AN INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT FILED AT CENTRAL RECORDS FACILITY, FT HOLABROOK, MD\*\*\*\*\*

CONFIDENTIAL

x932

20 June 1945

Classification (or changed) to  
**CONFIDENTIAL**  
by *Buyer*  
Date 2 Aug 1952

D-8-1

1. HOUSTON'S KNOWLEDGE OF GERRIT'S AND GERRIT'S AUSTRIAN  
contacts from the end of 1943, but GERRIT they were for intel-  
ligence purposes. HOUSTON and GERRIT reported to KERRIT on the  
Austrian plans. KERRIT did not want a separate  
Austrian solution, but was concerned with one for the whole Reich.  
HOUSTON brought KERRIT together with GERRIT about  
the end of 1943, but did not learn anything of  
the idea and tried to draw away GERRIT.

HOUSTON suggested KERRIT get KERRIT as a personal  
advisor, in hope of having him work on the Austrian  
plans, and this succeeded. KERRIT had good  
foreign contacts for KERRIT, e.g. with KERRIT.  
KERRIT went to KERRIT to Berlin late in 1944. KERRIT-  
KERRIT was eager to work with the Austrians.

KERRIT looked on GERRIT as a chief agent of his,  
and so was irritated at his efforts to negotiate.

KERRIT was not willing until the end to make a sep-  
arate peace for Austria, and then only under the condi-  
tion of KERRIT and KERRIT, KERRIT, and KERRIT's  
and Frau GERRIT. This proposal took place during GERRIT's  
visit to Switzerland in April. It was made under GERRIT's  
at Alt Aussee which convinced KERRIT not to carry on the  
fight in the mountains.

2. THE DREIER PLAN

This outgrowth of GERRIT's brain was conceived in 1943;  
efforts were made to establish contact at the beginning of 1944,  
through Switzerland. GERRIT in February 1944 KERRIT, GERRIT,  
and GERRIT wrote to KERRIT about it. The first step  
to Switzerland was motivated in part by GERRIT's  
the GERRIT idea, in part by the desire, GERRIT's  
approval, to sound out the Western Allies.

3. HOUSTON'S KNOWLEDGE OF GERRIT'S AND GERRIT'S AUSTRIAN

GERRIT appears to have been one of the most active  
of contacts for the movement in Austria. GERRIT was  
in Vienna, e.g. with GERRIT groups in GERRIT. GERRIT  
movement began by the end of 1943, GERRIT's  
of GERRIT.

FOR COORDINATION WITH Army

2-11-45

# BEST AVAILABLE COPY

- 2 -

THIS IS A COPY OF AN INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT FILED AT CENTRAL RECORDS FACILITY, FT HOLABIRD, MD:\*\*\*\*\*

COFFIN talked with HILBER, who in his State of activity should have been on the lookout for resistance movements, and did in fact, when he learned of the movement, went to observe it, but since KATZBERGER had approved of the contacts (for information purposes), it was possible to interpret it as a post-ration business, "Unternehmen Herweg", and HILBER laid off.

COFFIN's contacts included the Vienna Social Democrats, and through POPIK even some Communists.

HILBER, an ex-Social Democrat, had contacts with HILBER and other Social Democrats.

HILBER's own contacts were miscellaneous. They included, of course, Karl von HILBER (the name is probably still active. Callen with HILBER), and who was brought to HILBER without KATZBERGER's knowledge.

Others: Dr. GIER, of Katowice, who had been taken to Switzerland. To his central group belonged HILBER; HILBER, president of the European section of the ballroom company, an expert on oils and fats and fuel in general (this man too was brought by HILBER to the Swiss border, and may have got across); HILBER.

Then, in another group, the HILBER's contacts -- Dr. HILBER, referent for Southeast Europe under GIER, and an old contact of Von HILBER, who was hanged after the 20 July, and HILBER, a w/d expert on propaganda (now at training); and the Vatican referent Dr. HILBER, who was close to HILBER.

From intellectual circles: Prof. HILBER, Prof. HILBER -- a very active connection.

With Polish groups: through HILBER, strongly anti-Holocaust, who works closely with the London Polish Government.

Not only Austrians but Reichsdeutsche were in the movement -- they were hard to handle because of the strong anti-Holocaust interest of the movement. The only one named by HILBER is HILBER. Besides him, there was a group of HILBER -- (name unknown), who came to the top of the HILBER group. This man was of contact. He had been close to HILBER, and HILBER that HILBER's whole group stood with him.

HILBER's best military contact was with HILBER, e.g. Gen. LOBER, who played along with HILBER.

HILBER was the focal point of the movement, personally and geographically.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Prince ROSEN was also with the group. He had contacts with the General of the Jesuit Order at Rome. ROSEN had once been arrested by the Staps because of a book in which he had not been sufficiently condemnatory of the Russians. Some of his friends, e.g. his brother in law (KORNYI) were close to the movement.

KREIBACHER worked especially in southwestern Europe for the plan, and later in Austria. He got KREIBACHER's agreement to it.

4. GENERAL NOTES ON THE AUSTRIAN MOVEMENT

Only the central members of the movement knew of ROSEN's real plans, or of his trips to Switzerland.

The main line of the group was anti-Bolshevism, along with their dislike of the Nazi policies. There tended to be a strong Catholic tinge to the movement.

They wanted to create a strong basis for a government by bringing together these groups, but they did not want to negotiate about choices of ministerial posts, or such details were omitted.

They agreed on an independent Austria, democratic (!), anti-Bolshevik, properly parliamentary (though, remember that they were an Anglophile group), under a president or a monarch (such details were beneath them).

This whole conspiracy was built up on a personal basis, with occasional meetings away from the city centers, and in the place in Salzburg as a contact point, or of day-to-day work with ROSEN at Vienna, probably not often more than a week.

It appears that the movement had no specific membership, no organization, no positive aims, no plan for defeat or victory, no contacts with positive movements that it wanted to establish; its nature was apparently that of a meeting circle of disgruntled old ladies.

5. CONCERNING ROSEN'S TRIP TO SWITZERLAND

ROSEN told a little about his first trip to Switzerland, on which he spoke with KREIBACHER and the other central people, who thought there were still chances of success with the Americans. There was a great deal of talk about the had reached KREIBACHER at Berlin the day before he left for Switzerland, and got KREIBACHER's agreement to take the trip simply for KREIBACHER's own sake, and things up by telling KREIBACHER that he was engaged in political activity on the trip (?). ROSEN was arrested by the Staps, apparently because he was suspected he had tried to escape.

THIS IS A COPY OF AN INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT FILED AT CENTRAL RECORDS FACILITY, FT HOLABIRD, MD \*\*\*\*\*

THIS IS A COPY OF AN INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT FILED AT CENTRAL RECORDS FACILITY, FT HOLABIRD, MD\*\*\*\*\*

6. THE VOLLMACHT

HORTIL observes that WEISSBERGER received his Vollmacht early in April.

7. HORTIL AND THE BUREAU

HORTIL intended to go along with his colleagues into the desert, to help disintegrate it in the American interior. He had his W/T station set up already in Germany for this purpose. He took along his best men, WEISSBERGER, FORTVON, and HENNINGSEN, and his secretary, Ed. Kuhn. They were in contact with an American station near St. Gallen after mid-April. After HORTIL's third trip, arrangements were made for technical changes in the W/T system.

HORTIL's task was to keep in contact with the resistance movement in the mountains, to give them information about military strength, etc. and to carry on the propaganda work, e.g. study the effects of Allied W/T propaganda and leaflets, and to work with GRUBER-HORNBACH on propaganda leaflets. HORTIL suggested, e.g., that leaflets should point out that only way out was to save their own skins.

8. MEETING SOLMANN

To yesterday's contacts of the Austrian group, HORTIL added Dr. SOLMANN, a V-1 man for the Vatican, whom he saw twice or three times in Munich on his second visit to Switzerland. SOLMANN is a churchman who lectures at Fribourg; he is an atheist. He approved of HORTIL's attempt to work with Catholic groups.

Dr. GRUBER (mentioned yesterday) is a left-wing (though bourgeois), and HORTIL saw him in Switzerland, and tried to work with GRUBER's people in Vienna.

LINDER, also in Switzerland, a contact of HORTIL, is a member of the Social Democrats.

9. RESISTANCE PLANS IN THE NORTH

REISSERING was supposed to hold the point from the north, with a line in the Bavarian mountains, south of Munich; but this was to hold the same line in the east; what the plan was; VIENNA-CHORV Italy. The plan of having the line in the east of the Third Reich, military and political, in the north, was spoiled by the cutting of Germany into two parts.

HORTIL reports that the resist plan was rendered very serious, and points to be removed of the stereotyped and some others, to

# BEST AVAILABLE COPY

THIS IS A COPY OF AN INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT FILED AT CENTRAL RECORDS FACILITY, FT HOLABIRD, MD\*\*\*\*\*

the mountains. He says the military men believed they could hold out for a considerable time, in a region not vulnerable to tanks and aircraft, by blowing up the valleys that gave access to it.

Each of the resistance would have depended on the party groups — the Gauleiters as Reichsleiter, appointed in 1942 (which they had become about 1942, but which had grown to be an important function only after 20 July 1944). Early in 1945 they received court martial rights, to whom, then the resistance. BICKERT particularly took his powers seriously, used them typically, aiming to base resistance on the Volksturm, and even using Volksturm arms for it.

## 10. HOER

HOER had the task of working on HOER, who as the director of Tyrol had a central part in the anti-Nazi scheme. He had talked with HUBER about this after his first trip to Switzerland; HUBER went to HOER at the beginning of 1945. HOER was in a mood to carry on the fight against Tyrol; but at the end, HUBER joined HOER in appealing to HOER. At the end of April there was a conference at Innsbruck, with HUBER, REIS and VIERINGHOFF present, in which HOER said that he would not resist any more. HUBER said that he was informed of the result by HOER, who learned of it from his V-man at Meran, SCHUBERT.

## 11. CONFERENCE

HOER's negotiations with the Americans took place first in Switzerland, and later with General OBRIEN directly, through Dr. ANTONI, an Italian partisan.

## 12. REPRESENTATIVE AND NEGOTIATIONS

At the conference mentioned in para. 10, HUBER approved allowing VIERINGHOFF to negotiate first. He wanted HOER to stop the fight against the West, and to continue only against the Russians.

It was HITLER's wish that HUBER should become military head for the South, as he said he to be for the West. HUBER told OBRIEN that he had never been in the West, and that, of course, was to the point. HUBER was OBRIEN's representative. HUBER suggested that OBRIEN should know about the details of this. OBRIEN said he would go to the south to be HITLER's representative there, and that HOER agreed that this was a confusing arrangement.

THIS IS A COPY OF AN INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT FILED AT CENTRAL RECORDS FACILITY, FT HOLABIRD, MD\*\*\*\*\*

13. BERGOLF

The Bergolf was to be directed from the Reich, and HORTLE was given the job of penetrating it for the Germans. It appears that his main effort in this direction was by taking up contact with SHODAN, whose Jagdverbande were to supply the main military strength of underground resistance, although they were not officially part of the Bergolf, but were rather joined in personal union with it through SHODAN. HORTLE's position regarding the Bergolf was in fact much stronger than HORTLE's.

COFFMAN and HORTLE both discussed the matter with HORTLE. HORTLE spoke with him at Salzburg in the beginning of May, when SHODAN was considerably carrying on the fight in the mountains. Feeling that he had no large numbers, usually he had only a few hundred of his best followers with him.

HORTLE appointed COFFMAN as contact man to HORTLE re Bergolf matters, this at a discussion at the end of April, after HORTLE's second trip, in which HORTLE, COFFMAN, and HORTLE-BLANK took part.

HORTLE was expected to come south to lead the fight, but probably did not.

HORTLE's idea was to penetrate the Bergolf, and get it to stop its activities in the West, and tell the Germans to wait for further orders. He was unsure of what tactics to follow in the West; this was discussed with HORTLE, and there was hope of keeping control of it there for possible use.

HORTLE feels that the Bergolf are usually organized. The Gauleiters were to keep the Bergolf's contacts on it, and the NS was to contribute to it through SHODAN. There was also to be some help from Wehrmacht units in the South; HORTLE does not know what ones, or on how large a scale.

14. NATIONAL RESISTANCE IN THE WEST

National partisans were to take over the job of underground work in the formerly German-occupied areas in the West. HORTLE has sent a good many people there. The plans for these underground national organizations, working through individuals, were fairly far advanced, but HORTLE does not think the Germans will deal with them.

The work of JV leaders was in charge of the West. Under this, OSTER, HORTLE of the German-occupied areas, and HORTLE (he has been captured), and HORTLE (he has been captured). OSTER, HORTLE (or HORTLE) had a similar job for the West.

THIS IS A COPY OF AN INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT FILED AT CENTRAL RECORDS FACILITY, FT HOLABIRD, MD\*\*\*\*\*

The stay-behind people were supposed to wait for HELLER's  
promised offensive in the spring of 1948. He did think the  
plans were not really long-range, but were based on this interest-  
ing myth.

Notaf. HELLER worked along with the Jugoslavians on Jugos-  
lavia and can tell about the plans there.

15. VIETNAM and the HELLER

HELLER signed a decree in 1947 (and prepared) by  
WALKER in March 1948 ordering that operations could  
be undertaken by the HELLER (and HELLER) in this  
area only with the consent of the HELLER (and HELLER) in  
groups in VIET. This was aimed at the HELLER (and HELLER)  
stability. VIET already had groups in the HELLER (and HELLER)  
groups, and there was some contact with HELLER (and HELLER)  
with them. So VIET got a measure of political control here,  
though little came of it in practice.

16. HELLER OF HELLER (and HELLER)

HELLER had nothing to do with the matter. He went to  
suicide because his government was in trouble, and HELLER  
and HELLER were there also.

A HELLER was investigated for representative for HELLER,  
Albania, and Greece, as HELLER was the HELLER (and HELLER),  
and HELLER for Hungary. They had nothing to do with the  
HELLER.

The AD had backed the national (active) groups against the  
Auswertigen Amt, and found this to its advantage in the long  
run.

17. HELLER (and HELLER) and HELLER

HELLER backed, in the Auswertigen Amt, the most active of  
national groups. HELLER had gone to Hungary as his personal  
advisor in March 1948, and remained there until the end of 1948,  
disagreeing vigorously with HELLER and later HELLER on  
the policy toward the Auswertigen Amt. HELLER (and HELLER) of  
HELLER's activity and asked that he be killed.

HELLER had great power in Hungary. He had a  
HELLER (which was very bad), and had a high rank in the  
and was well informed on intelligence operations. HELLER  
reports that he had good contacts with HELLER (and HELLER)  
and had done up plans for a HELLER (and HELLER).  
HELLER, who had originally not killed HELLER (and HELLER) as  
an HELLER, changed his mind, about HELLER (and HELLER), and  
of HELLER because of HELLER's strength with HELLER (and HELLER), and

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS IS A COPY OF AN INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT FILED AT CENTRAL RECORDS FACILITY, FT HOLABIRD, MD\*\*\*\*\*

joined with HINDELANG in opposing HORNIG's plan for a government of broad concentration, and backing an authoritarian state under BRUNER. HINDELANG worked behind the scenes for this, and had his SS men in position to prepare for the change.

HINDELANG remained with the extreme line, left HORNIG as his representative and came to Vienna. HINDELANG and [redacted] flew to Berlin before 15 October and persuaded HORNIG to agree backing the narrow group; previously, HORNIG had backed HORNIG in this matter, and on 19 March, when the Germans occupied Hungary, succeeded in convincing HORNIG to limit the occupation carried out partly with Slovaks and Hungarians, and got HORNIG's approval for an occupation by the Germans only.

HORNIG's disagreements with the Government over Italy, Yugoslavia, and Hungary, had made him unpopular by HORNIG, and had caused also some ill feeling between HORNIG and HORNIG.

HORNIG was suggested by HORNIG as representative with the Hungarian Government, but HORNIG and HORNIG arranged for HORNIG to put HORNIG in as HORNIG of Bavaria.

### 18. HORNIG

HORNIG thinks that HORNIG heard of HORNIG's plans to act on his own in the South, and installed BRUNER, a mortal foe to HORNIG, to limit him.

BRUNER announced he would visit HORNIG, as holder of a Vollmacht, when HORNIG was there, but did not actually get there. BRUNER got his Vollmacht in mid-April, a few days after HORNIG-DRUMMER.

### 19. HORNIG

He was actual, though not official, deputy of HORNIG after HORNIG's death, in the South. He was a foe of HORNIG, and had expected, as object in mind in the South, to limit HORNIG. Later he went to the HORNIG, where he handled HORNIG.

### 20. HORNIG AND THE VOLLMACHT

HORNIG thinks HORNIG did little with his Vollmacht. He was supposed to Berlin by HORNIG about mid-April. HORNIG-DRUMMER did not come over to HORNIG's line till near the end.

### 21. HORNIG

HORNIG had no direct part in the negotiations in Switzerland, but HORNIG informed him about them, and HORNIG.

CONFIDENTIAL

# BEST AVAILABLE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

- 9 -

tried to get together for the American zone a counter-government against the Russian-sponsored one. He found candidates for it in Eastern Austria - GASTNER, DUMMER, LINDL, and others.

DUMMER went to Hitzbühl, then to Zell am See. It was planned to have the new Government come to Salzburg to Claude Horstmann, who had the approval of Bishop KATHNER, but it was physically impossible to get them together; KATHNER came to Salzburg, but nobody else.

COMPTON's Viennese contacts never got out of Vienna.

## 22. Dr. BOEGER

BOEGER also remained in Vienna. ROYAL now says that he disowned the contact with BOEGER on his first trip to Switzerland, but he himself felt that the trip to the U.S. to meet President ROOSEVELT was no longer practicable, and did not broach it, though this had been KATHNER's official reason for approving ROYAL's trip.

## 23. CLAUDE HORSTMAN

He had been initiated from the beginning in the negotiations, and ROYAL talked with him before and after each of his trips to Switzerland.

## 24. FRANZ GEBHART

ROYAL reported to KATHNER at Vienna after his second trip. He had left Switzerland on 15 April, spent most of the days at Bern; so the visit was about 20 April; he saw KATHNER first at Strättli, then two days or so later at Austria. Previously, only GEBHART had reported to KATHNER about ROYAL's trips. KATHNER then went to Hitzbühl and Zell am See; there was a meeting at Salzburg c. 25 April at which ROYAL was present; at this, KATHNER stated he was going to let ROYAL speak in his name in Switzerland.

ROYAL remarks that from the start, he and GEBHART had been the protagonists of the Austrian solution; KATHNER had been lukewarm and uncommitted, and had above all seemed to undertake anything that might go counter to his ideal.

## 25. ROYAL'S THIRD TRIP TO SWITZERLAND

ROYAL met LI CHANG at Vienna on this trip, then went to Bern, and returned to Vienna for LI CHANG's company; he intended to meet LI CHANG again at the Hotel Bristol for a final session of the personal meeting with ROOSEVELT, but had to leave and got to Bern about 4-5 May. KATHNER had already left.

THIS IS A COPY OF AN INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT FILMED AT GENERAL RECORDS FACILITY, FT HOLABROOK, MD\*\*\*\*\*

CONFIDENTIAL





BEST AVAILABLE COPY

- 12 -

II. sees the greatest danger from the Germans in the fact that there still must be considerable caches of arms, especially MP's, placed by the Volksturm in the mountains.

The Germans, he thinks, was best organized in the mountain-  
reid, under HINDL, and he says he does not know whether he  
thinks it may also have been well organized in Berlin. He recalls  
overhearing a telephone conversation at the beginning of April in  
Paris when HINDL called up HANDEL to ask for MP's, and  
HINDL arranged to send 5 or 6 loads of them from the Stoyr-  
werke to be used in contact with the Germans at Graz. He believes  
these were not used in fighting but were captured; they were  
transported by the Volksturm, not by the Luftwaffe.

II. says that HINDL's people broke into a Luftwaffe arms  
store of the Stoyrwerke at Mollan, because HINDL of the Stoyr-  
werke refused to supply arms to the Volksturm.

HINDL, II. thinks, is in Salzburg. He was at Bad  
Aussee on 7 May, and probably is being moved in the Gauern.

30. HANDEL IN THE BALKANS

The Wehrwolf expected to use HANDEL, II.'s PA station  
for the same sort of jobs as mentioned. HANDEL has given us  
information on his organization and on some of its work.

The PA station is to clear up their political operations  
in the Balkans with VI 2.

He says that the Wehrwolf party does not seem to have any in-  
formation service other than their own -- i.e. VI 2 and other  
parts of the RMA were not to supply them with intelligence.

II. says that the degree of April by which VI 2 had to  
clear its political operations with VI 1 had very little prac-  
tical effect.

II. gives an instance of confusion -- VI 2 planned this  
winter to drop a Wehrwolf to blow up a railway line in the  
Carpathians, but VI 1 fortunately had their German people  
drawn on it, and found that German partisans had blown up  
the railway some time before.

II. says HINDL was told about the number of partisans being  
trained by the Jugoslavians for the Southwest. HINDL was  
often at Jaidhaus, where HANDEL was in charge of their training.

THIS IS A COPY OF AN INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT FILED AT CENTRAL RECORDS FACILITY, FT HOLABIRD, MD\*\*\*\*\*

THIS IS A COPY OF AN INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT FILED AT CENTRAL RECORDS FACILITY, FT HOLABIRD, MD\*\*\*\*\*

31. VI 3 TRAINING

VI 3 trained four W/E operators in Hungary, and four others at a school in Kirchberg, which was under the control of Hungary, for whom about 16 other operators were being trained; but through H's personal contact with Istvan, R. A. H., in charge of the school, he got hold of the other 16 operators, and requested them to be sent to the American side.

32. HASZARDNER'S VOYAGE

HASZARDNER states that HASZARDNER was so busy travelling abroad in April that he made little operational use of his powers, beyond trying to keep the radio stations in their place. A specific instance of this was told to HASZARDNER by HASZARDNER, who had overheard a telephone conversation between HASZARDNER and HASZARDNER, who wanted to blow up the radio station at Kirchberg, in which objects of art were stored; HASZARDNER advised HASZARDNER that people at Kirchberg, incidentally, learned of HASZARDNER's local assistance movements, largely social in character, and his activities at the Switzerland in the post office, and that HASZARDNER was HASZARDNER's & boost in the eyes of the local people. HASZARDNER left about 20 April. HASZARDNER was HASZARDNER's central objective not to continue the struggle; this was also caused by the resistance people, and was spread about.

33. HASZARDNER'S VISIT TO HASZARDNER'S WIFE

HASZARDNER discussed with HASZARDNER the contents of (more than one) W/E messages he intended to send to HASZARDNER to the appointment of HASZARDNER, and about a change made by HASZARDNER in the disposition of HASZARDNER. HASZARDNER remembers it, HASZARDNER's messages were to point out that HASZARDNER had approved HASZARDNER's proposal to make HASZARDNER HASZARDNER with the HASZARDNER HASZARDNER, and to send HASZARDNER to HASZARDNER; HASZARDNER HASZARDNER HASZARDNER pointed out that HASZARDNER now wanted HASZARDNER to go to HASZARDNER in HASZARDNER, while he, HASZARDNER, had remained at the office of his full powers, and according to the original plan. HASZARDNER recalls that HASZARDNER came from HASZARDNER's special HASZARDNER HASZARDNER, and he thinks that the messages were to go from the W/E sender there. He does not know what, if any, reply was received, since he started the next day for Switzerland. (This would place the discussion about the end of April).

34. HASZARDNER'S VISIT TO HASZARDNER

HASZARDNER returned from his trip about 5 May, and stayed at HASZARDNER early in the morning, HASZARDNER (to HASZARDNER), HASZARDNER HASZARDNER, where he talked with HASZARDNER HASZARDNER HASZARDNER the plans for an Austrian Government, and HASZARDNER HASZARDNER HASZARDNER HASZARDNER was then to contact HASZARDNER in an attempt to co-ordinate the efforts for an Austrian Government, and HASZARDNER to

THIS IS A COPY OF AN INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT FILED AT GENERAL RECORDS FACILITY, FT HOLABIRD, MD\*\*\*\*\*

got together with NEUMER and through him with the Social Democrats. CHLIEB was to ask Dicho BILBAK for his backing. ROBERT was to go to Salzburg and meet HERRMANN and CHLIEB, and pass on information to HERRMANN at Munich.

On 5 May, ROBERT went to Salzburg; HERRMANN had gone (8) to tell Sell an eye to discuss with HERRMANN and HERRMANN, and CHLIEB told ROBERT that HERRMANN approved their ideas, but would not consent to having any official representatives in the Government, since he opposed politicizing the Church.

ROBERT then returned to Munich.

35. HERRMANN'S REVISION OF STRIKE

On the night of 6 or 7 May, HERRMANN came to Munich, and told ROBERT that (as he had learned from HERRMANN) the 6 HERRMANN would not oppose the execution of a separate Austria, and was willing to give up the military part of the struggle to hold the Reich. HERRMANN had decided to give up after his conference with ROBERT at Salzburg, but the final decision was taken at Munich.

36. STRIKE PLAN

ROBERT was asked to send HERRMANN to ROBERT to give on him the necessity of striking. HERRMANN, sent to tell him about the strike plan. HERRMANN was to go about 1 May, was delayed because of the lack of airplanes, and may have left later, though ROBERT thinks he is probably still in the South.

ROBERT adds that HERRMANN had been invited by HERRMANN for the post of State Secretary, and that a definite agreement at that time placed CHLIEB as head in the Ministry for Economics. HERRMANN is from Bavaria, and ROBERT thinks he may have been in contact with the disgraced HERRMANN group.

HERRMANN had some position with HERRMANN, possibly as representative of the Ministry for Economics. HERRMANN was not indicated into the Austria plans till the end, when HERRMANN told him.

37. HERRMANN, HERRMANN, AND CHLIEB

HERRMANN was last with HERRMANN, presumably at his home in Salzburg. He is probably there, or has gone to the first-cabin near Horn in Austria. HERRMANN thinks that HERRMANN should tell that he has a certain amount of his "Allied" work.

HERRMANN, who comes from Salzburg, is a leading HERRMANN-mann of Salzburg.