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COORDINATED WITH *CIC - Army*

**SUBJECT: HOTTL, Dr. Wilhelm
SS Stabschef.**

19 Feb 1908	Born in Vienna Father: Johann Hottl - Finance official Mother: Maria nee Renner. Attended elementary school, high school (Realgymnasium) in Vienna. Studied History, Germanistic and Geography at the University of Vienna.
1937	Doctor of Philosophy Research work for the Seminary of Modern History, University of Vienna.
March 1938	Applied for position with the SD and accepted on trial. Party and SD number.
Autumn 1938	Full-fledged member of the SD. Handled church affairs in the internal department of the SD - inland Amt II/1 (Kirchenreferat).
Winter 1939	Subject to disciplinary investigation on charges of "kaltanschauliche Unverlässigkeit", and transferred to Foreign Department (Amt Ausland - later Amt VI). Given the assignment of referent on the South-East of Europe with the SD - Leitabschnitt, Vienna. Intelligences work direction South-East and Soviet Russia.
1941	Removed disciplinary action on the score of political unreliability as evidenced by relationship with opponents of National Socialism and lack of "kaltanschaulische Festigkeit".
1942	Positive transfer to frontline service as common soldier, despite the fact that he was holding the rank Stabschef.
1943	Sucher at that time, war reporter, publisher of a Division Newspaper (in Divisionen Prinz Eugen), in Belgrade, until when Kaltenbrunner succeeded Heydrich as chief of the Reich. Reinstated by the SD and assigned to Amt VI (South-East), Berlin, as referent VI S 2 (Hungary), VI S 3 (Greece, Serbia) and VI S 4 (Albania and Montenegro), also deputy chief of Group VI 2.
1944	Went to Budapest as political advisor to the plenipotentiary of the Reich in Hungary, Ambassador V. T. ...
1944	Offices moved from Budapest to Baden.
1945	Trip to Switzerland. First contact with Allied Representatives
1945	Second trip to Switzerland.
1945	Third trip to Switzerland.
8 May 1945	Surrender to American Forces at Bad Alt Aussee, Austria.

1. In 1933, after the Dollfus regime had eliminated the influence of parliamentary institutions, the so-called "Kontrollrat" (Control Council) ...

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was activated. HOTTI, representing the philosophical faculty at the University of Vienna, became one of the leading functionaries. His endeavor was to bring about a rapprochement between a diversity of groups within the studentenschaft, namely the national and the Roman-Catholic groups. At that time he came in touch with corresponding student associations in the South-East, primarily with the Roman-Catholic ones, and an interest in South-Eastern affairs began to take root.

2. In the beginning - February 1943 - his work in the VI 7 sector was exclusively concerned with Italy, in particular with the Vatican. HOTTI had contacts in church circles and frequently compared notes with Father LAIDL, S.J., the Pope's German counsellor. He actively entertained the plan to seek a negotiated settlement with the Western powers through the intermediary of the Vatican, a move endorsed by the German Ambassador to the Holy See, Von Weizsaecker and Dr. Gunther Hofman, Vatican-Referent in the Foreign Office until - Summer 1943 - Minister von Ribbentrop expressly forbade them to lend themselves to any efforts along these lines.

3. HOTTI was in Rome at the time of Mussolini's fall. He tried to steer German policy in the direction of dropping Mussolini, expelling Badoglio and permitting the Italians to quit the war. This led to serious altercations with Ambassador von Mackensen. In order to silence all criticism von Ribbentrop prohibited all telephone calls from Berlin to Rome (except those authorized by Staatssekretar Steengracht), in HOTTI's case an abortive measure, because he had installed his own transmitter a few days before. For having tried to cross the official German line he laid down by Hitler, HOTTI was put on Hitler's blacklist. Ever since the events of September 1943, HOTTI confined his activities to the South-Eastern sector.

4. During his stay in Budapest as adviser to Ambassador Dr. Voegtmayer, HOTTI again found himself at cross-purposes with the official German policy adopted towards Hungary after her attempt to jump off the German bandwagon. In the opinion of Voegtmayer and the former SS and Policefuhrer SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Winkelmann the solution was to lift the extreme national-socialist groups represented by the "Folkswache" move out into the saddle. HOTTI, on the other hand, favored a moderate solution, a "burgerliche Konzentration", and had already brought a group of representative personalities together. When the viceregent Voegtmayer-Winkelmann prevailed and the Salaszi's government installed itself, HOTTI broke off relations and from then on confined his self to intelligence activities, preparing to cross back in Budapest.

5. In Budapest HOTTI established for the first time contact with the International Red Cross. After his return to Vienna he concentrated all his efforts upon getting into the fold all these groups within Austria and very who shared his political outlook and to organize them. His political tenets HOTTI sums up as follows: "To give up all efforts to lead the national-socialist back to the right track by democratic means (von innen heraus) and rather to try and achieve for Austria a special position and

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the discussion, gave Dr. Lohle a comprehensive survey of the personal and political philosophy of his opposition groups. During his stay in Switzerland he also met up with other personalities slated to play an important role in the settlement of the Austrian question as visualized by the American representatives, many of them members of the 'Freies Osterreich' movement.

8. HOTTLE's last trip, in May 1945, took place under greatly changed conditions. Weissenbrunn had been given plenary powers in South Germany, Germany's military collapse became imminent and under the impact of events, KALTENBACHER finally saw the light and empowered HOTTLE to make commitments on his behalf, also to arrange for a personal meeting between KALTENBACHER and DULLES. Owing to the speedy advance of the French Army, which appeared in the immediate vicinity of the Austrian-Swiss border, HOTTLE only managed to get as far as Liechtenstein. He met Hauptmann Dr. LINDNER in Vaduz and proposed through him to Dr. DULLES a meeting with KALTENBACHER. After a few days Dr. LINDNER brought back the answer, that such a meeting could be arranged on principle, but President THURNER's permission would have to be asked for. After handing over to Dr. LINDNER all available information, it was arranged that another meeting between them should take place on the Italian-Swiss border as soon as the US Government had its final disposition made known. This arrangement was superseded by military events.

9. In the meanwhile HOTTLE had sounded out all major German Army commanders through riddlers whether they would consider discontinuing the fight at this stage. The results were encouraging; inasmuch as Lt. General LOMER and General REIBELT declared their willingness to take matters in their own hands, provided KALTENBACHER went along. This was attained through concerted action on the part of Colonel Lefer (prevailed upon by the former secretary of State Dr. Dulles) and General Dr. G. H. H. H. H., a close personal friend of Lohle and HOTTLE. The decisive meeting, at Liechtenstein, was attended by Ambassador Dr. H. H. H. H. as representative of HOTTLE's group. Also the capitulation of Germany's Southern Army was prepared by riddlers of HOTTLE's group, who talked General G. H. H. H. H. (Colonel Lefer) and political officer in Italy) into boxing into the inevitable.

10. HOTTLE left Salzburg on 5 May en route to his headquarters in Steyerling, but got stuck in Bad Alt Aussee due to prevailing traffic congestion caused by retreating German troops. He immediately put himself at the disposal of the Austrian Resistance Movement and was laid up with gastric trouble (ulcers) the day American troops entered Bad Aussee. As arranged with the American representatives, he immediately informed the nearest American post of his presence, asking them to notify Lohle. A similar arrangement had been made in Steyerling, where HOTTLE's Deputy delivered a letter, written previously, to the local American Command or notified them of the presence of a traitor and its personnel in Steyerling. The correctness of this account lies in all its essential details and is confirmed. There has been no attempt on the part of anybody in Dr. HOTTLE's group, apprehended so far, to conceal anything. On the contrary, the cooperation

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offered has been spontaneous and without mental reservation as far as facts are concerned.

11. Since February 1945, HOTTL had been in direct charge of the Referate Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Albania and Montenegro. When he returned from Hungary end of 1944, he also tried to bring the remaining referate, viz. Rumania, Bulgaria and Greece under his hat. The underlying purpose of this scheme was, as HOTTL puts it, "ausstrahlungsbereich bzw. Zuerberfassung der 'Verbindungen Staaten' (collaboration with resp. putting at the disposal of the agencies of the United States the intelligence net). Bringing all referate of VI 7 into line with this policy was not too difficult a task, since all Referate-leader (with the exception of Greece: SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Klein) were HOTTL's personal friends and saw eye to eye with him in matters political ('Lage in ihrer inneren politischen Entwicklung auf keiner Linie'). In way of implementing this scheme, HOTTL had started already in Budapest to realign his intelligence net in Hungary, Jugoslavia, Albania and Montenegro through elimination of all those elements both in VI 7 and in the countries proper who could not be trusted fully to readjust themselves; this is what happened e.g. to the then leader of the referat Albania Montenegro, SS Hauptsturmfuehrer HUBER. AMTH and HUBER were told by HOTTL to follow suit by cleaning up their sectors. For AMTH this did not pose such of a problem, inasmuch as several attempts had been made by the American and also the British Military Missions in Budapest to enlist his agents for their own purposes. Beginning March 1945, already did AMTH intimate to his agents that the inevitable military collapse of Germany would not necessarily involve a cessation of their work and that a small circle of functionaries within Amt VI was contemplating to continue intelligence operations on sufferance by the Allies, possibly even with their active support. As far as HOTTL's own referate were concerned, viz. Jugoslavia, Albania and Montenegro, he had concluded the switch with the assistance of Hountefel, Demotovsky and Bondi. In particular HUBER had been entrusted with the task of activating central agencies in the mountainous regions of Jugoslavia and Albania with sufficient capacity (Ausstrahlungsmoeglichkeit), to extend into Macedonia, Bulgaria and that part of Greece that is in dispute (adjacent to Bulgaria).

12. In normal times all intelligence reports were collected centrally in VI 7. Wireless reports from Hungary and Jugoslavia however did not come in over the main receiver (Centrale, Vienna later (Pragawarter)) but were picked up by the receiver in Steyeritz.

The wireless channels to Rumania were all in a class by themselves, inasmuch as Dr. HOTTL's group had succeeded in penetrating them by the simple means of an unauthorized but expert AMTH and the wireless operator in the centrale that messages would be passed on to the correct agent and that directives to the wireless operators in Rumania would be authorized only by the HOTTL group. This scheme worked so successfully that even the chief of VI 7, HUBER, was unaware of the fact that a net to Rumania existed. When the decision was made to dissolve VI 7 (Pragawarter), the wireless operator in question, BTE, was secured by AMTH for the

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continuation of the Rumania service along established lines. The technical part of the switch-over from Xmasgunator to Mayorkin, had been completed when the Americans took over and HOUTREUIL (HOTTLE's deputy) already succeeded in calling Bularent, up to the time of occupation he received call-signs only. On 5 May 1943, Houtreuil told the operators to go off the air for the time being.

13. HOTTLE claims that his is the only information net of Amt VI that has come out of the general disorganization attending Germany's defeat basically intact. He believes that all existing nets have been disrupted beyond repair, but that some of their lines could possibly be reactivated in the course of time provided the referent of Amt VI and his W/T operators are still free agents. At the occasion of a meeting in Calzburg end of April 1943, SA Obersturmbannfuhrer LEOZKY mentioned that the entire wireless system connecting Amt VI with its agents abroad had been smashed. The speed of the American advance had compelled Amt VI to evade to its Thunisia hide-out in a matter of hours. Later on HOTTLE had checked with another group leaders, all of whom had lost both their referents and their wireless connections (Franklinia). This ties in with HOTTLE's own observation that the reinstallation of the Havellandnet (the powerful transmission system of Amt VI in liaison via Berlin) had not been accomplished and also the fact that during the last weeks prior to Germany's capitulation transmissions could be made only from the so-called "Central-Installation" police transmitters, of the RSHA, at Haidt via Linz and Garmisch in South Tyrol. The other large transmission establishment of Amt VI at Kirchhain via Prague, HOTTLE believes has been blown up, that remains may be a few small agent sets which, however, are helpless without a central station and that Amt VI and III could reactivate one of these, given the most elementary precautions of the occupational authorities, HOTTLE doubts.

14. In answer to the question what possible advantages could accrue to us from taking over and continuing operations of the SA information net in the South East and whether, given these advantages, they would not in the last analysis be outbalanced by the harm done to our relations with Soviet-Russia if it should transpire that we avail ourselves of an information system, planned, set up, staffed and operated by members of the former SA, HOTTLE made the following statement:

From my activities in the South East, extending over years, I know that the American information services in that area are still in their formative phase and that, in some countries, there are none at all. On the other hand, have I been able to ascertain from various sources that the British have a well-established (but somewhat) information net, which, even during the German occupation, has never been fully destroyed. If, most likely, will it be fully destroyed during the period of the Russian occupation. Inasmuch as the organization of an information service of Soviet-Russia proper would meet with considerable difficulties, it is generally (as first rule) to use the neighboring countries not occupied by the enemy as a window into Soviet-Russia (alone). This has nothing to do with the conduct of foreign relations towards that country, because after all, our country likes to have an information gathering agency in all other countries.

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The organization of such an infiltration net taking years and sometimes decades, it cannot possibly be affected by the consideration of whether the relations between the two countries concerned happen to be good or bad at any one time. As an example illustrating this contention, our good Allies, the Japanese, continued operating their intelligence service inside of Germany after Germany had declared war upon the United States; a complete set of the strategic plans of Germanic Northern Africa against Russia was found in the possession of Japanese agents.

The disadvantages on the other hand of letting oneself be influenced by gentleman-consideration, are shown up in the example of Italy. Until the fall of Mussolini in summer 1943, a personal order from Hitler forbade active intelligence operations inside of Italy. The pay-off came when the Allies started operating in North Africa and German intelligence services learned to their cost that the ideal basis for intelligence operations (nachrichtendienstliche Ausgangsbasis), viz Italy, was beyond their reach. Another example was Albania and Dalmatia, for intelligence operations between easy reach from the Western Adria; instead the more hazardous route through territory infected by the armies of Tito and in the beginning also of Mihailovitch, had to be chosen.

Conversely, it can be gathered from those examples that each country is aware that its closest ally is operating against it in the field of intelligence. On that score serious friction can only be considered if a country can prove to its ally that it is carrying on active intelligence, i.e. can trace a line that has busted back to its central agency in the country of that ally. This is an added advantage of taking over an intelligence net that is a going concern, rather than starting to build one from scratch. If the worst comes to the worst an agent can get caught and may confess that he is working for the Americans, hardly sufficient evidence for the Russians to base an accusation upon that the Americans are operating an intelligence net. A similar practice has been adopted, I happen to know, in Turkey which is the main operation basis of American and British infiltration services into Soviet Russia and where the Turkish intelligence which has shown excellent results for its activities in Russia, puts its material, quite openly, at the disposal of Americans and British. That the Russians are unaware of this practice, I strongly doubt. - End quote -

15. Cryptography is a highly developed art in Aust VI. One has managed to engage the best cipherers and decipherers, sort of the former members of the famed Bureaux (Generalmajor H. G. was chief of the Austro-Hungarian Nachrichtenamt in the First World War). Among experts they are considered the cream of the crop, as evidenced by the fact that the Hungarian deciphering department which continued the Austro-Hungarian traditions, did superior work with very restricted means at its disposal. The Hungarians had a specialized alphabet which monitored the international traffic of the whole world. The Hungarians knew all but the complete set of codes of Turkey, Greece, most French representatives, and also (the latter evidently operating in behalf of British intelligence). The complete record was kept of all reports sent to Washington by the American Ambassador to Switzerland, Dr. Harrison. Some time last year he apparently

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got wind of his code having been compromised and switched over to a new one, which the Hungarians also cracked in short order. HUTTL did not consider the material passed on by Harrison as particularly valuable; it was throughout in a tentative vein and ill-founded. HUTTL mentioned this fact to Mr. DULLIN when he visited him for the first time, pointing out that in his opinion Ambassador Harrison had relied too heavily upon Gestapo plants. The most valuable material the Hungarians brought to him were the reports the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow sent to Ankara; quite frequently his reports were exceptionally well informed about what was going on inside the Kremlin. HUTTL doubts that these reports are known to us in all detail.

16. HUTTL believes that some attempt should be made to reactivate the Hungarian cryptographical section. He claims to have laid the groundwork for such action by having seen to it that none of the key personnel left Hungary on time. He thinks that, given a free hand, he could in short order re-assemble a nuclear force, because most of them are hiding somewhere in the Austro-Bavarian Alps. HUTTL also suggests that we should give some thought to using 'Schlüsselzahlen' which have proven their value to an extent that even the German General Staff transmitted operational orders to Army Groups by that means. The use of these 'Schlüsselzahlen' would of course have to be confined to transmission between the German and the American central transmitters where its use would result in considerable savings of time. It could not be used anywhere there is danger of capture in which event the whole system would have been given away.

17. For each country Amt VI has a so-called Hauptverbindungsmann, e.g. for Rumania Hauptverbindungsmann AMI II. It is he who gathers a group of confidential, full-time agents (Hauptamtliche Vertretungsleute) in his assigned territory, as a rule German nationals, who then devote themselves to organizing an agent net. As a matter of general policy, the number of full-time agents is being kept down to a minimum compatible with a successful operation of the net. The number increases in countries like Yugoslavia and Greece where the net is spread over the whole country.

18. The chief agents - all told around two dozen in the whole South-East - have been checked over especially carefully and are without one exception close personal confidants of the man who organized the net. In their political leanings these men are anti-Bolshevik and their primary motive in doing agent work is to see the Russian forces of occupation leave the country and Bolshevik influence in the direction line of their people eliminated. They are speculating upon anti-Russian tendencies in German foreign policy, no doubt. HUTTL believes that it will take a long time before they will use themselves of that action. Aside from that, most of them are still agents we are inclined to view rather realistically and do not flatter themselves to the extent of believing that their reports could possibly be instrumental in crippling the United States with Russia. There is another element involved in their decision to continue operation; many of them are still in contact with Germany's decision most of them are bound to feel rather forcibly. Confused and naturally it would give them a certain feeling of necessity (not to be working for the most powerful nation in the world, even the danger of...

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of seeing the United States and Soviet Russia drawing closer together would not induce them to turn round and offer their services to the Russians, neither do they have anything to offer to the Russians (there is nothing they know about their American employer), and nor could they use the facilities of a wireless net organized along anti-Soviet lines. In HOTTLE's opinion the head agency in each country is proof against such a ploy.

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19. SOURCE: SA Hauptsturmführer Paul HUNTER, a confident of HOTTLE, fully initiated in all organization and technical detail of the information net as well as the political background of HOTTLE's activities (trips to Switzerland, etc.) posted to VI 7 in December 1943 as referent VI 7 2 (Hungary).
March 1944 sent to Budapest as HOTTLE's adjutant in the Hungary sector.
After the fall of Budapest sent to Steyerling where he took charge of transmitter-operations pin-pointing for HOTTLE.
After American occupation handed HOTTLE's letter to the local American commander.

SA Hauptsturmführer Joseph DIECKMANN
1936 - Handled church matters together with HOTTLE.
Until beginning 1944 with SA Leitwobmann
Vienna.
Transferred to Amt VI at HOTTLE's suggestion.
Sent to Budapest in March 1944.
Very intelligent with all the advantages and shortcomings of a lawyer.
Knew Hungary well after a stay of almost a year.
Works with HUNTER in the Hungary Sector.

20. Three transmitters were left behind in Budapest, one of which has reported so far. It is that the transmitter which is being operated by the chief of the information net, Rendelyon (see below). Its location is presumably in the Csan Sector. The silence of the remaining two transmitters is probably due to the fact that they were destroyed during the siege of Budapest.

21. Answer to Questionnaire (see Annex 1)
(2) a. LEMMAY, Stefan alias 'Lata Magyar', officer in the Hungarian state police. Dist address: Szomsz Utea, Szabkory (Schneidberg) Budapest.
HOTTLE considers him well-suited against detection, because he established for himself a good Communist reputation by supporting imprisoned Communists and Jews, helping some of them to get away, at the insistence of HOTTLE. After the Russians took over, he

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was re-instated in the state police.

- b. Age 30 years, medium figure, hair black, plentiful, combed back. Moustache, dark brown eyes.
 - c. To send reports of a general political nature stressing important events of the day (not officially announced) provided they have local or economic significance. The aim is to put the information out on the broadest possible basis, drawing upon all political parties and representing all shades of public opinion, so as to guarantee a factual and objective reporting.
 - d. 9 May 1945, on that day only call signs, HUNGARY's orders to go out the air complied with an action as American troops occupied Stuyerling (7 May 1945).
 - f. No party affiliations. See under a.
- 2) a. Four times as pre-arranged (see Annex II). Stuyerling went on reception four times a day, whereas the agents were free to choose their working time in accordance with circumstances. In the beginning Budapest called once, sometimes twice a week as directed, we do not to expose itself unduly. During the last period calls came in almost daily, usually around 1630.
- b. Languages in Hungarian. 10-15 groups was the limit. Abbreviations in accordance with the International Que Code. No peculiarities of style.
 - c. See Annex II. In case of an emergency, a special 'Tastyhaus' had been agreed upon with W/T Operator I GABRIK.
- 3) a. Agents' investigations and reports.
- b. In circles of the Hungarian Police, government, trade and business, labor, parliament, liberals and the national opposition.
 - c. If possible, from all political and social strata on the basis of personal trust, often in accordance with specific directions given over the central transmitter.
- 4) Good average. Messages received so far reflect a judgment of the political and economic situation in Budapest. The reliability of messages has in broad outline been confirmed by line-operatives.

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NOTE states: The quality has improved considerably of late. E.g. we have already received very interesting information on friction between the government of Siklos and the Russian Occupation authorities. In the beginning the reports were held as objectively and contained so many positive things, that at one time we began having our doubts as to whether he still was a free agent. For a long period of time we checked and rechecked his reports until we were satisfied as to their authenticity.

5. a. Just before Germany's collapse an agent with V/T was conveyed across the border via Graz, for operations in the general area of Veszprem. So far no contact has been established.

b. A V/T operator in Budapest, equipped with two sets (current and battery) has been slated to relieve the line Kszolyos. No contact yet.

6. a. Kszolyos has at his disposal a fund of 20,000 pengos and 5 thalers as to defray all expenses including payments to leaders (unless their contributions are voluntary). Further contributions have been promised, but have not materialized as yet. Also the agent mentioned under 5b has been given 20,000 pengos and 5 thalers.

7. Kszolyos was directed early in May 1945 to try and maintain contact with the central line officer under all circumstances, regardless of changes in the political and military field.

8. Expressions made in the Western sector of the CD have taught that the Russians do not believe in the practice of double agents. They strictly adhere to a policy of liquidation. The information system as it exists now is a unilateral one, that is to say: Chief agent reports but does not ask any questions, except of a technical kind in connection with transmission. Once the agent starts asking questions, there is a strong possibility that he has been turned.

9. Prospects for an expansion of the V/T system are favorable, provided that the latter is treated with expedition and system.

a. 20 V/T operators have been trained in a school in Hungary during the past six months, before of which were supposed to be completed in April 1945. In view of the political situation

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this could not be done. Only four of them were brought to Odenburg at the last moment with orders to let themselves be overrun. Call schedule and frequencies had been agreed upon. These stations have not been called so far. It has been planned to station the remaining 16 operators in the provinces, preferably in their active sector of the country. WITTEL believes that the operators are still somewhere in Austria and no difficulties should be encountered gathering them up once the principal of the wireless school has been located.

- b. Hungary has a vast untapped reservoir of potential agents and factors amongst its citizens who represent a cross-section of all social classes, political parties, and who, occasionally, have close connections to important personalities in the political and in the economic sphere.
- c. The potentialities of the Hungary not should not be judged on the basis of its present performance, but allowance should be made for the fact that KAPLYIC has only been operating for the three months under very adverse conditions.
- d. Difficulties are bound to arise from the fact that the speed of the American advance has interrupted communications between the various groups and also the disruption occurred part of Austria will in all probability be tactically sealed against outside infiltrations. The latter difficulty might be overcome by motivating a "hot potato" in Vienna, taking advantage of local talent, at the same time moving the operation base along to the Hungarian "Kispest" area.

22. In answer to question 5, WITTEL makes the following observation: It would not pay to link up the provincial transmitters with a central relay station inside of Hungary, thereby increasing the danger of detection. As it is planned now, the sub-agents will be equipped and directed by the central agency in Germany; once they have reached their destination they will try to attach themselves to existing political groups, gather access to their information material.

HUNGARY 23. **SURCS**, *Spätkapitänführer* (name RAB), (id) via Referent in VI B. WITTEL considers him a good organizer and a very good Bulgaria expert. On his qualifications as an intelligence operative judgment has to be deferred to him, in his capacity as referent, he was dealing mostly with the evaluation and to a much lesser extent with the processing of collected information.

24. Answer to Questionnaire (Annex 1)

1. Chief representative (V 20/01), chief agent (V 20/25) and wireless operator (V 20/05) were arrested and killed by German military.

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upon leaving Bulgaria in September 1944. As a result the projected transmitters in Sofia, Mitelje, Utip and Central Bulgaria never became operative. The Bulgaria-referat never had agents in the accepted sense of the word. The chief representative (IB) conducted the whole net and leaned for support upon national groups (Bulgari, legionnaires, Macedonians), who in turn had relations in all political camps and economic circles and through the variety of their connections made up for the uniformity of the basic organization. A second representative (V 20/02) was lodged in the staff of the German Embassy who, under the general supervision of the IB, ran his own net, thereby providing possibilities of a counter-check. Only very few agents worked consciously for the net and were steered by the IB.

a. Dr. Dieter ~~TOLETT~~ (V 20/21), lawyer, Macedonia, Deceased Sept. 1944.

Professor ~~ISTANJITZ~~ (V 20/17), school teacher, Bulgar, leader of the ~~istalka~~, left Bulgaria in September 1944. Last address: Had Alt Aussee.

Christo ~~JATIST~~ alias Kafa, Bulgar, politician (one-time leader of the national liberal party) and during King Boris' lifetime, in charge of the King's private intelligence service. left Bulgaria September 1944. Last address: Alt Aussee.

Athanas ~~MERICZ~~ (V 20/07) Bulgar, private, politically unattached. Remained in Sofia.

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We should also, HOETTL says, tell GRAUB that we know about his past activities, including the "illegal" ones.

38. HOETTL'S MEETING WITH KALTENBRUNNER AT 9. 20 APRIL

For two or three days about 20 April, there were discussions each day at Amsee with KALTENBRUNNER. HOETTL and GRAUB also came for individual meetings with KALTENBRUNNER. In HOETTL's discussions, he told KALTENBRUNNER he would not continue without his approval, and KALTENBRUNNER, who had previously come to further than a benevolent attitude toward HOETTL's negotiations, now permitted HOETTL to act in his name. (HOETTL had in the meantime indoctrinated Frau SCHULDER and KALTENBRUNNER's mistress, and those two ladies had worked on KALTENBRUNNER).

39. HOETTL-KALTENBRUNNER MEETING AT STROBL ON 25 APRIL

After KALTENBRUNNER's visit to HOETTL at Ennsbruck, he went to Salzburg, where HOETTL saw him again. Also at Salzburg were WANECK and GOETTEL; and KALTENBRUNNER had mentioned GRAUB; also Dr. STROBMEYER, head of just one of the units; a change officer unknown to HOETTL, with his adjutant; and a number of staff III C, were there, and brief notes from Bernhardsgau. HOETTL does not know the purpose of most of these people, and surmises that it may have been a matter of people from the ZONA reporting at Salzburg.

On this day, GRAUB and HOETTL discussed personal activities, and KALTENBRUNNER ordered GRAUB to collaborate with GOETTEL and HOETTL in their plans re the personal.

HOETTL recalls a meeting at Strobl with GRAUB and STROBMEYER and says that KALTENBRUNNER left Strobl for Amsee about 1/5 May.

40. KLOPPER, BAYER, and THE PARTOIRAPPEL

HOETTL recalls that started about 1944 from the Partoirappel (BONNEN), where he was in the command of a unit, called unexpectedly on KALTENBRUNNER in April (c. 30/4). He wanted to discuss his troubles - he had no contact with the North Germany; KALTENBRUNNER could not give him any advice, but did give him some lunch. Buergemeister BAYRER had 1000 Reichsmark passed through, but did not have any particular discussion with HOETTL.

HOETTL adds that October Dr. Jochen H. was the liaison man with the ZONA Partoirappel; sent on with the ZONA. He passed on reports from staff III, and also from staff I, to the ZONA.

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and a personal man WAGLER (9).

43. MURKIN RE KATZBERGER'S RESISTANCE 12/44

In rechecking this information, HORTL said he thought HUB-
BACH and KATZBERGER had discussed the plans for illegal-
loyal activity. KATZBERGER had no specific plans in mind as
a hideout in the mountains, and no communications route (except
with SCHUBERT's help). After KATZBERGER went to Munich, ca. 5
May, HORTL thinks he had no contacts with his leaders; he knows
only of the visit from KATZBERGER from Zell am See, to report that
KATZBERGER would not oppose surrender in Austria.

44. REVIEWING OF THE SCHEMATA VI

HORTL knows nothing of any plan to split the units into a
Northern and a Southern section (cf. interpretation of HUBER'S DIS-
SEMIN). KATZBERGER had simply emphasized the desirability of
getting the Austrian members to the south, had opposed moving Unit
VI to routes near BRUNNEN, and in fact had worked out the separa-
tion of VI B and VI C from the rest of Unit VI — a plan of which
little came, except that at least the rest of Unit VI did not come
down.

45. PLANS FOR MICROFILMING DOCUMENTS

VI B had plans, and in fact orders were apparently given, in
1945, for micro-filming Unit VI documents, on the initiative of
SCHILLERBERG. Not more than a small portion of the documents
were microfilmed. HORTL does not know of similar plans for other
Units.

46. Dr. JURY

KATZBERGER's contacts with JURY were good personal ones,
especially from the period 1937/38. JURY was not included in
the Austrian plans. Prince Rohrer was close to JURY, and HORTL
met him at Salzburg, but felt it was too late to approach JURY
in this matter.

47. THE FRED HEYER CASE

HEYER, an American parachutist captured in Tyrol, was recruited
by Colonel HOPF as a contact man with the Social Democrats
(Social Democrats and Christian Social), especially in the
mountains. HORTL does not know the leaders of this movement; it
it were to go via GALLI to glorified Austria. Perhaps, the
the new Bundschauptmann of Tyrol, known as...

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HOETTL got KALTENBRUNNER's approval, from Strobl, of saving MEYER -- KALTENBRUNNER sent an order to this effect to the Stapo Innsbruck through the Stapo Grazburg, and HOETTL sent the men to help MEYER across the Swiss border.

Another American, a V/T operator, caught earlier and long since in prison, got out with MEYER. MEYER was not kept in jail, but was well hidden. HOETTL knows of no contacts made by MEYER with the Americans while he was in Innsbruck.

48. THELMA'S DECKER CASE: OSTING'S REPORT

HOETTL says that Oetmar Dr. HEDER of the Stapo Innsbruck offered to turn over as mentioned V/T operator who had been caught earlier, to help MEYER make V/T contact. HEDER was an old Austrian state police officer, from Carinthia or Styria, who had been appointed at Innsbruck, as in Austria, by KALTENBRUNNER, who was tired of the proponderance of Reichsbach in such positions in Austria.

In the night of 2/3 May, some one from the Gestapo, (we know to HOETTL) came to HEDER to ask whether there were any plans for liquidating prisoners before the Americans arrived. HOETTL thinks this person was not a representative of HOETTL, and says that he was not recommending, or bringing anyone concerned, the killing of prisoners, but simply making inquiries. HEDER told this man that nothing of the sort was intended by him.

49. BORNEH'S DISSENT

Though BORNEH was mostly in Berlin, he liaison man of his Disentel, who he of it was in London. HOETTL knew there, besides KLOPPER, Ministerialrat Dr. Juchacz, in charge of church matters, a foe, of course, of the church.

50. RAHML'S V/T SCHOOL

Rahml was director of this school, which was a training place for V/T personnel for the Balkans -- first Greece, later Yugoslavia. Sixteen operators who were being trained there this winter were released and told to go to American-occupied territory. HOETTL does not know whether the four V/T operators who were being trained there for his own use actually used; they were taken to hospital that was to drop them, but they may not have left. The other sixteen operators were to be dropped behind the Russian lines, but he is sure they were not.

51. THE GARDENS

GARDENS was incompetent, and strictly a police nature. Since

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In past years KATZENBRIENNER had tried to assassinate him, but WINKELMANN had protected him; finally in February 1945 he was exposed by KROCHAL. WINKELMANN was fond of GESSLER, and kept him for certain matters dealing with Hungary; he also took him to Munich in April with the intention of making him IDG there. HOETTL does not know what became of GESSLER after that.

GESSLER had been in charge of the Stago (or possibly DGG) in Prague, had been tough in suppressing Czech underground activities in 1942-43, and once boasted to HOETTL that he had been sentenced to death by the Czech underground. GESSLER went to Hungary in March 1944 (the German occupation), as PFRADER's representative; when PFRADER was recalled, GESSLER became IDG Hungary.

HOETTL says that GESSLER always carried out orders, and so got on well with his superiors. WINKELMANN was a much more conciliatory person.

52. KROCHAL

KROCHAL was to be Inspector of Amt VI, mainly, HOETTL thinks, because KATZENBRIENNER wanted a check on WINKELMANN. KROCHAL stalled, insisted that KROCHAL visit Czech Republic of Amt VI to become thoroughly acquainted with it, and this process took weeks; at its end, KROCHAL was appointed IDG Hungary, and so actually never did the active work of Inspector. He was to study the whole office, including, HOETTL thinks, the IDG, Amt, suggest changes etc. This was about the turn of 1944/45.

Because of his failure in Prague, his premature departure from there, HITLER demanded that he be punished, but KATZENBRIENNER stalled off KROCHAL's transfer to the IDG as a private, until finally it was possible to put in KROCHAL as Inspector.

53. HOWARD SUBVERSIVE GROUPS IN THE BALKANS

The set of SA Gruppenfuhrer -- DROTH in Slovenia, ZIGON in Budapest, KILMIGER in Bucharest, HERRMANN in Sofia, and HILSCHE in Croatia -- who had been installed apparently as envoys, and of whom it was feared that they could bring the diplomatic chain in their way, turned out to be rather ineffective, so the SD had to take over and run German connections with the nationally minded groups in those regions. With J. G. the SD worked very co-operated well. The other envoys stayed at police districts, and maintained the old parliamentary groups on their own accounts.

As the Russians advanced the transportation was decided it was necessary to make use of the "national envoys". This effort was made in Bulgaria in July 1944 to work with the IDG.

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(KONTROVIZIJA) and the Loricinairo group (LORICINAIRO), but it was tried only at the last moment, and too late. The second part of attempt was made with the Iron Guard in Romania in 1941, with the same result. In Hungary, on the other hand, U. S. S. G. wanted to co-operate only with the extremist group of 1937, the Arrow Cross. In Greece, K. B. S. and later K. B. S. both worked successfully with the national groups.

As the Balkans were gradually occupied by the Germans, new "national" governments were formed, and it became clear that the SD enjoyed the confidence of these groups, and the Austro-Germanic Ant did not. The SD continued to maintain an intimate relation with the governments.

The Austro-Germanic Ant had little to do with what would be called; operations of that sort were handled by the SD. HOFFMANN knows of no cases of the Austro-Germanic Ant's participation in such operations with the SD.

On the other hand, he says that the SD, Ant did work in conjunction with the Austro-Germanic Ant. In any case, the Austro-Germanic Ant people were to supply the official line of policy, and guide the activities.

54. HAMBACHER AND THE SERBIAN POLICY

HAMBACHER worked for months to bring together the three main groups in Serbia; the official Rado government, which fled to Germany; the very pro-German Serbian Volunteer Corps under LADIC; and the strongest group, that of M. M. M. M., which had fought against the Germans, but, when Anglo-American support was switched to Tito, turned to collaboration with the Germans. HAMBACHER tried to work with the American representative Col. HAMBACHER, who was with M. M. M. M.

55. GOVILLO AND HINDLAI

These leaders of the Serb Church were next to be considered, through HAMBACHER, with the backing of HOFFMANN and K. B. S. because of the danger to them if they did not flee, and the hope that they would be acceptable as anti-Communists. They were in the West, since they had also had a long stay in the concentration camps, and had been looking for a German representative.

They were to leave for Switzerland at the end of April. HOFFMANN discussed this with LADIC. HOFFMANN says he understood that HINDLAI had a high reputation in the United States, where he had given lectures.

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56. VITKOVIC

VITKOVIC's position under the Administrative Act in relation to Hungary was like that of ALTENBERG and HILF in relation to other Balkan Governments, except that the Hungarian Government did not become an exile government until rather late.

57. THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN RESISTANCE PLANS

NO. 271 reports that SKORZENY had received a Führer Command from HITLER in the late summer of 1944 to organize an all-European resistance movement (gesamt-europäische Widerstandsbewegung), the immediate members of which would be the Kampfverbände, which would take up contact with the national resistance movements, which had in the meantime become the Balkan Governments-in-exile. Apparently this last phrase should not be taken too literally; NO. 271 went on to say that SKORZENY worked with the national groups or resistance units in the Kampfverbände, not with the governments; and that SKORZENY did not collaborate with the Administrative Act officials, such as ALTENBERG's.

SKORZENY's contacts were accordingly with the activist groups in the West, e.g. with HILF, DEBILLY, HERRIG, and NO. 271, while the Administrative Act people were in contact with the Governments corresponding to those persons. At first, General HILF (Y) and later ALTENBERG, maintained Administrative Act contact with the French Government in exile.

NO. 271 says there was a Government in Italy, collaborating with the Fascist movement, but he does not know the names of the leaders.

58. ORGANIZATION OF RESISTANCE IN THE BALKANS

A report received in April by the interrogator, based on information from NO. 271, was then discussed. This report stated that SKORZENY would head the military side of an all-European resistance movement, with a possible second in command for southeastern Europe; with political direction to be given by ALTENBERG, HILF, and VITKOVIC, and the operation of the movement in different countries under the leadership of each person as NO. 271 is Austria, etc.

The report went on to say that, after the fall of the Reich, the SD and the Abwehr would be dissolved, and the resistance would take over direction of resistance.

NO. 271 now says that a) the plan for resistance was not indicated on the basis that a great war was inevitable, being now in 1945 or 1946, hence the resistance was civilizational.

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operating during the war — and that no one dared to discuss openly the prospect of postwar resistance because that would have implied the possibility that Germany might lose; (b) the role of HORNBERG and his Jagdverbände in the resistance notes appears to have been reported correctly (cf. para. 10 and 13 of this interrogation report), except that HOTTIL indicated that the number of 100,000 men under HORNBERG, given in the April report, was exaggerated; (c) the disintegration of the Panzer Division had nothing to do with the resistance plans (cf. para. 6 and 7 above); (d) the operation of the movement for the different countries under such persons as HORNBERG is correct.

HOTTIL says that the Jagdverbände got no further than preparatory work — training agents, laying down caches, making w/a preparations, preparing assassinations, etc.

59. SKORZENY'S ASSASSINATION PLANS

SKORZENY had a special type of "Kloßtruppschulung" for small-scale operations, for which men were trained in special schools, separately from the Jagdverbände, and instructed in assassinations, special demolition work, etc. HOTTIL says that one attempt at least on SKORZENY's life was made by men trained thus.

60. UNPOLITICAL NATURE OF THE JAGDVERBÄNDE

HOTTIL, relying in part on HORNBERG's information, insists on the unpolitical nature of the Jagdverbände (i.e., that subversion played practically no role in their plans) and on the lack of political training in them. He points out that the Jagdverbände operations were to be carried out with military finesse, in expectation of a grand German offensive in 1945. The Jagdverbände people came from the Wehrmacht or the Luftwaffe, and cared little about politics. One exception is mentioned in the SD JERGENS, leader of Jagdverbände Abteilung.

Jagdverbände Leiter SCHLAFER in Croatia (this man's cover name was HERRMAN, and he was erroneously referred to by HOTTIL previously as HORNBERG) got involved with Col. HORNBERG, head of the resistance movement in Croatia, who planned for and led a post-defeat resistance activity in the Balkans.

In Yugoslavia and Albania, the Jagdverbände were aimed to join with nationalist partisans (a type which did not exist in Germany, Romania and Bulgaria). The Jagdverbände were to employ Wehrmacht men to make contact with individual partisans, while the SD would carry on the information activities.

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61. VI B AS POLITICAL DIRECTOR OF RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES

HOPTL once again referred to the agreement made with VI B by which VI E had to approve any political enterprises of VI B. He now adds that PASHUK's people (Iolintello II group) also had to get the approval of VI B (Hoptl). Usually the procedure was for the competent person in PASHUK's group or in the Jagdverbande to talk over the plans with the competent Reforat in VI B. There was little formal handling of such matters.

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