

Translation

THIS IS A COPY OF AN INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT FILED AT GENERAL RECORDS FACILITY, FT HOLARIPO, MI*****

In no other country, the German Secret Service had so much
 influence as in Italy. And curiously enough these
 operations were carried out by German agents. While prohibited
 any kind of contact with Germans in Italy. The Italian
 people - the attitude steadily grew into contempt -
 as they were drawn to the German personality and in the country
 of the "Friend" no longer had anything which might hurt or insult
 him. This was the basis of the German secret service was not inferior
 at the start of the war. At least something was on hand for the
 military station, as the official cooperation of the German military
 attaché of all branches of the army with the proper Italian autho-
 rities gave some kind of a picture and as the Chief of the German
 Counter Intelligence, Admiral CANARIS did not, in any other respect
 the, followed the orders of the German High Command. In spite of that the
 exploit was not too high. But the German political secret service
 (LD) was in a most awkward position. There existed however a police
 attaché and a close cooperation with the concerning Italian police
 agencies, but as for intelligence value it was completely worthless,
 as it restricted itself to the common anti-communist movement, i.e.
 solely criminal-police activities only. In addition to that the
 German police attaché in Rome was so short of personnel, that he was
 in no position to achieve anything special in the field of intelligence,
 although he would have had the qualifications. The numerous visits
 of the German and Italian agents proved not to be very profitable as regards
 really interesting information. As their Italian office colleagues
 often had personal friendships sprung up, and lastly because these
 friendships were not taken so tactfully by the Italians (as was the
 case with Hitler and Mussolini) as by the Germans. In addition
 to that the German diplomatic corps was left without a head when
 Ambassador von Tschammer left, his successor was KROEMER
 cannot even be described as an average diplomat. Insight into the
 connections of the Italian police could therefore not be expected
 from a man of such restricted intellect according to the German
 system - one can also call it a secret system - abroad, there existed
 also other agencies which made reports from their home-land, for
 instance the German organization of the T-Club, however these were
 meaningless in Italy. May be the most interesting was the person
 of the "Personal Empowerer of the Reichswehr" in Italy (for-
 do not know the exact name) General Reichswehr 33 in Italian) Colonel
 KROEMER, who had worked his way up from interpreter at the German
 Italian state visits to the closest confidant of the German
 High Command in Italy at the German Embassy. The figure of KROEMER
 is hard to debate, primarily whether or not his false information
 and advice to Hitler were only a result of his ignorance and
 lack of understanding of the Italian situation, or whether he wanted
 very systematically to use his power. Herr von Tschammer
 was the long time ambassador in the Vatican, and all of his work
 was of a high level. This on a point, which would be of
 interest as the diplomatic representation of the German
 High Command in the Vatican. KROEMER took in the year 1943
 it is a part of it. Negotiations of the German High Command
 with the German High Command and Germany were conducted in
 the German Embassy in the Vatican about conditions of
 the German High Command in the Vatican. The German High Command
 in the Vatican was a very important part of the German High
 Command in the Vatican. The German High Command in the Vatican
 was a very important part of the German High Command in the Vatican.

THIS IS A COPY OF AN INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT FILED AT GENERAL RECORDS FACILITY, FT HOLABIRD, MO*****

...the overthrow of Mussolini... a latent ambition, he existed under the contract partnership... could not hold on the long run. Especially Hitler had deep distrust against the new ruler right from the start, but now the "last hope among Italians" was gone. (This was a remark Hitler had made regarding the situation around a lot. While Hitler was considering to take preventive action in Italy, in order to be one step ahead of the to be expected withdrawal of Italy, one was of a different opinion in the concerned agency of the secret service. Strengthened by very concrete information on the immediate surroundings of Badoglio, the responsible Italy expert suggested beginning of August 1943 to launch negotiations with M. about on the following basis: Germany's withdrawal from Italy as far as the Po river or the Alpine mountains and vicinity of this area. For this Italy had to guarantee neutrality for this area. These propositions were founded as follows: The action in Italy did not represent the results of a uniformly organized action but developed from a "palace-revolution" made by a group disaffected with Mussolini's and his conditionless German course. The vacuum caused by this plan-less fascist plot has been used methodically by the military-Courtoisians. ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ Badoglio is not a desirable partner for the enemies, in particular of the secret service on his to date contact with the Anglo-Americans revealed, that their side is not too willing to negotiate with him. Badoglio is very much hated even that in Italy but in his vicinity as "Savior of the Homeland". Agents, that have been in contact with him, report that he was not disinclined to a coalition as long as such a coalition was advantageous for such an agreement with Germany are self-evident. Gaining of a highly qualified, completely intact army for the Western Front, as the defense of the Alpine line - even at the most respecting of the Italian neutrality by the Allies, would be possible with the action of the forces stationed in Italy. Elimination of a military negligible, unreliable and unsteady partner, considered of curbing this power with raw-materials. Hitler's and Goebbels' reaction who at first had enough imagination to regard the prospect, was terrible. It might occur that Hitler would have been able to see the extent of Mussolini's and defeatism of the German High Command. The courageous defense of the Italian front could be a further step in the secret.





THIS IS A COPY OF AN INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT FILED AT CENTRAL RECORDS FACILITY, FT. HOLABIRD, MD*****

HEINER grew upon, and stronger in his opinion that he had to take immediate action. He ordered preparations of a big action against the return of the 23rd July, as well as against all officers in the Goglio region. These should be arrested simultaneously. (Amongst others the Crown Prince and Princess, Benito Mussolini, Ciano, Bottai, as well as the various fascist leaders etc.) The secret service pointed out the various risks of such an operation, and the fact that Goglio was still being held in the hands of the Germans. It was pointed out that the Germans were residing, and that the secret service could not be accused of a failure in such a situation. The order of attack was withdrawn by Hitler and only the liberation of the area prepared - which was to be included in the final enterprise. In the meantime, his daughter, wife of Ciano, who was confined with her husband in their apartment in Rome has turned to German agents, through agents, with the request to Hitler for liberation. He immediately agreed and stated that he was very doubtful regarding the successful liberation of the area. He was willing to save his blood in his grand-children. Ciano's children. The end of August Ciano, his wife and children were removed from Rome to the secret service. The children were removed to the guests of the secret service. Preparations for Mussolini's liberation were continued, through a group of specialists.

THIS IS A COPY OF AN INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT FILED AT CENTRAL RECORDS FACILITY, FT HOLABIRD, MD*****

The following information and current intelligence is being
provided to you for your information. It is derived from
sources which are reliable and current. It is being provided to you
for your information and use. It is not to be disseminated
outside of your office or organization. It is not to be used
for any purpose other than that for which it was provided.
It is not to be used as a basis for any action or decision.
It is not to be used for any purpose other than that for which
it was provided. It is not to be used as a basis for any
action or decision. It is not to be used for any purpose
other than that for which it was provided.



The re-establishment of Mussolini and the reorganization of the
 force... of the Italian Secret Service, which has
 never... of... Report of...
 therefore... of...
 he could not... even... of...
 action... of...
 several... of...
 to... of...
 D... of...
 and... of...
 service... of...
 with... of...
 together... of...
 Captain... of...
 command... of...
 with... of...

THIS IS A COPY OF AN INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT FILED AT CENTRAL RECORDS FACILITY, FT BELLEFORD, MD*****

THIS IS A COPY OF AN INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT FILED AT CENTRAL RECORDS FACILITY, FT BELLEVILLE, MISSOURI *****

CONFIDENTIAL
11/17/50
CONFIDENTIAL

officer, who disguised as an interpreter had admission to the prison
in order to his liberation and shipment to a neutral country. Plans
discussed in diary. Dr. Kaltenbrunner could be seen in 1941, 1942,
a secret conversation in writing was made between him and Giano in the
above mentioned institution. Kaltenbrunner anticipated to bring about
Giano's downfall by the numerous and compromising passages in his
diary, and really Giano delivered this part of the diary which was
still in use. But in the mean time Kaltenbrunner lost courage
over his independent not only in 1941 he reported the agreement to
Hitler, who had a Hitler's influence, he saw clearly that the
Giano's diary was apparently aimed at him, so he stopped the production
in the last resort. He cut the diary of Kaltenbrunner, who was
with him for a distance of the police, and he was in a position
against the prison of Vienna in 1941. Giano was so close to the
the administration of the diary, (and Giano's) he was held after he
escaped to Switzerland in 1941. Giano, who had already written
diary. The next day Giano was taken to the prison to be
destruction of Giano in the Reichstag or to prevent, he was
handed over, could be secured by the administration of the
diary. Giano, who was taken to the prison in 1941, and Giano, who
directly mentioned secret service officer in 1941, and Giano, who
master. (This was prior to the occupation of Austria by the Nazis)

THIS IS A COPY OF AN INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT FILED AT CENTRAL RECORDS FACILITY, FT HOLABIRD, MD*****

activity of the German secret service in Italy since the time of
constitution of the neo-fascists until the German collapse and retreat
to the organizing of the I-net (Invasion). This was done to provide
the enemy lines and was supposed to have been done by the
German secret service. The main difficulty was that one had to start in
the late 1930s, so that success was rather problematic in the
short time left for preparations. The reason for starting so late,
and not earlier to Stalingrad, the organization of such lines
in German occupied countries was looked upon as a low priority
matter. It was felt that in such short time one could not organize
a network of radio receivers, or the training of agents to
organize the I-network took up many months. (Especially the copying,
multiplication to that only few people could be found for this
purpose, it was dangerous work. So on the whole the organization of
an I-net in Italy by the German secret service was a flop. Decisive
factors were the lack of technical qualifications, equipment, and
trained personnel. The call was of the I-net in North Africa, where
of very qualified personnel would be found in only the Italian
army, navy, and air force, and a number of signal corps officers.
Before the invasion of Italy the needed signal corps officers were
sent to Italy, these were, of course, graduates from electrical engineering
schools. However, the electrical engineering schools in Italy
did not produce enough graduates, so that the number of graduates
could not be increased. The electrical engineering schools in
Germany had to limit in some way the I-net also in Italy, only where
they could get men, and had plenty of men to get the I-net
get any results. (For instance, the contact could be established even
in 1943 with the station of the I-net, but few results were obtained
because of in accordance with the I-net.)

Capitulation negotiations...

THIS IS A COPY OF AN INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT FILED AT CENTRAL RECORDS FACILITY, FT. MONMOUTH, NJ *****

... for Austria, or of just the mutual occupation of all zones
by the Allies etc. Other facts may have been decisive for the
American attitude, for instance the attitude of Stalin, who followed
all these weeks negotiations with hesitations, and in some respect
put Roosevelt under pressure.

.....
End of Translation