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SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
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b. Political Agents in meetings of the Cabinet, meetings between foreign diplomats resp emissaries with high rank officials, measures of political or economic nature planned by the Government, frequent reshuffles of personnel.

V 20/17 had been specially charged to report monthly to the cover-sessions of politicians and high ranking officials, as well as to turn in reports on public sentiment from all parts of the country (the latter were also furnished by V 20/07).

All told the Bulgaria network employed between 40 and 50 agents referred to by numbers.

2. a. V 20/01 and V 20/02 maintained contact among themselves and with all agents.

Reports were rendered orally or in writing and transmitted to Amt VI by wireless (either) or by air mail (Luftpost).

3. Agents gathered information via their own connections or by using feeders (Zubriiger).

Their connections extended into the Court, Government, Ministry of War, Agrarians, Church, Imro, Democracy, National Socialist Front, national opposition and the Japanese Embassy (Ambassador Yamaji).

4. Reports were excellent and comprehensive. The most prolific source was V 20/17; in his reports on personalities, however, he very often let himself be influenced by personal motives and ambition.

5. The net in Skoplje was run by V 20/16 who reported via the HB to Amt VI and who was given his mission either by Amt VI or by HB.

The net of the Imro was led by V 20/15 and sent its reports via the HB.

6. The HB's monthly budget amounted to some 1 1/2 million Lira. Only V 20/17 and V 20/07 drew a fixed salary.

7. The question of a continuation of work under allied supervision had never been broached.

8. -----

9. The old information net of the SD in Bulgaria has been radically destroyed. The chief agent and the Imro leader, along with their families fled Bulgaria and went to Germany in September 1944, none of them, who stayed behind in Bulgaria have taken up their old posts.

By virtue of its geographic position and its location in Europe, the importance of Bulgaria for a military point of view cannot be underrated. The SD decided therefore to set up an information net from outside the country.

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End of October 1944 six men (including 2 Bulgarians) were sent into Bulgaria via railroad. Their task was to establish a transmitter and re-activate a radio station. After this part of the mission had been accomplished, the leader of the anti-righting was to come back after a long stay established contact with various groups of anti-communist resistance and left the second place later accompanied with no. 6 of the group. No wireless contact has ever made with the radio station. Reports of Bletchley II Sud-Ost, Vienna, show that the radio station was destroyed just outside of Sofia and lost out. The leader, Baron Vladimir Tscherkassow, was taken prisoner and, because of his anti-communist leanings, it can be assumed that he was executed.

Another project viz to recruit agents by a radiotelegrapher from a supply ship of Bletchley II Sud-Ost, scheduled for the middle of April, ended in a fiasco in account of the sudden departure of the SD from Vienna. One Bulgarian has been trained for this mission, and if that one succeeds to recruit the other, SCHWETZ, who had excellent personal relations to most members of the new regime in Bulgaria, in addition to the Swabkreis and the Agrarians, as intelligence agent. In the confusion of the departure both men were lost sight of.

The only successful mission was that of Bletchley II Sud-Ost, Leutnant HUEBEL, who succeeded in launching a group of 4 radio men in maintaining wireless contact. This group had been given the codeword II assignments (incarceration and sabotage).

The prospects of bringing an' intelligence net in Bulgaria in existence, operation are viewed by KLAUS as follows:

The difficulties of such an undertaking will be even greater in this case due to intervention of the direct control of the SD. Once this contact has been re-established, it is proposed to re-activate them and not to re-organize an entirely new organization consisting of Bulgarian exiles at present in Germany. Conviction of the following favor would be undertaken. The feeling that third world war (sd) is bound to come is wide-spread as especially in United States (Agrarians, Democrats) but also the national groups (in Germany, S. German party) will line up solidly behind Britain or the United States. Its feasibility a matter of skillful policy to bring this groups over to the side of either of Britain or the United States. The time for this would have such easier going than the British in their recent, and to some in the light of Britain's policy vis-a-vis the Greek rebellion. New territories also by tied up with the Macedonian question. With upon the early settlement of the Macedonian question, it is proposed to the SD to make granting Macedonian independence, although they still claim a right to the loss of that country. For other, less difficult, to be carried over in Bulgaria the importance of collecting the anti-communist organizations would not be left out of account; especially organizations to be maintained by the SD to the leader of the army, General H. R.

In feasibility of reviving the Bulgarian resistance as a factor in the Bulgarian exiles can be since as a result of the fall of the German army.

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(I.M.S. Comment: The above statement has been rephrased in full, not as the desired contribution to a strictly technical meeting, but rather so as to throw into striking relief the more important points made therein. The desire to see us embroiled in a conflict with us is so strong that the ostensible purpose of the "friendly" call is, we are furnished us with the existing facilities of information not, as is usually the case. Quid quid it est time fugit et non periretes).

SUGARLOAF

5. SOURCE: Dr. HUTTL

Just prior to Germany's capitulation several efforts had been started to feed P/T operators into Serbia via Croatia. A likely outcome would be success or failure of these undertakings, and as a result a final picture can be drawn of existing intelligence facilities in Yugoslavia.

At the time Steyerling ceased operations in Italy at June 1943 rating, the launching a direct link to the Yugoslav General Staff through Mihailoitch (P.M.), the other main U.S. P/T operator in North of Sarajevo, operating in conjunction with an anti-Tito resistance group and therefore constantly changing its position, came to Steyerling's operator. The latter reported no political motivation about the combat actions of local insurgents, import of which of the highest in communications emanating from TITO's own BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE. The link to P.M. was politically conditioned and directly involved the Chinese AF enabling him to make regular supply round-trips to the German Government. It is unlikely, HUTTL believes, that this link will survive now that the main incentive has dropped by the Chinese defeat. It is further improbable that the P/T operator, recruited by the P.M., will continue calling for any length of time after Steyerling's departure.

According to HUTTL, the potential intelligence assets in Yugoslavia are considerable and promising. Several thousand P/T agents (of present day) mostly with anti-Tito partisan bands, mostly in need of activation but have not started calling yet. In addition there are several information agencies with units of the USMACOM, Croatia, and not too much difficulty should be encountered calling them.

To what extent it will be possible to bring agents to Albania and Macedonia by land is doubtful. Two groups, one of which is connected least to SSK/P/T agents all equipped with sets, are known to exist in Albania. HUTTL believes that resistance forces the tribes of northern Albanian tribes will be forthcoming once the link to P.M. is lost by giving an information net in Albania, possibly to the Yugoslav Macedonia. Not more than a month ago he has heard of a secret German job. A group of agents (mainly American) is active in Macedonia, composed of a German agent and the leader of the Macedonian independence movement.

27. SOURCE: SS-Hauptsturmführer Rupert KÜHN

One of HUTTL's colleagues in P.M., A.H. KÜHN, is at VI different with SD-Landesabteilung Vienna until recently assigned to Amt VI P (technic) and is said to be a trained agent.

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To Group VI it was put that he had been carrying through technical missions (technische Missionen), i.e. that is, he was giving to their destination of agents.

In addition he was given the task to bring intelligence information in the Jugoslav sector as a long-range operation. In these missions representations were made by air from Belgrad and water from Agdam.

According to HOTTL he is a very gifted intelligence man and has expert knowledge of his assigned territory: Jugoslavia, Albania, Macedonia.

28. Answer to Questionnaire (see Annex I)

1. a. GASPAREVIC, alias Gara do Barro (Guest in wireless messages), Serb

b. 1.63 m, oval-shaped head, grey-blue eyes, dark-blond hair combed back.

c. Vienna, later Serbia.

GASPAREVIC with a group of 60 men (Serbs) and a German liaison agent named SCHWARZ (alias Mat) from the Banat, had been fed into Serbia (ost-Bosnien) with the intent and after having been oriented to General MIHAJLOVITCH. Dimitri BARTA, representative of General RUDOLPH VOLKASSER in the above.

d. To organize message centers especially in Belgrade and Nis, to report on all important developments to military, economic, to establish liaison to all groups, in Serbia operating under the command of MIHAJLOVITCH and to collect whatever important information they have, to collaborate if from other American and British intelligence services with a view to coordinating their work.

e. April month ago.

f. MIHAJLOVITCH movement, formerly Sjetic (SPK).

2. All papers concerning cover-names etc. have allegedly been destroyed together with the other papers of VI... There is possibility XXXXXXXXX that wireless communication has received some of the papers.

3. Connections to political, economic and military circles through people he and his colleagues know.

4. So far no reports on combat actions. The relations between agents have been made with Genl MIHAJLOVITCH. Like in Russia when G. GASPAREVIC has a tendency to over-exaggerate.

5. 250 gold pieces (muscadours).

6. As taken into account when he got his mission. He was then specifically ordered to establish the American, Canadian intelligence in Serbia and both he and his men had to do this by means above.

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3. In view of his political antecedents the necessary.
4. Wireless contact could be re-established via other links. In that case an expansion would meet no obstacles.
29. 1. a. JAKUBEC, alias 'Jackot', Banat-German.
b. 1.70 m, oval-shaped head, dark hair in dark eyes, flushed face.
c. Destination: Novisad and Beigrad.
d. To organize message centers in the Banat and in Belgrade, to return, this time to be re-committed with "T/T" operators.
e. Has not been heard of again.
4. All JAKUBEC has supposed to do was to arrange for the "Anlaufstellen".
7. Not informed.
8. Not impossible. Uninformed about other groups.
9. Could be used as 'Anlaufstelle' in case he can't be at Steiermark.
- C. D. M. FUNKLINIE - MINHAUDWITSCH wireless link.
Provisional arrangement agreed upon in Steiermark between Kommandeur MINHAUDWITSCH and GSPALOVIC. It was based on contract of liaison clerk to STWAKER (Stab Neub-cher) (no KLOPP (vi)). Pending final arrangements - KLOPP had to be brought back from the Jews - wireless contact was established.
2. a. Daily three times (morning, noon, and evening)
b. Language: French, international telephone.
c. Doppelurfer-V erfahren. - Technical instructions possibly in the possession of wireless operator himself.
4. Reports on the military situation, news as far as ammunition, clothing, rations, medical drugs.
1. 1. a. KLOPP alias 'Dusko', Banat-German.
b. 1.73 m, oval-shaped face, blue eyes, dark-blond hair, parted on the right.
c. ASTRA (Zagreb)
d. Liaison agent (Verbindungsfunke) between MINHAUDWITSCH.
e. Prior to leaving Austria for MINHAUDWITSCH he made a wireless transmission.

and discussions with MINHAUDWITSCH by telephone. This was arranged after retreating from Sarajevo, because of Army orders. Present whereabouts of KLOPP unknown.

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32. FRANCOSSI alias 'Schill', Banatski in ("ribi").
a. 1.85 m, black hair, dark-brown eyes, oval head.
c. Agram
d. Muslim agent (Verbindungsleiter) to HASANAGIC, Comil, leader of the Moslems in Prijedor (Sandzak).
33. HASANAGIC, Comil, alias 'Hasent', Moslem, Sandzak.
b. 1.98 m, black hair parted, black eyes, oval head.
c. Agram
d. To set up message centers in the Sandzak, to establish liaison with Albanian groups, in particular with Djif BlJUTA and DAKAJ leaders of a resistance group in the vicinity of Novi-Pazar, to set up bases for the support of agents to be committed by hand in the direction of Albania, collaboration with the USTASCI ('Neatis'), concealing the German character of the net, co-operation with MIHAJLOVITCH movement, submerging differences between Muslims and Serbs.
e. Initial transmission from Agram.
f. HASANAGIC belongs to the STOJANOVIC movement, a nihilist group. He and STOJANOVIC were imprisoned in 1941. During the Italian occupation he served as an official advisor to the Italian Governor of Montenegro. He then allegedly fled for German intelligence services.
FRANCOSSI (see 32) is a member of the SB (Spartakiadnoe Angestellte) Statistic at University of Belgrade together with HASANAGIC and belongs to the same political movement.
3. Has connections in the highest political circles, in particular to Muslim dignitaries. Was appointed leader of the "M" long in Eastern Bosnia by Dr. Pavlic.
4. HASANAGIC is a dependable and experienced intelligence agen.
5. 150 Gold pieces (Napoleons), 10,000,000 Ruma.
7. This question was fully discussed with both agents and in particular with FRANCOSSI one followed later. Both were convinced of the necessity of such an arrangement.
8. Collaboration with communists quite undesirable in view of his political antecedents.
9. Very good respects for extension. Will discuss with Oberst SUKERIC, who is in charge of the secret service department in Croatia and has collaborated very closely with the Germans.

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34. KUNGR, Adalbert alias 'Malec', German national (Volksdeutsche), native of Pancevo via Belgrade, Jugoslav. .
- b. 1.58 m, black eyes, black hair - short, wavy hair.
 - c. Agram
 - d. Liaison-agent to Pavle DJURICIC and Dr. MIJALOVIC. DJURICIC is Chetnik leader in Montenegro and, up till late, served under the command of MIJALOVIC. A month ago he switched his allegiance to Dr. DRLJEVIC, leader of the Montenegrin independence movement which has the support of the USTASCIJA (Croatia). His mission is the same as that of all other agents.
 - e. Serial transmissions from Agram.
35. KUNGR has been SD agent, for a long time in Agram. He is an expert on Balkan affairs. One of his closest colleagues is SIRDISIJA, writer and Balkan expert. He is the private secretary and travel companion of Dr DRLJEVIC (former anti-fascist president of Montenegro)
- f. 100 Gold pieces (Napoleons)
 - g. Was told explicitly.
 - h. Incapable in view of political jet effects.
5. KLASER, Konrad alias 'Kaktus' or 'Klaus'. Austrian born list.
- b. 1.70, grey eyes, curly hair combed down, swarthy complexion, wears spectacles.
 - c. Agram
 - d. Establish liaison to USTASCIJA effects, to point out to subjects HANCIC and SUBURIC. Observe that he is known to be an Anglophile.
- KLASER is well-acquainted with Agram. In view of several years he has done intelligence work in Agram.
- e. One month ago from Agram.
 - f. KLASER is politically indifferent. His sole passion is intelligence work. Fought on the Republican side in the Spanish Civil War. Later persecuted by the Communist Party, because he was known to work for the SD.
- g. 100 Gold pieces (Napoleons).
 - h. Explicitly told and understood.
 - i. KLASER is an excellent intelligence agent and can be used for divers assignments.

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36. The despatch of agents into Albania had been approved by Minister HAFIZ BEVA, but could not be undertaken. Connections exist with PLAVO BEG, D'AGA, ANJIF Bljuta and other national leaders of Albania. PLAVO BEG in turn has good connections into MONTENEGRO, specifically ZE Kaspiko with HASAN Shukri who is supposed to be in the MONTENEGRO Committee.
37. SPCFOR: Dr HOTTE
- The Rumanian intelligence net is both in quantity and in its ramifications the best. The agents in Rumania are at a very high level, i.e., their connections actually reach up into places where decisions are being made. This can primarily be attributed to the fact that since political collaboration has been established, but can also be due to the uniting in their anti-bolshevist leaning, a combination which naturally yields a number of possibilities for intelligence work. The information net is probably centralized in Bucharest. However, three transmission centers exist already in the provinces.
- Three transmitters are operating, but for security reasons only one is transmitting at a time.
- The centralization of the information net is naturally aided by the circumstance that ADMIR has selected a group of agents who know each other and between whom strong bonds of friendship exist, thus necessitating to break the system up into groups does therefore not exist.
- Another element favoring intelligence work in Rumania can be found in the fact that the SD undertakes several of its missions along the Iron Guard, these High Command set in Germany who also issued their orders through SD channels. From this circumstance the representatives in Rumania derive a certain amount of security.
38. The well the intelligence net in Bucharest is operating at present, can be gathered from the fact that several weeks ago a General in command, in active command of a Corps, with him himself and his personal staff in Rumania at the disposal of the SD. Another general, also in active command, hired an SD agent as his chauffeur, so as to have an informant going back and forth with the SD. After the dissolution of the SDU, former of the Bauernpartei and one of the last remnants of members of a pro Western Allies orientation, also this group, he contacts with the SD. Furthermore a anti-Soviet group was concluded between the United Front and The Iron Guard in the Rumanian Plan of an effort against Communism.
39. All the aforementioned circumstances point to the fact that a success of intelligence work is envisaged by the group. The number of Rumanians as an intelligence operation to the Soviet Union, etc., possibly be overrated.
40. The crossings from Rumania as far as received by us, do not only bring the highest utility but also the greatest danger to a day in kind country. On our days we see the SD, there or out. The Rumanian channel is being operated by direct communication, etc.

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enjoys AUNIK's unlimited confidence, is living in safety, and is able to re-establish connections in no time. Those agents operating in Rumania are of high quality, at present based in Vicenza and later in Kremsmünster, Austria. Reports started coming in end of 1944 and daily reports have been in the mail ever since.

The reports dealt for the most part with the political situation and also with the internal of Rumania's governmental policy.

40. The pros and cons of linking up the Rumanian radios with directly with the message centers of the Allied (U.S. and British) intelligence services, resp the Militärmissionen in Bukarest, have been carefully weighed. Such an arrangement, it was felt, could introduce a most fatal element of danger: it would jeopardize the American or British representative who is under constant surveillance by both S.D. and diplomatic reverussions might result; it would also endanger the agents who try to contact a personality publicly interested. For that reason and because of the loss of time involved, it is advised to transmit only to the central receiver of the SD.

41. SOURCE: SS-Hauptsturmführer Kurt AUNIK.
Used to be chief SD-agent of Ant VI in Rumania.

It was he who organized the SD-information net from 1939 until the Russian occupation in August 1944. His offices were in Bukarest. He is a close associate of HMTL.
HMTL calls him a very gifted intelligence man.

42. Answers to Questionnaire: (See Annex I)

1. GUMNI, Roland alias BOB. Age: 32 years
Rumanian officer. German national (Volksgenossen).
- b. 1.94 m, tall appearance, slim, blue eyes, brown hair, sharp features.
- c. Last address unknown.
Possible contact: Corcul, Jimbol Street, Bucharest, P.O.
- d. In charge of the wireless information sections in Rumania.
- e. Last heard of by wireless message on 12 May 1945.
- f. Belongs to group "Dr HMTL".

AUNIK's main assistants are:

- a. Silv R, Hans alias Tom Age: 27 years
Rumanian officer. German national (Volksgenossen).
- b. 1.70 m, tall heavy-set appearance, blue eyes.
- c. Same as GUMNI.

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- a. In charge of provincial net.

H. BILLET, Sam alias Jimm
German national (Volksdeutsche)
Rumanian soldier

Age: 25 years

- b. Small, black hair, brown eyes
d. Office work, drafts wires etc.
f. Shares GUNME's opinions.

BAUER, Dr (alias) real name unknown
Captured in the Rumanian Army. (Rumanian national).

- d. Wireless operator
f. Rumanian nationalist.)

2. Messages were conveyed exclusively by wire.

- a. Depending upon circumstances, re-broadcasted.

- b. Both Rumanian and German

Daily average 10 messages, which is between 10 and 20 min s.

3. a. All messages sent to GUNME (civil transmission system), he checked them and determined their value.

b. The most valuable connection was with the Hungarian General Staff, the ministries and the political section, including the Communist Party. Feeders also in Soviet Union and those establishments.

4. The line to Rumania is one of the best of the major intelligence channels. Reports on political, military, economic and social news were of high quality. Political developments were reported currently on daily basis and in all detail, e.g., changes taken on the Russian occupation authorities both political and economic, changes taken by the population and the situation of forces etc. In 12 instances reports have been found to be substantiated or informative.

5. The information net covers all front line, day and cities and in contact with Bucharest (wireless). Close collaboration exists with the Ukrainian information services in the Soviet Union.

6. Sizeable funds left behind in Rumania (Soviet currency, gold, several million lire) fell into the hands of the Germans. It is certain SISCHIC (unker) had given a large portion of these funds to the information net who labored under the pretense of Soviet intelligence entities.

Funds acquired by plane likewise fell into the hands of the Russians.

Eventually, in April 1945, HITL succeeded in getting the transfer of funds through Swiss bank, in the amount of \$1,000,000 U.S. This amount was placed in the credit of the German bank account at

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The said net in icy. Neither bank nor of the persons and flying this
to action. This net involves comparatively few risks and the
only expense involved is the commission paid to the messenger.

7. GUNNE is not cognizant of plans to set the net under American
control. He frequently mentioned though that in case of German
defeat, which he considered inevitable, the British and Americans
might be interested in a well-oiled and well-organized intelligence
service, citing as an indication that such plans had been entertained
by the British that they had been recruiting P/W agents from circles
connected with his information unit. At that time GUNNE said
not to jump the gun, but to wait until he got a signal giving the go-ahead
signal.

All along GUNNE maintained contact with the American and British
missions, occasionally feeding them information through his men. One of his middlemen was a certain Paul Ernest Ritter, 1097 Swan
Street, Bucharest, who kept in touch with a British reporter named
Gibson.

8. The friendship between GUNNE and RITTER is of long standing, and
RITTER believes that if ever GUNNE should be forced to switch over, he
would find ways and means of羞恥ing out a secret intelligence
intelligence to RITTER because of the close personal relationship.
Several agents have been arrested by the Russians. In view of the
quite safe handling and retention of material checked by agents of
Frontierstellung II Sud-Ost, Vienna, GUNNE maintains a P/W function
net in Rumania. (Lieutenant PIRR).

9. Processes of handing the net over, including a transfer
of resources, of its disposal, with a filament (radio code) or movement
of inserted) and material (1/2 sets and spare parts).

The switch-over should not run into any period of difficulties. With
GUNNE around, there is an experienced intelligence agent who
knows how to bring the various national elements in line with the
requirements of the information net.

Wireless communications can be established at any time. It is understood
that in case the central transmitter is destroyed or taken out
the Rumania transmitters will continue operating for several months.

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