

(3) OFICZERED, Emerich, HOCHTIL reported the meeting with OFICZERED which occurred at the Salzendorf-Custos crossing on the Austro-German border in essentially the same terms as this meeting was reported elsewhere by KUCHBAUM. According to HOCHTIL, after OFICZERED's car had departed, he and KUCHBAUM contacted the major SCHIFFER and KUGEL who had just come out of the customs office said, "Oh, you mean OFICZERED," and then made some remark about OFICZERED'S being engaged in espionage activity because he was passed directly through customs by the guards.

(4) Hildegarde BEITZ, HOCHTIL stated that in a restaurant in Dusseldorf during the October trip through Germany he encountered Hildegarde BEITZ who was having lunch with a party of eight or ten at a large table in the restaurant. HOCHTIL was not present. HOCHTIL approached BEITZ and spoke with her for several minutes. During this time, BEITZ stated that she had recently married and that she did not wish to resume any of her previous intelligence associations. When asked about the present whereabouts of one G. FLEX, whom HOCHTIL had known as an American interrogating officer, HOCHTIL stated that she believed FLEX to be in Berlin. HOCHTIL admitted that he subsequently mentioned BEITZ'S name to PONGER and that it was passed to PONGER something about her.

A large number of names (50-75) were mentioned during the interrogation by HOCHTIL or by the interrogators. In each case that a name was mentioned the interrogator asked whether the name had been discussed with HOCHTIL. In each case, HOCHTIL said either that it had not been discussed or that if it had, he did not remember. None of the names which he admitted had been discussed were connected with the Toeholz case or other as the interrogator knew. In any event on such names as LANGE, Tippelkuer, and other members of the Gehlen group and specific members of the group of Art Blaize, HOCHTIL stated that no mention was ever made and no similarity ever displayed by HOCHTIL. HOCHTIL admitted that he may have discussed such names as KUHNKE, a personal enemy, and that General GUDEN and HEINZ were mentioned because HEINZ was known to be a source of material for American books. In summary, HOCHTIL claimed that he did not know to David Intelligence anybody who is engaged in sensitive activity against the Soviets. He was not already known to GEHLEN. Concerning Art Gehlen, he admitted that he always had the impression that PONGER knew more than he did. He added that both Gehlen and HEINZ were discussed only as organizations and not as personalities. He admitted that PONGER might have actually to become a member of Art Gehlen, saying that undoubtedly Art Gehlen was the German Intelligence Service and giving as his reason the fact that the Americans had spent millions of dollars building up Art Gehlen and would never permit another group to become important in German Intelligence. When asked whether he knew that GEHLEN had talked to PONGER concerning a connection between HOCHTIL and American Intelligence in the summer of 1949, HOCHTIL affected complete surprise and stated that he had no idea that it had happened and no idea why PONGER should have made such a suggestion.

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In the course of the interrogation, considerable valuable information was developed on HERTTLE'S past and current activities. This information supported as it is by the documents impounded in the search of HERTTLE's quarters and office will be written up as the permit and disseminated to interested customers. The impounded material includes the press of the organization which HERTTLE was attempting to set up for him and which he later attempted to sell to Kurt Gehlen. These documents include contact lists of principal agents and of agents. It is interesting that these contact lists include only the names of notorious fabricators or of proven totalniks. There are no names on the list of persons who normally collect intelligence, and all of the persons listed are, like HERTTLE himself, primarily operations officers and arrangers. HERTTLE admitted that with the exception of several special cases he had never himself handled an agent directly, either under the Nazi system or during the period following the war. He also admitted quite freely that he did not have the techniques of espionage at the collecting level and that he never considered himself to be a technician in this field, having always been concerned with the larger picture and with organizing operations at the top level.

c. The interrogators have the impression that HERTTLE is definitely concealing information on a number of points. He showed sensitivity in the polygraph examination to all questions pertaining to the concealment or destruction of documents and, although he stated that he had not destroyed his files nor had he hidden other portions of his life outside of his house, the interrogators are convinced that some destruction or concealment has taken place. Technically HERTTLE is not physiologically testable by polygraph. He has low blood pressure and a circulatory defect which makes the recording of changes in his pulse rate and blood pressure almost meaningless. It was characteristic of his reactions on the polygraph machine that the strongest response was made to a question in which he indicated that he was not lying. It is also characteristic that he reacted in some respect to every question and that his breathing showed him to be a victim of tension. From these observations, which will be repeated below, by another interrogator, and from direct observation during the course of the interrogation, the interrogators are convinced that HERTTLE is lying about or concealing some piece of information which to them appears to be very important. This piece of information may be connected with his knowledge of the relations between Anton GOMBERG and the Soviet Union. The interrogators have various theories about what HERTTLE is concealing, but these theories are all unsupported by concrete evidence. It is possible that he is a Soviet agent in contact with the Soviet-controlled Spokane Com. Rmt, either through HERTTLE or through somebody else. It is possible that he is a Soviet agent who nevertheless was unaware of POMMER'S affiliation. It is possible that he is not a Soviet agent but is involved in some liaison involving the future German Intelligence Service and present German intelligence groups which he cannot afford to reveal to Americans. This last theory is partly supported by a number of curious circumstances surrounding the recent behavior by members of the Gehlen group and by members of other U.S.-sponsored intelligence operations which employ former German intelligence officers.

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Finally, it is possible that HOETTL is sincere in his statements that he expects Mr. Allen Dulles to take personal vengeance of him and that he is under the impression that his present interrogators are hostile to Mr. Dulles. This fourth theory would explain his reactions to interrogation, but the theory cannot be accepted unless we assume that HOETTL is naive about the present organization of American intelligence. Such naivete is unlikely. In any event, the fourth theory will be tested in the next interrogation.

4. Future Plans.

a. Further Interrogation. HOETTL is at present in solitary confinement, where it planned that he will remain until 3 April 1953 when he will be reintorrogated. The decision to release him is being delayed until his reaction to solitary confinement can be learned.

b. Reports. It is planned to follow this preliminary report with a series of more detailed reports.

(1) HOETTL's reaction to the arrest of VONSEN and POMMER. HOETTL's immediate reactions when he learned through the press of the arrest of VONSEN and POMMER are recorded in part in correspondence between himself and his chief assistant, Baron Heinrich von Moltke, as well as in his report to Report MANDEL and his report to half G. HUMMER. A separate report will be prepared covering this material.

(2) Personalities. The large number of personalities mentioned have been mentioned during the course of the interrogation will be listed in a separate report with HOETTL's comments on each personality summarized. This report will be of some value in the Team-to-Investigation and will be of considerable value in the continuing counter-intelligence study of HOETTL's activities.

(3) Assessment of HOETTL. A report summarizing the assessment of HOETTL as a personality will be prepared. This assessment will include impressions formed by the interrogators, facts established concerning HOETTL's intelligence activity, and capacity, and results of study of documents impounded.

(4) HOETTL's Correspondence with LOHNER. A special report on the correspondence between the Central European press and HOETTL is being prepared which will include the correspondence itself as well as HOETTL's responses to the intensive interrogation on this subject conducted during the evening hours of 26 March 1953.

(5) Impounded Material. The material impounded during the search of HOETTL's house and office is being photographed and copies of these photographs will be made available for incorporation into appropriate files. In the course of time, research will be done on this material both in Austria and in Washington, and it is probable that a series of reports will issue from this research.

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c. Press action. Press releases have been prepared in the event that public curiosity concerning HOHTL'S arrest brings him to bear on American authorities in Austria. If the Department of Justice concur, it is our present desire to issue at some time in the future a press release which will implicate HOHTL directly with Kurt Waldheim. The purpose of this press release is to insure that HOHTL is discredited once and for all with German Intelligence Services, and thereby to prevent his reentry of the United States by the processing through various channels of fabricated intelligence.

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