

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3.02
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

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1954

4 JUNE 1954

Chief of Base, Pallasch

Chief, Berlin Operations Base

Info: EE, COM

Operational/CART/IIIPSA

[] - GCIS Berlin - Alfredo PAPEROTA

REF: EOLA-7243; BERLIN-2917; EOLA-7252; SPULL-7692; BERLIN-3297; SPULL-7720;
SPULL-7738; EOLA-8382

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1. By way of introduction, it might be well to explain somewhat the local setting in which BOB action was taken in this matter. Without spelling out the many reasons therefor, GCIS Berlin stands as the agency most feasibly available to BOB for police-type executive action. GCIS is used effectively and often by all branches of BOB in carrying out spot surveillances, arrests of suspects, interrogation of security suspects in some cases, temporary detention of security cases and bodyguard activities. As a result, GCIS becomes acquainted with some aspects and personalities in a number of BOB operations. GCIS is the branch of the West Berlin police detached for the purpose of handling primarily matters of American interest and is under the effective control of the Public Safety Division, HICOG. Through this latter office all of our requests for action must be funneled; likewise all other American intelligence ofices in Berlin send their requests for police action. It is quite obvious that GCIS acquires a good deal of insight into American intelligence activities in general. Our particular interests, of course, are KURAKI interests.

2. It is therefore quite painful to realize that within GCIS, and in such a position that everything that officially passes through GCIS can become known to them, are two British representatives, namely Irwin HAMBUR (V-2995) and Alfredo PAPEROTA (V-2995.1). The situation becomes even more critical when the allegation is reported (EOLA-7243) that PAPEROTA "is a Soviet agent".

3. Fortunately, BOB also has an agent who has direct insight into GCIS affairs and exercises an effective amount of control over it, i.e., [] In view of the foregoing, [] via [] was asked

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to provide us with background information on all of the female help employed in OC-3 (not choosing to indicate our actual target, but pointing out that we had information concerning a possible leak to the East). [] being a relatively shrewd man, on his own eliminated two of the three females employed there and supplied background data on the one and only PAPPACOTTA. In supplying the information [] also indicated one or two incidents which to his mind created a suspicion that PAPPACOTTA may maintain unauthorized connections (see attachment and SHELK-2917). At this time, [] made it quite clear that in his official capacity he could undertake to remove PAPPACOTTA from OC-3 on the basis of his own information and belief, and stated his intention to inquire further into PAPPACOTTA's connections under suitable pretext. Since it was clear that PAPPACOTTA maintained a close relationship to HENNING who in turn was openly involved in the Waifong HENNING case, [] informed us that this was a most suitable topic of discussion for the pretext. We gave our consent to this task and laid down the stipulation that he move only if he could do so on the basis of his own information and initiative.

4. We next received SPULL 7692 relating to HENNING's report to ZIPPER concerning [] alleged confrontation, and then outlined the facts to the best of our knowledge in SPULL 3297. At this point, the troubled waters were allowed to become quiet, and [] was instructed not to pursue the matter further pending word from us. It was also at this time that [] reversed his position to the extent that he stated he now was no longer in a position to secure the removal or transfer of PAPPACOTTA from OC-3 on his own initiative, but that sufficient evidence acceptable to HENNING, chief of American Sector Police, would have to be presented to the latter after PAPPACOTTA had gone to HENNING for an explanation. It is interesting to note that she did not do this until three weeks following [] talk with her. In the face of this state of affairs, we instructed [] to drop the matter gracefully for the time being by carrying out his claimed pretext for the questioning of PAPPACOTTA, and explaining that he was satisfied with her explanations, and admitting that his questions must have been based on mistaken identity and unfounded complaints ([] claims to have genuine records which would tend to prove this point both to HENNING and PAPPACOTTA). As far as any SOB action on this entire matter is concerned, this is where it came to rest except for a rather complete review of the HENNING files at SOB.

5. The facts to date, plus what was easily gleaned from ZIPPER's own reports in the HENNING case, lead us to agree most wholeheartedly with your SOBA-8382 in which you state that ZIPPER's act of recruiting agents in OC-3 was not a friendly act, and worse still was the fact that ZIPPER did not immediately extract the true HENNING allegation and report it to you. Although we now understand and do sympathize with your position as regards ZIPPER, we feel it is also necessary to consider the relative value of a secure relationship existing between SOB and OC-3 as we view it here and the effect such a relationship has on all SOB operations. We wish to express our regret that the feeling appears to exist that [] and SOB possibly did not adhere strictly to the terms of the original agreement as to the manner in which action would

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be taken in this case. It is our belief on the other hand that an unexpected and undesired result obtained, i.e., kickback to ZIPPEN, has been interpreted as non-adherence to the agreement. In that connection, we view this strange relationship between ZIPPEN-PCB-505-Public Safety-OCIS as somewhat contradictory and impractical when regarded as a whole. Permit us to state only a few simple yet apparent facts:

a. ZIPPEN is or should be quite aware of our (American) jealous interest in OCIS's remaining free of their agents.

b. ZIPPEN realizes that PCB represents purely American interests.

c. It is more publicly and officially known that H. HEYDKE (OCIS) was connected with Wolfgang HOKER and his case, and ZIPPEN reports further showed that PA FAPPROTTA (OCIS) was also involved in that case.

d. Subsequent passing of Frau HEYDKE allegation and other information by ZIPPEN to PCB.

e. Cumulatively, apparent feeling on the part of PCB and ZIPPEN that the HEYDKE case and its implications are a taboo and secret topic for discussion and investigation.

f. Reasonable and proper action (unfortunately foregone) on the part of the Americans at the time of the HEYDKE flap to remove or request the removal of HEYDKE and FAPPROTTA forthwith from OCIS, at completely justifiable embarrassment to ZIPPEN, regardless of the particular American channel or method through which the removal was carried out.

g. Fact that some lapse of time only does not alter the existing evil and security threat.

h. Direct or indirect removal of PA FAPPROTTA at this time would expose nothing more than fact that the Americans of PCB actually make use of information received from ZIPPEN in warranted cases, and that such a removal logically could have been initiated through any American office in Berlin.

^{no sent EE}
Finally for the above reasons, we fail to understand the reasoning of your paragraph 5, SOLA-3788, as to why the HEYDKE case could not be discussed with HEYDKE. It occurs to us that we may be adopting too much of the ostrich technique before we are compelled to do so by German sovereignty in failing to take positive and justified action in those areas of interest which are clearly and concededly American.

6. The situation remains the same, at this moment, with HEYDKE and FAPPROTTA both still in OCIS. It appears, under the circumstances that our only recourse is to follow the original suggestion of PCB, and present the state of affairs to Public Safety. If what says about the Public Safety people is true, Public Safety will remove HEYDKE and FAPPROTTA from OCIS

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... [redacted] ... The possibility also exists that Levin ROKILL would also be exposed on the basis of his MID connection. Naturally we would be running the risk of losing [redacted] and bringing considerable embarrassment upon ourselves, should anyone become aware of the fact that [redacted] is our man, or even if the Public Safety people should suspect just that. Because of the risky implications of our now intended disclosure of the situation to Public Safety, we want to proceed slowly and carefully. We intend as our first step to trace PAMPONITA with MID, so that we will have the facts in that matter. Secondly, we would like FCB's reaction to the proposed disclosure, and we would appreciate a report from FCB of what is known to date on ZIPPER's CI investigation of PAMPONITA. It is felt here that FCB should not inform ZIPPER of our proposal at this time. ZIPPER should of course be informed of what might happen to their people in OCTA, but not until we are ready to take the step. We do not propose to take that step until the above-mentioned preliminary steps have been taken. Whatever the developments may be, and in view of the importance we attach to CI, we would appreciate most deeply your keeping us currently advised of any information you may acquire on the following points:

- a. ZIPPER's status and activity.
- b. PAMPONITA's status and activity.
- c. Progress of ZIPPER's CI investigation of PAMPONITA.
- d. Any evidence of further ZIPPER sources in [redacted].
- e. Any evidence of [redacted] connection to ZIPPER.

7. Attached to this report for FCB is the [redacted] report on [redacted] [redacted], which must be read in conjunction with the additional material set forth in referenced cables.

Enclosure:
report dtd 15 Feb re PAMPONITA

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