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SS Historical Paper

No. OTR-2

SUPPORT SERVICES HISTORY

(TITLE OF PAPER)
HISTORY OF THE
OFFICE OF TRAINING
(PERIOD)
1945 - 1949

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Controlled by : OTR

Date prepared : May 1969

Written by : Robert B. Sha

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HISTORY
of the
OFFICE OF TRAINING

-
1945 - 1949

Prepared by: Robert B. Shaffer, May 1969

Approved by:

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APPENDIX

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CHAPTER I. Outline of Organizational Changes (1945 - 1951)

From the earliest days in OSS up to the present in CIA, there has been no break in the continuity in the administration of training for clandestine intelligence work. But until the training organization which had survived the break-up of OSS in 1945 was incorporated into the newly formed Office of Training (OTR) in 1951, it underwent a confusing series of changes in name and organization which must be summarized at this point to make the following narrative more understandable.

- 10 October 1945 - Schools and Training (S&T) established in SSU as a Branch under Assistant Director, Intelligence. Chief: Col. Henson L. Robinson.
- 10 December 1945 - Becomes the Training Division of SSU, within the Operational Auxiliaries Branch. Chief: Col. Robinson. Other Divisions in this Branch were: Communications Division, Cover and Documentation Division.
- 17 June 1946 - Becomes the Training Branch (TRB) of SSU, within the Foreign Security Reports Office (FSRO), with stature equal to that of the Foreign Branches of FSRO. Chief: Col. Robinson.
- 11 July 1946 - TRB and the Foreign Branches now under the "A" Deputy, Special Operations, Central Intelligence Group (CIG). Chief of TRB:

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- 1 July 1947 - becomes the Training Staff (TRS) under the Chief of Operations (COPS) of the Office of Special Operations (OSO) of CIA. Chief of TRS: [redacted] (b)(3)
- 17 October 1949 - becomes the Training Division (OSO/OPC), (TRD), organizationally placed under the Assistant Director for Special Operations (ADSO), but under the joint supervision of OSO and the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). Chief of TRD: [redacted] (b)(3)
- 3 January 1951 - Office of Training established under the Deputy Director for Administration (DD/A), with the primary concern of developing a program of career training. Director (DTR): Matthew Baird. By April 1951, DTR is reporting directly to the DCI.
- April 1951 - [redacted] leaves; Rolfe Kingsley is Acting Chief, TRD. (b)(3)
- 1 July 1951 - TRD placed under DTR, and called Training (Covert). [redacted] is designated Assistant Director of Training (Covert) (AD/TRC). [redacted] is designated Assistant Director of Training (Overt)(AD/TRO). (b)(3)
- 8 January 1952 - Training (Covert) is renamed Training (Special) (TRS); Training (Overt) is renamed Training

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CHAPTER II. COI and OSS Training (1941 - 1945)

1. The Coordinator of Information (COI) - July 1941/June 1942

Training under COI was conducted by Special Activities/Bruce (SA/B) (predecessor of SI Branch of OSS) and Special Activities/Goodfellow (SA/G) (predecessor of SO Branch of OSS). SA/B was concerned primarily with preparing agents for espionage, principally under conditions prevailing in neutral territories. SA/G training was designed to prepare personnel for various forms of sabotage and to establish simultaneously a program and physical facilities which could be adapted to the training of guerrilla units when authorization therefor should be secured. Since the Americans had had no experience in the conduct of training for clandestine activities of this type, they turned by necessity to the British for help. The content as well as the general plan for these courses was almost entirely derived from what officers of COI learned by attending British intelligence schools.

2. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) - June 1942/October 1945a. Organizational Administration

When COI was abolished and OSS established, the tendency for SA/B and SA/G to find considerable value in each other's training courses had already appeared. It thus became evident, shortly after the establishment of OSS, that all OSS training should be centralized within one unit, so that trainees could secure more readily any type of training pertinent to

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their missions. Coordination was first attempted by establishing a Training Directorate, composed of three, then later four, men. More effective results were achieved, however, after the Schools and Training Branch (S&T) was established on 3 January 1943, with the responsibility for Training being placed under one individual who possessed the status of a branch chief. Various organizational changes occurred thereafter in an attempt to meet new administrative difficulties. Finally, on 26 May 1944, the last major organizational change was effected. In order that S&T might be in a position to maintain independence in dealing with the various branches it served, a Deputy Director of Schools and Training was appointed who was directly responsible to the Director of OSS. The Chief of S&T reported to this Deputy.

b. Types and Purpose of Training

Training was necessarily a complex task because of the varied and unusual activities which OSS was undertaking. In general, the objective of the training was to prepare men to work as secret agents, either in espionage (SI) or sabotage (SO). In addition, some specialized training was offered in the fields of propaganda (MO), counter-intelligence (X-2), guerrilla operations (OG), and maritime operations (MU).

Although no set schedule or order of courses was required for all men, the complete training of a secret intelligence agent took approximately sixteen weeks. Three

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weeks were spent in an intensive basic course at a secluded site. During this period, the students gained a familiarization with basic intelligence and espionage techniques, and their aptitude as well as their security sense was tested in a number of situations, the best known being the excursions into Baltimore and other cities for practical exercises under realistic conditions. Some students went through this course. It was followed in most cases by ten weeks of communications training and three weeks or so of special training directed at a man's specific mission.

Those OSS employees who were not destined for agent, case officer, or paramilitary roles did not usually receive any training. There was no consistent policy regarding indoctrination or orientation for all, and training was not provided. It was felt, for example, that no training was needed by Research and Analysis (R&A) personnel. It is not surprising that the small group of S&T training officers who stayed on after the disbanding of OSS and provided the bridge to CIA training were operationally minded, concerned solely with the training of employees for espionage, and under the direction of the Assistant Director for Special Operations (ADSO) rather than the DCI or an administrative officer.

In addition to conducting training courses, the S&T Branch was involved in:

- (1) The provision of required basic military training for enlisted army men;

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- (2) the establishment of assessment areas where the capabilities of prospective trainees could be judged;
- (3) establishment of parachute schools both in the U.S. and abroad;
- (4) establishment of area and language courses under university auspices; and
- (5) supplying of instructors and training materials for overseas posts, where a number of schools were being operated completely independent of S&T.

c. Training Areas (Physical Establishments)

The schools varied enormously in their physical characteristics. Some were comfortable country estates like RTU-11 (the "farm" in Maryland), and areas E (Maryland) and S (Virginia); some were rough CCC Camps and summer recreational areas which were far from adequate through the cold and rainy seasons. The latter, Areas A, B, C, and D, covered thousands of acres of wooded and mountainous terrain in Virginia and Maryland. Area F was in one sense the show piece of the training areas, as it was the Congressional Country Club on the outskirts of Washington. The only school in the Mid-west was at area M, a former Signal Corps Camp (MacDowell) in Indiana, where communications training was given. The schools at Georgetown University and the University of Pennsylvania were typical academic classrooms and dormitories. The West

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Coast installations varied from the Marine quarters at Camp Pendleton, to Headquarters on Catalina Island, which were in the pleasant buildings of what had been a private boys' school. Also on Catalina were smaller camps housed in temporary shacks and tents.

The East Coast training areas and their routines are amusingly described in Roger Hall's book, You're Stepping on My Cloak and Dagger. The very considerable psychological assessment activity conducted by S&T (over [redacted] people had been evaluated or screened by July 1945) has been completely reported in the OSS Assessment Staff's book, Assessment of Men. By mid-1944, the training activity on the East Coast was diminishing, and most of the effort was located on the West Coast. By the summer of 1945, only a small unit was left in Washington, and by the end of the year, it had been reduced to a few individuals, including [redacted] and [redacted] who provided an unbroken link with future training by staying with the training effort until well after the establishment of CIA.

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CHAPTER III. SSU and CIG Training (1945 - 1947)

1. The Training Division SSU - October 1945/June 1946a. The Change-over from OSS Schools and Training

During the summer of 1945, the requirement for training dropped off rapidly. The reduction of staff throughout the organization was reflected in S&T, which by October had no more than five or six instructors in the Washington area. These instructors were located in an old brownstone-front building near the center of Washington; there being no students, they spent their time writing and collecting training materials for future use, under the general guidance of At some time late in 1945, S&T was relieved of the responsibility for communications training, and from then until May 1946, the only teaching consisted of occasional tutoring of individuals, the instruction being very informal and geared to the particular needs of the individual student. The Chief of Training, Col. H. L. Robinson, had the problem of organizing and preparing a peace-time training program, but guidance from the branches it would serve was lacking; the need for training was not clearly recognized during this transitional period. Furthermore, the Training Division lacked space and people.

b. The Personnel Situation in May 1946

In a memorandum of 31 May 1946 to William G. Tharp (Executive Officer of SSU), Colonel Robinson reviewed the

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personnel situation at length. The Training Division at this time consisted of the following:

Col. H. L. Robinson, Chief of the Training Division

[redacted] Deputy Chief, and scheduled to

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become Chief of Training at Col. Robinson's

departure from the organization on 1 July 1946.

Capt. E. E. Koger, Administrative Officer (about to leave)

[redacted] Chief of Staff Training

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Stephen Whitney, Chief of Under-Cover Training

(expected to leave the organization soon)

J. F. Donohue, Chief of Counter-Intelligence Training

(expected to leave)

[redacted] Instructor in Investigative

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Techniques

[redacted] Instructor for Indoctrination

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[redacted] Chief of Assessment

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[redacted] Assessment

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[redacted] Assessment

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Two clerks

The five instructors, regardless of their designations, worked where needed, and additionally did research, wrote training materials, maintained contacts with the operational desks, and performed administrative duties.

According to Col. Robinson, the Training Division was faced at this time with the following requirements: possibly [redacted]

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undercover agents to be trained within six months (out of town and in safe houses); one-day indoctrination for all new staff personnel; a two-week intelligence course for staff personnel; plus a considerable number of individual tutoring jobs. Col. Robinson, who was evidently under pressure to reduce the Training Division, contended that the Division could not operate effectively with less people, and showed that it could not meet all the upcoming requests, even with no reduction.

c. The Training Offered in May 1946

The first formal course (known as SSU Intelligence Course No. I) lasted two weeks, began on 20 May 1946. It was presented in a room in "Q" Building for personnel above the clerical level, and was intended to indoctrinate new people as well as to re-orient the veterans of OSS towards the problems of peace-time operations. The content was pretty general, touching on a wide variety of positive and counter-intelligence subjects. The first covert training (or under-cover training, as it was called at that time) was first set up in May 1946. This training was conducted in safe houses and in hotel rooms on a tutorial basis. Although much of the material covered was the same as that which was in the Intelligence Course, the emphasis was put on tradecraft and reporting, and more attention was given to security and cover. The instructors felt that their job was made more difficult because of a lack of appreciation of the importance of security on the part of the

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operational desk officers.

2. The Training Branch/CIG - July 1946/June 1947 (TRB)

a. Development of the Branch up to July 1947

The response to Colonel Robinson's memorandum was inconclusive, but at least the training unit was not reduced in size. He did not get any guidance as to the direction that the training effort should take; no one really knew what the future of the organization would be. When [redacted] took over Col. Robinson's job in July 1946, the Training Branch was placed within the newly formed Office of Special Operations (OSO), with [redacted] reporting to the Assistant Director for Special Operations (ADSO). It is interesting to note that an organizational chart dated 12 November 1946 shows the Training Branch equal in status and position to the African Branch, the Western European Branch, and all the other geographic Branches. This proximity to operations lasted only a few months and never happened again.

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In view of the expansion that was taking place in the newly constituted Central Intelligence Group (CIG), [redacted] in July 1946 asked for authority to build up the Training Branch to a total of [redacted] people. He was then instructed by the Director to recruit additional instructors in view of the anticipated growth of the organization, disregarding authorized T/O and simply presenting each prospective instructor as a case through channels with confidence that employment would be approved.

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Some measure of success was achieved. In a memorandum of 6 December 1946, [] reported to Mr. Tharp that [] had reported for duty as [] Deputy and that the following instructors had been added to the Staff Training Unit: [] []

The Covert Training staff had been augmented by [] [] The Assessment Staff had been built up to a strength of [] still being Chief), bringing the total professional strength of the Training Branch to [] indicated that he was asking for [] more positions for Staff Training and [] more for Covert Training. He felt that this was a temporary estimate of what he needed and could reasonably hope to recruit by June 1947.

[] pointed out in the same memorandum that no statement of the extent of TRB's job had ever been given to him, and that a clarification of TRB's responsibilities and functions might make it necessary to ask for more or possibly fewer people. He further said that he did not know:

- the numbers to be trained in a given period
- the balance between Covert and Staff Training
- what responsibility, if any, he had for area background training, overseas training, administrative training
- how many people were to be assessed in a given period
- what responsibility the Assessment group had for research, record-keeping, etc.

The extant files do not indicate that [] got any answer

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to these questions, and it is doubtful that any answers existed at this stage of the Agency's development. In January 1947, however, the ADSO approved a T/O of [] persons, leaving [] vacancies to be filled. In spite of [] estimated need for additional instructors, he did not get them in the first half of 1947, the only additions to the teaching staff being [] and []. The difficulty, as always in the training activity, was to locate interested individuals who had had both operational experience and teaching experience.

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b. Development of the Training Courses up to July 1947

After the first Intelligence Course was held in May 1946, five more were given before the end of the year. As additional subject matter was added, the course was lengthened to three weeks, then four, and finally, five. In August 1946, a two-week period of additional instruction was set up to follow the Basic Course, dealing principally with special investigative techniques and photographic training, and oriented toward the missions and operational areas of individual students. [] full-time students took the Intelligence Course in 1946.

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In February 1947, the training for staff officers was revised, and four separate courses were set up:

- (1) a basic intelligence course of two weeks;
- (2) an advanced intelligence course of three weeks;
- (3) special training: photography, etc;
- (4) a one-week indoctrination course for administrative personnel.

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The pattern established at this time persisted for a number of years. The basic course contained no highly classified material, in case some of the students were eliminated at its conclusion. The courses continued to grow; in May 1947, the advanced course was increased to four weeks.

c. A Typical Month's Activity: March 1947

A month-by-month description of TRB activities at this time would serve no useful purpose. But a representative month may well be looked at as an illustration of the amount and kinds of activity taking place in the first half of 1947. (March 1947 has been selected because [] monthly report for that particular month happens to be more specific than most.)

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(1) Staff Training. A three-weeks Advanced Course was given for [] full-time students and [] part-time students. The week after it finished, a Basic Course was begun for [] full-time students and [] part-time students. The first Administrative Course (one week) was given to [] full-time persons; [] others audited various sessions. It was decided that this course should be strictly limited to administrative procedures and should not touch on intelligence procurement. Five Photographic Training courses (three days each) handled [] persons, and individual instruction in the use of special cameras and related equipment was given to several people.

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[] individuals were given special instruction in CI Techniques, and [] persons attended a two-day course on the same subject (primarily police and surveillance methods likely to be used against them).

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[] people were being trained during this month in Special Investigative Techniques.

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(2) Covert Training. Three programs were conducted in Washington and New York; one of these started in January and two in February. Two additional programs were started in Washington in March, and one case was started and completed in New York during March. Three covert appraisals were also conducted: one each in Washington, Boston, and New York.

(3) Appraisal. During this month, [] men and women were appraised in Q Building. Most were from OSO; [] were from Communications, and a few from other parts of CIG. In addition, [] clerical candidates were screened in classes held one day each week.

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(4) External Training. Early in 1947, TRB was made responsible for coordinating the training conducted in other branches of CIG and in the Department of State. During March 1947, TRB arranged for Communications training for [] persons, and made special arrangements for [] individuals to get special language training from the State Department. In addition, [] students attended the State Department Indoctrination Course (two weeks).

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CHAPTER IV. Training Staff/OSO (July 1947/September 1949)(TRS)

1. Growth of the Training Staff in 1948 and 1949

In July 1947, the Training Branch became the Training Staff (TRS), reporting to the Chief of Operations of OSO (COPS). At that time, [] positions were approved for this Staff, apportioned as follows: Office of the Chief - [] Special (i.e. Covert) Training - [] Staff Training - [] The Appraisal Division was dropped from the T/O at this time, and the function discontinued as it did not seem to be needed and the ADSO had indicated that he was strongly opposed to the assessment and evaluation activity. In March 1948 the T/O still had [] positions, of which [] were vacant instructor slots and [] were clerical positions. Of the people actually on duty, two-thirds were actively engaged in instructing--a proportion which dwindled in later years. The Chief of Training's position was rated as a GS-14; the instructor positions were mostly GS-11 and GS-12.

A reorganization of the Training Staff was proposed by [] in a memorandum of 12 August 1948 to the Chief of Operations, OSO. [] proposed to have three main sections: (1) Staff Intelligence Training, which would serve OSO staff personnel; (2) Covert Training, for those who could not be trained in groups or overtly; and (3) Special Projects, which would include orientation and administrative training, language training, training materials, central records, etc. [] asked for a T/O of [] positions, which he felt should be adequate to meet the expanding demands on TRS. Between March and August, the

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strength of TRS (but not the T/O) had gradually grown from the approved [] to [] Much of the growth was in his so-called "Special Projects Section." One of the reasons for requesting a larger staff of instructors was to enable the Basic and the Advanced Courses to be run simultaneously, thereby speeding up the training pattern and cutting the size of the classes in half. [] also asked for an upgrading of the instructor positions, pointing out that otherwise he would not be able to attract the experienced mature individuals he felt were needed to conduct training.

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Among the new activities, an "unclassified pool" had been established in June 1948 to provide useful activity for people who had been brought into the Agency before being fully cleared and for newly cleared employees waiting to be admitted to classes which were operating under quotas. By this device, prospective employees who could not wait for the necessary number of months before full clearance was received could be put on the payroll immediately, the only problem being to keep them profitably occupied and motivated. This responsibility fell to TRS (apparently by default). Occupants of the Pool could be tested and assessed; they were usually given assignments to read unclassified materials of pertinence in their future employment, and in some cases did writing or research on selected topics. By the middle of August, the population of the Pool had risen to [] during November 1948, [] people were in residence.

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To cope with another training requirement which was expanding, [] also wanted to add a Chief of Language and Foreign Service

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Institute Training, in view of the anticipated doubling of demand both for language training and for instruction in State Department procedures and practices.

Written a month before the establishment of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), [] August 1948 memorandum also contained a far-sighted proposal to form a "War-time Techniques Section" with [] instructors, based on his feeling that the techniques of sub-
versive warfare which had been learned during OSS days were being forgotten and that Agency officers were not getting any training in these skills or their use, at a time when there was a need for positive action in many parts of the world. He wanted his proposed section to devote about six months to digging out basic materials from the OSS archives and working them over for training purposes. It was unfortunate that nothing came of [] proposal; such a section could have been of great value to OPC operations and training in the early days of that Office.

The Chief of Training, [] did not get his increase in T/O strength until July 1949, eleven months after his initial request, and subsequent to repetitions of his request in October 1948, and again in January and March 1949. There were two reasons for this delay. In the fall of 1948, the ADSO, Colonel Donald Galloway, was expecting to leave his job at the end of the year, and he and the other top officials of OSO felt that his successor should rightfully be the one to make a policy decision on this request, particularly in view of the changed situation to be expected as a result of the recent establishment of OPC.

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Furthermore, by the time that the new ADSO, Colonel Robert Schow, arrived in March 1949, OPC had become a reality with its own Training Unit with a proposed T/O of [] (and an actual staff of [] (b)(3)

It was rapidly becoming obvious that a policy decision would have to be made soon as to the extent to which OSO and OPC could or should pool their training facilities and personnel, an action which would greatly affect the plans and activities of both units. A Joint OSO/OPC Training Committee had been set up in January 1949 to consider mutual problems. In August 1949, it prepared a proposed T/O for a combined OSO/OPC Training Organization, calling for a total of [] (b)(3)

individuals, of whom [] were already either on duty or hired and awaiting clearance. (b)(3)

Consequently, when [] became Chief of Training in September 1949 as the successor of [] (who (b)(3)

was rotating to an operational assignment), he inherited both the OSO Training Staff and the OPC Training Branch, with their rapidly expanding tables of organization and their multitude of vacant positions. To him fell the task not only of struggling to get the organization and the positions needed to meet the requirements of OSO and OPC, but also that of achieving an actual merger of the two training units under a single head. (b)(3)

2. Additions to the Training Staff in 1948 and 1949

Between December 1946 and March 1948, there was very little change in the size of the Training Staff or in its roster. But as it grew in 1948 from [] to [] people, a number of individuals were acquired who ((b)(3)

would make significant contributions in later years. Among these were:

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[redacted] (the first chief of the unclassified pool); [redacted]
 [redacted] (covert training); [redacted]
 and [redacted] (staff training); [redacted] (administrative train-
 ing); [redacted] (technical
 training).

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In 1949 the build-up of the Training Staff began to accelerate, but instructors were hard to find. In August 1949, the first instructors acquired by OPC were placed on loan to TRS Staff Training for practical reasons. These were [redacted] this turned out to be the beginning of a combined OSO/OPC training organization.

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3. Development of the Training Courses: July 1947 - September 1949

During this period, the principal training activity was centered in the Basic Course and the Advanced Course, which had been initiated in the previous period. The general objective of these courses, which was to introduce students to the concepts and techniques of gathering intelligence information, did not change. The main effort of the instructors was directed to the improvement of instructing techniques and to the refining and updating of the training materials.

The Basic Course was extended to four weeks in November 1947; the duration and content of this course then remained basically the same for a number of years. One of the principal features of this course was the final week, which introduced students to the theory, the organization and the tactics of Communism. The importance of this subject was recognized from the beginning by the Agency's training officers, and this week in the Basic Course was the ancestor of the

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later School of International Communism of the Office of Training. One of the features of the "Communist Week" in 1948 was a demonstration of a Communist Front meeting, which as role-played by the instructors ended in complete frustration for the trainees and had an impact which was remembered for a long time by many of the students. Twenty years later, (1968), this same exercise (with some modification, of course) was still being used successfully by the School of International Communism.

The Basic Course will also be remembered for its comprehensive problem, which gave the students an entire week of practice in writing information reports and in holding various types of role-playing interviews with instructors. This was the so-called "Buenos Aires" or "Margel" Problem, a highly improbable situation which nevertheless served its purpose, being refined by the instructors through thirteen editions over the years. Many Agency intelligence officers will likewise remember "The Prefect of Palermo," a series of atrocious information reports which gave them a drill in the editing of information, and the "Vienna Riot," which gave them a chance to sort out fact from fiction as collected by them in an interview with a biased source.

The Advanced Course, which dealt primarily with "tradecraft" (i.e. the techniques and skills of handling agents and operating clandestinely), and was the ancestor of the present (1969) Operations Course, was extended to five weeks in November 1947, six weeks in September 1948, and to seven weeks in June 1949. This course had an elaborate comprehensive role-playing problem which gave the student

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practice in handling "agents." This was the "Korean Problem," which was the prototype of the "Trieste Problem" and a whole group of later "live" problems which have been a distinguishing feature of the clandestine operations training ever since. The idea of using role-playing as a training device was handed down from OSS Training, which in turn got it from British practice. These problems in the early days were written by the instructors, who usually based them on actual happenings and situations, considerably disguised.

4. Technical and Photographic Training

During the 1947-1949 period, several basic issues were surfaced regarding this training. The Chief of Investigative Training (as it was called at this time) was who had been teaching this material since the early days of OSS. During that time, a pattern was set of lectures and demonstrations on such phases of police work as surveillance, microphones, wire-taps, lock picking, house and body searches, etc. The presentation was comparable to what it would be in a police school. A primary objective of the instruction was to make the student realize what methods might be employed against him by police in other countries and what means he might use to counteract them. A small dark-room was maintained for instruction in photographic work.

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In the SSU period, the Training Division was able to give photographic training only through an informal arrangement with the Reproduction Branch to use its dark-room facilities in the attic of South Building. No policy decision designated any specific unit as responsi-

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ble for this type of training. The Field Photographic Branch of OSS had felt that its experts should do the teaching, and this view persisted after the War. The laboratory facilities of the OSS units were inherited by the Cover and Documentation Division (C&D), which felt strongly that photographic training was its responsibility; it was apparently reluctant to make its facilities available to TRB.

Jurisdictional conflicts persisted during 1947 and 1948 between C&D and TRS. At one point, TRS set up a make-shift laboratory of its own. In a memorandum of 14 July 1948 to the Chief of Operations, OSO, the Chief of Training went on record as not in favor of transferring technical training to the Communications Division and the Cover and Documentation Division because they did not have as much experience as TRS in conducting training in these subjects, and such a transfer would weaken the TRS attempt to integrate investigative techniques into the operational training. He suggested that TRS continue to conduct all basic training in photographic and counter-intelligence techniques, with training in specialized techniques continuing to be conducted by Communications, Cover and documentation specialists. The issue was apparently unresolved, as the content of the TRS courses remained a matter of dispute for several more years.

In the fall of 1947, TRS offered a Counter-Intelligence Course consisting of the following: surveillance (2 hours), searches (1 hour), fingerprinting ($\frac{1}{2}$ hour), microphones and wire-tapping (3 hours), recording equipment (2 hours), lock picking (3 hours), flaps and seals (1 hour), photography (2 days). The work on photography was focussed on exposition of the various types of cameras, darkroom

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work, and document photography. Practical exercises were difficult to stage in the limited space available; the storage and display of special equipment was a considerable problem. By 1949, both the photographic instruction and the investigative instruction had expanded to one week each. A proposal was submitted by [] in April 1949 for a four-week course in techniques (one week each on investigation, interception, identification, and surreptitious entry), but although it seemed to gain acceptance, it was not put into effect at that time because of various unresolved problems of course content, facilities, and jurisdiction.

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5. Other Courses

The one week Administrative Course first run in March 1947 was increased to two weeks in June 1947 and to three weeks in June 1949. It devoted one week to stenographic skills, one week to headquarters orientation, and a week to field administrative procedures; it was primarily for clerks and stenographers. Covert training continued in Washington and out-of-town on a modest scale during this period, and arrangements continued to be made by TRS for trainees to attend language and orientation courses at the Foreign Service Institute.

6. Evaluations of Students

Training exercises and live problems were not only teaching devices, but the basis for evaluations of student performance; they were compiled by the instructors for the offices to which the students would report at the conclusion of the training. Comments on the students have been compiled from OSS days to the present (1969), and

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this responsibility has always been an unwelcome and perplexing one for the instructors, with many different approaches and techniques being tried through the years. The evaluation problem was particularly acute during the formative period 1947-1949. Not many of the instructors had done any professional teaching, and they were not only unsure of the means of grading students, but reluctant to do so, feeling that their evaluations might injure a man's career unjustly. This feeling was well founded. A memorandum of 29 June 1949 from the ADSO to the Chief, TRS, indicated that the ADSO would use the training evaluations from the Basic Course to select which students would take the Advanced Course (and, in effect, have a career with OSO). A memorandum of 10 August 1949 from the Deputy ADSO quoted the Director as stating that anyone unable to attain "excellent" in training should not be employed. In effect, a man's future was being left up to the judgment of the instructors. The DADSO felt that the large number of low evaluations suggested that TRS standards might be too high. He also felt that there were too many categories of marks. In a memo to the ADSO on 1 July 1949, TRS was vigorously attacked by the Chief, Foreign Branch T, for its negative evaluation of an individual. This was one of a number of such adverse reactions.

Controversy and confusion existed within the Training Staff over such questions as: what controls over dissemination?; what scale to use; narrative descriptions?; adjectival ratings only?; the purpose of the evaluations (a measure of observed performance? a prediction of operating potential? a screening device?); the basis for evaluations (individual observation? collective judgment? observed personal traits?

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objective tests? what norms?). These questions were not resolved until the psychologists of the Assessment and Evaluation Staff (A&E) of OTR assumed the responsibility about 1952 for providing practical guide lines and assistance to the instructors.

7. Size of Classes

The Basic and the Advanced Courses had [] to [] full-time trainees in each class, in general, during this period. For the twelve months ending 31 July 1949, the Basic Course had [] students, while the Advanced Course had [] In April 1949, with a theoretical limit of [] pressure was building up for these courses to take more students as OPC employees started to enter on duty in quantity. But TRS was not staffed to handle an increased enrollment unless it gave up all exercises and problems and restricted the instructing methods solely to lectures. In fact, the Chief of Staff Training [] in April 1949 recommended that the Basic Course be limited to [] students since there were only [] full-time junior instructors and one part-time senior instructor available; likewise for the Advanced Course, which had only [] full-time instructors. Much of the time of the Joint OSO/OPC Training Committee meetings in the first half of 1949 was taken by discussions of possible ways to admit the increasing numbers of applicants to the existing courses, and to augment the staffs. The Administrative courses were similar in size. The technical courses were usually less than []

8. Space

Up to the summer of 1948, the Training Staff was limited to several rooms in "Q" Building; both class-room and office space

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were a severe problem, which was alleviated at that time by the acquisition of Buildings 13 and 14 for the Basic and Advanced Courses and the Pool, the second floor of the "Garage" for Investigative Techniques, and office space in "L" Building. In May 1949, T-30 was made available to TRS, but because of the extensive remodeling and restoration necessary, it was not occupied until September 1949. In June 1949 the second floor of T-14 became available for administrative courses. All of this space was unsatisfactory for class rooms. The rooms had not been designed for the purpose, were awkward in shape, cold in winter and stifling in summer, with poor ventilation and acoustics.

9. Other Activities of This Period

In 1948, a beginning was made in the direction of formalized research activity. By December, TRS had a Chief of Training Materials and Research Throughout 1949, this section was engaged in procuring and editing the records of interviews of case officers and station chiefs returning from field posts. These interviews formed the basis for the content of lectures. The section also searched for other materials which could be used by instructors in lectures and problems. This section not only edited this material, but also edited and reproduced cases and other materials used in the classes. Progress was evidently slow because of a continuing shortage of clerical assistance.

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Although the assessment and appraisal function had been dropped by TRS in 1947 there was still some demand for this service, and it was gradually resumed. In the fall of 1948, TRS was conducting a modest psychological testing program; for the most part it consisted of a

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battery of psychological tests which were given to the members of the unclassified Pool. [] was responsible for their administration; by early 1949, he was also giving aptitude and proficiency tests to the students of the Basic and Advanced Courses. These had been devised by [] the Deputy Chief of TRS, with the objective of identifying pertinent strengths and weaknesses of students, particularly in the areas of report writing and logical thinking. In early 1949, [] also assumed the responsibility for consolidating and coordinating the training evaluations of all students, using the rough data provided by instructors. He carried the title of Chief of Records, Tests and Evaluations until the establishment of the Assessment Unit in June 1949 under [] At this time [] took the responsibility for developing a Training Library, which in the next several years became quite sizeable.

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10. Conclusion

The period from mid-1947 to mid-1949 was a difficult one for the little group that was trying to establish a solid training organization. With little to draw upon in the way of operational or teaching experience, working in unsatisfactory space with limited facilities, searching for suitable methods, materials, and doctrine, the Training Staff showed remarkable motivation and sense of mission, and succeeded in providing a firm base for the training effort that was to come.

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CHAPTER V. Training Branch/OPC (January-September 1949)

1. The Beginning of OPC Training

The establishment of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) on 1 September 1948 posed the problem of its relationship to the Training Staff of OSO (then known as TRS). [redacted] the Chief of TRS, was told by the ADSO (Col. Galloway) in September 1948 that the Training Staff was to assist OPC in its training problems and was to permit OPC students to attend OSO training courses, provided that no essential changes were made in the courses and also that no OSO students were displaced from training courses by OPC entrants. TRS then proceeded to provide advice to OPC officers on the types of training applicable to their operations, on standards of selection for instructors, and similar matters. It took OPC students into the uncleared pool, into the Basic Intelligence Course and the Advanced Intelligence Course (part-time only). Drawing on their knowledge of OSS training and archives, the Training Staff members provided OPC with sample schedules, T/O's and manuals used in OSS Schools and Training.

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In the beginning, the points of contact in OPC were [redacted] [redacted] (at that time the Acting Executive for Administration and Services) and his Deputy, [redacted] (Acting Personnel and Training Officer). OPC began to set up its own training unit by December 1948. It began with [redacted] USA, who was appointed Acting Chief of OPC Training on 4 January 1949,

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and [] who joined the training staff at the same time. [] then appointed his deputy, [] to be the sole channel from TRS to []

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The appointment of [] and the pressing need for furnishing training to OPC personnel posed many questions and doubts for TRS. When OPC asked that [] be enrolled in the Advanced Intelligence Course (AIC) beginning in January 1949, the Deputy Chief of TRS felt a policy question had been raised of sufficient importance as to justify a meeting with Admiral Hillenkoetter. The question: should OPC personnel be permitted to take OSO/TRS courses, particularly the advanced ones? The DC/TRS pointed out in a memorandum of 22 December that OPC officers would acquire definite information about OSO practices and procedures, learn the identities of OSO persons and even become friends with them, with consequent risks to security of operations. This particular problem was resolved by an OPC Administrative Memorandum which listed the lectures in the AIC which OPC personnel would be able to audit. Both

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[] and [] then audited the Advanced Course in January 1949, but were excluded from lectures considered by TRS to be of purely OSO interest or of high security classification.

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[] first progress report (4 February 1949) tells of an unsuccessful effort to obtain the services of the Director of the State Department Foreign Service Institute for

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the purpose of making a thirty-day survey of the existing training facilities in CIA, the Military Establishment, and other governmental agencies. He reported that the OSO Communications Branch had agreed to recruit and train communications personnel for OPC with the understanding that OPC would furnish several instructors. He also said that several OPC staff personnel had been enrolled in evening courses at American University, for training in administrative and personnel work.

[] stated that his main problem was the procurement and training of instructors, but he felt this should not be done so hastily as to be a security hazard. As one way of solving this problem, OPC by this time had approached OSO with a proposal that the two offices jointly screen and recruit [] instructors during the first six months of 1949. They would then be carried on the OPC T/O, but detailed to TRS for training in all phases of clandestine activity, for a period of up to six months. Then, under TRS guidance, they would research and write OPC training materials for another six months, at the same time getting on-the-job practice in conducting instruction before beginning their actual duties as OPC training Officers. No action was taken on this proposal, however.

2. The Joint OSO/OPC Training Committee

[] report also told of the establishment of a Joint OSO/OPC Training Committee by authority of an ADPC memorandum dated 11 January 1949 and an ADSO memorandum dated 18 January 1949. This Committee was composed of Messrs. [] and []

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from OSO/TRS and [] and [] from OPC.

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Their first duty was the composition of a proposed outline of functions and duties which would then be submitted to ADSO and ADPC for approval. This Committee's membership changed frequently, but it continued to meet up to four times a month until its dissolution in July 1951, at the time that OSO/OPC Training was placed under the organizational jurisdiction of Matthew Baird. During the two and a half years of its existence, the Joint Committee was the key factor in the rapid development of the Training organization which took place in this critical period.

The Committee at the beginning felt that its job was primarily to make recommendations on training policy, more particularly as questions arose regarding joint use of facilities, instructors, and activities. It was also seen as having the authority to establish procedures and channels for the conduct of training matters of joint concern.

The deliberations of the Committee have been preserved in a complete file of carefully written minutes of their meetings. A study of this file reveals that the Committee's time during the first half of 1949 was taken up primarily by the general question of what kind of training OPC people were to get and the extent to which they could utilize or be admitted to already existing OSO courses. In January 1949, the Committee studied an OPC request for a one-week course in the recruiting, briefing and handling of agents, and decided that with very little change

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in the Advanced Intelligence Course, it would be more practical to admit OPC personnel to the two weeks of that course which dealt with "tradecraft," than to set up a separate course.

In February, the Committee decided that [] students from OPC could be taken into the two-week segment of the AIC, but during the "live problem," half of these students would have to be limited to observing rather than participating. As for the Basic Intelligence Training Course (BITC), it was agreed that [] OPC students could be accepted in addition to the regular quota of [] from OSO, if [] could assume a share of the instructing load. A few auditors could also be fitted into the limited space.

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The minutes note that on 16 February the Committee felt unable to proceed further until the Assistant Directors approved its statement of its functions and responsibilities. The Committee also felt that the training staffs were hampered by their lack of understanding of how OSO and OPC were planning to coordinate their respective activities. This of course was something that nobody else knew the answer to at this time.

During March 1949, the Committee concerned itself with problems of language training (OSO had used up all its funds for Foreign Service Institute training), admission of OPC students to OSO courses, the proposal for the training of OPC instructors which had been made the previous December, the relationship of OPC Training with OSO Communications Training,

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Cover and Documentation Training, etc., with questions of additional space for current courses, and with the design of a T/O for OPC training. [] in his Training Report for March, noted that he was spending four to eight hours a week on OPC training matters, while his Deputy, [] was devoting 12 to 16 hours a week to these matters, with other members of TRS giving an appreciable amount of time either to training OPC students or to helping OPC Training to set up its own programs.

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3. Development of the OPC Training Unit

In March 1949, the OPC Training Unit added James Cross to its staff temporarily and conducted a six-hour Indoctrination Course for [] persons. It also had [] persons waiting for formal instruction, prior to being assigned to the Training Unit. [] and [] were taking the OSO courses in preparation for their assignments as instructors. During April 1949, a T/O of [] persons for OPC Staff Training was drawn up for approval; this number, when compared with the contemporary OSO Training T/O of [] gives a measure of the large-scale plans being drawn up in OPC. In addition, OPC was preparing a T/O for the conduct of para-military training in an area outside Washington; courses were being planned, and a search for a suitable site had begun.

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At the beginning of June 1949, [] reported that the recruitment of personnel continued to be the biggest

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problem facing him. It appeared impossible to fill his T/O with men who had had operational experience, and he had come to the conclusion that it would be necessary to recruit from college faculties the men who had the personal qualifications and who could be trained to be members of the Training Staff. Letters had been sent to [] individuals who either had been in OSS or had been recommended by members of OPC. A total of [] men had answered; [] of these had been interviewed; of these, [] had been hired.

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An area for para-military training had not yet been located, but even if it had been, it could not have been staffed other than by drawing on military personnel entirely. Actually on duty in the Training Branch at this time were []

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[] (secretary), and [] (temporarily). []

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[] were enrolled in training courses, as was []

[] a researcher. It was quite obvious that any hope of setting up a training unit in the near future was not related to reality.

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During June, additional letters were sent to individuals and to six college presidents or deans, the archives were combed for names, and of [] men interviewed, one was hired []

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[] individuals were assigned to full-time personnel duties in an effort to find suitable people for the Training Branch. These efforts continued through the summer, with slow

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progress being made. But by this time, the status of OPC
Training was being changed.

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CHAPTER VI. The Merger of OSO and OPC Training

1. Studies of the Problem

When OPC first set up its own Training Branch, the Chief of TRS [] worked out a plan for merging it with the OSO Training. In a carefully thought out memorandum of 10 January 1949 entitled "CIA Organization and Functions" addressed to the ADSO, he proposed that the Chief, TRS, have a Deputy for OSO-type training, a Deputy for OPC-type training, and a Deputy for Covert Training (for both OSO and OPC). Administrative training, basic orientation, and a basic intelligence course would be available for people of both Offices. Advanced courses for OSO and for OPC would be offered as required. He felt that TRS should continue to be under the direction of the ADSO for a number of reasons, chief of which was the continuity of experience and the assets already in being on the OSO side. He also proposed that TRS be advised on training requirements, objectives and plans affecting training by a committee composed of the chief planning officers of OSO and OPC as well as representatives of the operations staffs of each Office. He pointed out the numerous advantages in having a single training staff, and foresaw the possibility of a single Office of Training serving the entire Agency eventually.

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[] proposal for the organization of Training was

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composed in an atmosphere of urgency caused by an apparent threat from another direction. In the preceding several months, the DCI had been moving in the direction of centralizing under an Executive for Administration a number of support functions which had previously been performed within OSO. []

[] noted in his memorandum that the most recent CIA Organization Chart (dated 1 January 1949) stated that the Personnel Officer, as one of his functions, "provides training and indoctrination for CIA employees as needed." This seemed to give the Personnel Officer of CIA the authority to assume jurisdiction over all OSO training. (b)(3)

[] took a strong position against the placing of training under personnel or administrative officers, pointing out that the nature of secret intelligence work made it imperative that the training of people for such work be closely related to covert plans and operations. He felt that the Agency should take the approach of the Armed Services rather than that of a typical government bureau, and cited the example of the organizational placing of the training function within the British Intelligence Service. He therefore recommended (as part of his proposal) that the DCI delegate the responsibility for all CIA training to the ADSO. (b)(3)

The Chief of TRS in this paper enunciated a basic outlook which has been fundamental to training philosophy ever since. The closeness of TRS to the operating elements of OSO generated

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the view that training was a basic part of operations, rather than a personnel function. Part of [] problem with OPC Training stemmed from the fact that it was organizationally under a Chief of Support (along with Personnel and Finance) whereas OSO Training was under the Chief of Operations. Over the years, all of the Directors of Training have worked to strengthen the ties with operating elements (particularly the Clandestine Services), and have resisted periodic proposals that the Training organization be merged with the Personnel Office.

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Although [] conceded that the non-OSO/OPC employees might need some formal indoctrination, he did not deal with that problem, limiting his proposal to ways of organizing for training in clandestine activities. In this, he was following the example set by OSS Training. His plan was still being studied in August 1949, when [] the Agency Management Officer, indicated that the proposal for a unified training staff under the ADSO was acceptable in principle, although he believed that CIA should have one training staff which would handle all training for the Agency, including the orientation of new personnel for ORE, OCD, etc.

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Meanwhile, in the first few months of 1949, it was becoming increasingly clear to the Joint Training Committee that joint effort would answer many of the problems that had developed. At a meeting of the Committee on 11 May 1949, [] submitted a draft of recommendations to be submitted to the ADSO and the ADPC, on the subject of joint OSO/OPC training programs. This paper

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did not mention a proposed organization or chain of command, but otherwise reflected the proposals of the previous January.

This paper evidently added to the pressure that was building up for some solution to the joint problems. On 21 May 1949, an all-day conference was held on the subject of OPC Training. The following were present: [redacted] and [redacted] (for TRS); [redacted] Mr. Cross, [redacted] (for OPC Training); [redacted] (Chief of Support/OPC) and his Deputy, [redacted] (Executive Officer/OPC); and two consultants, [redacted] and [redacted] (evidently brought in by OPC).

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The OSO courses and facilities were described by [redacted] and [redacted] discussed the proposed activities, facilities and T/O of OPC Training. Training requirements were discussed by various OPC Program Chiefs (e.g., sabotage, guerrilla warfare).

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[redacted] in a follow-up of [redacted] previous proposals, showed the savings in personnel and facilities that would result from coordinated courses, assessments, and research. The chart which he used moved [redacted] to suggest that all OSO and OPC training be placed under the authority of a Joint Training Board, composed of two members from each office, with its own T/O, and under the direction of a high-ranking Chief of Joint Training. Four days later, a detailed proposal to this effect which had been drafted by [redacted] was approved by the Joint Training Committee for submission to the ADSO and the ADPC for their concurrence and forwarding to the Executive, CIA.

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This paper evidently stirred the interest of the ADSO, Colonel Schow, who asked [] to prepare written recommendations for him concerning OSO/OPC training problems. (b)(3)

In a paper of 3 June 1949 to the ADSO, [] said that the OSO Training Staff had been "squarely in the middle" ever since OPC had been set up. He felt that TRS had developed an excellent training program after several difficult years, but with barely enough strength to meet the requirements. At this point TRS had been told to assist OPC to develop a training unit but the demands this made on the meager TRS assets (both personnel and facilities) had necessarily lessened the quality of OSO training. Nevertheless, he said, the TRS personnel had recognized their obligation to help OPC establish a competent training staff and had given their best to the effort. (b)(3)

As [] was expecting to rotate to a field assignment shortly, he was desirous of leaving to his successor a clearly defined relationship with OPC. Therefore, he was again submitting his paper of 10 January for the ADSO's consideration, again suggesting a Chief of Training, appointed by the ADSO, with one deputy for OSO training and one for OPC training. This memorandum indicates that [] was somewhat apprehensive that Training might be put under the Office of Personnel if this problem were not resolved shortly. (b)(3)

[] proposal was held by the ADSO until 8 August. (b)(3)

In the meantime there were several other inputs. The two consultants who had attended the conference of 21 May [] (b)(3)

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and [] submitted detailed recommendations to the Chief of Support, OPC [] on 20 June 1949. They urged that a single Training Office be set up, with a Chief who would have three deputies---one for OSO training, one for OPC training, and one for "combined" training, i.e., training which was of mutual concern, such as language, administrative procedures, and basic operations. They noted that completely satisfactory unification of training facilities was not possible without the actual unification of OSO and OPC. But in view of the efficiency and effectiveness to be achieved, they advocated as much unification as was feasible at the time. They proposed that policy direction, priorities, and programs be provided to the training organization by a Joint Training Committee of three, consisting of the Chief of Training and one high-level officer each from OSO and OPC. The consultants stressed the importance of giving priority to the development of competent instructors and efficient techniques of instruction. Extant files indicate that this report stirred up a debate among the top staff officers of OPC as to the make-up of the committee, and the desirability of unification.

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On 14 July 1949 the Executive Officer of CIA informed the ADSO (in a memorandum of that date entitled "Table of Organization, Training Staff, OSO") that [] additional positions for Basic Training had been approved by the Director, these being in effect OPC slots. He also said that the Director had directed OSO to be "responsible for the conduct of basic training for personnel of OPC, such training to meet standards to be established by OPC."

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SECRET2. Establishment of the Training Division, OSO/OPC (TRD)

On 8 August 1949, the ADSO returned [] memo of (b)(3)
 3 June 1949 with the notation: "This should be restudied on
 this basis of a complete merger of OSO-OPC. The views set forth
 in the attachment could very well serve as a point of departure."
 Just at this point in time [] replacement, [] (b)(3)
 [] USA, entered on duty, and received the title (b)(3)
 of "Chief of the Training Division, OSO/OPC" (abbreviated as TRD).
 The Training Division was thereafter shown on the organization
 charts of OSO until it was officially detached on 1 July 1951
 and placed under the Director of Training, CIA. Although TRD was
 officially a part of OSO, it was in fact an amalgamation of the
 old TRS/OSO and of the Training Branch of OPC; it gradually be-
 came an integrated training organization along the lines suggested
 by [] and the [] team. (b)(3)

The recommendations of the [] report regarding (b)(3)
 policy direction and control of the integrated training unit were
 followed almost to the letter. The Joint Training Committee's
 membership was revised to include high-level representation from
 OSO and OPC. It then assumed a strong role in providing policy
 and general guidance (if not actual supervision) of TRD activities.
 True to the underlying philosophy, for a long time the OSO repre-
 sentative on the Committee was its Executive Officer, whereas the
 OPC representative was its Chief of Support. The Committee played
 a vital role in the activities of TRD from September 1949 to July
 1951, a critical period of rapid expansion and development.

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APPENDIX A

A NOTE ON SOURCE MATERIAL

The information in this historical paper has been drawn almost entirely from documents in the Office of the Director of Training or on deposit at the Record Center. In all cases, they have been identified in the narrative.

There has been a minimum reliance on interviews, other than the checking of details with knowledgeable individuals.

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