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INFORMATION REPORT

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THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
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(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE: From a source who was in an excellent position to obtain this information, from firsthand knowledge and conversations with Soviet officials who took part in these negotiations. Source is believed to be reliable (2). Appraisal of Content: 3.

- In April 1953, an ECAFE conference Asiatic Regions Mineral Resources Development Conference was held in Tokyo, Japan, and among the delegates were the following Soviets: Colonel Andrey Markovich Otroshchenko and Nikolay Ivanovich Generalov, who is now Soviet Ambassador to Australia. Generalov was formerly the political advisor to Lt. General Kuzma N. Nikolayevich Derevyanko and had previously been stationed in Japan from approximately 1947 to 1948 or 1949. While in Japan, Generalov demonstrated himself to be completely incompetent and was returned to Moscow after several scandals of a political and personal nature. After his return to Moscow he was fired from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and went to a political school of the Central Committee of the Communist Party for about a year, after which he was reinstated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then sent out as the Soviet Ambassador to Australia. Both Colonel Otroshchenko and Generalov were summoned personally by Molotov prior to their trip to the ECAFE conference in Tokyo. They were briefed by Molotov and told to investigate the situation and see what the possibility was of establishing diplomatic relations with Japan. Molotov pointed out to them that the Soviet representation in Japan suffered daily because of the pressures put on them by the Japanese.

- On arrival in Tokyo, meetings were arranged between Otroshchenko, Generalov, and certain Japanese political elements. The Japanese group, at least the leader of it, represented government court elements, and also included some representatives of business and political circles. The leader of this Japanese group was Prince Higashi-Kuni. The initial meeting was arranged through one Shimura (sic), the Japanese teacher at the Soviet Mission in Tokyo. Shimura had previously sounded out the Soviet attitude on the establishment of diplomatic relations through Georgiy Ivanovich Pavlychev and Fedor I. Lylich Kunov, both members of the Soviet Mission.

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3. There were two or three meetings between Otroshchenko, Genserslov, and the Japanese. Anatoliy F. Fedorovich Kotelnikov, a member of the Soviet Mission, was in charge of the arrangements for the meetings. These meetings were considered highly secret. At the first meeting they discussed ways and means of establishing diplomatic relations, but the Japanese did not suggest anything concrete. However, the Japanese did try to find out as best they could what the plan of the Soviet representatives was. As a consequence, no results were reached, and both sides were disappointed. After this meeting, Prince Higashi-Kuni did not want to meet with the Soviet representatives again, and for the subsequent two meetings sent a subordinate. The Soviet delegates sent many cables to Moscow in the course of the discussions.
4. Earlier attempts of numerous Japanese representatives from commercial and political circles to meet with Pavlychev and discuss the possibility of establishing closer relations between the USSR and Japan failed because Pavlychev declined to meet with them. He was deathly afraid of taking any action which could result in what might be considered a mistake and, therefore, could have an adverse effect on him and on his career. In order to excuse his inaction, Pavlychev, in his reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, exaggerated working conditions in Japan, stating that it was impossible to work in Japan, that there were police all over surveilling his personnel, that there was difficulty in getting out of the Mission, and that he could not meet Japanese leaders. He would pick out and send numerous examples from the newspapers which tended to substantiate his thoughts in this matter. Thus, Otroshchenko and Genserslov were very angry when they arrived on the scene and saw the real situation.
5. Pavlychev's timidity was particularly noteworthy, since in mid-autumn 1953 the Soviet Mission in Japan received a circular cable from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which was addressed to all Soviet embassies and diplomatic posts throughout the world. This cable advised the recipients to broaden their contacts in their areas of responsibility, to develop additional contacts in business, commercial, political, and newspaper circles, and to become more active. One of the reasons for this cable was that the Ministry in Moscow felt that it had been receiving inaccurate, incomplete, and misleading information through its political reporting channels because the reporters had been using newspapers and periodicals as their primary source of information. A second reason for this circular cable was to encourage the Soviet representatives abroad to convince local government circles of the desirability of Soviet policies and of Soviet good faith, i.e., to popularize the USSR. As an example of this, source cited the actions of the Soviet ambassador in Greece. Source feels that the effects of this cable should be easily noticeable in other areas of the world as well, indicated by an increased activity on the part of the local Soviet representatives. Until the time that this cable was circulated, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs depended primarily on information obtained by its representatives abroad from newspapers or publications. They realized that this was a very unsatisfactory system, and as a result directed specifically that their representatives abroad depend on their own conversations and observations drawn from intercourse with commercial, industrial, political, and other elements of the population of the areas in which they were assigned. Source feels that this is an important change in Soviet policy.
6. It is the intention of the USSR to use trade mission activities and expansion thereof to develop a relationship closer to a true diplomatic status between the USSR and Japan. In approximately December 1953, representatives of business circles in Japan took definite steps toward exchanging trade missions with the USSR as a first step toward the establishment of diplomatic relations. At this time many cables on this matter were sent to Moscow through Pavlychev's and the Soviet trade mission's channels. Molotov replied that "it was a very good idea", and ordered Pavlychev and Andrey M. Ivanovich Ygnitskiy of the trade mission to continue negotiations, to find out the details, and to make concrete suggestions. This was the first real concrete indication that diplomatic status, or some semblance of diplomatic status, would come about.

7. Anatoly Anatolyevich Rozanov, Chief of the Japanese Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Colonel Andrey Semenovitch Smirnov, Chief of the US section of the MVD, arrived in Japan with a group of Soviet skaters in January 1954. Although neither individual gave any concrete statements to the effect that in the near future the USSR planned to establish diplomatic relations with Japan, strong hints were given in that direction and to the effect that such establishment of diplomatic relations might take place in three to four months. Rozanov had specific orders concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations and discussed this matter with Vasily I. [Il'inh] Savelyev of the Soviet Mission. Rozanov is a very close friend of Savelyev, and when Rozanov was in Japan before, approximately 1946 to 1950, he served as a private informer to Savelyev.

1. Washington Comment: Names in brackets were added in Washington.