


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9 November 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting Between General Adolf Heusinger and the Director on 5 November 1959.

- 1. The following is a summary of Heusinger's statements:
- A. Progress in German Rearmament The Germans now have eleven divisions, nine of which are completely organized; two additional divisions will be brought to peacetime 70% strength this year; by end of 1960 will have fulfilled MC-70 goal of 12 divisions. Air Force will not become really operational until 1961 1963 period when Fl04s will be available. 150 now on order from U. S.; total F-104 strength will be 350. Current budget around 12-13 billion DMs; will be increased 15-16 to handle increased costs equipping Air Force. In short, Germany is on schedule in rearmament.
- B. Soviet Psychological Warfare Against Germany The Soviet Bloc PP effort against the Federal Republic has in the past twelve months reached an all time high. Attacks against Adenauer and some of his ministers, against senior civil servants such as Globka and against military leaders continue but are not the most serious problem. The Soviet political



offensive exploiting the "Spirit of Camp David," the growing conviction among the intellectuals and other segments of the population that the Adenauer policy of strength cannot bring about reunification and the continued unwillingness of the SPD to support either conscription or atomic weapons are creating conditions in which specific Eastern PP operations aimed at selected targets in West Germany are proving more effective.

Propaganda and political action operations intended to develop conflict between officers and enlisted ranks of the Armed Forces have become very intense and require a continuing program to inform German soldiers of Communist techniques. The most serious problems relate, however, to the propaganda efforts of the Soviets to exploit differences among the Western Allies and the political apathy of the Germans themselves.

C. The SPD and the Defense Forces - Heusinger has recently talked with Ollenhauer, Erler and other SPD leaders who have individually been sympathetic to Heusinger's problems over the years. He asked the SPD to adopt a military position limited to recognition of the need for conscription and for agreement that the German forces should be trained in modern weapons systems with the stated condition that all atomic warheads for such weapons should be kept under U. S. control.

Although individually each professed a positive attitude, none felt that the SPD as a party could possibly take this line.

Heusinger expressed concern that the SPD opposition would result in the history of the Weimar Republic repeating itself with the German military being driven into a political position of association with the Right. He recalled that Kurt Schumachter in their early post-war discussions had stated again and again that the SPD could never permit itself to make this mistake.

D. NATO Concepts - The 12 German divisions which will be ready by the end of 1960, the 5 American divisions, the 2

Belgium divisions, the 2 British divisions and the 1-1/2 French divisions if properly armed with modern atomic weapons and adequately supported will have a capability of deterring a Soviet offensive to a degree that a considerable risk would be involved to the Soviets. Certainly the Soviets could not without marshalling the Soviet forces available to them in East Germany and reinforcing them from the Soviet Union expect to easily overrun Western Europe. This force would fulfill the concept of the "shield" rather than the "tripwire" and will, if the Western Allies remain steadfast in their willingness to commit their strategic strike in support of this field, deter the Soviets from launching an European war. In the current political atmosphere, however, there is a new wave of doubt sweeping Europe concerning the

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willingness of the U.S. to (1) remain committed to the present degree to participation in European defense, and (2) use the nuclear strategic power to support the defense of Europe. Adenauer is extremely sensitive on this point and, as the history of recent years has shown, must be periodically reassured. The major crisis on this issue in connection with the 'Radford Plan' was overcome by U. S. assurances in early 1957 which produced a period of relatively calm that lasted until late 1958 when the Berlin crisis initiated by the Soviets produced a series of results ranging from Macmillan's trip to Moscow to Khrushchev's visit to America. Heusinger emphasized that the Chancellor has, since the death of Secretary Dulles, felt compelled to assume a greater responsibility to sustain a policy of strength vis-a-vis the Soviets. The success of the Eisenhower visit to Bonn reassured him only temporarily. Heusinger emphasized repeatedly that (1) The "shield" of NATO must be kept strong, (2) Khrushchev must be told again and again that the West is prepared to fight a nuclear global war if he attacks Western Europe, and (3) the leaders and the people of Europe must be convinced that the U. S. is not going to retreat from the concepts and goals of NATO.

E. German/British Relations - From Heusinger's remarks

I inferred that Adenauer's unconcealed distrust of the British is considered somewhat irrational by many Germans. He noted, for example, that Adenauer's most recent public outburst on this subject would do little to lay the ground for a successful visit to London in a fortnight. He urged that we do anything we could to convince the Chancellor that Macmillan is not another Chamberlain.

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