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DATE 2006

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7 June 1955 per GSN 43-26

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations

SUBJECT: GEHLEN's Relationships with HEUSINGER and SPEIDEL

1. A recent dispatch (attached) from Colonel Critchfield based on a long talk with General Heusinger provides us with some details on indications of gradually mounting friction between Generals HEUSINGER and GEHLEN on the one hand, and HEUSINGER and SPEIDEL on the other. At the same time the relationship between GEHLEN and SPEIDEL seems to be getting closer.

2. The central issue giving rise to this friction revolves around the question of security risks and the extent to which the West German government is penetrated by the Soviet IS. As you know, GEHLEN has a theory that a "Rote Kapelle" exists in West Germany today and that a number of key government officials are involved in varying degrees. One of his pet projects is to collect all possible information tending to support this theory. Among those considered by GEHLEN as security risks are Achim OSTER and Juergen BRANDT of HEUSINGER's staff; however, GEHLEN has been unable to produce any concrete evidence to support his suspicions. HEUSINGER is fully aware of GEHLEN's theory and of his reservations concerning OSTER and BRANDT. In the absence of concrete derogatory information he feels obligated to support his subordinates; nevertheless, GEHLEN's charges have tended to make his job considerably more complicated. At the same time charges - relatively common in Bonn circles - of GEHLEN's "meddling in politics" continue to reach HEUSINGER's ears. He admits that he has no concrete proof of these charges but they do tend to increase his concern that GEHLEN is involved in matters which are not properly the responsibility of the GIS. HEUSINGER remarked that he considers it a regrettable coincidence that the Germans have a "good intelligence service" and a "weak security service".

3. The gradually developing friction between HEUSINGER and SPEIDEL seems to be based on several factors. HEUSINGER seems to resent the fact that SPEIDEL has been leading a leisurly existence in Paris leaving him (HEUSINGER) in Bonn with all the headaches. SPEIDEL tends to support GEHLEN's theories on Soviet IS penetration of the West German government and has criticized HEUSINGER's indecisiveness in ridding the BLANK Office of "security risks". Also playing a key role in this entire relationship is former Lt. Col. Gerhard WESSEL, a key member of SPEIDEL's staff who was on very close terms with HEUSINGER when both were with ZIPPER. WESSEL left ZIPPER as "HEUSINGER's man" on temporary loan to SPEIDEL in Paris but has obviously become "SPEIDEL's man" and is solidly on the side of GEHLEN and SPEIDEL in their views on "security risks" in the BLANK Office.

4. Both GEHLEN and HEUSINGER agree that WESSEL should be the G-2 in the new defense establishment. With the present personal situation in the

BLANK Office this would mean that he would be working under KIELMANNSEGG and that OSTER would be a member of his staff. WESSEL objects to KIELMANNSEGG for personal reasons, and to OSTER for security reasons. There have, however, been indications that KIELMANNSEGG will receive an assignment in Paris with SHAPE. This would probably clear the air considerably for WESSEL's assignment as the G-2. This change, along with the establishment of a GIS, some clarification of the respective charters of the BfV and the GIS, and, perhaps most important of all, the move of ZIPPER into a legal framework offering a variety of checks and balances that do not in a legal sense exist under the present arrangement, will probably resolve most of the irritating factors that affect the relationship between HEUSINGER and GEHLEN. In the final analysis, however, it is GEHLEN's preoccupation with the problem of Soviet penetration of the West German government (dossiers in Pallasch on Federal Republic officials) which represents the root of the problem.

5. On the issue of German entry into NATO, GEHLEN and HEUSINGER appear to be in complete agreement in that they support unequivocally the entrance of the Federal Republic into NATO, establishment of a full 12 Division Army and closest cooperation with the United States. This unanimity of opinion also seems to extend to the GIS and its relations with the German defense establishment.

Chief, Eastern European Division

Attachment: EOLA-14109

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The UTILITY/HORN/SPEIDEL Relationship

(DELAYED REPORT) **DEF. CAN 43-26**

1. I came away from dinner and a long evening with HORN on 18 April with some very distinct impressions regarding current relationships between him and UTILITY on the one side and him and Hans SPEIDEL on the other. On all important political and military issues all three of these former Generals steadfastly support the policy of Chancellor ADENAUER. Both HORN and UTILITY have, in conversations as recent as the third week in April 1955, clearly and unequivocally supported the entrance of the FedRep into NATO, pressing ahead vigorously with the establishment of the full 12 Division Army, closest cooperation with the United States and, in general, full support of Chancellor ADENAUER's policy of integration in the European and Atlantic Communities. This unanimity of opinion also seems to extend to the issue of the GIB and its relations with the German defense establishment. However, beneath the surface of this ostensibly harmonious atmosphere there do exist some differences which may in the future assume significance.

2. The crux of the matter is that UTILITY and HORN do not agree on the extent and character of penetration of the Federal Republic. SPEIDEL, on the other hand, has gradually developed with UTILITY a relationship of which HORN is both resentful and disapproving. HORN, during each of the conversations that I have had with him during the past year or so, has eventually gotten around to SPEIDEL. He resents the fact that SPEIDEL has been leading a leisurely existence in Paris, leaving HORN in Bonn with all the headaches. Also, WIELAND, who left ZIPPER as "HORN's man" temporarily on loan to SPEIDEL in Paris, has obviously become "SPEIDEL's man" and is solidly on the side of UTILITY and SPEIDEL in their criticism of HORN's indecisiveness in ridding the WANCE office of "security risks." Twice during the last year I have lunched alone with WIELAND. Although both UTILITY and HORN periodically reaffirm that WIELAND will be the I-C, WIELAND has refused to work with OSTER (for security reasons) and under KIELMANNSENE (for personal reasons). WIELAND was, some months ago, sharply critical of the fact that HORN had permitted the situation to develop where Juergen BRANDT and OSTER were the only two members permitted to carry the SPERIC material between PARIS and BONN. WIELAND is well known for his biting sarcasm and his lack of tact. He is known as a brilliant officer with strong convictions and opinions to which he rather stubbornly adheres.

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He is impartial in his choice of targets and I have heard him take UTILITY over the coals with the same personal detachment that has been characteristic of his criticisms of HORN in the last year. Both SPEIDEL and WIELAND are aware of and approve of UTILITY's UJRTZZLY theory and consequently feel that HORN is, on this count, naive.

3. [] and I talked without interruption with HORN for six hours. At least half of the conversation dealt directly or indirectly with the related issues of UTILITY's "meddling in politics", the prevailing sentiment of distrust vis-a-vis all former Generals, the unresolved issue of the GB charter within the Federal Republic, ex-ZIPPERites in the government, the political opposition to direct dependency of either the defense establishment or the intelligence service on the Chancellor, the definition of a "security risk," the responsibility of HORN and BLANK vis-a-vis security cases in Amt BLANK and the entire problem of communist penetration of the Federal Republic. HORN considers it a regrettable coincidence that the Germans have a "good Intelligence service" and a "weak security service." He feels that RADKE would be the BfV President today if he were not an ex-ZIPPERite. He is concerned about the number of people who in turn have expressed concern about UTILITY's men throughout the government. Some one had even gone so far, he said, as to compare UTILITY's role with that of von SEECKT after World War I. HORN knows that both SPEIDEL and WIELAND continue to maintain contact to UTILITY; one of HORN's staff during a recent visit to Paris noted a "report to UTILITY" in WIELAND's typewriter. HORN feels that all Amt BLANK staff members in Paris should have only one channel for reporting - to his office in Bonn. He believes that UTILITY should concern himself exclusively with the collection of intelligence and the running of operations against hostile services outside of the Federal Republic. UTILITY's UJRTZZLY activities he finds most dangerous and categorically the responsibility of the BfV.

4. At times the conversation got down to specific cases. The EDER case was, he thought, improperly handled; it should have been turned over to the BfV at the very beginning. He also noted that UTILITY had suggested that certain members of Amt BLANK were security risks but had failed to provide Amt BLANK with evidence.

5. HORN had no specific examples in mind regarding UTILITY's "meddling in politics"---it was simply a charge that has been made very often. He had not heard of any specific incidents---not even of the case of ZORR, the LfV Hesse Chief who was reportedly dropped for a too close association with ZIPPER. HORN agreed that the general charge of "political meddling" was partially an outgrowth of the old "special connection" operation and partially the result of an active opposition made up of a variety of individuals and groups with rather varied motives. Nevertheless, it does appear that HORN does have a genuine concern that UTILITY may be heading for internal political difficulties. He admitted that, spurred by stories that reached him to the effect that UTILITY was supporting BONIN in his "disloyal role," he had written a sharply worded letter to UTILITY demanding a "Stellungnahme." At this point, demonstrating rather remarkable

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mental agility, HORN noted that he had positive evidence that BORN was in contact with Herbert WEHNER of the SPD and "other neutralists such as HEINEMANN and NYENDELLER."

6. Both [] and I had the impression that BORN has never really sat down and clarified his own thinking on the subject of the broad counter-intelligence and security problems that face the Federal Republic. His statements on the subject were mainly expressions of irritation with the existing situation which he, along with a lot of other people in and out of the Federal Republic government, considers unsatisfactory.

7. HORN confirmed a statement made earlier the same day to [] that KIELMANNSEGG will probably receive an assignment in France with SHAPE. His departure would probably clear the air for WIELAND's assignment as the I-C. This change, along with the establishment of a GIS, some clarification of the respective charters of the BfV and the GIS and, perhaps most important of all, the move of ZIPPER into a legal framework offering a variety of checks and balances that do not in a legal sense exist under the present arrangement, will probably resolve most of the irritating factors that affect the relationship between HORN and UTILITY. In the final analysis, however, it is UTILITY's preoccupation with GJDRIZZLY ("dossiers on Federal Republic officials") which is the kernel of the problem. In the present political situation in Germany, with almost the certain prospect that "neutralism" and "Eastern connections" will become increasingly common in German political life, it will take some very persuasive forces to effect a complete reorientation of UTILITY away from his favorite professional hobby.

8. The rest of the conversation with HORN dealt with developments in Amt BLANK planning and the relationship with the U.S. Advanced Planning Group. He was most lyrical about the latter and confident that the forming of German Armed Forces could now proceed. In view of the extensive contact that now exists between Amt BLANK and the U.S. military, it would not seem that KUBARK has any further obligation to report on this activity. Also, the fact that KUBARK continues to retain contact with HORN should be considered a KUBARK matter. The HORN/SPEIDEL/WIELAND relationship is also an affair that should be kept, for the present, within KUBARK. Thus, it is requested that no dissemination of the contents of this report be made and that, within KUBARK, it be handled on a need-to-know basis. An exception in the case of Mr. Dowling and the ambassador may be made. I am quite willing to leave to Offenbach's judgment the necessity and extent of a briefing of them on any of the information obtained from HORN as long as he is not revealed as the source.

C J