VIA: ATR (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. EGL-A- 323

SECRET CLASSIFICATION

TO

: Chief, EE

DATE: 26 September 1952

FROM : Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Op_rational

SPECIFIC— Conversation with General Heusinger, 17 September 1952.

- 1. Heusinger had a meeting with General Ridgway several weeks ago. In the course of this meeting Heusinger became aware that Ridgway is experiencing more than considerable difficulty with Marshal Juin in the leadership of SHAPE. Juin seems to be exercising much more authority than would be normal to the second in command of the Supreme Headquarters. The added prestige of Juin's rank appears to play a predominant role, and Heusinger is of the opinion that another star for Ridgway would go far in alleviating some of his difficulties. Juin is not endeared to the Germans in general, and this has been aggravated recently by several statements made by Juin:
 - a. During a recent discussion on European defense problems Juin is credited with the statement that when Germany participates in the defense of Europe, the campaign tactics of the German contingents will be similar to those exercised by General Rommel in Africa. This has caused considerable criticism in the German press, and was considered to be an unwarranted statement.
 - b. Juin's typical attitude was reflected in connection with a discussion of German defense and contingent planning. Blank-Heusinger-Speidel raised the matter of establishing close collaboration with the U.S. and British defense forces for the interim period when Germany will be going through its conscription, training, equipping phase, preparatory to assigning the contingents to EDC. Heusinger is of the opinion that this period will last approximately 18 months. When Juin heard this he replied that this is not the business of the Americans or the British in any event, but it is a matter that properly belongs under the jurisdiction of EDC. This, however, is not agreed upon by Heusinger or other military planners. It is their opinion that EDC will exercise no role during the first 18 months after ratification, during the time military preparations are conducted within Germany under the direction of the "Zonenbefehlshaber".

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- 2. The British are conducting a concerted effort to woo the future German military staffs. Heusinger has been invited to every British maneuver conducted in Germany. He has been invited to attend a meeting with the British War Minister, Lord Alexander, in Kirkpatrick's home in the next few days. He has also been invited to attend the current British maneuver "Hold Fast". In general, the relationship between the German military staff and the British is extremely good. There is still no American high level contact since the departure of General Hays. Heusinger cannot understand why the Americans are not following up on this since it would be to our advantage. He raised the point that it would be a good idea if were to invite Heusinger to attend a meeting between General and I to discuss Germany's role in the EDC.
- 3. Heusinger personally is considerably discouraged that the defense planning matters have again slowed down. He stated it is now common gossip in Bonn that the French will in no case ratify before January or February, 1952, and this means, the first contingents will not appear until the last part of 1953, if then, since the coming elections will play a very predominant role.
- 4. Karl Friederich Heinz had a meeting recently with Heusinger, at which time Heinz discussed the possibilities of his future activities. Heinz readily admitted that he does not and will not enjoy a future as head of this present embryonic German military intelligence service; that he is most anxious to meet with UTILITY; that he and his group would welcome any sort of absorption into the ZIPPER organization. Heinz J queried Heusinger about the "II" activities of ZIPPER to which Heusinger admitted no knowledge. Heinz then stated that he would prefer this sort of an assignment with ZIPPER since he considers himself to be one of the most qualified Germans in this particular field. Heusinger advised Heinz to contact UTILITY at the first opportunity to discuss his case. Heinz acquiesced and had a further discussion with Blank on the matter of Blank's attitude towards the future of Heinz. Blank allegedly informed Heinz that he obviously cannot retain him as the head of any intelligence organizetion after ratification of the treaties, but he is aware of the loyal service that Heinz has rendered over the last two and one-half years and assured him of some sort of assignment. On 18 September Heinz was supposed to meet Merker with Heinrichsbauer in Munich for a detailed discussion- - if UTILITY had agreed.
 - 5. UTILITY visited Heusinger the week of the 15th September during which time Heusinger raised the issue of Heinz and advised UTILITY to seriously consider taking him into his organization. UTILITY was non-commital, in fact, rendered no opinion even after Heusinger advised UTILITY that he told Heinz to make contact with the organization. Heusinger claims not to understand UTILITY's attitude toward Heinz. If UTILITY wants to dispose of him he will have to do it in a legal manner and Heusinger seriously doubts that UTILITY has sufficient information available to discredit him.

SECULITY INFORMATION SECRET

- 6. On the question of a Liaison Staff of the German IS and the interim problem of one liaison man to the British, Heusinger expressed his opinion that Herdahl definitely should not be connected with the liaison staffs. It is his suggestion that he stay where he is and that he will be much better off. Thorwald's recent book did more harm to Herdahl than good. In fact, it is a laughing matter among the PULLACH crowd and according to Heusinger if the Nuremberg trials were still in existence Herdahl would find himself a defendant based only on the statements that are contained in this book. Heusinger suggests that Gerstorf be contacted as the man for the liaison job for the British.
- 7. On the question of G-2 for the interim planning staff with EDC, Heusinger is firmly convinced that the initial men for the job is WTELAND. Heusinger had a discussion with Speidel in the last few days during which time it was confirmed that the EDC G-2 interim staff will be headed by a German if a qualified person is found for the job. Wieland was in Bonn last week and Heusinger had a detailed discussion with him on this matter and they arranged that Wieland will go to Paris for at least two weeks in the very near future to look over the present plans and organization of the interim staff. Heusinger feels quite strongly that the right man must be assigned to this interim staff because ZIPPER's future relationship to the German Government will play a predominant role.
- 8. The question of G-2's with the EDC staffs will come up for discussion during the October session. Since the G-2's of EDC will have no collection responsibilities and since collection is now presumed to be conducted by the national intelligence services of the respective countries it is only a question of time when the German planning staff will be queried about a national intelligence service of theirs which will be able to contribute to the EDC G-2's. This point cannot be denied and Heusinger is of the opinion that we should be well prepared with what we are going to state at that time.
- 9. Blank prefers a G-2 of the Defense Ministry to be a separate individual from the head of the GIS Evaluation Staff. However, he does not care if the former individual is a former ZIPPERite.
- 10. Heusinger has not heard of British influence over the creation of a German ONI. In fact, he has not heard anything about the plans for a ONI office and feels that he would certainly be informed if such plans were being considered.