

Heusinger

26 May 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: ZIPPER

The attached memorandum contains the results, as they are known to date, of High Commissioner McCloy's discussion of ZIPPER with Chancellor Adenauer, and also some reflections of Bonn thinking on ZIPPER as relayed to our representatives by General Heusinger.

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ZIPPER-BONN Relations

1. General Truscott, Gordon Stewart and our senior representative with ZIPPER met with High Commissioner McCloy and two of his assistants on 11 May 1951 to outline the planned discussion of ZIPPER between Mr. McCloy and Chancellor Adenauer. Our former position was modified somewhat, since it was the opinion of Mr. McCloy's advisors that the December Brussels agreement of the North Atlantic Council prohibited German military intelligence. Rather than attempting to arrange closer cooperation between ZIPPER and Bonn and a token of recognition from Bonn for ZIPPER, Mr. McCloy would restrict himself to suggesting that Adenauer point out to Gehlen that, although Bonn could have no military intelligence now, ZIPPER would be given full consideration when such an organization is permissible. General Truscott and Mr. McCloy also discussed the possibility of protesting, under the terms of the Brussels agreement, the existence of Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz' semi-official intelligence agency in Theodor Blank's office. It was decided that the case against Heinz would be too thin to press, and it was agreed that it would not be brought up.

2. On 17 May Mr. McCloy discussed ZIPPER with Adenauer briefly and according to plan. Herbert Blankenhorn, a German official charged by Adenauer with liaison between his Chancellery and the High Commissioner's office, was present. Mr. McCloy later told his Director of Intelligence, Benjamin Shute, that Adenauer was well informed and fully aware of the problem and that he had agreed to call in Gehlen for discussion.

3. Some additional indications of Bonn feeling on ZIPPER were passed along to our representative by General Heusinger on 22 May 1951. He said that on 10 May, in a meeting of the Allied-German Military Committee, General Hayes spelled out for the first time the specific Brussels prohibitions of a top German staff in the fields of planning, operations, and intelligence. The exchange of views on the definition of intelligence was inconclusive. General Heusinger added to our representative that Bonn still does not recognize the Brussels agreement and that the Germans would accept a prohibition on intelligence only if the French, Dutch, and other North Atlantic nations would likewise forego sovereign intelligence services.

4. Heusinger also said that on 10 May, at a large party at the home of General Jean Ganeval, he had been approached by one of Adenauer's associates who discussed the urgency of the German intelligence problem, inquired as to Heusinger's views on ZIPPER, and posed the problem of what to do about Heinz and his office. Unfortunately, Heusinger did not further identify this official, but it is believed to have been Herbert Blankenhorn, who was present at the McCloy-Adenauer discussion of ZIPPER. It is of interest to note—although it may not be significant—that Blankenhorn is generally believed to be extremely close to British intelligence.

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5. One other indication of German political thinking which Heusinger passed on was a recent expression to him by Carlo Schmid of his dissatisfaction with the progress of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and his belief that ZIPPER should be taken over by the government in the near future. Schmid, as you will recall, is the number three man in the SPD.

Refs: MGKA-29312
PULL 2177 (IN 42689)
PULL 2184 (IN 43081)

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