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A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION * Except as noted

SOURCE Paragraphs 1 and 4: Former Japanese intelligence officer, friend of HAYASHI Saburo.

Paragraphs 2,3,5,6: Former Japanese officer with intelligence experience, a close friend of HATTORI Takushiro.

- B-3 1. According to ex-Colonel HAYASHI Saburo (坂 七郎), the HATTORI Organization (Hikan) is approaching him in two ways to try to change his anti-HATTORI attitude. First, HATTORI Takushiro has repeatedly sent his subordinate, ex-Colonel IMOTO Kuzo (井 本 久生), to HAYASHI in attempts to alleviate strained relations between the two and to eliminate misunderstandings. Second, some members of the HATTORI Organization have told the Attorney General's Office that HAYASHI is suspected of holding pro-Communist views. During January 1952, a member of the Attorney General's Office came to HAYASHI's house to interrogate him on this point.
- B-2 2. HAYASHI is more closely allied with ex-Colonel SUGITA Kaguji (or Ichiji) (杉田 一治), a member of the HATTORI Organization and of the newly-formed Military Advisory Board,² than is generally supposed. SUGITA apparently keeps HAYASHI informed of the details of secret HATTORI Organization meetings. IMOTO kept up his contacts with HAYASHI through February, and late in that month HAYASHI, IMOTO, SUGITA, and a certain ex-Colonel MURAKAMI (from) (村 上 三郎), all graduates of the Army Officers School 37th class, had an informal talk on current events.
3. Former Lieutenant Colonel TANAKA Kengoro (田中 健三郎), reported by the Kyoto News Agency on 1 March 1952 to be a member of the new Military Advisory Board,³ is one of the HATTORI "colleagues" (doshi), and HATTORI places much hope in him.
- B-3 4. According to HAYASHI, the HATTORI Organization has a representative in every prefecture in Japan, with several men under each. KOTANI Etsuo (甲 谷 悦生) is the HATTORI representative in Yamaguchi Ken.⁴ The person in charge of studying economic requirements of rearmament for the HATTORI Organization is former Major KUMURADANI Koji (小 村 谷 廣三), a graduate of the Military Academy in the 47th class (1935) and of the War

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College, and a member of the Military Affairs Section of the War Ministry.

5. Late in February 1952, a left-wing Socialist and KANDA Asano (江崎 阿佐), Communist, made an interpellation in the Welfare Committee of the Diet on HATTORI's section, the Historical Records Department, War Demobilization Board. The interpellators wanted HATTORI to appear before the committee to explain the position and activities of his department, but the Demobilization Board refused to send him, offering in his place the chiefs of the General Affairs Department and of the Demobilization Board. The interpellators turned down the suggestion, but it appeared that HATTORI would not be summoned before the committee.
6. The Welfare Ministry apparently intends to reduce the size of the Historical Records Department from that of a department (bu) to a section (ka) and to reduce HATTORI's position to that of a person "attached" to the War Demobilization Headquarters. The move was originally planned for the week of 2-9 March 1952, but, as of 20 March, it still had not been made. This plan had been advocated for some time by former Home Ministry personnel and other anti-HATTORI factions, but it appeared by 20 March that no move would be made until after the Peace Treaty comes into effect because of HATTORI's strong American support. However, the plan has gone beyond the speculation stage and has become a probability. HATTORI intends to resign from the War Demobilization Board should the proposal be effected.

- 1 Field Comment. IMOTO's contact with HAYASHI and its purpose are confirmed by Source 2. IMOTO also has a very close working relationship to INADA Seijun of the WATARABE Research Institute.
- 2 Field Comment. Other members of this committee reported previously are MIYANO Masatoshi, TAKAYAMA Nobutake, HOSODA Hiroshi, and ISODA Saburo. TAKAYAMA and HOSODA are former HATTORI subordinates, and the other two are past acquaintances of HATTORI.
- 3 Field Comment. Kyodo included in its list TANAKA, SUGITA, the four persons named in Field Comment 2, and three former naval officers, MANDA (fn), ONAE (?Toshiichi), and YOSHIDA Eizo, a captain in Section 1 of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry, who is at present engaged in the compilation of navy war records in the NIK Building. ZJJ-45 (Source 2) reports YOSHIDA as a member of the navy's YAMAMOTO (Yoshi) Organization, as does Shinzo Tokubatake, Trushin.
- 4 Source Comment. TANAKA is a man of excellent character.
- 5 Field Comment. Amplification of KOTANI's position appears in ZJJ-736, ZJJ-768, and ZJJ-70. Source 2 adds that KOTANI was graduated from the Army Officers School in the 37th class (that of TSUJI Masanobu and HAYASHI's associate TSUKAMOTO Makoto), served both in Germany and the USSR, was a war-time section chief in JIGS, and held the rank of colonel at the end of the war.
- 6 Field Comment. For the nation-wide aspects of the HATTORI Organization, see ZJJ-746. It appears that HATTORI has too many enemies in the present government to have any overt power after the Peace Treaty comes into effect. Previous reports have cited his preoccupation with HATOYAMA Ichiro's health; the inference is that, unless HATOYAMA can make a political comeback, HATTORI is finished as a political force.

ATTACHMENT A

Shinzo: Tokubetsu Igashin (Truths Special Report), No. 304, 5 January 1952.

Seething Rearmament Discussions.

Plan by those close to Prime Minister YOSHIDA; OKAMURA Keiji (or Yasutsugu), former general, takes part.

The year 1952 will be the year of Japan's rearmament. Former military men have begun intense activity. We will outline three major rearmament plans: (1) by those close to Prime Minister YOSHIDA; (2) by former Colonel HATTORI Takahiro; (3) by ASHIDA Hitoshi.

Plan of those close to Prime Minister YOSHIDA.

Prime Minister YOSHIDA admits that Japan must rearm because she has signed the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty. However, his rearmament attitude is rather negative for three reasons: (1) Japan is not economically strong enough to rearm; (2) Japan should not openly discuss rearmament in deference to Southeast Asian countries until the reparations issue is settled; (3) public opinion is not favorable. Those close to the Prime Minister say that he is unwilling to start rearmament while he is in office. However, in compliance with the request of the U.S. State Department adviser John Foster Dulles, he has ordered Chief Cabinet Secretary OKAZAKI Katsuo to draw up a plan for the gradual strengthening of a defense force based on the National Police Reserve. In making his plan, the prime minister has consulted IATSUNI Eisichi, former military attache to the London Embassy; SHIMOMURA Sadamu, former War Minister; KAWABE Shomo, former general; KAWABE Torashiro, former lieutenant-general; NOMURA Kichisaburo, former Admiral; HORI Tokichiro, former vice-admiral; YAMAMOTO Yoshio, former rear admiral; ARITA Hachiro, former Foreign Minister; HOTA Masaki, former adviser to the war-time Banking Embassy; IGUCHI Sadao, Vice-Foreign Minister; and WATANABE Tetsuo, former president of Toho Pictures. Other aides include SUGITA Kasuji (or Ichiji or Kasutsugu), HAYASHI Saburo, and MATSUTANI Makoto, all former colonels. According to the projected plan, the MFR and Maritime Safety Board will be strengthened. Japan will be defended by a defense corps in cooperation with U.S. garrison troops. A joint committee will be established for negotiating the Administrative Agreement called for under the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty. Besides the proposed committee, a Joint U.S.-Japanese Defense Council will be organized. This is an outline of the projected plan. It is explained in more detail as follows:

- (1) The National Police Reserve will be responsible for countering indirect aggression and U.S. garrison troops for direct aggression. The Joint U.S.-Japanese Defense Council will be organized for coordinating relations of the two parties.
- (2) JUSJDC will be empowered with the right of examining the munitions industry, will map out a plan for rearming Japan after U.S. troops are withdrawn from her territory, and will prepare a program which will bring Japan into the Pacific Collective Security Treaty.
- (3) The 75,000-man MFR personnel will be doubled in number of troops

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by the autumn of 1952. The question as to whether the Constitution should be amended will be examined at the same time. Most equipment will be leased from the United States. A part of the equipment will be produced in Japan. The United States will apply a sort of Lend-Lease Law to Japan for leasing equipment.

Recently a Cabinet shakeup has been carried out. According to the shakeup, OHASHI Takeo, Attorney General, has been appointed as the State Minister in charge of the NRP and National Rural Police. State Minister OHASHI, State Minister OKAZAKI Katsumi, and former military men who are usually called "those close to the Prime Minister" will participate in the plan-making. The draft plan will be as follows: A 150,000-man defense corps based on the National Police Reserve will be established. The defense corps will be composed of 10 divisions, each of 15,000 men. An infantry division and a mechanized corps division will be stationed in Hokkaido. Two infantry divisions and a mechanized corps division will be in Kyushu. An infantry division and a mechanized corps division will be in the Kanto Sector. An infantry division and a mechanized corps division will be in the Kanto Sector. Besides, there will be both an infantry and a mechanized corps division in reserve service. A naval force, with 308 vessels totaling 250,000 tons, will be created on a five-year basis. These vessels will include light cruisers, small-type aircraft carriers, destroyers, coast-defense boats, mine-layers, mine-sweepers, submarines. An air force of 1,200 aircraft will be created. Thus, Japan's land, sea and air forces will have a total of 250,000 men.

How much the above five-year draft plan will cost on the U.S. price basis is under calculation. A result of the calculation will be available by the end of January.

The "Okazaki" draft plan is criticized by the "Demobilization Bureau" Group, headed by HATTORI Takemichi, a former colonel. The group members claim the draft plan is a mere desk plan, because it lacks explanation on the military command, without which no military operations can be conducted. This criticism is supported by former militarist elements of the National Police Reserve. This has touched off a feud between the NRP militarist and bureaucrat elements. It is believed that the feud will reach a peak in the fall of 1952 when the NRP is reorganized.

SCAP sources think that it is no time to criticize the "Okazaki" draft plan. According, however, to their unofficial comment, "The draft plan which is aimed at minimum self-defense is not suitable for the current situation in which a drastic strategical change has taken place. The Prime Minister's negative rearmament attitude makes the nation more sceptical of rearmament than is necessary. The United States is trying at such cost to make Japan immune from Communist aggression by including her in a defensive structure against Russia. Therefore, she thinks that Japan has the duty of showing a definite attitude of cooperation with her. With this in view, the United States will shortly show the Japanese government a tentative plan from the new strategic viewpoint. Projects for Japanese aid, including that of "Lend-Lease", will soon be formalized. OKAMURA Weiji, former general, has expressed his opinions to SCAP regarding the projected tentative plan.

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WATANABE Tetsuo, former president of the Toho Motion Picture Co., manages a rearmament research institute. His staff is composed of former generals and admirals such as INABA Shiro, HOSHIHA Zenshiro, FUKUDOME Shigeru, etc. They made a rearmament plan, and showed it to U.S. State Department adviser John Foster Dulles and to Prime Minister Yoshida. Mr. Watanabe has maintained relations with those close to the prime minister. The Watanabe Rearmament Research Institute is said to be financed by the HAKAJIMA (Yadanji) group of former aircraft industrialists. According to the plan, 20 army divisions, each of 12,000 men, 300,000 tons of naval vessels, and 2,000 aircraft will be created. Twenty heavily-equipped army divisions trained in the American style will be enough to defend Japan, they think. The U.S. navy mainly will be responsible for the defense of Japanese sea lanes, and the Japanese navy will be employed as an auxiliary force. The prime minister will be entrusted with the command of Japanese defense forces. A Chief of Defense Council will be appointed from among able civil officials. Financially, the standard of living of the Japanese nation should not be cut down more. To that end, Japan must seek financial aid from the United States. These are the main points of the Watanabe plan. (To be continued)

1. Field Comment. Source 2 originally reported the Watanabe group to be financed partially by OOKO Ietsu (or Kiyoshi), or SRIKUSAMA Keiso, later concluding that the Kobe Steel Foundry K.K. had set up a fund through OOKO's good offices. OOKO was reported in recent news articles to be a leader of an eight-or-ten man delegation of aircraft experts going to the U.S. and Europe to study aircraft production. The articles did not, as far as we know, state what company he represented, if any.

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ATTACHMENT B

From the Morning Yomiuri, 28 February 1952.

The General Staff Office on the Move Again.

Prime Minister lies.
Rearmament gathers momentum.
Ex-soldiers calling for new army.

(NOTE: The first two paragraphs are a synopsis of the first part of the Yomiuri article.)

(Whether we like it or not, Japan is going to rearm. Yoshida may or may not be opposed to rearmament, but the fact remains that the government is running headlong towards its own destruction by heaving rearmament. It is too bad we have to go against our Constitution, but the Japanese will be ridiculed if they become sentimental in their desire for peace at any price. More and more people are coming to see that there must be rearmament and some Japanese have begun research on the problem, a good sign since the former General Staff Office and Naval Board of Command allowed no one but themselves to plan military activities, and those two bodies led the nation to destruction. We must not let a small minority plan rearmament, and, for this reason, Yomiuri will try to reproduce for its readers the basic data relevant to rearmament.

(The German Army between the two World Wars had a cadre of 100,000 men, but it was created in such a way that overnight it became a full-scale, well-trained army. After two years of training, the Japanese National Police Reserve is still unfit to defend Japan. It has been a huge waste of money. Military men are unanimous in their denunciation of the Police Reserve).

When it was created, the Police Reserve was to be nothing more than a body of reinforcements for the police. Even within SCAP the disposition of the Reserve was a delicate problem -- should it be under General Willoughby as a semi-military force or under General Whitney as a police force? MacArthur decided for Whitney. Otherwise, former Colonel HATTORI Takushiro, currently chief of the Historical Records Department, War Demobilisation Board, might have played an important role in the formation of the Police Reserve, since he was trusted by Willoughby. This has given rise to a number of rumors, such as these: when HATTORI went to see Director-General MASUHARA of the NRE to offer his assistance, he was turned down, and when he visited YOSHIDA, the Prime Minister told him "I don't want to see any secretary of TOJO."

But even though YOSHIDA dislikes the army, rearmament is unavoidable.

When Mr. Dulles came to Japan late in January 1951, there were rumors that rearmament was one of the major items of discussion. It is up to historians of the future to decide whether the Peace Treaty came first and then rearmament, or the Peace Treaty came only after rearmament was agreed upon. The recent muckraking statement of State Minister OHASHI that Mr. Dulles had strongly pressed for rearmament argues the latter.

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It was said that YOSHIDA talked to Mr. Dulles only at the effect of rearmament on other Asian nations, avoiding the economic angle in the expectation that Dulles would have by-passed that with the offer of a loan. Dulles said that, except for Australia, the nations of Asia were more interested in reparations than in Japan's rearmament. Australia, however, agreed to Japanese rearmament.

There are no civilian war experts in Japan, except for ITO Masatoku, who explains that the dearth of such people is due to the fact that the military gave out no information to the public. Therefore, the Prime Minister had to call upon military men for assistance. The first of a series of meetings between former generals and top government officials was held in January 1951. Several meetings have been held since. Those who were present at the meetings were said to be such friends of YOSHIDA as Admirals NOMURA Kichisaburo, ATORAYASHI Saizo, and TORIDA Teijiro and government-invited military leaders such as Major General TATSUMI Eiichi, Rear Admiral YAMAMOTO Yoshio, General SHIMOMURA Sadamu, and KAMARE Torashiro. Finance Minister IKEDA and Vice-Foreign Minister IOUCHI have sometimes taken part, and OKAZAKI has been present at all conferences. OKAZAKI was later designated to take charge of the matter.

Former Major General TATSUMI was a military attache in London when YOSHIDA was ambassador there. YAMAMOTO has been acquainted with OKAZAKI since they were in Washington. YAMAMOTO and OKAZAKI's son are now working for the same company. These men are all more or less anti-TOJO and are worthy of being consulted, particularly SHIMOMURA, who hails from the same town as YOSHIDA. His painstaking job of war demobilization was highly appreciated by MacArthur. KAMARE was among those asked to take a leading position in the SCAP Historical Records Department.

With these consultants, OKAZAKI seems to have set his policy of strengthening the Police Reserve gradually. When the de-purging of military personnel was foreseen in July 1951 as a sure thing, OKAZAKI reportedly set up the "Six-man Committee" (Rokumin Iinkai) of TATSUMI, SHIMOMURA, YAMAMOTO, former Lieutenant General KAMITSUKI Yoshio (上 野 中 将 二 郎), IIMURA Jo, former president of the Military College, and former Lieutenant General MIYAZAKI Shunichi within the Police Reserve to have them choose its young leaders. Former Kempei colonels TSUKAMOTO Mikoto and HAYASHI Hidesumi are reported to have selected the staff members of the Police Reserve from among former Home Ministry officials. It was originally planned to employ 400 leaders, including 100 navy men from classes between the 38th and 53rd, but actually only 300 men were taken, of which a majority had been unemployed.

The number of invitations sent to former military men inviting them to apply for entry into the National Police Reserve was limited to 1800, four or five times as many as originally decided on. These exclusions of many students from eligible classes led them to pass a resolution at each class meeting boycotting the Police Reserve.

In order to appease these men, MASUHARA called in members of the Demobilization Board and declared, "The NFR is the sole basis for the new Japanese army," thus giving away what was in those days secret. This can only be judged as a conceited remark. At that time both MASUHARA and YANAGIZAWA, chief of the MSB, were asked by OKAZAKI to work out a policy for reinforcing their respective agencies, but each was reluctant to do so because, not having been consulted in making government policy, they were quite anxious about their future status.

TOSHIDA is criticized nowadays as being even less effective in regard to rearmament than Adenauer. He is handicapped by the fact that he is forced to lie when asked whether Japan is forming an army. Military leaders are primarily discontented with the NFR and without exception believe that there must be an entirely new army, even though some of these military leaders are taking part in the government's program to build the army on the foundation of the NFR.

Existing military groups are divided into many splinter factions. In the army, military staff officers and attaches are apart from intelligence officers. Pro- and anti-TOJO factions oppose each other. The navy is quite united compared with the army.

However, the fact that patriots, politicians, and zaibatsu are backing rearmament despite the fact that they lay themselves open to criticism deserves our attention. For instance, the rearmament league now being proposed by WATANABE Tetsuzo may be aimed at the bringing of military ideas into politics. It is natural at the present time that the rearmament movements are dominated by strong and mutually opposed groups.

The leading group contains the former military attaches, who have had long cosmopolitan lives abroad and are sooner or later obliged to stand on the side of the Police Reserve. Those who are called Police Reserve proponents in this sense are SUJITA Kazuji, former colonel, military attaché to Britain, and author of An Outline of the History and Ground Battles in the Pacific War; HAYASHI Saburo, former major general and chief of the Soviet Section, JIGS; TSUKAMOTO Makoto, former colonel; and HAYASHI Hidesumi, former colonel who is not well spoken of by others.

- 1 Field Comment. KAMITSUKI is the correct translation of the characters given, but the name has been reported as KOTSUKI several times before () and there is a Lt. Gen. KOTSUKI Yoshio listed in the Army Officers guide of 1942. The conclusion is that Yoshio is wrong here.
- 2 Field Comment. HAYASHI was a colonel. He may have headed the Soviet Desk.

ATTACHMENT C

From the Morning Yomiuri, 29 February 1952.

The General Staff Office on the Move Again.

A Prelude to Rearmament.

Dominant Opposition Groups Led by HATTORI and TSUJI.
Strategists Opposed in Each Research Institute.

The best-known of the opposition (to the government) factions is that of former Colonel HATTORI Takushiro. HATTORI was once highly respected by the late Lieutenant General ISHIBARA Kanji, a founder of the Dai To-A Renmei (Greater East Asia League). He is a graduate of the Army Officers School, 34th class, and was graduated from the War College in 1930. He stayed in France for two years, 1934 and 1935, during which time he had the opportunity of observing the Ethiopian War. After his return, he was put in charge of mobilization in the General Staff Office. Soon after, he was chosen for the staff of the ~~Escorting Army and had some influence in planning the Manchuan Incident.~~ By the time the Pacific war started, he had been put in the important position of chief of the Operations Section. He served as secretary to TOJO, later being reassigned to head the Operations Section. At the end of the war he was a regimental commander in China. At present he is in charge of liquidating war materials in the Demobilization Board. Former Colonel TSUJI Masamitsu has professed himself a 100 percent supporter of HATTORI. He is second to none in popularity among the younger officers today.

Among the members of the HATTORI group are former Colonel NISHIURA Setsuro, honor student of the 34th class; former Colonel HORIBA Kazuo, runner-up for honors in the 34th class (HATTORI was fourth); MIZUNAGHI Katsugi; HARA Shiro; former Lieutenant Colonel HASHIMOTO Masakatsu; former Major YAMAGUCHI Niso; and former Colonel INOTO Kameo. All these officers held important positions in the General Staff Office. NISHIURA was a secretary to TOJO and was a professional army strategist. The reason the former strategists came to join HATTORI is that they are too intelligent to work with civilian strategists but are quite fit to do editing work on war history for America.

It was natural for these former strategists to get together, spread the map of the world out, and play the game of war. No one paid these men originally. HATTORI's house in Setagaya was rumored to be too sumptuous, but it turned out that he was living with his brother, a director of the Teijin (帝人). They commuted to the Demobilization Board for study, with lunch-boxes. As soon as the rearmament issue began to come to the public's attention, HATTORI was rumored to be circulating a thirty-page pamphlet called "Research on Japanese Rearmament." If he really wants to pull strings, he can do it, since there are in the Demobilization Bureau many military comrades whom he can organize.

Some of the members of HATTORI's group are called in by G-2. This may not mean anything, since G-2 often calls in ex-military men to answer very simple questions on the details of certain war events. On the other hand, there may be some military men who are actually working for G-2. HATTORI without doubt tried to help Director General MASUHARA from the NPR. But, no matter how presumptuous he might be,

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HATTORI could not have done so without some force behind him. One of his group claims that Major General Willoughby put considerable trust in HATTORI. Willoughby gained considerable respect for the strength of the Japanese Army and the efficiency of its operations when he saw some landings on Bataan, and for this reason he sought out HATTORI and started a friendship with him. It is reported that HATTORI's influence saved TSUJI in his 3,000 mile underground escape (from Bangkok to Japan).

The War Demobilisation Board is the only agency of the government which employs former military leaders. No matter how eager these men may be to serve, it is unlikely the stubborn Prime Minister YOSHIDA will support this agency, which employs two former TOJO secretaries.

HATTORI's is the real "opposition" group. He has submitted his plan to both HATOYAMA and ASHIDA, and it is likely to be incorporated into the government plan when the time is right.

Another important rearmament figure is TSUJI Masanobu, who is inseparable from HATTORI. TSUJI has sold a house in Setagaya which he bought with proceeds from his best-seller. Only a few people, including former Lieutenant Colonel ASAEDA Shigeharu, a repatriate from Siberia, know where TSUJI lives now in Tokyo.

SATO Katsuro is a 48th class graduate of A.O.S. and owns Ato Shobo, which has published TSUJI's war books. Late in 1951, Ato Shobo began putting out the magazine *Kyowa*, believed to be the organ of the Kyowa-to (Concordia Party) in Yamagata Ken, which was founded on the theories of Lieutenant General ISHIHARA Kenji's Dai To-A Renmei. Although this magazine has nothing to do with the mysterious document for which TSUJI was indicted, it has certainly a strong united-Asia bias. An important fact is that the idea of the county-unit defense army which constitutes TSUJI's rearmament theory is not only in accord with the civil-army theory held by NABEYAMA Sadachika, MITAMURA Shiro, and KOBORI Junji (小堀 純二),² but also is similar to the idea of many army officers, including HATTORI.

Former Lieutenant General IWAKURO Hideo, famous intelligence authority and head of the Makano (TRNK) School, fiercely charged HATTORI with lining up with SCAP. Former Lieutenant General WATANABE Wataru³ sided with IWAKURO. Recently, however, these men are less active, reportedly because of the fact that they are working for war munitions companies along with SUGA (fnu) and SHIBUYA (fnu). Their rearmament plan, calling for a large number of infantry troops, is criticized as unacceptable in the present situation.

MacArthur's War History Editing Office at the NYK Building was also the hangout of former military men, including General KAMABE Torashiro, head of the office; Lieutenant General ARIEIE Seiso, former military attache to Germany; Navy Captain OMAE Toshiichi (大前 敦一),⁴ and HATTORI. Presumably because of their differences in position, they are nowadays not active enough to be known outside. Only Lieutenant General AYABE Kitanji,⁵ Colonel SUGIYAMA Shigeru, etc. are still working in the research office.

A notable trend today is for civilians to offer places to military men in the various rearmament research establishments, such as the Economic Research Institute of WATANABE Tetsuo, the Continental Problems Research Institute of OKURA Kobo (大倉 宏雄), and the National Defense Research Institute (Kokka Boei Mondai Kenkyu-sho) of TERADA Takeo (寺田 武雄).

The WATANABE Research Institute is staffed by Lieutenant General INADA Seijun and Vice Admiral FUKUDOME Shigeru. INADA is the son-in-law of former General ABE Nobuyuki. He was Operations Section head at the time of the Nomonhan Incident and was the superior of both HATTORI and TSUJI, staff officers of the Kwantung Army, controlling the excessive enthusiasm of these two. He is not favorably looked upon by those he previously controlled. INADA founded a small group which studied the defense of the home islands of Japan when the Japanese army looked only to overseas military operations. He was released from Sugamo Prison last year. He receives visits from HATTORI Organization members now. Mr. WATANABE's political power, mature experience, and well-organized opinions might have considerable strength in future rearmament plans of the government. He is reported to have presented his opinions to the government and these opinions have the support of both HATOYAMA and ASHIDA.

The Continental Problems Research Institute (Tairiku Mondai Kenkyu-sho) has on its staff Lieutenant General DOI Akio and Lieutenant Colonel ASAI Isamu. DOI was appointed chief of the Soviet section twice and was also chief of the Operations Section at one time. After being fired from the General Staff Office, he held the position of chief of intelligence in the Kwantung Army for a long time. After being chief of staff of the Central China Expeditionary Army at the surrender, he was detained by CHIANG Kai-shek for a long period. He is the best informed of all army officers in Soviet affairs. He is at present doing basic research work and has nothing to do with the rearmament problem in a political way.

Among the members of the National Defense Problems Research Institute are Colonel YOKOYAMA Hisasane (横山 英三), Lieutenant Colonel MARUYAMA Shigeru, and Major SUGIYAMA Kyo (杉山 京). Colonel YOKOYAMA was fired from the General Staff Office by TOJO. They have recently completed a rearmament program, but have little political influence.

Among those who are active as individuals are former Lieutenant General SAKURAI Tokutaro, known as the hero of Bataan, who is concerned with the organizational aspect of the problem, and Lieutenant General HANAYA Tadashi, known as an intelligence authority connected with IWAKURO and DOI. Former Major General IMAI Takeo (今井 武敏) is making a study of the Swiss military system, former Colonel YAMAGATA Arinoto (山形 有徳) of international relations, and former Colonel YABENAKA (fuu) (矢部 中) of the USSR. If they show promise, someone will bring them into one of the groups.

It is not because of weakness but of strength that the Navy is mentioned last.

At the top of the Navy hierarchy stands NOMURA Kichisaburo. He has been popular in America since before the war. He tells his subordinates:

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"If you have anything to say to America, tell me. I'll take care of it." As a result, most of the Navy men are relying on him. Former Vice-Admiral FURUDOME Shigeru, chief of staff of the Combined Fleet, is actively, independently, and overtly working on the rearmament problem in the WATANABE Research Institute. He gets his data on personnel from former Captain HATSUMI Tamagoro (羽島 辰夫), and his subordinates. Data on the operational aspect of the problem comes from former Rear Admiral TORIOKA Sadatoshi, onetime chief of Section 1 of the Navy General Staff, who is now doing research at the Cultural Rehabilitation Material Investigation Institute (Bunka Fukko Shiryo Ghasa Sho) in Meguro. TORIOKA still has a number of former Navy staff officers around him who are willing to work for a month and a half or so in snow-bound Hokkaido for him.

Admiral NOMURA is reported close to HATOYAMA lately. Whomever NOMURA may contact, it is not likely that the Navy policy will be altered. Since not many of the former Air Force leaders are still alive, and since air technique has changed greatly in the last seven years, research in this field seems difficult.

Almost all navy and army officers who are pressing for rearmament can speak French, English, or Russian. They are not the type who fight without thinking first, but this is just one point on which they excel the other military men.

- 1 Field Comment. This is possibly Teikoku Jinsu Kiito K.K. (Imperial Synthetic Silk Co., Inc.).
- 2 Field Comment. MITAMURA and HAHRYAMA are former communists, and SAITO is rumored to be a communist or communist sympathizer. Nothing is known of KOBORI.
- 3 Field Comment. WATANABE had connections with Chinese Nationalist intelligence in North China after the war.
- 4 Field Comment. Presumably the OKABE mentioned by Kyodo as a member of the Military Advisory Commission. See Field Comment 3, ZJJ-72.
- 5 Field Comment. AYABE was once mentioned by a former Japanese intelligence officer as a member of the Six-Man Committee advising the Prime Minister. However, since the autumn of 1951, there has been no word of his participating as a member of the committee. He is a classmate of TATSUMI and at the time of the surrender was in the OKABE Butai in the Philippines.
- 6 Field Comment. OKURA is a friend of SATOMI Ryosaku and participated in the 2.26 Incident. His last rank was that of Captain in the Navy.
- 7 Field Comment. TERADA, who uses the alias TERADA Yoshio, was born in Shiga Ken in 1909, graduated from Doshisha (Kyoto), and participated in the 2.26 Incident after following the ideas of KITA Dick. He was a friend of SATOMI. During the 1930's he studied Marxism and brought government suppression upon himself by doing so. Under KANDA Koichi he helped form the Kyowakai in Manchuria, after doing some intelligence work there. In 1944 he was blacklisted from the Kyowakai for his Pan-Asian views. Since the war he has

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worked for IWAKURO and IWANORO's subordinate, Colonel AKIGUSA. He now lives in Kamitakata, Nakano-ku, Tokyo. (Information from a single source, a Japanese with Manchurian intelligence experience.)

- 8 Field Comment. HANAYA's connection with IWAKURO has been confirmed by another source. According to TSUJI's book, Underground Escape, TSUJI has also known him since their wartime days in Burma, when HANAYA was a member of the Hikari Organization.
- 9 Field Comment. IMAI is mentioned in a Junkan Yomiuri article as a close friend of TSUJI.

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