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AIR

LHM 1149

23 January 1952

Director, FBI

Operational

Transmittal of Report on Japan's Recruitment and the Movement of Former Military Officers

ATTACHMENT: Report on Japan's Recruitment and the Movement of Former Military Officers

1. The attached report from a controlled covert source is forwarded for [] information. Although it adds little to previously reported information on the Hattori Group, it is considered of interest because it differs so greatly from [] reports in point of view.

NY: []

APPROVED: _____

Source is []
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HATTORI Group

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

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Japan's Rearmament and the movement of former military officers

1. Hattori group and others:

Most of the former officers are living on a margin worrying about tomorrow's bread. Therefore, they do not have the time to think about such things as the procedure of rearmament. Those who do have such time as who are watching the chance to assume leadership when rearmament is realized, belong to what is known as the Hattori group.

The Hattori Group is centered around former Colonel HATTORI, who was the Chief of Planning Section, Imperial GHQ, at the outbreak of the Pacific War, and the principal members thereof are at present officially employed either by the Historical Record Section of the Demobilization Bureau or by the Historical Section, GHQ, SCAP. They are assisting the compilation of the war history of MacArthur and at the same time, are acting as General Willoughby's Intelligence Agent, and are continuing to be active even after the General's return to the States.

We do not know for certain whether these people are studying the rearmament problem with the understanding and the approval of the Occupation authorities. When the Police Reserve Force was established, these people tried to assume important posts with the help of General Willoughby, and this became instrumental in their study of the rearmament problem. Therefore, my assumption is that the group was more than slightly influenced by General Willoughby.

On October 1, 1951, approximately 400 former army and navy officers of senior rank entered the Police Reserve Force and it is becoming clear that these former officers will be the main body of the force, which will

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eventually be reorganized into ground force divisions. This fact is making the members of the Hattori Group very impatient, as their hope of becoming the main power in Japan's rearmament has been shattered.

The characteristic of the personnel organization of the Hattori Group is the fact that it is composed of former staff officers of the military planning field. In the former Japanese Army, the staff officers of planning field were traditionally influential, and there was a strong tendency to look down on the staff officers of Intelligence, Transportation and Communications. The Planning staff officers were dogmatic and abstract in their way of thinking, and they also had the feeling of being the most important people. Consequently, it took them, on the whole, a long time to adjust themselves to the post-war society. And those who were the last to adjust themselves belong to the Hattori Group. It can be easily understood from the above-mentioned trends that some of the members of the Hattori Group are highly conceited, professing that the rearmament can never be accomplished without them, and also that their idea of rearmament, which we shall state later, is based on a narrow viewpoint.

Moreover, if the Hattori Group did begin to take definite steps as the promoter of rearmament, there is a great possibility of them receiving strong opposition from the public opinion. One reason for this is, that the two well known members, Mr. NISHIURA and Mr. IMOTO were the former aides to Premier Tojo, and the public will receive the impression that the rearmament will mean the return of Tojo militarism. The second reason is that they tried to assume important posts in the Police Reserve Force

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when it was first established under the instruction of General Shephard (?) of GHQ. The anti-Hattori group feeling is very strong in the Diet, because of their above-stated shady and underhand movement. Recently, there are members among the Hattori Group, who have sensed such an atmosphere and have expressed that it will be extremely difficult for them to get important posts when rearmament takes place.

2. The Rearmament problem studied at Watanabe Economic Research Institute:

As against the Hattori Group, the rearmament problem is being studied on the civilian side by Watanabe Economic Research Institute (4th floor of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry). The head of the Institute, Mr. Watanabe, is well known for his strong opposition stand which he took against the Red labor offence, as the post-war President of Toho Company. In this Institute, research is being done with Mr. Masarumi IHADA (former Major General), Mr. Zenshiro HOSHINA (Former Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau) and Mr. Shigeru FUKUDOME (former Vice Admiral) as the center figures. It is an accepted fact among the former Army people that Mr. IHADA, who has recently been released from Sugamo prison, is an extremely clear-minded person. I do not know much about the two former Admirals.

The big difference between this group and the Hattori Group, which does not include former naval officers and consists only of former army officers of senior rank, is that this group is organized by generals and admirals. Moreover, their attitude is not secretive like the Hattori Group, and adopt an attitude of listening to the opinion of people from all fields. Therefore, there are many who expect that a reliable plan will be produced by them.

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3. The rearmament plan of the Hattori Group

I have not yet had the chance to see the "Basic Ideas of Japan's rearmament" drafted by the Hattori Group, as it is labelled secret. But an outline of it can be gathered from "Interview with Ex-Colonel H" published in the October 21 issue of Shimkan Asahi (Weekly Asahi). According to this magazine, Ex-Colonel H. considers the estimation of war-time military strength to be most important, and this he figures to be approximately 50 divisions. On the assumption that a three fold increase will be made to obtain this 50 divisions, he strongly advocates maintaining a standing army of 17 divisions.

An exhaustive study of the international situation, particularly that of the military situation in the Far East is lacking in the above-stated plan. Needless to say, the study of the international situation plays an important part in deciding the scale, procedure and speed of Japan's rearmament. In the Hattori Group, there is none who has specialized in intelligence. Their analysis of the international situation is therefore insufficient. According to what has been disclosed by one member of the group, it is said that the Hattori Group is judging the Soviet forces to attack Japan in the event of World War III to be 15 to 20 divisions. Should this be so, it appears that they are making an overestimated judgment.

The members of the Hattori Group are stressing that rearmament can only be accomplished through the hands of former officers. And, moreover, they speak in a way as if only the Hattori Group is capable of managing it. They invariably cite the example of the rearmament of Germany and the forming of the Red Army immediately after World War I and emphasize the role of officers

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in rearmament. In the case of Japan's rearmament, they are not giving much confidence as to the existence and assistance and guidance of the U. S. authorities based on the spirit of the Security Pact between the United States and Japan, and are contemplating to push forward rearmament on their initiative. According to their idea, the Commander-in-Chief of the future Defence Force must inevitably be a former officer, and are trying to have former General Sadam SHIMOMURA assume this post.

Mr. SHIMOMURA is also originally of the "planning field", and has held the post of Minister of War immediately after the termination of the war.

The Hattori Group is emphasizing that the minimum force necessary must be maintained even if the national budget should be deficient. On this point they hold the "motto" of "the national defense first", which is the same idea entertained by former military authorities. They are therefore, covertly criticizing Premier Yoshida, who is not rushing for rearmament. The active elements of that group are even saying that Premier YOSHIDA should retire.

The Hattori Group's idea is influencing political parties, for example, the argument of a ground force of 20 divisions by Mr. ASHIDA of the Democrats and Mr. HATAYAMA of the Liberals is based on the opinion of Mr. HATTORI and his lot.

4. Research undertaken by Watanabe Economic Research Institute:

Watanabe Economic Research Institute, is as aforementioned, at present engaged in forming a plan by widely inquiring the opinion of people of various fields. The main problems being given serious considerations are as follows:

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(1) Whether the fundamental character of rearmament will be a National Defense Force or a Police Force of the United Nations. If it is to be a Police Force of the United Nations, then there may arise the possibility of despatching forces overseas, depending on the international situation. Not only that, it may even so develop that Japan will burden the main responsibility for the Korean and Manchurian operation. They are, therefore, giving serious study as to the fundamental character of rearmament provided that it is to be a National Defense Force, but will reject it if it is to be a force for overseas' operation.

(2) The possibility of an invasion by the Red Forces, and if so, the judgment as to the anticipated strength of forces and place of invasion. (Their estimation of the invading forces is smaller than that of the Hattori Group, and are judging that although an attack on Hokkaido can be considered, the possibility of an attack on Kyushu is small).

(3) The scale of air raid on Japan and judgment as to the targets thereof. (They are judging that the vicinities of the U. S. bases in Japan will receive damage, but the possibility of indiscriminated bombing of cities is small).

(4) Problem pertaining to rearmament and Japan's economy.

(5) Necessary expenses for rearmament.

As aforementioned, the principle of "the National Defense first" is strong in the idea of the Hattori Group. Moreover, they appear to have no definite opinion as to the expenses required for armament, as there is none who has good knowledge of economy. To this problem, hopes are entertained of the results of the future studies of Watanabe Economic Research Institute.

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At the present moment, figures which appear authoritative for expenses needed for rearmament are those of the report presented to GHQ, by former Colonel NAKAHARA, formerly in charge of materials for munitions, Military Affairs Section, Ministry of War. This report is apparently confidential, but according to what has been disclosed from a certain source, the outline of the report is as follows:

- (1) Study to be based on the premise that the war expenditure will be 400 million dollars. (This figure has been provided from some source in GHQ, SCAP.)
- (2) The expense for establishing one division (approximately 20,000) will be approximately 30 billion yen.
- (3) Annual maintenance expense per head will be 250,000 to 300,000 yen.
- (4) Using half of the facilities of former arsenals and a part of that of private industry, a force, the scale of which will be aircrafts 2400, warships 200,000 tons, ground force 10 divisions, will begin to be formed from the beginning of 1952.

The approximate date of completion will be 1958 for ground forces, 1960 for navy, 1962 for air force. Only three years will be required in the case of organized ground forces only.

As stated above, it is considered that the figure of approximately 30 billion yen will provide a rough estimation for the cost of establishing one division of ground force.

6. Date of rearmament:

The Chief of the Government Section, GHQ, has clearly stated to the approximately 400 former officials who entered the Police Reserve Force on October 1, 1951 that the said force will be reorganized as a ground

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force division in the future. It is said, however, that he did not mention the date.

The former officers are judging from their own standpoint that the completion of a ground force division will be around 1953. Their reasons:

(1) Two years will have elapsed since the establishment of the Police Reserve Force by the autumn of 1952, at which date contracts will terminate. Taking advantage of this opportunity, military personnels will probably be recruited. (The object of the majority of the present personnel in the Reserve Force is to obtain the retirement allowance of 60,000 yen.)

(2) The term of the present Diet members will expire at the beginning of 1953 and a general election will then take place. The political parties will probably not take up the problem of rearmament seriously prior to the election.

The former officers are judging from the words of the aforementioned Chief of Government Section, GHQ, SCAP, that steps will first be taken to strengthen the Police Reserve Force and then to reorganize it as a ground force. There are also a considerable number of former officers who stress that it is now about time to start gradually the training of pilots for the establishment of the future Air Force.

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