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Subject: Briefing of HANBEI Iochitane concerning MATSURI's Hokkaido Nets

Report No: LAL-752 (FD-326)

Date of Information: Mid-October, 1951

Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan

Date Acquired: 31 October, 1951 and 12 and 17 November, 1951

Evaluation: C-3, except as stated

Date of Report: 22 November, 1951

Source: Sub-source as stated.

1. During the middle of October, 1951, MATSURI Takushiro, acting upon the recommendation of Source, decided to ask former Colonel HANBEI Iochitane to become the new chief of his Hokkaido organizations. MATSURI had been extremely dissatisfied with the leadership of both the "Colleagues" organization and the intelligence direction of his independent operational nets in Hokkaido for quite some time. On 6 October, 1951, he had surprisingly revealed this problem to Source, who suggested HANBEI, a former "Agesa" (UNE) Kiban deputy chief, as highly qualified to handle the intelligence operations at least. On 10 October, MATSURI had again asked Source to consider whether HANBEI might be suitable to head, and possibly amalgamate both the rearmament colleagues group and the intelligence nets. Source thought it highly satisfactory from many points of view, including his own, (though he did not discuss the latter point with MATSURI, assuredly.) MATSURI interviewed HANBEI with Source on 12 October, at which time they exchanged views on rearmament at great length; then after a separate interview with HANBEI, MATSURI signed him up. (Sub-source for the last phrases: C-2 (Para. 1: C-2)

2. Subsequently, in preparation for his departure for Hokkaido to take over active supervision of the nets, HANBEI was given several briefings by MATSURI and his subordinates on the situation in Hokkaido and on MATSURI's assets in Hokkaido. HANBEI left for Hokkaido about 1 November, 1951, and was scheduled to be back in Tokyo for conferences on the Hokkaido situation with MATSURI about 8 or 10 December, 1951. During mid-October, HANBEI received the following four briefings: first, from Lt. Colonel MASAKATSU, the second time, from MATSURI Takushiro himself; the third time, from Lt. Colonel FUJIMURA Kenichi, who is not a colleague and demobilization Board subordinate, but an intelligence chief and former subordinate in wartime of MATSURI; last time, by Lt. Colonel MATSUSHIGE, who has taken over processing of the Hokkaido information at the Tokyo end from HANBEI, and HANBEI and MASAKATSU together. (Sub-source: Eval: C-2)

3. HANBEI MASAKATSU's briefing at the first contact concerned both the intelligence situation and the bare outlines of a discussion of MATSURI's operative assets and channels in Hokkaido, as follows:

a. The Japan Communist Party in Hokkaido.

Under the JCP District Committee in Hokkaido, which is very carefully and classified

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- (1)(A) Privacy
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powerfully organized, there are thirty-seven local committees. In addition, however, there are two hundred seventy-two cells which have been uncovered to date by the ANREI organization, and identified as in operation at the present time. Although the JCP claims officially that there are 5,300 members in Hokkaido, and 8,000 fellow-travelers are in evidence in addition, the actual number of registered overt members of the JCP is approximately 2,200. The remaining 3,000-odd members of the JCP are divided between those who have left the JCP for sincere ideological reasons and those who are not overtly associated with it at present for operative reasons.

The Liberation Zone Plan

The labor unions in Hokkaido are overtly inactive at present; however, the Communist members within these unions are taking active measures, principally in coal-mining areas, to prepare for the establishment of liberation zones, and also what are known as "KALFO SU" Maritime operational districts; with a possible invasion attempt by the Soviets in mind, of course. These "liberation zones" and "maritime operational districts" are equivalent roughly to the operations of local area committees under direction of the overall district committee. It is definitely confirmed that there is a plan and certain preliminary organizational preparation to create maritime operational zones or districts in the following localities: Hakodate, Otaru, Muroran, and Kushiro. Members to aid in the program and planning thereof are being recruited from among the members of unions, port employees, seamen, fishermen, and other groups whose work pertains to the waterfront. The liberation zone committees seem to be established under the auspices of the district committee within the area of each local committee. The Communists are striving earnestly by infiltration to get control of the political and economic machinery of various fishing villages and cooperative agricultural organizations. The most typical districts of Hokkaido where the Communists have attempted these operations are Makkanai, Ishikari, and Oshima. In some places, the Communists have even attempted the establishment of Communist village farm organizations modeled on the Soviet "kolkhozes". The overt activity of the Communist Party in Hokkaido at the present time politically has achieved nothing of any significance whatsoever. The Party merely re-emphasizes the crucial importance of their preparedness for the invasion's directives and activities in close relationship to a definite design for readiness for an invasion of Japan. These underground cells and related organizations in obedience to the CP are operated and prepared in such a manner as to be able to provide prompt and efficient coordination with the Soviets in the event of an attack by them. The Communists all throughout Japan are planning for such a coordination, but nowhere more than in Hokkaido are these efforts more intensive.

JCP Directives

In 1949, the JCP received certain directives for the future in view of the

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failures in the labor union field and cyclotrons were made. The plan is to place strategic emphasis upon the following fields: (1) the coal mines, transportation systems, dock and harbor facilities, and communications facilities, particularly electric. Consequently, railroad and communications and telegraph-telephone labor difficulties have occurred more frequently than any others in Japan. It has even been attempted at one point during the past year to cut off communication between the administrative centers of Hokkaido-Sapporo and Ishikote - and the "liberation zones" of Nemuro, Wakkanai, and other points.

d. Smuggling Trade.

There is a very active smuggling trade in Hokkaido, most of it concerned with and going to North Korea. This is largely conducted from small fishing ports and bases on the west coast. The boats generally use these ports, and utilize pre-designated transmittal points along the coast of Honshu from Niigata Prefecture down as far as the late Iwate Prefecture. At these points, the goods are passed over to local Japanese or to other Japanese who transfer them to North Korea. There has also been a rather large-scale smuggling trade reported between Hokkaido and Formosa too. Smuggling boats, but in this event chiefly used for the transport of Soviet agents and their equipment, have also been reported sailing from east and north-west coastlines of Hokkaido going to the coast on Sakhalin.

e. HATTORI's Sources of Information.

(1) YAMAGUCHI, who lives at Otaru, is at present gathering information on Hokkaido JCP activities through infiltration of the Party ranks. He was a graduate in the 2nd graduating class at Sakano Institute, was Secretary of the former Army Garrison.

(2) YAMAGUCHI has been making studies of the political conditions throughout Hokkaido on behalf of the Party. He is not engaged in active clandestine intelligence operations. He is an observer, reporting on what first-hand inspection of the scene reveals. He was formerly a staff officer in the Japanese Army in Japan at the time of the Surrender, and was a graduate of the School in the 42nd graduating class. He was later assigned to the Welfare Section of the Hokkaido Government after the war.

4. YAMAGUCHI was previously in charge of checking, verifying and reporting the information concerning Hokkaido. Although YAMAGUCHI is at present in charge of the Tokyo and Toy Hokkaido, YAMAGUCHI gave him the briefings instead because the former officer was sick in bed at the time.
5. On about 20 October, YAMAGUCHI received his formal briefing. This time YAMAGUCHI himself. This was more general in nature, in order to give YAMAGUCHI a picture of the overall picture of the activity throughout Hokkaido. In addition to that briefing by YAMAGUCHI was an oral briefing.

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A. A general picture of the operational condition of the JCP and of the Soviet plan regarding Japan is necessary. A report made by General KERSYANCO, then of the Soviet Mission at Tokyo, to his home government in the late spring of 1950 stated that preparations for a revolution by force in Japan had been all but completed by mid-April, 1950. An important assignment which had been given to KERSYANCO in Japan had been to get the JCP secret units to complete necessary preparations for accomplishment of a revolution by force whenever necessary. Upon fulfillment of his duty, KERSYANCO returned to Russia in May, 1950, just as the JCP leaders finally were put under the purge ban.

B. The Japan Communist Party has been concentrating upon the reinforcement of preparations initiated by KERSYANCO ever since that time, and continues on them at present. It is not alarmist to say that Japan is on the eve of a revolution; in actuality, Japan is wavering ignorantly on the brink of total downfall.

The JCP is endeavoring to have each of its members equipped with at least a pistol. This is to be carried out mainly by smuggling weapons into Japan. Most of the arms smuggled are light weapons, such as light machine guns, rifles, etc. In addition, however, various JCP units have procured blasting powder in large quantities from public construction workers and coal mines workers, and have cached these stocks in mountainous areas within Japan. These operations have had the assistance of certain Koreans.

To accomplish its purpose of effecting a revolution in Japan, the JCP has organized a committee in each city and prefecture, which is in charge of giving guerrilla warfare training to trusted members. Political agitation and street warfare training is also given on a large scale to those who are to direct the revolution. The method and discipline of training are entirely similar to that of the former Army. Each local troop which becomes completely formed and organized is given the name of an "operational unit" (KUMBUKI). For instance, mountain operational units are charged with the duty of assisting and guiding Soviet paratroopers when the latter have landed and providing bases for overall guerrilla warfare in addition. In Hiroshima and Fukuoka Prefectures, mountain operational units are already in existence and operating. In present-day Japan, the problem of hydroelectric power is a major political and economic concern. The JCP has taken special note of this problem, and has therefore created "electrical source operational units", the main task of which will be to destroy electric power sources and supply lines at the proper time. The JCP directive of September, 1950, specifies electrical power sources, railway networks, communications facilities and systems, port, harbor, and coal mines as principal targets for immediate sabotage in event of an emergency.

C. At present, the JCP is prepared to carry out sabotage operations on a considerably large scale. It is in a position to effect and execute such operations immediately whenever the directive comes from the leadership. The Communists would commence this operation only when their direction in Moscow decrees that a sudden resort to arms and revolution is in the greatest effect upon politics. In other words, even though preparations are completed, the Communists will hold their fire and will not immediately indiscreetly into such an operation. There will probably be some delay of that kind with the outbreak of World War III. Although the

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Japanese nation could be communitized by a revolution stirred up by the JCP and also by bombing of Japanese cities by the Russian Air Force. If Hokkaido is invaded and successfully held, Japan will be paralyzed totally in about six weeks or two months because of the fuel problem and other economic factors.

- 3. Instead of invading Japan directly at all, Russia would bomb this country and simultaneously call for revolutionary activities by the JCP all over the nation.

The first two of these three possible methods are most economical and effective. For this reason, Russia pays extremely serious attention to Hokkaido. The description below of preparations and activities on Sakhalin and in the Kuriles of both intelligence and military nature very clearly point this out. 4

- f. Hokkaido conditions. There is an intelligence operations headquarters for the Far East at Toyohara, Sakhalin. Many intelligence officers in the Russian service receive their training at Toyohara. In a small village about one hundred miles southwest of Toyohara, there is a Japanese operational unit (KORAMUTAI) largely composed of the Japanese Army officers, many of whom were previously acquainted with officers of the Japanese Army working with MATSUKI. These Japanese in Sakhalin are in charge of working out various operations vis-a-vis Japan. They can come to Hokkaido from Sakhalin in about five hours by so-called "pon-pon" boat (a small boat with a one cylinder gas engine or a semi-diesel engine). The strong-arm gang leaders of Makkana wait in small boats off the coast in order to ferry the Japanese operational unit personnel into Hokkaido. In two days after their departure from Sakhalin, the members of the operations unit can straggle into Tokyo.

It is noteworthy that there is a considerably large number of former Army field grade officers among the members of this Japanese operations unit. These officers were captured by the Soviet Union upon termination of the war, while they were harboring anti-American sentiment. They are given no true information on the situation in Japan. In order to stimulate further their anti-American feeling, the Russian authorities always give them twisted facts in propaganda which those officers believed to be true. They do not necessarily agree with communism, but have a fervent desire to save their homeland from the alleged atrocious rule of America, and to restore Japan once again to its old status. To accomplish this, they have been led to believe that Japan must go through a revolution. They are indoctrinated in the theory that Russia, as a supporter of revolution, is able to aid this cause.

The armament of Russia in Sakhalin and Kuriles Islands is much stronger than most Americans and Japanese imagine. All sorts of previous facilities of the Japanese Army in those areas are today utilized as they are by the Soviet Army. There are eleven airbases in the Kurile Islands. The northern half of the Kurile Islands is armed for the purpose of defence, while the

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southern half is prepared completely as a series of bases for an attack, not merely for defence. General Hattori was also reported as the emanant for obvious offensive purposes existent in the Kuriles.

Military transport ships frequently ply between the mainland of Siberia and the Kuriles and Sakhalin. Russian submarines also frequently pass through the Bering Straits about two and a half or four months ago, Russian Army troops were shipped to the Kuriles by way of the Bering Straits. It is not too much to say that Russia is committed intensively to preparations for an attack on Japan.

On the mainland of Japan, there is no district where a "freedom village" or "liberation zone" has been established, however powerful the Communist Party be locally. In Hokkaido, however, there are freedom villages or "liberation zones" at various places. Almost all of the strategically important spots in Hokkaido are infiltrated by Communists.

A careful and detailed investigation into the conditions of the Kuriles, Sakhalin and Hokkaido reminds HATTORI of the tense atmosphere immediately preceding the outbreak of a war.

- 8. In the fall of 1950, when Major General Willoughby went to visit the Japanese Army officers in the New Police Reserve, General Hattori told Major General Willoughby, "The recruitment of purged officers into the Police Reserve would instigate Russia and might lead to an invasion of Hokkaido by Russia. Therefore, you had better be careful about the recruitment of purges." The situation of Hokkaido has assumed a serious aspect since then.

(Evaluation for para. 5 in general C-3 to C-4, concerning HATTORI's information; C-3 concerning accuracy of HATTORI's reporting.)

** NOTES **

1. Field Comments: For further details on the colleagues organization and separate intelligence "cells" and their inter-relation; cf. 617-756 and particularly 617-746.
2. Field Comments: In the light of previous reports of his will and attitude toward HATTORI and the Prime Minister, this personal bouquet to HATTORI is significant. If indeed, it is actually HATTORI's comment. On the other hand, HATTORI may have wished to have his new Hokkaido chieftain, HATTORI, realize his own grievances, or HATTORI may have been sincerely softened in his attitude toward HATTORI by HATTORI's friend.
3. Field Comments: If accuracy of these figures is a criterion for the accuracy of the rest of HATTORI's report, evaluation would be given more Korean and Chinese Communist troops than that have already been in the struggle in Korea.

Field Comment: If HATTORI's purpose was merely to impress HATCHI with the significance of the present situation, (this might be all right. As a professional and sincere appraisal of the situation by a man reputed to be Japan's leading strategy expert, it shows a shocking disregard for the aerial defense situation and even ground troops defenses possible at present in Japan by IJAF and IJNA. It is considered more than possible that this sets the keynote for evaluation of the entire HATTORI situation report: possibly false, but with very large degree of alarmism for the obvious ulterior motive that HATTORI, as a leading proponent of rearmament, is bound to provide information slanted to justify his proposed project.

5. Field Comment: We were given no indications as to whether HATTORI was interviewed by General Ridgway, which seems doubtful; whether some American officer told him that General Ridgway was surprised; or whether the inference is even more vague and indirect. We shall query but obviously, it may just not be discreetly checkable.