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Should Japan Have a National Defense Army

- A design built upon a Hypothesis -

Not to speak of five years, but even a year ago, people never thought of the hypothesis "If Japan were to have a National Defense Army..." Now that the global situation surrounding Japan has undergone radical changes, however, the question of establishing a National Defense Army in Japan has come to be positively discussed among us. Aside from the question of rearmament, the reporter sounded out the opinions of military critics A and B on the hypothesis that "If Japan has a National Defense Army, what should it be like? The conclusions of this article teaches us what important significance the rearmament issue bears.

1. A definition of rearmament.

A. Before we refer to the main theme, we must put the issue on the right track. The word "rearmament" is used nowadays in too ambiguous a sense. In the first sense, it connotes the strengthening of armed police forces to subdue internal disturbances, namely, what Mr. Dulles refers to as "an indirect aggression". To put it more concretely, it is tantamount to the reinforcement of the existing Police Reserve which, however, is in my opinion contrary to rearmament. Rearmament is the preparation of armaments which are absolutely necessary for the maintenance of internal security. However large the scale of such rearmament might be, therefore, I believe that it would win international recognition and be in accord with the principles of the Constitution. However the term "rearmament" used in the above sense is an erroneous one. Real rearmament means the establishment of armed forces to defend Japan from an external invasion. In order to do this, the revision of the Constitution is of course necessary. Furthermore, I think it is also necessary to take into our consideration the possibility that should a "Pacific Defense Force" or "United Nations Army" be established, the problem of Japan's entry into such international collective security forces would come to the fore. What I would like to emphasize particularly is that we must not confuse the reinforcement of the Police Reserve with rearmament.

B. I agree with you. There is no definite spirit or objective in the Police Reserve. Therefore, it is absolutely nonsense to think that the Police Reserve can be a substitute for a "national defense army".

2. The Police Reserve should be reinforced to double its present strength.

Reporter: Then, to what extent should the Police Reserve be reinforced in preparation for "an indirect aggression?"

A. That will be decided by an estimate of the potential strength of the revolting forces in an emergency. My estimate of those revolting

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forces, including external fifth columnist, in case of emergency, is approximately one million of which only about 15%, namely about 150,000 will be equipped with arms for fighting. The rest will be a crowd of Police-travellers, including women, children and aged people. If the Police Reserve is to be armed in the same way as the revolting forces are, a total of 150,000 would be necessary to control them.

As regards the quality of the revolting forces, I think no other weapons than pistols and rifles would be used. If the Police Reserve is to be armed with machine guns and tanks, its 150,000 men can be considerably reduced. 150,000 men are tantamount to doubling the number of the existing Police Reserve personnel. Let me repeat that even if the Police Reserve is going to be equipped with tanks, it does not mean in any way the rearming of Japan. Since the rise of the revolting forces is, in fact estimated to occur concurrently with that of an external aggression, it is all the more important to draw a clear-cut line between the Police Reserve and the National Defense Army. It is only at a time when the National Defense Army is necessary that the Police Reserve would be most necessary.

B: Another important thing in my opinion is the strengthening of the Maritime Safety Agency so that the flow into Japan of weapons, funds and fifth columnists for the revolting forces can be stopped on the sea. As the coast line of Japan is very lengthy, guarding it is difficult. A scout-plane can be of more help to guarding it than a patrol ship. Even helicopters would do. The ships of the Maritime Safety Corps necessary for adequate coastal guard would be roughly 150,000 tons and its personnel will be somewhere around 30,000. 300 scout planes would be enough.

3. The Third World War will be a counterpart of the Second World War.

Reporter: What he have been discussing was the armed forces against indirect invasion. Now will you gentlemen please proceed to the main issue?

B: Before we come to the main issue, I think we have to think of what future warfare is to be like. As far as I am concerned, there will not be many differences between a future war and the previous one in its aspect. It will be almost similar to the Second World War. It will be not a local war, but definitely a drawn-out war on a worldwide scale. It is almost certain that the air force will assume a predominant position. But, the Navy, Army and Air Forces should be equally maintained respectively. Success or failure in the anticipated war will be determined by the effective mobilization and coordination of the Navy, Army and Air forces.

The Air Force will be of more value in the coming world war than in the Second World War. However, the forces of Navy and Army will never be curtailed. Operations will be worked out jointly by the Army, Navy and Air forces. Consequently, it can be surmised that the war will be protracted for a long time. Although atomic weapons are an important factor to decide the success or failure of war, it can not be a principal means of conducting a war. The air force is to be the predominant power. There-

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fore, considerations should be given to the armament including the Army, Navy and Air forces. Both the Navy and Air force will be necessary.

A: For that very reason, defense on land alone is not enough, if one is to take defense into serious consideration. Particularly, the geographical involvement of Japan should be taken into account. Since Japan is encircled by the sea and situated close to the continent, its blockade by naval forces is possible.

4. The Scale of An Invading Army.

B: Now, with regard to the strategic situation in the Far East, how would Russia, Communist China and Korea jointly plan a Red invasion of Japan? On what a scale is an attack on Japan being planned by the Red Army? I presume that the existing military strength of Russia, amounting to nearly 200 divisions, would be increased to 400 or 500 divisions in time of war. The present number of Russian airplanes available for frontline battles is said to be 17,000. I have no information regarding the industrial potentiality of Russia. During World War II, Soviet produced approximately 30,000 or 40,000 planes per year. America produced 98,000 planes yearly. Japan produced a maximum of 40,000 planes. Japan's yearly productivity of air power ranked second of all. The Soviet industrial potentiality has been and will be expanded. Supposing it can produce 100,000 planes per year, 20,000 planes could be maintained for combat activity. Now, the question is how many of 400 or 500 divisions of the Army and of 20,000 airplanes can be mobilized in the Far East. It has been said that the transportation capacity of the Trans-Siberian railway is 60 divisions. How many of 400 or 500 divisions will be dispatched to the Far East? I speculate that it will be one-sixth or one-fifth of them.

5. The military forces to be mobilized in the Far East by Russia will total between 60 and 100 divisions.

A: My estimation is about 20%.

B: In case one-sixth of them are mobilized, they will amount to somewhere between 60 and 100 divisions. If 20,000 frontline planes are maintained by Russia, 3000 or 4000 of them would be shipped to the Far East. The population of Korea is 30,000,000. It has approximately 20 or 30 divisions in its Army. Communist China has a population of 400,000,000 or 500,000,000 at present, though it claims it to be 1,000,000,000. The maximum number of forces Communist China can mobilize is only 4,500,000 (1% of 450,000,000) of which approximately 500,000 would likely be used for an attack of Japan. These forces are however stationed in local areas. The expeditionary forces of Communist China capable of waging other battles simultaneously are from 500,000 to 1,000,000. As the Soviet Union cannot send its entire forces out of the country, only 60 or 70 divisions will be dispatched abroad with the rest of them placed in readiness on the continent.

6. Invading forces would consist of 20 Soviet divisions and 30 Communist China's divisions.

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B: In view of the transportation capacity of Russia, the armed forces it can mobilize for an invasion of Japan may be not in excess of 20 divisions. Mr. Drew Pearson, the American radio commentator, has once said that Russia would be able to mobilize 20 divisions and from 3000 to 5000 airplanes in attacking Japan. I think these numbers are fairly close to the truth. North Korea has 20 or 30 divisions of which about a half, 10 to 15 divisions, could join an invasion of Japan. Communist China is capable of sending out about 30 divisions.

7. The first wave of an attack on Japan will consist of approximately 50,000 men or so.

A: One million soldiers now awaiting on the Continent can not land on Japan at a time. It took three months for the U.S. Army to pour 450,000 men into China. Even if hundreds of ships may be put into use, the troops to be dispatched on the first wave of invasion will be somewhere between 50,000 and 100,000 men. If the ships on the first wave are all destroyed, the troops aboard them can not secure a beachhead on Japan. The second-wave troops would then be reformed. However, complete wreckage of ships means the loss of transportation means. In other words, there is a limit to invasion possibilities. Thus, the difficulty of invasion at any time by a large number of forces can be easily understood.

Paratroopers are about 30,000 in number. But, there remains a question of transportation by air. It was recently announced that six divisions of paratroopers ready for an attack of Japan are stationed in Siberia and two divisions in Sakhalin and the Kuriles. As a matter of fact, a paratroop attack force is very weak. Only if it lands on an entirely unprotected area, can it hardly hope to succeed in a surprise attack. Paratroopers can not start landing until practically all defending planes are shot down and all the obstacles to their destination are cleared away. They can summon up strength only when they have finished arming themselves after landing and getting themselves closely formed. Therefore, they must be crushed before they get themselves ready for fighting. It does not require a great number of troops to keep Communist paratroopers from landing in Japan. From a geographical view point, it would likely be Hokkaido where they would make the first and second attacks. So, I think it is important to place our forces in readiness in those spots where the enemy paratroopers are likely to alight.

Though eight paratroop divisions are stationed in Siberia, Sakhalin and the Kuriles, their actual number is only about 30,000. But, no speculation can be made as to how many paratroopers of the enemy would be poured in once the Soviets succeed in occupying a certain area and establishing a so-called liberation zone. After their land operations have been successfully initiated, there will still be problems of logistics and transportation, but no obstacle to the use of paratroops any longer.

The maintenance of air forces demands continuous supply to them. The shipment of armed forces will fail when ships on the sea are damaged. A paratroop division consists of a comparatively small number of men between 5,000 and 8,000. Besides men, instruments, foods and ammunitions must also be dropped. Practically more than half of what are loaded on the plane are these above-stated articles including heavy weapons. The number of men to be dropped is less than a half the total load.

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B: Another important thing is, I think, to take into our consideration the Soviet's design for an invasion of Japan. Strongest is the likelihood that Russia would strip Japan of its potential by bombing it completely. All Russia has to do to stop the U.S. Army from garrisoning Japan is to destroy Japan's industrial establishments thoroughly by bombing. Russia must put Japan under occupation, however, to capitalize on those industrial establishments. Russia may occupy Japan by force of arms, if it is to capture this land. Or else, Russia may exercise its military force only at a certain section of Japan so as to throw this country into an over-all state of revolution. It might capture limited areas such as Hokkaido and Kyushu where it would raise armed forces under which support a revolution could be effected in Japan. Therefore, it is necessary for us, the Japanese, to presuppose the all-out armed occupation of our nation by the Soviet Union.

Reporter: Your debates give an impression as if the Soviet is about to invade Japan at any minute. But, I would like you to confirm it again that you have been discussing a mere presupposition. Although we can hardly accept Premier Stalin's statement as a whole that a war is not inevitable, it is by no means a mere illusion to conclude that Russia and Communist China want to avoid a catastrophe. Now, what about America in this respect?

9. The quantity of military forces America can provide.

B: With regard to the volume of the U.S. military forces, it has a maximum of approximately 200 divisions of ground forces and is capable of producing a maximum of about 200,000 planes per year, as its yearly output during World War II was 100,000. One fifth of the entire output, namely 40,000 planes, can be maintained for front-line battle use. One sixth of 40,000 planes, namely, 6000 or 7000, are detailed to the Far East. The maximum volume of the U.S. ground forces during war-time is 200 to 300 divisions which can be raised after about a year's elapse since the outbreak of war. But this does not mean they are all combat forces.

A: America needs to retain six or eight divisions in Japan in order to aid in the repulse of an invading force.

B: Since the strategy of America is decided by its own security, it is necessary to work out a program of the defense of Japan by our own efforts. After our self-defense program is made, then we can depend upon the collective security of America and other countries. I think there are two different views on how our homeland can be defended. One is to adopt defensive operations, and the other is offensive operations. The control of Korean peninsula is indispensable for the defense of Japan. Particularly at the present time when the Communist armed forces are threatening South Korea, the defense of the Japanese mainland would be very difficult. Therefore, it is only too natural that one would contemplate the defense of

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Japan in terms of offensive operations which call for attacks on Korea and Sakhalin. Though the offensive operations are deemed virtually necessary from the viewpoint of a pure strategic scheme, they are not feasible from a political view. Consequently, we will have no choice but to adopt defensive operations to save our homeland.

10. The necessary number of divisions during war-time would be 50 or 60.

Reporter: Now will you please go into the main topic? What is the adequate and necessary defense army of Japan on the assumption of such defensive operations?

B: Prior to Japan's defeat in the recent war, approximately 80 divisions or at the very least 60 full divisions were deemed absolutely necessary, for defense of the home islands. Since airplanes were in shortage in those days, the need of 60 divisions was commonly accepted. If the wartime strength consists of 40 or 50 divisions and about 5000 planes, it would perhaps suffice. The question is what should be the size of the peacetime or standing army strength. What should the system of military service be? Should it be a voluntary system? Or a draft - or civilian defense system? The answer to this question will decide the necessary forces in peace time as compared with that of war-time. Then, when is another war apt to break out? If the establishment of 50 divisions were necessary by the summer or autumn of 1952, considering that problem, they have to be organized much before then. Another question is how many military forces should be maintained during peace time. The total number of forces greatly differs according to the formation and equipment of one division. A conception of approximately 50 or 60 divisions in all was made on the condition that one division would be better equipped than the best divisions of the former Japanese Army, but a little inferior to an American one. With these factors in mind, any one can easily think of 50 or 60 divisions. In case 60 divisions are needed during wartime, 20 divisions will serve the purpose during peacetime as a standing army.

11. Twenty divisions during peace time means about 300,000 men.

B: Twenty divisions in peace time would consist of approximately 300,000 men. If fifteen divisions are needed, there should be slightly over 200,000 men. In order to organize sixty divisions, however, 1,500,000 or 1,600,000 men should be trained. How many years are necessary to train them? What should be the term of service? I think the Japanese people of conscription age number about 600,000 or 700,000, don't you?

A: Yes, approximately 600,000, I presume.

B: Out of 600,000 or 700,000 persons of conscription age, 300,000 or 400,000 are qualified to enter the military service. In order to acquire 1,500,000 or 1,600,000 men, four years are necessary if the term of service is one year. If it is six months, two years are necessary. In Japan, there are many people who have already received military training. But they can not be put in use again; many have families and their age exceeds twenty-five. The most appropriate people are those of the ages between twenty and twenty-five who have to be given completely new training. But, this is a very knotty problem under the present social circumstances.

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12. The Navy should preserve 120,000 tons and the airforce 1000 planes.

A: Now with regard to the Navy, additional 120,000 tons are by all means necessary for sea and coastal patrol above and beyond the present Maritime Safety Agency forces. Only convoy and escort-ships, coast-patrol ships and tenders are in demand. No consideration should be given to the construction of cruisers or destroyers. As to the air force, though America will most likely take care of it, the minimum of about 1000 planes must be produced by Japan including interceptors and light bombers so as to destroy enemy planes on way to Japan. A half of 1000 planes should be used in the forefront battle, while the other half would consist of reserve planes, scout planes, training planes and planes for miscellaneous use.

13. The merchant marine should have about 2,000,000 tons.

Reporter: Incidentally, how many tons are necessary for the maintenance of the Japanese merchant marine?

A: In my judgement, 2,000,000 tons are necessary. Even if escort-ships are assigned to convoy duty, moreover, a considerable amount of damage should be anticipated. It is a matter of common sense that a monthly loss of 10% of the total amount is inevitable. Fifty submarines can easily blockage Tokyo Bay. Therefore, our maritime security should be guaranteed somehow or other. For this purpose, our defense should be prepared on a large scale. Of course, our ship-building capacity should be taken into consideration, but 2,000,000 or 3,000,000 tons should be maintained at any cost for the survival of Japan.

14. The Army of the Japanese people.

Reporter: What about the problem of the authority of supreme command of the Japanese Defense Army which should be made according to your design?

B: The revision of the Constitution will be inevitably necessary. Even so, it should be the Prime Minister who is accorded the position of commander-in-chief.

A: Exactly. In America the president is commander-in-chief.

B: Statesmen pay respect to the prerogative of supreme command. They are well-trained. The Cabinet bears responsibility to the Diet. I think the relationship of supreme commander to the Emperor is a serious problem.

A: At any rate, the unmistakable point is that the new army must be the army of the people at large. It should never be the army built upon the conflict of classes. It should be created on the firm principle of the army of the

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entire people. Then, how should the new army be related to the Emperor? Some people say that the Emperor is a symbol of the unity of the people. The use of the term "symbol" would be proper only when the Emperor is in a position to lead the Army. The problem, however, leaves room for more study. It is indubitable at any event that the new army is to be established on the basis of the entire race and backed up by all the people.

- B: In case the prerogative of supreme command belongs to Prime Minister, other politicians should respect it, and at the same time, the prerogative should be made entirely free of politics. Otherwise, no efficient army would be formed. In Japan, there has never existed a factor by which the prerogative of supreme command was identified with politics. The Japanese military authorities conducted the war with only liaison conferences with the Government. The Government and the military authorities were unitedly connected only by direct authority of the Emperor, in which the cause, if any, for Japan's defeat in the war may be found. Consequently, when the future armament issue is taken into consideration, I believe it is essential to lay its framework as soon as possible by placing and planning political, military and financial affairs in coordinated fashion. Within this framework, the size of an armed force and the period of time necessary for its reorganization should be studied. When its formation should be started is also brought up for our research from the viewpoint of military techniques.

15. The problem of the Defense Ministry.

- A: As regards the issue of the Defense Ministry, I believe it is absolutely necessary that the said Ministry be placed upon one single basis, if it is to be set up at all. The conflict hitherto between the Navy and Army should be done away with at any cost. They have to be united into one body. An independent Defense Ministry, Military Board of Command (GUNSEIIN) or Joint General Staff HQ are absolutely necessary.
- B: Only a Joint General Staff HQ and Defense Ministry should be established. In that case, there would be those who are in charge of military administration and others who are in charge of strategic affairs. A military man should be appointed chief of strategic affairs, but because military administration is purely political, for the chief of the Military Affairs Board of Command or of the Defense Ministry a military man is not absolutely necessary. I think that Japan has to have more civil statesmen who are well qualified and prepared to handle political, economic and military affairs together in preparation for a total war.

16. Expenses amount nearly ¥ 200,000,000,000

Reporter: Then, approximately how much maintenance expenses are needed?

- A: Supposing the new army consists of 200,000 men, the expenses necessary for its maintenance are less than post-war occupation expenses. Other than the maintenance expenses of ¥ 1,000,000,000 yen for clothing, feeding and arming, the expenses for its formation are needed.
- B: The amount of personnel expenses also differs according to the system of military service, voluntary or drafting. For the support of 200,000 men similar to the Police Reserve, roughly 60,000,000,000 yen is necessary.

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1. When 200,000 men are mobilized, the necessary amount of money is 60,000,000,000 yen for 200,000 men. The formation demands a vast sum of money. In anticipation of a mobilization in time of war, the construction of arms, weapons and ammunitions is necessary which requires a tremendous outlay of money.

2: When 200,000 men under the present plan are well fed, clothed and equipped, the necessary amount of money per year to maintain them will be around 60,000,000,000 yen during peace time. In addition to this, finances three times as much as that proposed amount should be accumulated every year, for the personnel three times as many as the proposed number would have to be mobilized during war time. When these things are taken into account, the problem will be a very difficult one. Let me cite an extreme example: If all the expenses for the formation and equipment are loaned or given, which amount to approximately 20,000,000,000 yen per year, armament, though insufficient but close to the plan, could be completed in two or three years. If the post-war occupation expenses, Japan Aid Counterpart Fund and military aid expenses are added up, and the standpoint of national budget is considered, the appropriation of the above-stated amount of money seems possible. But the question lies in the beginning: Whether or not the expenses necessary for equipment will be given or offered in the form of a long-term loan? Maintenance expenses could be laid out from the allotments for occupation expenses. A portion of the Japan Aid Counterpart Fund could be appropriated for military purposes.

Reporter: Thank you very much for your participation in the discussion.

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