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Partly Cryptographed: and References: ZJL-551 and ZJL-571

Source, Operational Data, Agents:

1. Attached are two reports on the recruitment activities of TSUJI Masamichi (HATTORI) in Hiroshima which, although from entirely independent sources, are working in their confirmation of those men that we have included in our transmittal.

2. [] source is a former Navy Captain OI Atsushi (), who worked in the G-2, GHQ Military Historical Section until 31 March 1951. Previously he had been in the office of the Naval General Staff (GUMKINS SAKHO), chief of staff of the Marine Guard Headquarters (), and for two years around 1938 he was in the office of the Naval Attaché at Washington. His report was rendered to [] just before he resigned his G-2 job with the request that it be handled confidentially and with the offer of further information if the investigation of HATTORI's activities which he recommends, were carried out.

3. [] quotes former Colonel FUJISAKI Masahiro and former Lt. Col. KIKUCHI Genji as the sub-sources for his report, which he claims came through their connections in the stock exchange. Again it must be remembered that [] has his own very definite ideas with regard to recruitment, which he appears to have sold very successfully to ASHIDA Hitoshi. Nevertheless, the unconditional indictment of HATTORI and TSUJI by both these sources is felt to be worthy of serious consideration at this time when Japanese recruitment is approaching the action stage. Furthermore, its implications in the current PFCV- [] negotiations add to our already serious reservations with regard to the utilization of PFCV's sources.

3 May 1951

Classification

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

Classified and Approved for Release
Central Intelligence Agency

2005

Subject: Japanese Movement—Attempt
by Former Japanese Army Officers
to Gain Control

Report No.: ZLI-408
Date of Information: March 1951

Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan

Date Acquired: 5 April 1951

Evaluation: D-4

Date of Report:

3 May 1951

Source: MATSUDA, Gen
sub-source (see cover sheet)

1. When the Japanese National Police Bureau was formed in 1950, a group of former Japanese military personnel attempted to obtain high office positions in it by negotiating with the Japanese Government through OKAWAI, the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, and making it seem as though they were under orders from Maj. Gen. KILLINGBY of GRC. This attempt failed. Major JOSHIDA Shigeyuki and the project was finally discarded. Several days by General Headquarters, including endorsement to Gen. KILLINGBY, Gen. HALLIDAY and others.

2. After that incident, the group remained silent, but the recent disclosure of movement has found them again engaged in aggressive activity. The leader of the group is former Colonel MATSUDA Shuzaburo

(), the son of one (name confidential) secretary to TOJO Hideki; another, the 1st of the same rank is TRUJI Naomuro, an MATSUDA in working in the Warfield Building, O-4, GRC. The principal Japanese employee of that building, ABATE Kazuo () is a former prisoner at Army Imperial in () appears to be acting as a figure-head for MATSUDA and others. He is () of

former Vice-minister TOJIMA () was in charge of former former members of the Japanese Army General Staff (SAIMO KAIJIN) in attempting to "get around" American military personnel in GRC. The group includes, French and German elements, and has used her facility in dealing with foreigners to become close to General KILLINGBY, HALLIDAY and Harwood.

3. MATSUDA is of the opinion that Japan's movement cannot be controlled through democratic methods, and advocates the reestablishment of the old Japanese way, in which he explains to be Chief of Staff. However, he and his group take this opinion from their American colleagues, especially from their personal aid and pretending to cooperate fully. There is a serious danger that the American military personnel in G-4, GRC, will be taken in by this group. For this reason, a project study must be conducted as quickly as possible so as to leave Japan free from GRC's reestablishment.

DATA Summary:

This summary refers to OKAWAI Bureau, TOJIMA's GRC contact summary, MATSUDA and TRUJI are mentioned in similar context in [] and []

Classification:

Reference: [] regarding the approximately 10-15-4-4-571 source GRC Tokyo telephone interview of 1 April 1951 includes both "Dr. ABATE" and "Gen. ABATE" as members of Operations Branch, Military Warfield Bldg.,

O-4, GRC. Vice-minister TOJIMA, whose relationship to Gen. KILLINGBY is formerly deputy to Gen. HALLIDAY, is described by source as a "mild" for Gen. ABATE's activities, has been referred to as "ABATE" address and one of the Japanese Government's principal sources of info on GRC policy during the early days of the occupation.

REPORT 2

Subject: Japanese Rearmament—Danger of
Control by Former Militarists

Report No: LIL-608

Date of Information: April 1951

Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan

Date Acquired: 23 April 1951

Evaluation: C-2

Date of Report: 3 May 1951

Source: []

1. Two former Colonels of the Japanese Army General Staff, MATSUKI (ina) and ISUJI Masamichi, are directly connected with GHO authorities in conducting research on rearmament. They are an inseparable pair, with ISUJI dominating the more docile MATSUKI.

2. It is a known fact among former General Staff officers that MATSUKI and ISUJI planned and urged the hostilities which brought about World War II. They were the prime movers whose tireless efforts of convincing the General Staff finally brought the opening of hostilities.

3. Both MATSUKI and ISUJI are extremely irresponsible, and will not take the consequences for their actions. They have cleverly avoided all responsibility for the Nomonhan Incident, letting their superiors or other staff officers bear the consequences. ISUJI is the type of man who, given the chance, would start World War III without any misgivings.

4. There is sufficient feeling among former General Staff officers unfavorable to MATSUKI and ISUJI that, if the latter were to be given a voice in Japan's rearmament, these General Staff officers would refuse their cooperation, knowing that they would again be led down the wrong road. These facts are being discreetly circulated among stock exchange circles, who anticipate an effect on the market when MATSUKI's and ISUJI's rearmament activities become known to the general public.

Classification