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Subject: Japanese I.S. Personalities

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(FD-17)

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Source: []

- (a) Colonel MATSURI Takushiro, former expert in strategy and operations Staff Officer, Army, has been working in POW's Historical Section supposedly assisting officers of that section in the preparation of a history of the Occupation. His actual functions are those of a high-level contact of TRM regarding anti-Communist espionage in Japan and long-range research concerning military substantial and logistics regarding Korea and China and also in view of a possible Japanese rearmament.
- (b) Although the former topic is the chief duty and function of MATSURI, research papers have been written concerning the latter problem and consultations held with General KAAMI Torashiro, Lt. General SAKURA Taro, and Lt. General SAKURAI Tadamaro. It is believed that research studies have also been received from these other sources independently.
- (c) In December, 1950, POFOW asked MATSURI if the latter knew Source. MATSURI was asked what sort of person Source was, and how competent an individual he was. MATSURI described Source in glowing terms as an expert on Indochina and Southeast Asia in general, and one of Japan's best professional intelligence men. Shortly thereafter, MATSURI broached the subject to POFOW of utilizing Source to build an espionage net in Southeast Asia. POFOW rejected the idea, stating that although research on the area was all right, operating in that section of the world was beyond the authority of Tokyo and rested with the "State Department", under Mr. Acheson's authority. Then MATSURI suggested to Source, on his own initiative that the latter switch over and work with their group on anti-Communist activities within Japan. Source told him he was busily engaged in research studies on his chosen area. POFOW was discouragingly non-committal when MATSURI again mentioned Source and indicated a hope of persuading Source to work on JCP investigations.
- (d) Sometimes MATSURI sees POFOW, but more often works under orders transmitted through an unnamed subordinate of POFOW, or through an officer in the section where he works.
- (e) Colonel MATSURI is an extremely able Operations Staff Officer and a man of great integrity and character. For a person never previously connected to intelligence activities directly, he is reasonably competent and secure, but he lacks the professional experience and technique necessary for real operations, and tends to view intelligence problems from a military standpoint.
- (f) MATSURI was originally recruited by Lt. General ARISUE Seizo, introduced

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

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by the letter to POPOV, and for quite some time served as a member of the ARISUE "Group". Since last year, however, he has had nothing to do with ARISUE. He dislikes ARISUE intensely and disapproves of the latter's ideas, working methods, and security.

2. (a) It is definitely felt that Colonel TSUJI Masanobu works for POPOV through HATTORI. Reasons for this opinion being strong enough to be considered fact by Source are personal.

(b) Source is a very close friend of Colonel HATTORI and also of Colonel TSUJI, and was a class behind HATTORI (who is about 42) at the Imperial Officers' School. TSUJI visits HATTORI regularly and frequently. Source keeps in fairly close contact with both. On one occasion when visited, TSUJI was engaged in work concerning maps of Korea and North China which he covered hastily on Source's approach, claiming it was some work for Colonel HATTORI. Since TSUJI is well aware that Source is on excellent terms with HATTORI, he would probably not have kept this secret if only HATTORI were involved.

(c) In mid-January, 1951, TSUJI received a letter from a Chinese Nationalist leader at Taipei, Formosa asking him to do the CHIANG Government a favor. Approximately two divisions of Chinese Nationalist troops sought safe-haven in Indochina when the Communists swept into the south provinces of China in 1949. These troops were promptly interned by the French authorities in Indochina, and at first received very unkind treatment. However, since fortunes of war went against the French and Vietnamese in 1950, treatment of the interned troops improved, and there has even been some discussion of using them against the Vietnam rebels and/or Chinese Communists. The Nationalist leader on Formosa, knowing TSUJI's great reputation among the Japanese troops, wanted TSUJI to write a letter to those Japanese serving with the Chinese Nationalist divisions in Indochina asking them not to desert the cause despite adversities, and to other Japanese in Indochina exhorting them to enlist with the Nationalists. TSUJI is deeply and sincerely anti-Communist, but he has no particular love for nor faith in the Chinese Nationalist regime. In addition, he has been in Indochina only twice and has no detailed knowledge of the area nor of the Japanese Army personnel there. He came to Source with the problem. Source advised him to present it to American authorities, to which TSUJI replied that he could easily do that, and probably should, but that still left him with the problem of how to answer this Chinese Nationalist general, who was a personal friend. Eventually, by the end of January, TSUJI's distrust of the CHIANG regime won out over his naive inability to refuse a friend's request, and he wrote back that he could not write such a letter because he had no knowledge of the Japanese in Indochina and did not wish any unprincipled individuals among the Japanese community there to make ill use of his name and reputation.

(d) TSUJI has many foreign visitors and many correspondents from countries all over East Asia because of the trek he made in Southeast Asia and South China and the book he wrote about it. Until recently, his work with HATTORI seems to have concerned mainly the Korean problem, but whether it involves the placement of agents in North Korea or not is not known.

(e) The last week of January, 1951, TSUJI visited Source and stated that he had been asked for an opinion, backed up by research, on the question of whether an invasion of South China by Chinese Nationalists, aided from within by

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Chinese anti-Communist guerrillas, stood good chances of success or not. Source professed his ignorance of such matters, but pointed out that, unaided from within, it would probably go as badly as did the Japanese invasion of the same area. TSUJI stated that it was a matter of great consequence and yet he felt that the Americans could not rely upon CHIANG Kai Shek and that the authorities in Tokyo should not consider backing such a venture. He appeared to be using Source as a sounding-board for his ideas concerning the problem. About a week later, TSUJI made an unexpected and hurried visit to Source. He asked the latter if he had talked about their conversation to anyone. Source said he had not. TSUJI then insisted that Source promise not to reveal the nature or subject of their earlier discussion to anyone because it was a top secret matter. A few days later, Source was not too surprised to receive a much less naive warning by implication on the same topic from HATTORI, which topic HATTORI approached deviously but rather obviously from a discussion of TSUJI's danger from reputed assassination by fanatical ultra-Nationalists. POFOW had requested the original project of HATTORI and TSUJI, and then had heard from a Chinese source of a security leak on this highly secret topic; TSUJI probably told HATTORI that he had discussed the question with Source, and both became unduly concerned; without a warning from POFOW, it is unlikely that either one would worry at all about sharing secrets with Source.

(f) TSUJI has received warnings and threats several times from what appears to be a wide variety of ideological crackpots, but even his best friends doubt that he is in any real danger; it is merely that to some people he is sort of a symbol of old-style militarism, and to certain Rightist fanatics, he is a symbol of subservient cooperation with Americans, as opposed to the violently anti-white wing of Pan-Asianism. TSUJI himself is definitely Pan-Asian in his thinking, but along the lines of Japanese cooperation with the other Asian bloc nations PLUS extremely close and friendly cooperation with the Anglo-Saxon powers to stem Communism and develop Asia.

(g) Between the face of TSUJI as a patriotic and loyal Japanese soldier and old-style gentleman of the highest tradition and the almost equally widespread stories of his incompetency and childishness, it is difficult to find the true middle ground. Despite a certain naivete, he is considered to be a reasonably capable strategist and operations officer, and there is no question that for a Japanese officer, he is a kind, honest, and loyal gentleman to all. However, in either politics or intelligence work, he is hopelessly lost both by reason of personality and lack of experience.

There are several other formerly important Japanese military figures now maintaining top level liaisons with either POFOW or [] Intelligence Section; concerning intelligence and strategic research matters: Lt. General KAJIIE Toshiro is the chief figure among these, and liaises directly with POFOW; Lt. General TATSUMI Naichi and Lt. General HIGUCHI Yasuyuki are contacts of the Intelligence Section, [] although Lt. General YAKURO Takeo and YAKURAI Tokutaro occasionally are called in for direct consultations by POFOW's Section, they usually work through KAJIIE and subordinate to him; Lt. General ARISUE Seiso also is a contact of POFOW of long-standing, but does not work through anyone else at all now; Lt. General TOKI (fnu) liaises with the Intelligence Section of [] []

4. Of all of these men, the only one really competent in professional intelligence

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