

SECURITY INFORMATION

Subject: The HATTORI Nets in Hokkaido Report No: ZJL-774 (PD-345)

Date of Information: As stated

Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan

Date Acquired: As stated

Evaluation: C-3 except as stated

Date of Report: 2 January, 1951

Source: []

1. A series of briefings were given to HARUKE Yoshitane by the various members of the HATTORI Takushiro Group in mid-October, 1951, previous to HARUKE's trip to Hokkaido which was to be for the purpose of taking over charge of both the intelligence nets and the rearmament planning activities of HATTORI's colleagues there. When HATTORI Takushiro definitively decided in mid-October that HARUKE should take over leadership of both the Hokkaido colleagues ("dashu") and the Hokkaido intelligence nets as well, he called HARUKE and Source to his home. HATTORI intended to have former Lt. Colonel YIZURACHI Katsugi, whose duty is to check, confirm, edit, and process various information reports brought to HATTORI from Hokkaido, brief HARUKE on the situation in Hokkaido. At that time, however, YIZURACHI was bed-ridden with a cold, so Lt. Colonel HASHIDOTO Shokatsu, who had formerly handled such duties for HATTORI's organization, gave the first briefing instead. This was followed by a general briefing by HATTORI himself on the Hokkaido situation and the JCP in general. These two briefings have been previously reported. Although it was completely unnecessary for Source, who is not part of the organization but had merely recommended HARUKE for the post, to be present at the first two briefings, HATTORI, for some unknown reason, included him on both occasions. It seemed to be because HATTORI and Source are intimate friends and the latter had established the original professional contact between HATTORI and HARUKE Yoshitane, or it may have been a matter of the degree of trust placed by HATTORI in Source. However, both HATTORI and HASHIDOTO appeared to be lacking in memory of necessary details concerning the most recent information on Hokkaido and JCP-Soviet activities regarding that area. HATTORI promised HARUKE the night of the second briefing that he would have YIZURACHI give a detailed explanation of the situation as soon as the latter had recovered. Several days later, YIZURACHI did brief HARUKE, without either HATTORI or Source present. HASHIDOTO was also present at this third briefing.

2. Then, just before HARUKE left at the end of October, 1951, former Lt. Colonel FUJIMURA Isachi, another member of the HATTORI Intelligence Organization who temporarily assumed charge of making contact between Source and HATTORI on his own initiative, gave HARUKE a separate briefing. FUJIMURA was on duty in the India Theater during the war, and was a high-ranking operations officer of the HIMARI Kikan at the time. During part of his career there, he was therefore under the command of HANURO Hideo @ Oog, then chief of the HIMARI Kikan (1947-1948), and later under KAKURO's trusted deputy, KAGAWA Yoshio. From March to May, 1946, during the same time that KAGAWA and Source were confined together in a British prison at Singapore, FUJIMURA was in the same compound.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy

(2)(B) Methods and Sources

(2)(G) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release by the Central Intelligence Agency

Date: 2005

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Source has a low estimate of FUJIMURA's character despite the latter's fine mind and operational ability, and also doubts whether FUJIMURA really intends to cooperate with MATSURI, or not. Although MATSURI claims that he is not completely satisfied himself with the character of FUJIMURA Iwachi, MATSURI highly praises the latter's intelligence ability and activities on their behalf. MATSURI told Source that he has given FUJIMURA specific directives on what information he wants gathered concerning Hokkaido, from what sources FUJIMURA gets the raw intelligence to fulfill those directives MATSURI claims he does not know, but they are in any event separate from the main MATSURI sources in Hokkaido, which had been described by HASEGAWA, MIYAGUCHI, and MATSURI.

3. FUJIMURA is fairly closely related to a certain OGAKI (小滝), who is chief of the General Affairs Section of the Hokkaido Government, and FUJIMURA gave HANEKE an introduction to OGAKI and to OGAKI's colleague, the Governor of Hokkaido, who has organized the Hokkaido Defense Research Committee for investigative and research purposes. FUJIMURA had a great interest in HANEKE's trip and claimed to welcome him eagerly as "another real professional". HANEKE was asked to keep details of this fourth explanation even from MATSURI, and there seemed to be no knowledge nor desire on MATSURI's part that the briefing by FUJIMURA was given to HANEKE at all. (Sub-source for para. 3: [])

4. HANEKE was apparently not very interested nor concerned with details of the third briefing from HASEGAWA and MIYAGUCHI. Since both had formerly been his subordinates, MIYAGUCHI for quite some time directly under him, HANEKE took considerable time during the proceedings in airing his own opinions. These opinions were on world conditions, Japanese rearrangement, and the MATSURI Group itself; HANEKE gave them some very frank and direct criticisms and advice concerning the last point in particular, and asked them to reflect a bit on the degree of professionalism which the group possessed in its intelligence-gathering activities. Therefore, although HANEKE was given the "Chart of the Military Situation of Soviet Russia" (cf. Attachment A) at this time and MIYAGUCHI intended to elaborate upon it in his briefing, HANEKE gave him very little chance to do so. (Sub-source: [])

5. Source Comment concerning the third briefing and Attachment A. Because of HANEKE's lordly attitude towards his former subordinates apparently, details of the third briefing were not divulged. It is possible but unlikely that HANEKE did get more details but concealed them from Source; the account was too much in keeping with his attitude toward the MATSURI Kikan and his future duties as well. If MATSURI's usual practice regarding such information has been followed, the chart (given in Attachment A) was prepared by the MATSURI Kikan on the basis of their Hokkaido information and then presented by MATSURI to G-2 GHQ. There is no confirmation of this, however, and it is quite possible that the chart has not yet been presented to G-2 by MATSURI. Nor is there any definite proof that the chart was actually prepared by the MATSURI Kikan itself, although it seems most likely that the information for its preparation came from the main segment of MATSURI's Hokkaido sources, under IZUMI and TAGUCHI, and that it was prepared by the desk officers for such information gleaned from another "kikan", or actually prepared by another "kikan" or an information broker and obtained from those sources by the MATSURI Kikan. Consequently, the first point of check is thorough investigation of whether

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ESTREI actually has submitted these charts in his various reports to G-2 CDR and whether he describes the source of the information and charts, and if so, how.

- 6. According to the outline of the topics of the fourth briefing, which is given below, FUJIMURA apparently went into considerable detail in his explanation of JCP and Soviet activity in Hokkaido, and supplied considerable information additional to what MATSUI and KISHIMOTO had given. However, ESTREI expressed very little interest in what FUJIMURA had to offer, and was apparently quite inattentive according to his own admission, because he has a very low opinion of and aversion to FUJIMURA's personality. As a result, he was unable to reproduce FUJIMURA's verbal briefing given on the basis of the written outline. The written outline, which was handed to ESTREI by FUJIMURA for his convenience, was as follows:

OUTLINE OF BRIEFING EXPLANATION ON THE JCP

a. Outline Points

1) Regional Units

The North District, one of the five major operational districts of Japan, is divided into three areas (or sub-districts):

Designation:

- Area #1. Hokkaido—(HQ at) Sapporo
- Area #2. Aomori, Iwate, Akita, Yamagata—(HQ at) Akita City
- Area #3. Niigata, Fukushima, Miyagi—Senda City

Warfare: In the event of war, the Hokkaido and entire Tohoku District is to be turned into Soviet territory for purposes of the Soviet's military operations for Japan.

2) Leaders

- MATSUOKA Mitsunaga (松本 三雄)
- SUGIYAMA Fumin (杉本 文夫)
- LI Kwan (李 冠南) (Korean?)

Present lists:
 YAMAMOTO Jiro, 山本 治
 ANKI (Cm), Ideological leaders, assisted by nineteen committee members of whom half are now in hiding or are missing, plus
 SAKAGUCHI (Cm), connected with the National Railways Union clique in the Obihiro area.

3) Membership

The JCP membership in Hokkaido is 2,700, including official, overt, and covert members. Follow-travellers recognized as such number about 10,000; workers and groups adhering to farming area agitators and propagandists susceptible to the influence of the JCP however total about 200,000.

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4) Areas Where JCP Activity is Intense.

The KAMIKAWA Area, centering around ISABIRAWA (旭川),
The SORACHI Area (空知), chiefly INAMIZAWA (沼見沢),
for the coal-mining districts.
The ISHIGARI (石狩) Area, centering around Sapporo, for the
agricultural districts.

5) General

As a whole, there exists no cross-sectional contact and coordinated
collaboration between each area and district. As slogans and catch
propaganda of the JCP in Hokkaido, emphasis is brought to bear upon
the cultivation of lands belonging to absentee landlords and upon the
monopoly of capitalistic firms there. Twenty families of farmers at
Arashio and Hokuto villages are Communist. However, if their living
standards were raised a bit, they would be freed from Communist influence.

b. Special Intelligence Operations of the JCP, Communist China, and Russia
for an Attack.

1) Raid Zones (for quick-landing attacks) in Hokkaido

Six major districts:

- 1) Ishigari-Kamikawa District
- 2) Hakodate District
- 3) Ashibari District
- 4) Nemuro District
- 5) Kushiro District
- 6) Oshima District

Four Specific Points or Areas of Attacks:

Otaru, Muroran, Ashikawa, and Wakkanai.

2) Raiding Spots in the Middle Area of Hokkaido. (paratroop)?

- a. MOYA (真由), KASHINAI (歌志内), for raids on a full
scale; (Utashiro).
- b. INAMIZAWA (沼見沢) and YUBARI (夕張) for raids on
a small scale;
- c. TSUKIDATA (月形), SHENJOISU (新十津川), and KANAKOBE
(中ノ沢); Spots where "DESANTO" (降参ト) are
expected to land.

① 3) Wartime Riot and Sabotage Program. (Formed at Iwanizawa and Saginote,
in February, 1951)

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a) Objectives

Creation of riots simultaneous to landing of Soviet paratroopers.
Destruction of important facilities.
Establishment of Administrative, Defense, Transportation, and Communication Means, including Seizure of Hydro-electric sources.
(The names, places, and other necessary matters in this connection are under investigation.)

b) Headquarters

IMAIZUMI

Makoto District
Hirogan
Kashira
Sapporo
Ashibari
Makimae
Ogura


- 4) Plan for the destruction of the TOUREKAWA (苫小牧) Paper Mill Factory.
Destruction of the SUICHIKU (支笥) Lake Hydroelectric Power Supply.
- 5) Establishment of the ISHIMARI District Special Sabotage Operations Unit (24 August, 1951)

Commander: IMA (依田)

Officers in charge of Intelligence Operations and Propaganda:

ARAKI (芳) and three other men.

Layout:



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
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
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SECURITY INFORMATION Operations in the Ishigari District:


SANAGI Area



MIYA Area



YUBARI Area



6) Electric Sources: Zonal Destruction Operations.

(AISUMA: 熱田, a Korean from Nagoya City.)

DOYA (洞爺), SHIGEMU Lake, KESU, OYUBARI, Lake MIYAN (阿曾), Lake USSEARO, the AWASHIO River, the ISHIBERI River Plants; MUGOAN (coal power), AKATE Machi (coalpower in the vicinity of ASANIKAWA.)

c. Intelligence Operation, Diversion, and Organization.

- 1) Investigation of Plantations on the Ishigari Plain.
- 2) JUMSU Hot Springs (KAJ: ra-a-su)
- 3) Aita Operation (KAJ: A-1-ta)
- 4) Seaman's Groups and Local Groups
- 5) Submarine Cable (reportedly from Osa; KAJA Islands; two Dances; OJ: 2-2-2)

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SARUWAKI (S. South of MURAKAMI), KURIHARA, KAWASUMI,
JOKAI, SAKURAI.

6) Establishment of Far East Cominform at Nemetsu ()

7) Cominform Intelligence Operations Units EQ in Hokkaido:

Nemuro, Ishikari, Nemetsu, Ishikari, Otaru, Hakodate, Muroran,
Sapporo, Kushiro.

8) Investigation of Hydro-electric supply plant at lake Sotchi and
of Communist influence there.

9) The Hokkaido Line: (Hokkaido Water Routes) work of the
"organization whips" ("orgs")

Aomori-Hakodate Ferry Steamers: Doya Maru and Yuki Maru

Muroran - Tokyo (Osaka Commercial Steamship Co., OSAKA SHOSEN K.K.)

Kushiro - Tokyo (Japan Steamship Co., NIPPON SHOSEN K.K.)

Otaru - Tokyo - Osaka (same company)

Otaru - Fushiki (伏木) - Karao (久尾) (Japan Sea
Steamship Co., NIPPON KAI KISEN K.K.)

KUSHIRO - NIKICHI - Fushiki (San-A Company: 三井)

10) Maritime Organizational Whips ("orgs")

Tomakomai (Ishikari, KURIHARA, KURIHARA - coal fields, all for investi-
gation and intelligence-gathering activities.)

Muroran (same)

Hakodate (Hakodate, Tanabe (), Mori, Eze, and Inaguno,

Otaru (Sapporo, Kitchan, entire coal fields)

Tomarijuku (Nagano, Fukagawa, Arakawa, Hiei, Torano)

Ishikari (unknown)

Ashibari (Enpuru, Ryubeshibe, Iatsute, Mihoro, Shari.)

Nemuro

Kushiro (Atsukashi, Shibeche, Ochihiro, Shimizu, Nemetsu.)

d. Conclusion

1) The support for the JCP has been reduced and will not be
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(EJL-776, FD-315)

of public opinion favoring rearmament, build-up of military power, etc., after signing of the Peace Treaty in 1947, with the general tendency towards restoration of the Japanese race.

- 2) Investigations by means of suppressive control on several occasions have had a heavy effect - as a result of these operations, the police force has been strengthened several times.
- 3) Gradual improvement of the food conditions and other aspects of livelihood.
- 4) A large portion of farmer, agricultural villagers, and others can be freed from the domination of Communist Party government officials to them. Since only 500 officers of the National Rural Police and only three companies of the National Police Reserve are stationed in the eastern section of Hokkaido at present, propaganda operations have been undertaken for the strengthening of the police force as much as possible.

In addition, a civilian defense program is contemplated for Hokkaido.

(Date of info for paras. 1-6: as of mid-October, 1951; Date Acquired: 27 Nov 1951)

7. HANUKE Yoshitane returned from Hokkaido by plane on November 26, 1951, and then engaged in conversations with the various personages who went to Hokkaido. It became evident that although he had given some time to discussion of the intelligence operations in Hokkaido of MATSUI's group, he had spent most of his thirty days in Hokkaido merely gathering information on the situation, most of which he hoped to publish in a book in lobbying through ASAHI Hitoshi, Democratic Party leader, in the area for purposes of strengthening Hokkaido defenses and calling attention to defense problems there. He went back to Hokkaido at MATSUI's invitation on 1 December, 1951.

(Date of info: para. 7: 26-30 Nov 1951; Date Acquired: 15 Dec 1951)

FORES

1. Field Comments: Cf. EJL-752. In the light of later developments, it is more likely that MATSUI was endeavoring to be polite with his friend, by inviting him to some of the briefings, but definitely hoped thereby to gain him from the more detailed discussions. Cf. 2 & 3 below.
2. Field Comments: It was concerning these documents copied by [redacted] body employed the operational strategy outlined in EJL-752 & [redacted] to have been then already from a non-Hokkaido source in order to gain an excuse for investigating further the MATSUI Hokkaido network, an excuse to borrow said document copies for photostats, and to see what would say about them later. Please note that the first page of the document did not develop, but that it also shows faintly that [redacted] for this reason, he will be able to identify and [redacted] of it exists, it can be used [redacted] [redacted]

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quite likely that although HARKNE gave this briefing sheet to Source, he may have been instructed to keep verbal details to himself.

Field Comment: It is a pity that we do not possess FUJIMURA's detailed verbal briefing on this outline, because it shows the framework of some interesting reportable material. Because we do not have the additional facts around the outline, we have not separated this off. Whether HARKNE's account is valid, whether HARKNE was holding out on Source or even whether Source is holding out on us, in any event, there is enough for comparison purposes. This has been copied from Source's copy as closely as practical.

HARKNE's interesting whirlwind trip to Tokyo at the end of November will be described in a separate report since it was concerned with a variety of other matters as well. That was true chiefly because HARKNE did not limit himself to assigned tasks which we felt worth noting here.

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