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
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
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GUINEA - PORTUGUESE GUINEA: Toure urges rebels to  
be more aggressive. (Page 8)

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GUINEA - PORTUGUESE GUINEA: President Toure is using his strong influence over the Portuguese Guinea insurgent movement based in his country to steer the movement in more militant directions.

Toure, reflecting his own political biases, is urging the insurgents to tighten security measures and adopt a more radical ideological line. He has counseled the insurgents to devote less attention to "international contacts" and more to the situation within Portuguese Guinea and within the movement itself. He is particularly concerned with the division between its mulatto and black elements. Toure also wants closer contact between the Conakry-based leadership and fighting elements inside Portuguese Guinea, thus implying that military commanders should have a greater voice in setting policy.

Before his assassination, the pragmatic Amilcar Cabral had devoted considerable attention to cultivating support among non-Communist states in the hope that his planned independent government, when formed, would receive broad foreign political backing. This effort had met success, especially in Western Europe. Adoption by the movement's permanent leadership of a harsher ideological stance or closer ties to its Communist supporters could jeopardize those gains. The movement's recently named acting leader, Aristide Pereira, lacks the prestige or forcefulness to counter Toure's "guidance" either on policy or on selection of a permanent successor to Cabral.

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