

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

ATCH NO. EGMA-27648

6-124-27

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE
Attn: []
FROM : Chief of Base, Munich []

DATE: 5 July 1957

INFO: COS, Vienna

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/GRARB
SPECIFIC— GRCROOND Project Review

REFERENCES: EGMW-4076, 29 May 1957
DIR-23147, 24 June 1957

1. The GRCROOND roof project encompasses the following sub-projects with agents listed under their project:

- a. **GRLAUNCH**
(1) GRLAUNCH-1 (P/A)
(2) GRLAUNCH-2
(3) GRLAUNCH-3
(4) GRLAUNCH-A/9
- b. **GRBLAMED**
(1) GRBLAMED-4 (P/A) (3) GRBLAMED-21 (P/A)
(2) GRBLAMED-23 (4) GRBLAMED-26
(5) GRBLAMED-31
- c. **GRBATIK**
(1) GRBATIK-1
- d. **GRREPAIR**
(1) GRREPAIR-3 (P/A) (6) GRREPAIR-4 (P/A)
(2) GRREPAIR-5 (7) GRREPAIR-6
(3) GRREPAIR-7 (8) GRREPAIR-16
(4) GRREPAIR-9
(5) GRREPAIR-11
- e. **GRCROOND-1**
(1) GRCROOND-1 (P/A)
(2) GRCROOND-2
(3) GRCROOND-4

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3020
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

2. In accordance with your outline as presented in EGMW-4076, we have applied each of your four categories - General Evaluation of Effectiveness, Planning for the Future, Security, and Finance - to each of GRCROOND's five sub-projects, GRLAUNCH, GRBLAMED, GRBATIK, GRREPAIR and GRCROOND-1. The first three categories are covered under each sub-project heading, but the financial aspects of the five

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

- 2 -

EGMA-27648

sub-projects are placed together and entered at the end of the review. There are two future activities planned for each sub-project and these are also entered separately at the end of the review.

3. GRLAUNCH

a. General Evaluation of Effectiveness

(1) Active Agents' Reliability

(a) The operation's P/A, GRLAUNCH-1, the deputy P/A and W/T operator, GRLAUNCH-2, and the W/T operator, GRLAUNCH-A/9, are all considered reliable agents who can be expected to perform satisfactorily under KUBARK direction and control both now and in wartime.

(b) The P/A, GRLAUNCH-1, is a head-strong individual with Monarchist leanings. He desires to carry out more activities in preparation for war, i.e., recruit additional personnel, lay down caches of weapons and supplies, etc. than KUBARK is willing to have him do, but case officer believes GRLAUNCH-1 is well aware he would not receive the support he is presently obtaining from anyone else but our organization and consequently, he will continue to carry out case officer instructions.

(c) The deputy P/A and W/T operator, GRLAUNCH-2, is believed to be a very reliable agent and is rated as the best W/T operator ARB possesses. (ARB has, however, only three W/T operators who are rated as at least satisfactory and capable of "coming up on the air" at a moment's notice - GRLAUNCH-2, GRLAUNCH-A/9, and GRIMPASTE.) GRLAUNCH-2 is particularly dependent upon KUBARK support since he holds no overt job and the majority of his monthly income is received from KUBARK.

(d) The GRLAUNCH operation's second satisfactory W/T agent is GRLAUNCH-A/9. His W/T ability, attitude, and actions mark him as a reliable agent whom we may expect to perform satisfactorily for us at the present and to work under our direction in wartime.

(e) The operation's fourth agent, GRLAUNCH-3, is not considered a reliable W/T agent. Although he has not had sufficient refresher training to maintain his W/T ability, case officer believes agent should not be considered reliable because he also apparently lacks the qualities of confidence and determination which case officer believes are essential to an agent before he can be considered reliable. GRLAUNCH-3's family situation - a sick wife and two children - are a probable factor in reducing agent's reliability.

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

EGMA-27648

(2) State of training of each agent

(a) GRLAUNCH-1 has read 38 training briefs (in German) extracted from the B.A.T. manual, has received innumerable oral briefings from and held operational discussions with a number of case officers during the seven years he has worked for us in the Unconventional Warfare field, and has done much area reconnaissance and spotting and recruiting of personnel during this seven year period. GRLAUNCH-1 has not received any formal or concentrated U.W. training during this time and therefore should be considered only partially trained as far as his P/A duties and responsibilities are concerned.

(b) GRLAUNCH-2's W/T training is up-to-date and complete - he is considered a trained and ready W/T operator. He most recently completed five days W/T refresher training in March 1957. GRLAUNCH-2 has not received training in the duties of a Deputy P/A but, as in the case of the P/A, GRLAUNCH-1, he has acquired knowledge and some ability by working at the job over a period of years - six years in his case. GRLAUNCH-2's other major activity, reporting on Drop and Landing Zones, is something he is well qualified to do as a result of his World War II experience as a fighter pilot together with the considerable photographic and draftsman ability he possesses. GRLAUNCH-2 was given a ten-week course in Agent and Paramilitary Operations at Grafenwoehr, Germany in 1952 and was an able student.

(c) GRLAUNCH-4/9 is rated as a satisfactory W/T operator who also completed five days refresher training in March 1957.

(d) GRLAUNCH-3 is not considered a satisfactory W/T asset. He took two days refresher training in November 1956 and is not now believed capable of operating his W/T set successfully if the wartime need arose.

(3) Spotting new agents

(a) GRLAUNCH-1 has spotted six persons whom he desired to recruit as so-called "area leaders", to be subordinate to him in various areas of Salzburg and Tirol provinces. These six persons were active agents in the GRLAUNCH operation before 1953. Headquarters does not want these persons to be recruited and case officer has informed GRLAUNCH-1 we will not recruit them. GRLAUNCH-1 has also given case officer the name of a possible W/T replacement for GRLAUNCH-3 should we decide to replace GRLAUNCH-3. This person is not now a W/T operator and would therefore have to be trained.

SECRET

SECRET

- 4 -

EGMA-27648

(b) No other candidates, for W/T positions or other work, have been spotted because case officer has been more concerned with putting the brakes on the activities and plans of this operation than in encouraging them. To ask GRLAUNCH-1 to spot additional personnel is to run the large risk that he will carry his discussions with them too far and reveal his operational interests to them.

b. Planning for the Future

(1) In the coming twelve months, case officer plans to "hold the line" with the GRLAUNCH operation and make them, particularly GRLAUNCH-1, accept the fact that we do not want to carry out any activities beyond those they are now doing - maintaining the W/T proficiency of the operators, reconnoitering for Escape and Evasion facilities and any additional required Drop or Landing Zones, and providing biographic information on certain persons of anticipated wartime use. The only exception to the above statement is the possibility of allowing GRLAUNCH-1 and 2 to rent a room in a forester's house in their expected redoubt area (north-east of Achensee) with the intention of using this room as a base and an excuse to thoroughly reconnoiter their area and to become acquainted with the people throughout the area.

(2) Regarding W/T recruitments, case officer would like to replace GRLAUNCH-3 with another W/T operator if it becomes apparent that GRLAUNCH-3 either will not or cannot take the necessary W/T refresher training. If a replacement is believed necessary and/or desirable, case officer would like to obtain a person in GRLAUNCH-3's general area - Saalfelden.

(3) Case officer expects to run a W/T Field Test in the Achensee area of Austria for agents GRLAUNCH-2 and GRLAUNCH-A/9 on the last weekend in July 1957. This Field Test will consist of two days of making contact with a base station and the transmission and reception of several messages by each agent. GRLAUNCH-2 has made several W/T Field Tests in the past and conducted himself in excellent fashion. GRLAUNCH-A/9 has never taken a Field Test.

(4) We expect GRLAUNCH-2 to take three to four days W/T refresher training during the month of October or November 1957. Case officer hopes GRLAUNCH-A/9 will be able to take refresher training during this period also, but his instructor duties at the university may cause his training to be postponed until the spring of 1958.

(5) We shall continue to request GRLAUNCH-3 to make himself available for W/T refresher training and for at least a five to six day period. Case officer is doubtful regarding GRLAUNCH-3's ability and/or desire to undergo more training and believes if agent has not taken more training by the end of this year - or has made a definite commitment for training to be taken early in 1958 - we should terminate him and recover his two cached W/T sets.

SECRET

SECRET

- 5 -

EGMA-27648

c. Security

(1) The security of the GRLAUNCH sub-project is considered by case officer to be weaker than that of any of the five sub-projects under GRCROOND for the following three reasons: (a) The project and its principal personnel have been operating in our behalf for the past seven years; (b) past activities of GRLAUNCH-1, the P/A, have been concerned with a great number of agents who possess varying degrees of knowledge of GRLAUNCH-1's operational interests; and (c) GRLAUNCH-1, and to some extent GRLAUNCH-2, have not always conducted their spotting and recruiting activities in the most secure manner.

(2) To amplify point (c) above, case officer believes GRLAUNCH-1 has often gone beyond the bounds of operational security in the course of spotting personnel for wartime requirement and work. GRLAUNCH-1's feelings that additional personnel should now be recruited for eventual wartime use have led him to commit these errors of security. Case officer believes this tendency on the part of GRLAUNCH-1 to talk too freely with persons he believes to be reliable must be considered a damaging aspect to this operation. Past and present case officers have attempted to restrain GRLAUNCH-1's excessive zeal but have not in every case been successful. There are no known instances of security compromise but present case officer must assume that general knowledge of GRLAUNCH-1's involvement in this KUBARK activity is probably spread among quite a number of unauthorized persons (in the form of wives, relatives, friends, and friends of friends.).

(3) The most recent example of GRLAUNCH-1's propensity to carry his elicitation for spotting purposes too far is the renewed contact he made with the six persons he was considering for immediate recruitment to act as so-called "area leaders." While GRLAUNCH-1 assured case officer he had not revealed his operational interest in the individual to the person himself, case officer thinks these six persons must suspect or believe GRLAUNCH-1 is still concerned with Austrian Unconventional Warfare activities and that they themselves are or will be involved, now or later, in these activities. These six individuals are all former GRLAUNCH active agents and unless GRLAUNCH-1 has maintained frequent social contact with them (which has not been the case, as far as case officer knows) since 1953, the year the GRLAUNCH organization personnel were sharply reduced, then these six individuals must be quite aware of the reason for GRLAUNCH-1's renewal of contact with them.

4. GRBLAMED

a. General Evaluation of Effectiveness

(1) Active Agents' Reliability

(a) The GRBLAMED agents 4, 21, 23, 26 and 30 are considered by case officer to be reliable agents who are now performing in a satisfactory manner and can be expected to do so in a wartime situation.

SECRET

SECRET

- 6 -

EGMA-27648

(b) The only of the GRBLAMED agents whose reliability case officer questions is GRBLAMED-21. Case officer does not question GRBLAMED-21's ideological orientation with the West or his stated agreement with KUBARK Unconventional Warfare aims but rather entertains some doubt as to his availability in wartime. GRBLAMED-21's position as mayor of his town and as a prominent businessman with a family living there all seem to case officer to be contributing factors leading to possible wartime inactivity on his part. Certainly other ARB agents are in somewhat similar positions, but GRBLAMED-21's relative inactivity as a principal agent (he has only spotted persons and provided case officer with an introduction and establishment of bona fides to two persons) combined with his prominent position cause case officer to have doubts regarding his wartime availability.

(2) State of training of each agent

GRBLAMED-4 and 21, the two principal agents of the sub-project, have received a number of oral briefings on tradecraft matters from their case officer. GRBLAMED-23 and 26 have been exposed to very few aspects of proper clandestine procedures and this through the medium of conversations only. GRBLAMED-31, the only GRBLAMED W/T operator, has not as yet commenced his W/T training but it is expected he will do so during the summer of 1957. No training in the form of training briefs, espionage books to be read and discussed, or case officer lectures on specific clandestine matters have been given or are now planned. The only training presently contemplated for the GRBLAMED agents is continued oral briefs by case officer.

(3) Progress made in spotting new agents

GRBLAMED-4, 23, 21 and 26 have all supplied names of personnel for wartime recruitment. Case officer does not expect to recruit any of these spotted GRBLAMED personnel in the year ahead. Two of the persons spotted, GRBLAMEDs 29 and 30, had received POAs and were to be recruited during 1956 but case officer now feels they should be left in the category of "wartime recruitment only."

b. Planning for the future

(1) Case officer hopes that, within the next year, GRBLAMED-4 will provide the name of a W/T candidate and if so case officer plans to attempt recruitment. In view of GRBLAMED-21's inactivity as a principal agent (not entirely intentional because he is an extremely busy man) case officer plans to reduce contact with him to one to two meetings a year. This reduction in contacts will be effected only after case officer has made firm peace-time and war-time emergency communication arrangements with GRBLAMED-21.

SECRET

SECRET

- 7 -

EGMA-27648

(2) GRBLAMED-31 will commence his W/T training in the summer of 1957. Case officer expects it will take a year and a half to two years before GRBLAMED-31 will reach W/T proficiency. GRBLAMED-31 is a school teacher and can only take time off for W/T training during school vacations.

c. Security

(1) Case officer believes the GRBLAMED operation is a relatively secure one. All four agents, GRBLAMEDs 4, 23, 21, 26 and particularly GRBLAMEDs-4 and 21, the P/As, are extremely security conscious and there have been no known or suspected compromises of security. The fifth GRBLAMED agent, GRBLAMED-31, has not yet been exposed in sufficient detail to the need for security but case officer plans to give him a thorough security talk during the next contact. There are no security questions pertaining to the GRBLAMED operation that have arisen during the past year. The operation's one terminated agent, GRBLAMED²³, was if anything, overly security conscious and case officer does not anticipate any security risk arising from his termination.

5. GRBATIK

a. General Evaluation of Effectiveness

(1) Active Agents' Reliability

In case officer's opinion, GRBATIK-1 is an ineffective agent. Case officer has had four contacts with agent and as yet has to receive anything of operational value from him. The previous case officer had levied two requirements on agent; to spot and provide biographic information on a W/T candidate and secondly, to reconnoiter his area for Drop Zones and Landing Zones. The requirement of spotting a W/T candidate was levied on agent almost two years ago; that of the DZs and LZs levied a year ago. Present case officer's experience with agent has been one of increasing anger at agent's failure to provide any information which would satisfy either requirement and the transparent excuses he offers as explanation for this failure.

(2) State of training

The previous case officer gave agent several oral briefs in regard to his requirements and also discussed general operational considerations with him. Present case officer has repeated general operational points but has not given and does not intend to give agent any training as such.

SECRET

SECRET

- 8 -

ECMA-27648

(3) Progress made in spotting new agents

GRBATIK-1 has failed to make any progress in spotting a W/T candidate. At previous case officer's request, agent spotted two persons intended for wartime requirement. These two persons were considered unsuitable by previous case officer for several reasons. Agent has not been requested to spot additional persons and will not be asked to do so.

b. Planning for the future

Case officer plans to terminate GRBATIK-1 in the near future since it is case officer's opinion that agent is and will remain unproductive. Termination will be carried out at the next, or possibly the following, contact with agent. Case officer will tell agent we no longer have an interest in W/T candidates or Drop Zones because our political and military leaders have now made other plans. It is case officer's intention to thank agent for his efforts (even though non-existent) and to make the termination as friendly as possible, thus avoiding any resentment on agent's part. Case officer believes the only sorrow or resentment which agent may feel will be over his loss of ANS 300. per month. Although agent has only a policeman's job, he owns a Gasthaus and has only two mouths - his and his wife's - to feed. Despite this, agent has displayed a great concern over money to case officer.

c. Security

The security of the GRBATIK operation has been exemplary. It is a perfect example of 100% security at the expense of no efficiency. Agent has repeatedly stated to case officer that "we" must have 100% security in "our work." This comment by agent is one of his ready excuses for failure to perform. No known or suspected instances of security compromises have occurred in the past year.

6. GRREPAIR

a. General Evaluation of Effectiveness

(1) Active agents' reliability

(a) GRREPAIR-3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 4, 6, and 16 are considered by case officer to be reliable agents who can be counted on to perform their duties in a satisfactory manner both today and in wartime. The reliability of GRREPAIR-3, 7 and 9 is affected slightly by certain security considerations listed below (See Security c.) GRREPAIR 3 and 4, the two principal agents, have always carried out case officer's instructions properly and have displayed a conscientious attitude in their dealings with case officer.

SECRET

SECRET

- 9 -

ECMA-27648

(b) Case officer has had only limited contact with the other six GRREPAIR agents but to the best of case officer's knowledge and with assurances from the principal agents concerned, these agents have been and will continue to be reliable assets.

(2) State of training of each agent

Neither GRREPAIR-3 or 4, the principal agents, has received any formal training. What knowledge they have of clandestine operations has been acquired through case officer contact and conversations only. With the exception of GRREPAIR-5, the one GRREPAIR W/T asset, the other five GRREPAIR agents have received nothing but brief oral explanations in the way of training. GRREPAIR-5 has received only one week of W/T training given in April 1956.

(3) Progress made in spotting new agents

GRREPAIR-3 has spotted two W/T candidates, GRREPAIR-13 and Subject of MUNI 1309, and case officer will attempt to recruit both of them on 1 September of this year. GRREPAIR-4 has spotted one W/T candidate, Subject of ECMA-26202 and, assuming POA is received in time, case officer will attempt to recruit him at the end of July of this year. GRREPAIR-7, 9, 4 and 6 have submitted names of persons for wartime recruitment. Case officer will add these names to the file and does not expect to recruit any of them during the coming year.

b. Planning for the future

(1) Recruitment of GRREPAIR-3's two W/T candidates and GRREPAIR-4's one candidate will be attempted in the next few months. If the recruitment attempts fail or if any one or all of the three candidates do not pass the W/T aptitude test, case officer will request GRREPAIR-3 or 4 to obtain another candidate.

(2) It is expected that GRREPAIR-5 will take at least one and perhaps two weeks W/T refresher training during the month of September 1957.

c. Security

The security of the GRREPAIR operation is not as satisfactory as case officer would like to see. Case officer feels this way because GRREPAIR-3 and 9 have not observed the best security practices in the course of spotting new agents. Case officer is aware of three instances (two on the part of GRREPAIR-3 and one on the part of GRREPAIR-9) when the agent doing the spotting revealed his operational interest in the individual to the individual concerned before case officer had approved

SECRET

SECRET

-10-

ECMA-27648

it or had a chance himself to talk with the person. This security weakness on the part of GRREPAIR-3 and 9 can be blamed as much on case officer's negligence as on agent's aggressiveness. It is obvious that both the previous and the present case officer had failed to impress these two agents with the insecurity of their actions. Case officer has recently discussed this aspect with both agents and has pointed out to them the possible dangers resulting from their action. Case officer now believes agents will not reveal their operational interests to any unauthorized persons in the future. There are no known instances of security compromise which occurred in the GRREPAIR operation over the past twelve months. Case officer must assume however that certain unauthorized persons (wives, relatives, close friends, etc.) are generally aware that present case officer and GRREPAIR-3, 7 and 9 are engaged in secret activity of some sort.

7. ~~GRCROOND-1~~ GRAVIMETRY

a. General Evaluation of Effectiveness

(1) Active agents' reliability

GRCROOND 1, 2 and 4 are considered reliable agents who can be expected to carry out KUBARK instructions both now and in wartime. All three agents are amenable to case officer direction and willing to cooperate to the best of their ability. GRCROOND-1 has several times failed to arrive at a meeting on time and failed to provide information on the date requested. For these reasons, case officer considers GRCROOND-1 not as reliable as he should be. This can be remedied in part - or perhaps entirely - by case officer insistence on punctuality in meetings and reporting.

(2) State of training of each agent

GRCROOND-1's training in clandestine operations consists of only five years "on-the-job" activities. This manner of acquiring training applies to the principal agents in the other four GRCROOND sub-projects. What knowledge GRCROOND-1 has obtained of proper clandestine activity is the result of case officer briefings and occasional activity such as participation in the Hochschwab 100-man cache effort in 1952. GRCROOND-2 has been contacted by a case officer only three times and it can be said he has received no training at all. GRCROOND-4 has received to date only three weeks of W/T training and is not considered a finished W/T operator. The three weeks of training were taken in July 1956.

(3) Progress made in spotting new agents

Both GRCROOND-1 and 2 have spotted and supplied case officer with the names of potential agents. Case officer is obtaining biographic information on these half-dozen persons and will file these names for any future recruitment possibility.

SECRET

SECRET

- 11 -

EGMA-27648

b. Planning for the future

No additional W/T operators will be recruited for the GRCROOND-1 group in the coming twelve months. We expect to give GRCROOND-4 another three weeks of W/T training in July of this year, and he is now scheduled to commence this training in Munich on 15 July 1957.

c. Security

The security of the GRCROOND-1 group is considered satisfactory. The three agents of the group appear to case officer to be security conscious and they have apparently conducted themselves in accordance with good security practices. Case officer's only reason for terming the GRCROOND operation's security as only satisfactory is based on the agent GRCROOND-1's past and present employment and length of service with us. GRCROOND-1 worked for the U.S. Army when it was in Salzburg and now works for the National Catholic Welfare Committee. In addition, he has worked for us and been contacted by a KUBARK case officer over the past five years and a certain amount of security must be considered lost as a result of GRCROOND-1's past and present activities and position. Case officer is not aware of any instances of security compromise occurring during the past year.

8. Planning for the Future (applies to all five sub-projects)

a. Case officer plans during the next twelve months to establish firm emergency communication arrangements with each agent in each sub-project. These arrangements are: (1) an emergency verbal signal to be used when a "cold take over" of agent today or in wartime is necessary, and (2) a dead drop facility to be selected and reported on (by agent when possible) and retained for wartime use. These two means of emergency communication will be tested with the particular agent as soon as it is possible and convenient to do so. In addition, case officer will give each principal agent, wartime manager, and W/T operator his Munich cover post office box number and operational phone number, together with an alias for agent to use. This will enable each of these agents to establish immediate contact with case officer today, should the need arise.

b. During the next twelve months, case officer plans to impart some aspect of clandestine operations or technique to each principal agent, wartime manager, or W/T operator at each contact with him. Case officer has no firm schedule of subjects planned at present or is not yet certain the form it will take - training briefs, books, oral briefings, or a combination of all three - but some training in clandestine matters will be given each agent of the above categories.

SECRET

SECRET

9. Finance

Estimated FY 1958 expenditures (for all five sub-projects of GRCROOND):

<u>Rents and Utilities</u>	\$600.00
(Rent for Salzburg safe apartment for one year - \$480. plus \$120. heating and cleaning.)	

<u>Supplies and Materials</u>	200.00
-------------------------------	--------

<u>Equipment</u>	300.00
------------------	--------

Contractual Services (for 26 agents)

Indigenous Field Agents	
Supplies and Equipment	100.00
Other costs-travel, etc.	3,000.00 *
Operational Entertainment	300.00
Contractual Services	
Operational, Other	1,000.00

TOTAL → FY 1958 estimate

* Field Agent salaries and expenses only.

	<u>Salary</u>	<u>Expenses</u>	<u>Total</u>
1. GRLAUNCH-1		150.	
2. GRLAUNCH-2		1200.	
3. GRLAUNCH-3		100.	
4. GRLAUNCH-A/9		100.	
5. GRBLAMED-4		---	
6. GRBLAMED-23		---	
7. GRBLAMED-21		---	
8. GRBLAMED-26		---	
9. GRBLAMED-31		150.	
10. GRBATIK-1			
(6 months on)			
11. GRREPAIR-3		400.	
12. GRREPAIR-5		150.	
13. GRREPAIR-7		150.	
14. GRREPAIR-9		150.	
15. GRREPAIR-11		---	
16. GRREPAIR-4		150.	
17. GRREPAIR-6		---	
18. GRREPAIR-16		---	
19. GRCROOND-1		---	
20. GRCROOND-2		---	
21. GRCROOND-4		150.	
TOTALS		\$4200.00	

SECRET

SECRET

- 13 -

ECMA-27648

		Salary	Expenses	Total
22.	GRREPAIR-3 W/T	Candidate	150.	
23.	GRREPAIR-3 W/T	"	150.	
24.	GRREPAIR-4 W/T	"	150.	
25.	GRBATIK-1 W/T	"	150.	
26.	GRBLAMED-4 W/T	"	150.	
	TOTALS		<u>4,950.</u>	

Distribution:

- 3 - EE
- 2 - COS, Vien
- 2 - COS, Germany

SECRET