

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY CHINA (TAIWAN)

REPORT NO.

SUBJECT GRC PLAN FOR OPEN MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST MAINLAND CHINA

DATE DISTR. 25 MAY 1962

SMITH-BUNDY

GILDNER

KAYSEN

PETERSEN

SCHLESINGER

TAYLOR

BELK

FORRESTAL

KOMER

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES

IN

40914

FILE (b)(1) (b)(3)

DATE OF INFO.

PLACE & DATE ACQ APPRAISAL

DETAILS OF DESTROY

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APPRAISAL:

SOURCE :

TO STATE: NO DISTRIBUTION EXCEPT TO ROGER HILSMAN, JR.

1. COMMENT. ON 23 MAY 1962 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA (GRC) PRESENTED FOR UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

APPROVAL AND NECESSARY ACTION THE OUTLINE PLAN FOR THE SECOND STAGE OF COUNTERATTACK ON THE CHINA MAINLAND.

DETAILED GRC PLANS FOR THE FIRST STAGE OF MAINLAND COUNTERATTACK BUT ONLY BROADLY OUTLINED PLANS FOR THE SECOND STAGE. THIS REPORT DETAILS THE OUTLINE OF THE SECOND STAGE. THE GRC PLANS FOR DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES AND CHOICE OF TARGET AREAS GIVEN IN THIS REPORT ARE BASED ON ESTIMATES OF MILITARY, TOPOGRAPHICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIOLOGICAL CONDITIONS

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ON MAINLAND CHINA, WHICH THE GRC ALSO PROVIDED. THESE ESTIMATES WILL BE SEPARATELY REPORTED [REDACTED]

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2. THE GRC PLAN FOR THE SECOND STAGE OF MAINLAND COUNTERATTACK CALLED FOR PHASED OPERATIONS AGAINST CERTAIN TARGETS IN THE CH'AOCHOU-SWATOW, AMOY, OR FOOCHOW AREAS OF SOUTH CHINA USING THE GRC ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE. THE PRIMARY CONCEPT OF THIS PLAN WAS THAT THE GRC WOULD COUNTERATTACK THE MAINLAND WITH ITS OWN FORCES WHILE THE UNITED STATES AND THE GRC JOINTLY DEFENDED TAIWAN, PENGHU AND THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS, AND THE UNITED STATES PROVIDED LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR ATTACKING GRC FORCES.

3. SUCCESS OF THE PLAN WAS PREDICATED ON THE DEVELOPMENT WITHIN COMMUNIST CHINA OF A POPULAR RESISTANCE MOVEMENT THAT WAS TO BE BROUGHT ABOUT THROUGH POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AND BY PARAMILITARY ACTION UNDER THE FIRST STAGE OF THE PLAN. THE FIRST PHASE OF STAGE TWO OF THE PLAN CALLED FOR AIRBORNE AND MARITIME COMMANDO RAIDS OF VARYING SIZES AGAINST PRESELECTED TARGETS ON THE FUKIEN AND KWANGTUNG COASTS TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO ANTI COMMUNISTS IN INITIATING RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS, TO OCCUPY LIGHTLY DEFENDED CITIES AND VITAL MOUNTAINOUS REGIONS IN PROVINCIAL BORDER AREAS. PHASE TWO OF STAGE TWO ENVISIONED ASSAULT LANDINGS AT SEVERAL BEACHES ALONG THE FUKIEN AND KWANGTUNG COASTS TO CARRY OUT CONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATIONS. THE GRC WOULD ALSO HAVE TO SEIZE ONE OR TWO AIRFIELDS AND ONE

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SEAPORT THEN CONSTRUCT STRONG FORTIFICATIONS AROUND THEM FOR USE AS THE INITIAL BEACHHEAD LINKING THE COMBAT AREA WITH TAIWAN AND THE PENGHU ISLANDS. THESE WOULD PROVIDE BASES FOR THE REPULSING OF COMMUNIST COUNTERATTACKS, THE CONTINUING OF LARGE-SCALE AIRDROP OPERATIONS BEHIND ENEMY LINES AND THE SPREADING OF THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT. PHASE THREE OF STAGE TWO, WHICH WAS PREDICATED UPON THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE GRC BEACHHEAD ON THE MAINLAND AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A RESISTANCE MOVEMENT BEHIND ENEMY LINES, CALLED FOR GRC TROOPS TO ADVANCE DEEPER INTO AREAS OF FUKIEN AND KWANGTUNG OR TO OCCUPY TOTALLY ONE OF THESE PROVINCES. WHEN THIS HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED, THE GRC WOULD APPRAISE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND COMMUNIST CHINESE, THE COMBAT STRENGTH OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST TROOPS, AND THE STRENGTH OF RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS NORTH OF THE YELLOW RIVER TO DETERMINE WHETHER TO DEVELOP A PLAN FOR THE UNIFICATION OF ALL OF CHINA OR TO PARTITION CHINA TEMPORARILY UNTIL RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS IN NORTH CHINA HAD INCREASED AND SPREAD.

4. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STAGE TWO CALLED FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF A COMBINED ARMY-NAVY AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE AND A COMINED ARMY-AIR TASK FORCE FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE WERE TO BE PRIMARILY CONCENTRATED IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

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<p>DEFENDING THE TAIWAN AREA. UNDER THE TERMS OF THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY THE ARMY WOULD ALLOCATE PART OF ITS FORCES FOR THE DEFENSE OF TAIWAN, THE PENGHU AND OFFSHORE ISLANDS. THE SPECIFIC DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES WAS TO BE AS FOLLOWS</p> <p>A. IN PHASE ONE UNITS OF THE SPECIAL FORCES AND THE ANTI COMMUNIST NATIONAL SALVATION CORPS WOULD BE CHARGED WITH UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE. THEY WOULD HAVE THE NECESSARY SUPPORT OF THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE.</p> <p>B. IN PHASE TWO THE ARMY WOULD ASSIGN UNITS TO COORDINATE WITH THE NAVY AS A COMBINED AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE. THE INITIAL LANDING FORCE WOULD COMPRISE ONE MARINE DIVISION TO BE FOLLOWED UP BY TWO OR THREE REGULAR DIVISIONS WHICH IN TURN WOULD BE REINFORCED BY SIX TO NINE REGULAR DIVISIONS. ONE ARMORED DIVISION WOULD SUPPORT THESE FORCES. THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE WOULD SUPPORT THE LANDING OPERATION. THE GRC HAD A SEA TRANSPORT CAPABILITY OF 68 LANDING CRAFT TALLING 122,800 TONS THAT COULD CARRY ONE REINFORCED LANDING DIVISION PLUS 140,000 TONS OF MERCHANT VESSELS THAT COULD SUPPORT MILITARY OPERATIONS DURING THE INITIAL STAGE OF THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE. THE MERCHANT VESSELS COULD BE USED ONLY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LOADING PURPOSES INCLUDING THE TRANSPORTATION OF REINFORCEMENTS. DEFENSIVELY THREE ARMY DIVISIONS WOULD REMAIN ON CHINMEN, ONE DIVISION ON MATSU WITH FIVE INFANTRY DIVISIONS ASSIGNED TO DEFEND TAIWAN AND THE</p>		
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PENGHU ISLANDS. THIS ARRANGEMENT, PLUS THE HELP OF UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES, WOULD ENABLE THEM TO DEFEND THIS AREA. THE REMAINING NINE TO THIRTEEN INFANTRY DIVISIONS AND ONE ARMORED DIVISION WOULD BE PUT UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE SUPREME HEADQUARTERS AS A GENERAL RESERVE FORCE. THE MAIN BODY OF THE FORCE WOULD REMAIN IN TAIWAN AND THE PENGHU ISLANDS WITH PART OF IT STATIONED ON CHINMEN AS A MOBILE FORCE READY FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF THE COUNTERATTACK.

C. THE NAVY DURING PHASE TWO WOULD BE ENGAGED PRIMARILY IN THE COMBINED AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE, BUT IT WOULD HAVE TO COORDINATE CLOSELY WITH THE UNITED STATES TO INSURE THE SECURITY OF THE TAIWAN STRAIT AND IMPORTANT SEA AREAS NEARBY. IF THE GRC NAVY WAS FORCED INTO DECISIVE BATTLE WITH THE COMMUNIST FLEET, IT SHOULD DESTROY THE ENEMY VESSELS WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE GRC AND UNITED STATES AIR FORCES IN ACCORD WITH THE TERMS OF THE ROCHESTER PLAN.

D. THE JOINT ARMY-AIR TASK FORCE WOULD CONDUCT AIRBORNE OPERATIONS AGAINST PRESELECTED TARGETS IN SUPPORT OF THE MAIN LANDING FORCES IN PHASE TWO. THE AIR FORCE IN PHASE TWO WOULD BE DEPLOYED TO INITIATE CONCENTRATED ATTACKS ON COMMUNIST FIRST LINE AIRFIELDS AND IMPORTANT RADAR STATIONS TO FORCE THE COMMUNIST AIR FORCE TO RETREAT TO SECOND AND THIRD LINE AIRFIELDS

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MAKING IMPOSSIBLE THE LOCATION OF COORDINATED OPERATION OF COMMUNIST BOMBERS AND FIGHTERS. FROM THIS POINT, TOP PRIORITY FOR THE AIR FORCE WOULD BE THE MAINTENANCE OF AIR SUPREMACY OVER THE TARGET AREA AND THE CONTINUATION OF COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS. AFTER THE EXECUTION OF COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS, SOME AIR FORCE STRENGTH WOULD HAVE TO BE ASSIGNED TO INTERDICTION MISSIONS AIMED AT ISOLATING THE BATTLEFIELDS AND WEAKENING COMMUNIST REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES. THE AIR FORCE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO PROVIDE THE COMBINED AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE WITH PROPER INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION DATA AND COVER TO INSURE THE SECURITY OF TASK FORCE CONCENTRATION. AFTER THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS HAD PROGRESSED THE AIR FORCE WOULD MOVE ITS COMBAT UNITS FORWARD INTO THE MAINLAND COASTAL AREA TO AUGMENT THE SCOPE OF ITS OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES.

5. GRC TARGETS FOR LANDINGS ON THE MAINLAND WERE LIMITED TO THOSE WITHIN THE OPERATIONAL RADIUS OF THE GRC AIR FORCE AND THOSE THAT COULD BE LINKED TO TAIWAN AND THE PENGHU ISLANDS IN THE ABSENCE OF DIRECT UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN THE COUNTERATTACK. THUS THE GRC WAS PRESENTING FOCHOW, CH'AOCHOU-SWATOW, AND AMOY FOR CONSIDERATION. FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF CHINESE COMMUNIST DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTERATTACK, CH'AOCHOU SWATOW APPEARED THE BEST LANDING AREA. FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF GRC COMBAT CAPABILITY AND THE

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CONSOLIDATION OF A GRC BASE ON THE MAINLAND, HOWEVER, THE AMOY AREA WAS PREFERABLE.

6. TO PERMIT THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF AN OPERATION AGAINST ONE OF THESE TARGETS THE GRC REQUESTED THAT THE UNITED STATES ADHERE TO THE TERMS OF THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY, AUGMENT THE STRENGTH OF ITS FORCES IN THE TAIWAN AREA, SUPPLY CERTAIN PRESENTLY NEEDED EQUIPMENT FOR THE GRC AND REPLACE EQUIPMENT LOST BY THE GRC DURING ITS COUNTEROFFENSIVE OPERATION. THE QUANTITY OF EQUIPMENT NEEDED REPRESENTED GRC HOPES FOR UNITED STATES AID AND DID NOT REPRESENT ANY CONDITION PLACED UPON THE UNITED STATES BY THE GRC. [REDACTED] COMMENT. THE OFFICIALS DID NOT AMPLIFY THIS STATEMENT FURTHER.) THE GRC REQUESTED THAT WITHIN THE TERMS OF THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY THE UNITED STATES MAINTAIN EFFECTIVE CONTROL OVER THE TAIWAN STRAIT, UNDERTAKE THE BULK OF THE AIR DEFENSE RESPONSIBILITY FOR TAIWAN AND THE PENGHU ISLANDS, CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE AND PATROL MISSIONS OVER THE STRAIT PARTICULARLY STRENGTHENING COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST CHINESE COMMUNIST SUBMARINES, AND ATTACK ANY COMMUNIST MILITARY UNITS ATTEMPTING TO CROSS THE STRAIT. ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT URGENTLY NEEDED FROM THE UNITED STATES INCLUDED 16 B-57 BOMBERS FOR ATTACKING SECOND LINE CHINESE COMMUNIST BASES PLUS THE FOLLOWING NAVAL VESSELS AMOUNTING TO A TOTAL TONNAGE OF 100,000: 1 LSD, 20 LST, 10 LSM, 10 LCU, 50 LCM, 4 MSC AND 20 MSL. THE GRC HAD

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THE NECESSARY MEN TRAINED AND READY TO MAN THESE VESSELS. THE GRC ALSO HOPED THE UNITED STATES WOULD PROVIDE FOR FOLLOWING AID FOR THE ARMY; FULL EQUIPMENT FOR THE 15 FORWARD LOOK DIVISIONS, M-41 TANKS FOR THE TWO ARMORED DIVISIONS, FULL EQUIPMENT FOR NINE RESERVE INFANTRY DIVISION SO THAT THESE COULD BE REORGANIZED INTO LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION, PERSONNEL PARACHUTES AND CARGO PARACHUTES PLUS OTHER EQUIPMENT FOR AIRBORNE UNITS AND BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION RIVER CROSSING EQUIPMENT. THE GRC REQUESTED THAT THE UNITED STATES REPLENISH ALL WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT SUCH AS AIRCRAFT NAVAL VESSELS AND ARTILLERY PIECES, AND ALL KINDS OF SUPPLIES LOST IN ACTION OR THROUGH ATTRITION AS SOON AS THE LOSS OCCURRED. THE GRC ALSO NEEDED ALL KINDS OF EQUIPMENT, MATERIAL AND UTILITIES NECESSARY FOR THE REOPENING OF SEAPORTS ALONG THE MAINLAND COAST DURING THE INITIAL STAGE OF THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE OPERATION. THESE WOULD INCLUDE PONTOONS, CAUSEWAYS AND FLOATING WHARVES AND VARIOUS KINDS OF LIGHTERS AND BARGES.

7. DISSEM: STATE (CHARGE ONLY)

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