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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
 Golitsyn

FROM: AC/IMS <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 20px; margin-top: 5px;"></div>	EXTENSION	NO.
	1901	DATE 27 May 1984

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17 MAY 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Counterintelligence Staff
Chief, Publications Review Board

FROM:

[Redacted]

Acting Chief, Information Management Staff

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SUBJECT:

Anatoliy Golitsyn's Answers To Questions
Submitted By E. J. E. Publications Inc.

At the request of the CI Staff, the attached manuscript was reviewed for classified information within the DO. The manuscript contained no classified information.

[Redacted]

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175-1-34

DODD, MEAD & COMPANY

79 MADISON AVENUE

NEW YORK, N. Y. 10016

Publishers Since 1839

May 4, 1934

Dear Anatoliy:

I have just had lunch with Ed Eustein who is writing a cover story about you and NEW LIES FOR OLD for Parade Magazine, as I mentioned to you in my letter dated April 30. n


He has asked me to pass on the enclosed 2 questions for which he would like answers.

You can, of course, get your reply back to me and I will pass it on to him immediately.

I am also enclosing a copy of the ad for the book which appears in today's National Review.

With all best wishes.

Yours sincerely,



Ellen Klots

For Ed Epstein

E.J.E Publications, Inc.
430 East 86th Street
New York City 10028
May 4, 1980

Allan Klotz
Dodd Mead
79 Madison
New York City 10010

Dear Mr. Klotz

I am enclosing below nine questions for Mr. Golitsyn. I would greatly appreciate it if he could answer them. My phone number is 212-249-4003.

1. To what extent did the first and second chief directorates coordinate their activity? Was there rivalry?

2. Why was a KGB officer, Shitov, chosen to be USSR ambassador to Cuba? Did Shitov have a special relation with Castro?

3. In 1959, a second chief directorate officer named Rumantsyev attempted to defect during the trade exhibition? Was he stopped because of a leak? Did this incident have ramifications for Soviet intelligence?

4. What would the 13th Department of the First Chief Directorate, and General Rodin, have known regarding Oswald's defection?

5. Could Oswald have been recruited by the 2nd Chief Directorate in the USSR? If so, which Department of the KGB would handle him when he returned to the US? Would an agent recruited by the 2nd Chief Directorate be prepared to be handled by a stranger? By a First Directorate Officer? Would the 13th Department have any role?

6. Is there a difference in the way an ideological or mercenary recruit is handled?

7. Do you believe Oswald had been in contact with the KGB? What is the probability--before he defected in 1959? While in the USSR from 1959-62? After his return to US?

8. John Barron's 1974 and 1983 books on the KGB contain markedly different organizational divisions in the KGB. Does this reflect a change in the CIA's picture of the KGB? Or a change in the KGB itself? Or a change on the defector and other source material the CIA relies on?

9. When the Trust was studied or discussed in KGB schools what were the main theoretical lessons drawn from this deception?

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY E. J. E. PUBLICATIONS INC.

The answers are keyed to the questions (attached).

1. There was close coordination of activities between the First and the Second Chief Directorates. A rivalry, however, did exist between the two during the period 1947 - 1953 when the Political Intelligence Committee (the Committee of Information) and the Security Service (MGB) were separated from each other. The coordination between the two improved under SEROV. However, after the reorganization by SHELEPIN, the coordination between the two directorates has become excellent and there has been an exchange of officers between them. The First and the Second Chief Directorates have become Shelepin's right and left hands. A KGB chairman would not tolerate rivalry within one house.
2. In my opinion, Castro, at the initial phase from 1960 to 1965, was regarded by the Soviets as their "Agent of Influence." Because of the Soviet's special relation with Castro and because of the U.S. and French intelligence activities against the Cuban regime, special countermeasures were needed and therefore Castro was handled by high ranking GRU and KGB officers under diplomatic cover, even as high as an ambassador. In 1960, he was handled by a GRU officer, namely Sergey KUDRYAVTSEV. In 1961 he was handled by a KGB specialist in France and Argentina, one ALEXEEV SHITOV.
3. RUMYANTSEV, an officer of the second Chief Directorate was an officer of the Moscow KGB Branch. According to information which I received from an officer of the Second Chief Directorate, RUMYANTSEV was actually caught trying to make a contact with an American at the American Exhibition in SOKOL'NIKI. He approached an exhibition guide whom he believed to be an American and made arrangements with this

person to transfer his KGB documents from a train at a specific train station. I do not know whether this guide was actually an American or a Russian but I do know he was a KGB agent who reported the incident. SHELEPIN was informed about the attempted approach and after review issued his instruction. The instruction did not mention that the guide was a KGB agent. RUMYANTSEV was later tried and executed.

4. The 13th Department of the First Chief Directorate would be notified about Oswald's background, his connection with the U.S. army and about his defection. They would normally take part in Oswald's debriefing and ask specific questions about those units of the U.S. Army that Oswald might have knowledge about.
5. I believe that Oswald could have been recruited in the U.S.S.R. by either the Second or the First Chief Directorate or even jointly. If so, he would have been handled by either the FCD's Illegal Service or by the 13th Department's Illegals. I believe that if Oswald was recruited and if the KGB believed and trusted him - he could have been handled by a stranger who, however, would be introduced to him, in the USSR.
6. The KGB usually exercises more caution with a mercenary recruit than an ideological one. A mercenary recruit is met in third countries by a foreign agent since they try to avoid personal contacts between Soviet KGB agents and mercenary recruits.
7. I learned from reading U.S. press reports that Oswald received his Soviet visa in Finland in 1959 from the Soviet Consul named GOLUB. I met GOLUB in Moscow on his return from Finland and knew him as an officer of the First Chief Directorate. I was briefed by him on cover activities in Finland. On arrival I was given the responsibility at the

Consulate in Finland of granting visas for KGB contacts illegals. Normally KGB Headquarters would notify their Residentura in Finland about the expected arrival of an illegal and instruct them to give the illegal a visa when he applies for one. There would be no delay in issuing a visa for an old, old KGB contact or for an illegal. A new KGB contact, such as a defector, would experience a delay of approximately 10 to 15 days in receiving a visa. During this period he would be thoroughly debriefed and correspondence exchanged between the Residentura and Moscow.

I do not know whether Oswald experienced a delay in getting his visa in Finland. I believe, however, that if one could check his passport for his arrival date in Finland and his departure date, it would indicate whether he experienced a delay and further clarify whether he had been in contact before 1959. I further believe that he probably was in contact with the KGB during the period 1959 - 1962, for debriefing and for verifying his bona fides. My personal experience in handling one defector in Finland in 1961 may be helpful. A major ~~in~~ the Iranian Army walked into the Soviet Consulate requesting political asylum. He stated that he had received training in the United States. As per my orders, I conducted a debriefing and notified the Ambassador and the KGB resident, ZHENIKHOV, who immediately sent telegrams to the Foreign Ministry and to the KGB Headquarters respectively. We received permission to grant a visa in about 10 to 14 days and then sent the defector to Moscow in the company of a GRU officer. He was met at the Moscow Airport by the Chief of the Eastern Department of the SCD which handles Iran. After a debriefing which took approximately two months the request for political asylum was granted and printed in the Soviet press.

I do not completely exclude the possibility that Oswald may have been contacted in the United States.

8. I cannot comment on the CIA's picture of the KGB. I can state, however, that in my opinion the structural changes in the KGB as given in the Barron books, do not reflect the real changes in the KGB. When Shelepin came into power he decided to get away from the obsession that the KGB had in the 30's, 40's, and 50's, with internal security, toward the active political use of its various assets such as scientists, intellectuals and priests against the West.

As I have stated in my book, the political direction of KGB activities under Shelepin has continued and this makes the KGB very effective and thus dangerous. In my opinion, Barron's characterization of KGB structural changes cannot rationalize the new political challenge of the KGB to the Western World.

9. During the study of the Trust in the KGB Institute, it was presented as a valuable historic experience of active methods, as practiced under Lenin and DZERZHINSKIY during NEP. The Trust was presented as a model to follow in helping the party solve political, diplomatic and military problems. It was presented as an effective method to get away from routine, petty and wasteful operations and to prevent professional degeneration of its cadre and to involve them in ~~in~~ a more militant, successful struggle with capitalistic countries and their intelligence services.

A. G.