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\* Amt VI of the RSHA

Gruppe VI B

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Gruppe VI B and Western Europe

Preamble

It is merely a matter of convenience to treat the history of Western Europe under Amt VI in terms of the activities of Gruppe VI B such as it existed at the time of the German collapse: for it has to be remembered that in the various reorganisations of Amt VI, especially in the early part of its history, the section designated as Gruppe VI B was not throughout competent for Western Europe, nor were the territorial divisions between the various Gruppen without frequent modification. In Part I of this paper therefore, which deals roughly with the years 1939-41, care is taken to refer to Western Europe rather than to Gruppe VI B; the remaining Parts dealing with the work of the Referate against the various countries, however, are dealt with in terms of Gruppe VI B as if the organisation of the Gruppe had remained unchanged throughout, unless where specific points require clarification.

This treatment is somewhat inaccurate, but not seriously so. Amt VI activities against Western Europe fall into two well defined parts, as does indeed the history of the Amt as a whole - the periods before and after the appointment of SCHELLENBERG as Amtschef. SCHELLENBERG's accession in late 1941 marks a turning point in Amt VI; a change in organisation, in personnel and in policy. The results of Amt VI activities in the time of JOST were meagre, in the case of Western Europe almost negligible. Parts II-V deal in fact very largely with the SCHELLENBERG period from early 1942 onwards, by which time Gruppe VI B was finally established with only minor subsequent changes. Part I therefore serves as a historical background to the remainder of the paper.

A further complication to be noted is that caused by the military campaigns themselves; broadly speaking Amt VI as the Auslandsnachrichtendienst dealt with foreign territory, while Amt III as the Inlandsnachrichtendienst dealt with the home territory. Occupied territory, however, became a source of friction between the two Aemter, and no well defined policy seems ever to have been established. The 1940 campaign in the West and the subsequent occupation of the Low Countries and part of France led to a reorientation of Amt VI policy against these countries. The change however was ill defined, as is evidenced by the strong Amt III representation in Holland and Belgium as against the equally strong Amt VI representation in the Bds Frankreich. This factor is of importance in dealing with Holland and Belgium.

The main purpose of this paper is to give an account of the development of Amt VI activities against Western Europe and to attempt to assess the degree of success which attended its efforts to obtain through its representatives in the countries under review the information it desired. In this assessment two points must be borne in mind. Firstly all the necessary evidence is not available since some leading personalities have not yet been arrested and interrogated. Secondly, this paper deals only with the SD and its personnel; any advantages which the absorption of the Abwehr in 1944 bestowed on Gruppe VI B do not form any part of the scope of this review. The first defect is however not serious and further information is not likely to modify this interim assessment. The reservation however must still be made.

Part I      The Historical Development of Gruppe VI B

A. Western Europe under JOST

1. The Original Organisation

When the RSHA was created on the outbreak of war, Amt VI of the new organisation under JOST in effect broke new ground for the SD which until then had not officially concerned itself with the Ausland. The organisation of the new Amt therefore in the early stages could only be tentative and would naturally be subject to modification in the light of experience. Such in fact was the case and the Amt underwent drastic reorganisation on at least two occasions before the end of 1941. By January 1940 the Amt had lettered Gruppen up to the letter H. Under this organisation Western Europe was divided between two Gruppen - Gruppe VI E and Gruppe VI F. ~~X~~Gruppe VI E under (Stubaß ~~ROSSNER~~) dealt with Italy, Spain, Portugal, and South America, while ~~X~~Gruppe VI F under ~~Hastuf~~ ~~BIELSTEIN~~ controlled France, Luxemburg, Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland. Roughly therefore, Western Europe was divided into two North-West and South-West groups, while the appearance of South America in the South-West group is explained by the fact that penetration of that country was envisaged from the Iberian Peninsula.

2. The Beauftragter - JOST's first appointments.

Side by side with this central organisation in Berlin was the appointment by JOST to the various countries listed above of Amt VI representatives whose function it was to provide the Amt with the information it had been set up to obtain. In Western Europe these appointments were the following:<sup>1</sup> Ostuf Dr. PETER was sent to Switzerland, Stubaß PLATH to Spain, EAST to Portugal, and Dr. ERB to Holland. No appointment was made to Italy, as in accordance with the Fuehrerbefehl, no espionage activities were to be carried out in that country. No representatives were sent to France and Belgium before the occupation of these two countries in 1940 and in deed Dr. ERB in Holland was not a permanent appointment. ERB merely travelled on several occasions to Holland and in the course of his other duties acted on behalf of Amt VI.

Generally speaking, the Beauftragter were badly chosen, ill-trained, and given no clear instructions on their duties. They were given commercial cover, as the Foreign Office opposed giving diplomatic cover to such intruders on its own sphere. They were charged with providing their respective Gruppen with political information regarding the countries to which they were sent, but had in general to find their own contacts, spurned as they were by the Foreign Office, and in some cases had to find their own channels of communication. In these unfavourable circumstances the Beauftragter achieved little in the way of results. The development of these original appointments abroad are dealt with in the Parts dealing with the activities of the Referate of Gruppe VI B.

3. The Reorganisation of Amt VI in early 1941.

The first major reorganisation of Amt VI took place in January 1941. In this change an entirely new system seems to have been envisaged, but it is doubtful if it was ever in fact put into operation. The number of Laendergruppen was decreased, and in particular a new Gruppe VI B came into being, having under its control the whole of Europe, Africa, and the Near East. The Gruppe, having such a wide territory to cover, had the unusually high number of ten Referate, but there is no indication of the territorial division between these Referate: nor are the names of the Gruppenleiter or Referent available. This organisational structure however was obviously an unwieldy one, and it is not surprising that before long it was abandoned in favour of a decentralisation of territorial control. The existence of this Gruppe VI B must have been very short lived.

4. JOST's final Organisation.

By the summer of 1941 JOST had finally decided on the organisation of his new Amt. The Gruppen were again seven in number, but the territorial divisions and the lettering of the Gruppen had undergone considerable changes. Of these Gruppen, Western Europe was assigned to Gruppe VI E which represented in fact an amalgamation of Gruppe VI E and Gruppe VI F of 1940 as the countries controlled by the new Gruppe were Holland, Belgium, France, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland and Italy. South America however passed to VI D. The new Gruppenleiter was Hastuf BIELSTEIN, the Gruppenleiter of the 1940 VI F.

5. The Personnel under JOST.

Mention has been made in paragraph 2 above of the poor quality of the Beauftragter chosen by JOST as Amt VI representatives abroad: the personnel in the Amt itself did not present a very much brighter picture. JOST, the weakest of the Amtschefs in the new RSHA both in personality and in status, was not in a strong position in choosing the personnel of his new Amt, and Gruppe VI E was little better than any other Gruppe. The original Gruppenleiter was Hastuf BIELSTEIN who was replaced in early 1942 by Stubaf FREISE. Neither was competent. The main source of recruitment open to JOST was the personnel of Abteilung III of the old SD-Hauptamt of which Abteilung JOST had been Leiter. But the work of that department was an inadequate training ground for the new duties assigned to Amt VI. The main weakness was that few of the officers had any knowledge of the countries which now came under their control, a weakness which they shared with the Beauftragter who had been sent as representatives to these countries. It is of interest to note that of the original officers chosen for Western Europe in 1939, two survived until the end. They are Ostuf BERNHARD and the then Ostuf ZSCHUNKE, who later became respectively Referat for France and for Belgium. As the following history of Gruppe VI B will show, ZSCHUNKE can claim to be not only one of the original members but the last officer of the Gruppe to be operationally active. The remaining original members however had almost entirely disappeared by 1942 as a result of the efforts of SCHELLENBERG to improve the work of

Western Europe under SCHELLENBERG

Reorganisation under SCHELLENBERG

1. It is with the advent of SCHELLENBERG as Amtschef in the latter half of 1941 that Amt VI took its final shape. The Amt subsequently merely expanded and apart from minor re-adjustments of territory between the new Gruppen, the organisation of the Amt remained substantially the same until the end. The fate of Western Europe in this reorganisation is easy to follow. VI E as created by JOST became Gruppe VI B, its final designation. The territory controlled by the new Gruppe suffered only one adjustment as Italy passed to the new VI E which dealt with the Balkans; but even this change was only a temporary one as in late 1944 Italy returned to Gruppe VI B to become Referat VI B 1. Between 1942 and 1945 however there were readjustments in the Referate of the Gruppe. It is under the final internal organisation of the Gruppe nowever that its activities will be considered. This organisation is as shown at Appendix II.

SCHELLENBERG's Efforts to improve Personnel

Changing the organisation of Amt VI was the least of SCHELLENBERG's troubles. Much more important from his point of view was the necessity of improving the standard of personnel both in the Amt itself and abroad. Gruppe VI B was no exception in this reform, but here as in the other Gruppen, SCHELLENBERG was limited in his plans by the very restricted field available to him for further recruitment. By 1942 SCHELLENBERG had decided to recall the Amt VI representatives from SD Stellen in Germany where they served very little useful purpose, in the hope that the personnel thus available would strengthen the position in Berlin. Among the leading personnel BIELSTEIN was the first to go, being replaced by Stubaf FREISE. The latter however did not meet SCHELLENBERG's requirements as a Gruppenleiter, and in the Spring of 1943 he in turn was replaced by SCHELLENBERG's final choice, Stubaf STEIMLE. STEIMLE had previously been Amt VI representative in the SD Abschnitt Stuttgart, where he had worked against Switzerland. STEIMLE was ambitious and capable and remained in charge until the end.

As Referent for France and the Low Countries, SCHELLENBERG chose Ostubaf BERNHARD, who also remained in that position until the collapse, though even he has been described by SCHEELENBERG as an "altogether negligible person". Hastuf NEUBURG became Referent for the Iberian Peninsula. The personnel problem remained however until the end, and SCHELLENBERG was faced with the everlasting problem of whether to send his reliable men to the outstations to improve the work there at the expense of the Amt, or strengthen the Amt at the expense of the outstations.

The results of SCHELLENBERG's efforts are discussed  
II - V.

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Part II - Referat VI B 1 and its Activities against Italy

A. The Period before the Italian Armistice.

1. The Fuehrerbefehl

As has been mentioned in Part I, JOST in 1939-40 sent no Beauftragter to Italy, as in accordance with the instructions laid down by Hitler himself, no espionage activities were to be carried out in that country. Amt VI therefore had no representation in the country until 1942 when attempts were made to circumvent the Fuehrerbefehl. By that time of course Italy's own position in the war had seriously worsened and Hitler's decree made it extremely difficult for Amt VI to be well informed on the state of Italian morale and the trend of political thought in official Italian circles. The only existing source of information (apart of course from the Foreign Office and its official channels) was in the person of Ostuba ~~KAPPLER~~, the Polizei Attache in the German Embassy in Rome.

2. KAPPLER's work as Polizei Attache

KAPPLER had been appointed to Rome as early as 1939 as Polizeiverbindungsfuehrer, later to become Polizei Attache. In this capacity he carried out his normal functions as political adviser to the Embassy and liaison officer with the Italian Police, and was not an Amt VI representative. KAPPLER did, however, submit regular but unofficial reports through the Havel Institute on Italian politics and morale: these reports were proved by subsequent events to be sound, but being sound were not highly popular. KAPPLER in the main relied on official contacts for his sources of information and was in fact the political observer on the spot. He did however succeed in tapping the Vatican as a source through the medium of an employee in the Vatican Library.

3. Attempts to circumvent the Fuehrerbefehl

By 1942 the Fuehrerbefehl had become too awkward to be strictly obeyed: Italy presented great advantages for Amt VI work, and with the changing war situation attempts were made to increase activities in the country, but such attempts had of course to be camouflaged. The first step was the appointment of Stubaf LOOS as assistant to KAPPLER, with the specific assignment of using this cover to collect information on general political matters. LOOS, who had to establish his own contacts, was largely ineffective. Side by side with this appointment was that in late 1942 of Hastuf GROEBEL who was sent to Rome under cover as an employee of a German travel agency with the specific assignment of preparing a post-occupational network in the Rome area. GROEBEL was to work independently of KAPPLER and contact between the two was to be avoided. By March 1943 instructions from SCHELLENBERG became more specific: KAPPLER was now charged with the preparation of a post-occupational network in Sicily, while GROEBEL was to be responsible for South Italy. These preparations did not get beyond the initial stages and from the point of view of results, both KAPPLER and GROEBEL failed completely.

The failure however was confined to the organisation of the networks; the political reports from both KAPPLER and GROEBEL continued to be an accurate reflection of opinion, but especially after the fall of Mussolini in July 1943 when an accurate picture reflected the strong existing anti-fascist feeling, the reports were ignored as running counter to official German policy. In Italy, as elsewhere, it was difficult to report objectively and at the same time meet with favour.

### 3. The Period after the Italian Armistice.

#### 1. BdS Italien and the Aussenkommando Rome

The collapse of Italy and the altered situation created by the Badoglio armistice led to a modification in policy regarding Italy as a theatre of espionage operations. The previous restrictions were removed and indeed both HIMMLER and MALTENBRUNNER, quite irrespective of SCHELLENBERG, gave full encouragement to espionage activity, as it was realised that a territory where contact could be made with so many nationalities serving under the Allies, could prove to be a valuable source of information regarding Allied morale and the degree of cooperation or non-cooperation which existed between the Allies themselves. Functionally, Gruf HARSTER was appointed BdS Italy, while KAPPLER remained in Rome as head of an Aussenkommando there. GROEBEL meantime had been killed by partisans almost immediately after the armistice.

#### 2. Aussenkommando Rome and its Post-Occupational Plans

Between the setting up of the ~~Aussenkommando~~ Aussenkommando Rome in September 1943 and the fall of Rome in June 1944, the task of preparing a post-occupational network in the Rome area and in Southern Italy fell on the Abteilung VI representative in Rome under the command of Stubaf HASS. HASS had taken part in the liberation of Mussolini and stayed on in Rome as a replacement of LOOS; he had as his second-in-command Ostuf SCHUBERNIG. HASS took over one of GROEBEL's agents whom he sent to Naples to allow himself to be overrun, and act as a contact for further agents to be sent to the area; the agent (KALLMEYER) was never heard from after his departure. Two further attempts were made, using a cloister and a bee farm as cover, but these too came to nothing. By May 1944 HASS had some five or six groups prepared for operations, while independently of these groups which were to work together, HASS had brought from The Hague the female agent BENKATE BROUWE to remain in Rome. The network was a complete failure and the fall of Rome in June 1944 made other arrangements necessary.

### The Period after the Fall of Rome

#### 1. Reorganisation in the North

With the fall of Rome and the dissolution of the ~~Aussen-~~ Aussen-kommando there, the Aussenkommandos of BdS Verona in the North assumed greater importance, and the preparation of stay-behind networks were made through them. The growing seriousness of the position led to further attempts by Amt VI to improve the situation.

Stubaf HUEGEL, a competent officer at the Amt, was sent as representative to the Bds Verona, while Stubaf WOLFF (later to become Leiter of the ~~Leitstelle~~ Siegfried under VI B 2) was given the special assignment of organising the post-occupational networks in Northern Italy. By October 1944 the Aussenkommandos had been given their clear instructions and by April 1945 networks had been established in eight different areas in Northern Italy - Genoa, San Remo, Milan, Como, Trieste, Venice, Bologna, and Fiume.

## 2. The Failure of the Networks

The networks however were not set up without the usual difficulties. There was the problem of finding suitable material and having found it, the question of training prescribed further complications. The training had to be carried through under rushed conditions owing to the pressure of time, and as a result was generally inadequate, especially on the W/T side. The language difficulty itself was a hindrance to speedy training, and the provision of W/T sets capable of overcoming the geographical conditions presented by the Alps was an added problem. On technical grounds alone, therefore, the I-Netze were doomed to failure. But even had these technical difficulties been overcome, and even if sufficient personnel had been available on the German side to train in time a sufficient number of reliable agents, the networks would not have been able to rise above the sequence of events. They were essentially post-occupational networks; no provision had been made to operate them as post-defeat networks. The general surrender in Italy therefore rendered them quite ineffective.

## 3. \* Einheit Ida

While the Aussenkommandos in the North were preparing their stay-behind networks, the former Aussenkommando Rome which had operated under KAPPLER dispersed on the fall of the city to reform as a separate unit with its headquarters near Parma. The unit, known by the cover name of Einheit IDA, came under the command of Stubaf HASS with Ostuf SCHUBERNIG still as his deputy. Einheit IDA did not prepare post-occupational networks but trained its agents for line-crossing missions. The agents were given W/T instruction and the mission given included the obtaining of information on both political and military matters. By October 1944 at least six agents trained by the unit had been arrested and were able to give sufficient information on the personnel of the unit, other agents in training, and even its intended line of withdrawal, to make it a comparatively easy target for counter-espionage. The unit achieved very limited success.

## 4. Unternehmen Bertram and Tosca

Although this enterprise operated from Northern Italy, it was in fact under the control of VI B 2 and directed against France. It is therefore discussed in Part III.

## D. Amt VI Work against the Vatican

### 1. Ostuf ELLING and his mission

When Italy was still dealt with by Gruppe VI E in 1943, there existed a ~~Referat~~ VI E 1 (Vat) under Ostuf REISMANN which became



VI B 1 (Vat) when Italy was transferred from VI E to VI B in late 1944. REISMANN carried on his work against the Vatican in VI B; he is reported to have died in December 1944. By May 1943 Amt VI had decided that the existing channel for obtaining information on the Vatican through KAPPLER was insufficient. A special representative was therefore chosen in the person of Ostufaf ELLING. ELLING had had a long career in the RSHA concerned with research in church matters and had seen service in that connection with both Amt III and Amt VII. ELLING therefore was given a period of training in Amt VI under REISMANN preparatory to being sent on his mission.

## 2. ELLING's work at the Vatican

The usual difficulties were experienced in trying to obtain for ELLING proper Consular cover through the Foreign Office. So long was the delay indeed that ELLING was finally sent in November 1943 to the Aussenkommando at Rome under KAPPLER to familiarise himself with his new territory pending the granting of his Consular cover into the Vatican itself. It was not until January 1944 that ELLING finally succeeded in establishing himself in the German Embassy under Ambassador WEIZSAECKER. In his comparatively short stay there, ELLING succeeded in making only limited contacts, which enabled him to submit reports on the Vatican finances, its relations with Russia, and the Vatican attitude to the war and Germany. The appointment however was made too late for any results of real value to be forthcoming.

## 3. Attempts at Post-Occupational Work

When it became apparent that Rome would be occupied sooner or later by the Allies, an attempt was made to instal ELLING in the Vatican as a post-occupational agent. For this purpose a W/T operator was chosen to work with him, but the arrangements were made too late to be effective. ELLING in any case was not himself an enthusiastic supporter of the plan which led to nothing. ELLING in fact was interned with the other members of the Embassy staff who remained in Rome after its fall.

## E. Conclusion

It is not difficult to reach the conclusion that Amt VI work in Italy was a failure; the Fuehrerbefehl had of course deprived it of what in the early stages of the war should have been a profitable ground for its activities in view of the many official contacts which could have been exploited. It deprived the Amt too of a suitable base for operations against North Africa. The removal of the restriction came too late for any effective work to be done. The reports received from KAPPLER and through VI E 1 (Vat) and later VI B 1 (Vat) were good and accurate but, as has been explained above, official policy did not welcome reports which showed its policy to be wrong. The one great success of VI S in restoring Mussolini was a false recommendation that the restoration of the Duce was against the recommendation of the reports received through VI B 1. The lack of coordination in Amt VI policy is nowhere better illustrated.

Part III - Referat VI B 2 and its Activities against France and the Low Countries.

A. The Period before the French Armistice

1. ZSCHUNKE as Referent

The first Referent for France chosen by BIELSTEIN, Gruppenleiter of the original VI F, was Ostuf ZSCHUNKE, to whom was assigned the task of preparing V-Men for despatch into that country. ZSCHUNKE had no easy task; since prior to the outbreak of war the SD had not even attempted to instal agents in France, nor was there, as in Eastern Europe, any pro-German minority in France which could be exploited to advantage. In addition, little background material regarding France was available to the Gruppe, so that ZSCHUNKE had virtually virgin territory to exploit. The SD-Abschnitte in the West had nothing to offer in the way of agents, and ZSCHUNKE's efforts at recruitment met with failure.

2. The LORENZ Enterprise

There was however one exception; in November 1939 ZSCHUNKE took over a prospective Abwehr agent, Ostuf LORENZ, who had been destined for a mission in Paris. ZSCHUNKE was successful in providing LORENZ with false papers of sufficiently high standard to enable him to get to Paris through Italy in March 1940, armed with three W/T sets and sabotage material. LORENZ was a failure in his mission, but on his return in April claimed to have obtained through a telephone operator in Paris details of a conversation between Reynaud and Chamberlain regarding the dispositions of Weygand's Near East armies. The story was an invention on the part of LORENZ, but was accepted on its face value and passed direct to Hitler himself. The story was given great prominence in the German Press for propaganda purposes, and was the first success claimed by Amt VI. It was a success of a rather ominous quality.

B. The Period after the French Armistice

1. Early Difficulties

When the French campaign began ZSCHUNKE passed what little material he had on France to Amt III as occupied territory was considered by that Amt to be its concern. The fall of France and the occupation of Paris however opened up new possibilities for Amt VI, but contrary to what might have been expected, there was no coordinated plan for such an eventuality. FILBERT, Gruppenleiter VI A, but in effect directing the work of the Amt, sent both ZSCHUNKE and LORENZ to Paris to carry on their work there. Their stay did not exceed a fortnight as Staf KNOCHEN, the new BdS Frankreich, had his own ideas, and sent them quickly packing. The conflict between Amt III and Amt VI on occupied territory was an added complication. It was not an auspicious start. Soon two lines of development emerged - the steady growth of Abteilung VI in the Paris Dienststelle with KNOCHEN as BdS and Hastuf NOSSEK as Leiter of Abteilung VI, side by side with the despatch by the Amt itself of individual representatives to different parts of France.

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C. The Activities of BdS Frankreich

1. KNOCHEN and NOSSEK

Of the two tendencies mentioned in the previous paragraph the more considerable was the strong development in Amt VI work from Paris; it also yielded least results. KNOCHEN, the BdS, was ambitious and jealous of his reputation, largely based on the Venlo incident; he personally undertook to send reports on France and Vichy direct to the CdS, thus circumventing Gruppe VI B. This relationship continued when KALTENERUNNER became DdS. Meanwhile NOSSEK developed his VI Abteilung, but on lines hardly profitable to Amt VI. The results achieved under the JOST regime were negligible. By the end of 1941 however SCHELLENBERG had become Amtschef, and some attempt at improvement was made, though it is to be noted however that SCHELLENBERG had little faith in Amt VI work carried on under a BdS, normally ignorant of what secret intelligence meant and unsympathetic towards it, especially when it dealt with political matters.

2. The Situation in 1942

Ostuf BERNHARD was appointed by SCHELLENBERG as Referent for France in January 1942. By now the Paris Dienststelle had grown to the extent of having its own Abteilungen. It became indeed the largest Dienststelle under Amt VI in Europe. It extended its interests beyond the borders of France itself, and thus we find an Abteilung VI B responsible for France, Abteilung VI C under Hastuf ALISCH collecting information on the Iberian Peninsula, Abteilung VI D under Hastuf ZUCHRISTIAN working against England and the USA (ZUCHRISTIAN was in fact a Gruppe VI D officer), and a section under Hastuf DOEHRING responsible for North Africa. This section was later to become VI B 4 (Parseval). This organisation however was impressive rather than effective. No results of any importance were achieved and the Dienststelle was more concerned in combatting Resistance Movements than in collecting political information. NOSSEK in July 1942 was replaced by Stuf HAAGEN, who showed himself equally Resistance minded. BERNHARD's attempts at improvement of a rapidly deteriorating situation failed, and the failure was due to the everlasting problem of finding personnel of sufficient ability to carry out the work.

3. The Position in 1943 - NOSSEK and the PPF:

Further attempts at improvement were made in the course of 1943. An added impetus was the order to prepare I-Netze in the event of an Allied invasion of France, which preparations are dealt with in the following paragraphs. By April 1943 HAAGEN, whose conception of Amt VI work continued to be operations against the Underground, became personnel Referent to the HSSuPF Frankreich, and was replaced by Staf BICKLER who remained in command until the evacuation of Paris. In the same month Ustuf BOURJEAU took over from NOSSEK who was given the special assignment of concentrating on Vichy and North Africa, for which purpose he exploited the PPF. In this work NOSSEK employed as a specialist Leopold VOELKER (later despatching officer for agents at Leitstelle Siegfried). A certain amount of success was achieved, especially through contact with those PPF delegates who attended the conference in Paris in 1943.

4. Preparations for the I-Netze.

A serious start on the preparation of the stay-behind organisation in the event of an Allied invasion was begun by March 1943. For the purpose additional staff was sent to Paris, the actual task of preparing the networks being in the first instance

given to Ustuf RISSMANN. Later Hastuf KOENIG, Stubaf LANG, and Haschaf ZUANG were sent, and a training school established at Rue Desbordes-Vallmore. Ustuf ZACH of VI F became the W/T expert at the school. By June 1944 agents had been placed with W/T sets at Rennes, Paris, Bordeaux, Montpellier, Marseilles, and Toulouse. The proportion of agents rejected in training had however been exceptionally high and the comparatively small number of agents ready by June 1944 was a small return for more than one year's work. It is to be noted too that apart from this activity, the Paris Dienststelle as an Amt VI station had almost ceased to function, the chief contributing factors being the continued poor quality of officers and the attitude of KNOCHEN himself. The Dienststelle therefore had its last chance of justifying its existence.

5. The Invasion and the fall of Paris.

The I-Netze in fact failed completely; soon after the break-through in Normandy the first of the stay-behind agents was arrested in the second week of August. Before the end of the month five more were picked up, and the faults in training were now apparent. Little attempt had been made to segregate agents in training, close contact between the agents and the officers themselves had been allowed, the agents themselves were unreliable and easily swayed by the fortunes of battle; the inevitable result was that before the end of August an almost complete list of agents in training together with the names, functions, and ranks of the officers responsible for the organisation of the network was available to the counter-espionage forces of the Allies. The liquidation of the network became comparatively simple. When BERNHARD visited Paris just before the evacuation two W/T links were still available while three more agents could be reached by courier. By February 1945 one W/T set in Montpellier (MARCAUD) was still operating, but on MARCAUD's arrest the network ceased to function. The information achieved by the network had been negligible.

6. The Retreat from Paris

Early in August 1944 the BdS Paris split up and retreated into Germany in sections. Abteilung VI withdrew to St Die and then to Strasbourg where it underwent reorganisation. After some initial confusion it was decided to set up a new organisation to work against France from Germany making use of the subversive elements which had withdrawn from France - the Doriot and Darnand groups. The organisation was placed under the command of Staf BICKLER and was known as Leitstelle WALTER.

7. The Leitstelle Walter Organisation

Leitstelle Walter set up its headquarters in Baden-Baden in October 1944. The personnel was largely composed of the personnel of Abteilung VI of the BdS Paris, while Stubaf HUBIG from the Amt was sent as BICKLER's second-in-command. The Stelle was divided into some nine Kommandos, each Kommando recruiting its agents from one or other of the French subversive organisations; each Kommando having a cover name. These Kommandos were as follows:-

I-BAER under NOSSEK recruiting from the PPF.  
I-IGEL under MORO recruiting from the PPF.  
DACHS under DETERING recruiting from the Milice.  
FUCHS under BOURJEAU recruiting from mixed sources.  
MARDER under MORITZ recruiting from Groupe Collaboration.  
HIRSCH I and II under KUNZE as the central W/T school.  
BIBER under WILD recruiting from the Breton Group.  
ELCH under WENZEL recruiting from mixed sources.

The Stelle recruited both for line-crossing and parachute operations. The MORITZ Kommando concentrated on sending its agents through Switzerland, while NOSSEK worked in collaboration with Stubaf GOHL in Milan. In March 1945 DOEHRING of VI B 4 (Parseval) also joined the unit.

#### 8. The Failure of Leitstelle Walter

The results achieved by Leitstelle Walter were meagre in the extreme; of the line-crossing operations about a 20% degree of success was achieved in agents reporting back. The parachute operations were a dismal failure; one plane crashed on the take-off, another left but missed its course, a third dropped its agents who were immediately arrested. At the end a further batch of eight agents was ready for despatch but no planes were available. Eventually the Stelle itself was overrun by the speed of the Allied advance and instructions were given to the remaining officers and agents to disband. The Stelle evacuated from Baden-Baden to Horalberg and finally to Heiligenberg, where it dispersed. This dispersal brought to an end the history of the Dienststelle in Paris, the end of five years of continuous failure.

#### D. Other Activities against France.

##### 1. The Individual Representatives

It was noted in paragraph B(1) above that the growth of the Dienststelle in Paris was one development of Gruppe VI B activities against France from 1940 onwards. The other independent development was the despatching of individual representatives to different parts of France reporting directly to the Amt and not through a Bds. This development had its beginnings with ZSCHUNKE in 1940, not because ZSCHUNKE considered such a method superior to working through the Bds, but because no other method was open to him since KNOCHEN had regarded control of his work by the Gruppe as unnecessary. By the time SCHELLENBERG took command however in late 1941, the system became a matter of policy and not of convenience, as SCHELLENBERG considered that Amt VI work such as he envisaged it was much more likely to succeed through the activities of a single well trained officer working under proper cover than by a large and self-advertising Dienststelle. The trouble as ever, however, was to find the competent well trained officers.

##### 2. ZSCHUNKE's first agents - REICHE at Vichy.

It is to ZSCHUNKE's credit that he was instrumental in recruiting the most successful VI B officer to operate in France in the person of Ostuf Dr. REICHE. In the Autumn of 1940 ZSCHUNKE sent REICHE to Vichy under cover as the representative of the German Embassy in Paris. Soon after his arrival in

Vichy in October 1944, REICHE was given a W/T operator through whom his reports were sent to Amt VI. REICHE was successful in making good contacts in official Vichy circles, and until his departure in 1942, was able to submit reports of a consistently high standard on political trends in Vichy. REICHE had only one paid agent - a Swiss newspaperman. His information was obtained almost entirely through social and diplomatic channels. REICHE left Vichy in 1942 and was transferred to the Eastern Front where he was killed in action. He was replaced by Hastuf SCHMIDT, whose work was not of the same high standard.

3. Ostuf GROSS at Biarritz.

ZSCHUNKE's other venture was hardly so successful. Ostuf GROSS (alias GRANDE) was sent as an ordinary civilian to Biarritz armed with a W/T set. He did not have REICHE's advantage of any kind of official cover. GROSS was quite unsuccessful in his work, falling foul of the Abwehr, in the first instance his W/T set, of which the Abwehr had had no notification, being taken to be an enemy set, and secondly becoming involved in a drunken brawl, which led to his recall early in 1941.

4. SCHELLENBERG's efforts to improve the work against France.

As explained in paragraph 1 above, SCHELLENBERG was not long in deciding that proper Amt VI work through the BdS in Paris was not to be hoped for, and his efforts were concentrated on finding single officers of suitable ability for work at outstations. The following officers were given special assignments:-

(a) Ostuf SCHNEIDER: was sent in the Spring of 1942 to Strasbourg with the task of exploiting Corsican circles. SCHNEIDER was a failure in his work and achieved nothing. He was eventually recalled in the Autumn of 1943 and dismissed from the Amt.

(b) Stubaf FREISE, the Gruppenleiter before STEIMLE, was appointed at the end of 1942, did little to redeem his past failures. He was sent to Portugal in 1943 but was expelled before the end of the year. On SCHNEIDER's recall from Strasbourg, FREISE went as replacement. FREISE attempted liaison with the Paris Dienststelle, but only succeeded in arousing jealousy and suspicion there. His work achieved nothing and he too was recalled in 1944 to be transferred eventually to Amt IV. His assistant, Kriminalrat UHRING, was arrested on the fall of Strasbourg.

(c) Hastuf SENNER at Marseilles was a more serious effort. SENNER was sent under consular cover to Marseilles early in 1942. He succeeded in recruiting a network of some 20 - 30 agents, finding his material among the Groupe Collaboration. The SENNER network covered the South of France and extended into Spain. The results achieved however were negligible owing to the very poor standard of agent available. SENNER remained in Marseilles until the retreat, and after his return to Germany was sent to Milan to work with GOHL in the Unternehmen BERTRAM (see para 5).

(d) Stubaf FANELSA at Metz is the last of the group. FANELSA was a complete failure and it is only necessary to record his name.

5. Unternehmen Bertram and Tosca.

SENNER returned to Germany from Marseilles in August 1944. He had not attempted any stay-behind network before the invasion. It was decided by STEIMLE to send SENNER to Milan in order to operate against his former territory of Southern France from the Italian side of the border. SENNER accordingly established himself at San Remo in October 1944 and made tentative plans to utilise subversive French groups for frontier-crossing operations into France. These efforts came to nothing; by the end of the year Stubaf GOHL was sent to San Remo to become head of espionage activities against France and the enterprise now became the Unternehmen Bertram and Tosca. SENNER's function was to organise the crossings into France either direct through Switzerland or by sea. The agents were sent to him from Berlin already briefed for their missions. The agents were chiefly from the PPF groups. In all SENNER had nine agents to despatch; the majority were arrested soon after reaching French territory. SENNER himself surrendered to the French soon after the collapse.

E. Activities against the Low Countries.

1. Relations with Amt III.

The part played by Gruppe VI B in the Low Countries was a minor one throughout the five years of occupation. The chief factor was that the territory came under the control of Amt III as occupied territory and it was Abteilung III of the BdS both in Holland and in Belgium whose responsibility it was to submit reports on political trends and public opinion in the two countries. Amt VI activity was as a result very limited though some effort was made to use the Low Countries as a base for operations against the U.K. These efforts in the first three years of the occupation were very limited and quite futile, but in 1943 STEIMLE made some effort at improvement, while the preparation of I-Netze in 1944 gave the Stellen in Brussels and The Hague a somewhat more important part to play.

2. BdS Brussels in 1940-42.

The early history of Gruppe VI B activities in Belgium can be very summarily dealt with. The original appointment to BdS Belgium was Hastuf ~~LOECHELT~~ who attempted nothing and achieved nothing. He was succeeded in 1941 by Hastuf ~~BAUSS~~ whose activities were limited to employing minor agents to submit reports on France, a futile field in view of the existence of the large Dienststelle in Paris engaged on the same work. When BERNHARD became Referent VI B 2 in January 1942 the inefficiency of the work in the Low Countries caused him some concern; at that time Belgium and Holland in the Gruppe were dealt with by the Referat for France. BERNHARD therefore decided to set up a new Referat dealing with Belgium and Holland with Hastuf LAWRENZ as Referent. To improve the work at the outstations he was instrumental in having recalled from the Eastern Front Ostuf ZSCHUNKE, previously Referent for France, who had been sent there in disgrace at the end of 1941 after a quarrel with Stubaf ROSSNER. ZSCHUNKE therefore was sent to Brussels in September 1942 to replace BAUS.

### 3. ZSCHUNKE's Activities in Brussels

ZSCHUNKE spent approximately one year in Brussels. His early work was largely concerned with clearing up the chaos left by BAUS. Later some effort was made to recruit suitable agents for missions to England, but this ended in failure. An added impetus to such attempts however was given by a visit in May 1942 by STEIMLE, the new Gruppenleiter, who also recommended that efforts should be made to penetrate underground movements controlled from the U.K. with a view to obtaining information on the date of the Allied invasion. No success was achieved in these attempts. ZSCHUNKE was eventually sent once again to the Eastern Front in September 1942, having again brought disgrace upon himself, this time through having married a Belgian woman.

### 4. Activities in Holland

The story in Holland was even more dismal from the Amt VI point of view; in Holland the Amt III representation was especially strong and the original Abteilung VI representative, Hastuf MUELLER, was Abteilung VI in title only. His work had been entirely controlled by Staf KNOLLE, Leiter of Abteilung III, and until the middle of 1943 no Amt VI work of any kind was carried out in Holland. MUELLER eventually left the service altogether about mid-1943 and advantage was taken of his resignation by BERNHARD in an attempt to set up an independent Gruppe VI B representative. The choice of officer however was not a happy one: Hastuf AHRENS, previously employed in VI B 3, from which department he was dismissed for inefficiency, was sent to Holland in November 1943 to set up his independent Stelle. KNOLLE however insisted on AHRENS working for him, and it was not until early 1944 that AHRENS finally established his independence.

### 5. AHRENS' Work in Holland

The task assigned to AHRENS was that of obtaining economic and political information about the U.K. and of establishing a stay-behind network in the event of invasion. He also had the job of organising line-crossing missions in the event of a partial occupation of Holland. In these tasks Hastuf HINCKFUSS assisted in the preparation of the I-Netze, and Ustuf EGIDY in the despatching of line-crossers. AHRENS was a complete failure. No information about the U.K. was obtained, three line-crossers were despatched without success, while the I-Netze failed completely. The latter subject is dealt with more fully in paragraph 6.

### 6. The I-Netze in Holland and Belgium

The preparation of the I-Netze in the Low Countries was a combined operation between HINCKFUSS, AHRENS and LAWRENZ, who had replaced ZSCHUNKE on the latter's posting to the Eastern Front. W/T training was carried out in the Seehof School. The preparation was begun too late to stand any chance of success. By July 1944 eight links had been established in Belgium, but the network was almost immediately liquidated by the surrender of one of the main agents to the Allies soon after Belgium was occupied. In Holland six links were prepared, but no contacts were established after the liberation. The faults in the training of agents mentioned in connection with the I-Netze in France applied with equal force in the Low Countries.



7. Leitstelle Siegfried

Side by side with the setting up of Leitstelle Walter in the South was the creation on very similar lines of Leitstelle Siegfried in the North. The Stelle had its headquarters at Marburg on the Lahn and was set up to provide agents for line-crossing and parachute operations against Holland, Belgium and Northern France. As in the South, the supply of agents was from the subversive groups - the Rexists, Flamands, the Degrelle organisation, etc. The Leiter of the Stelle was Stubaf WOLFF, with Hastuf KOENIG and most of the personnel of BdS Belgium and Holland as staff. ZSCHUNKE, recalled from the East in March 1945, also joined the staff as the expert on Belgium. About 100 agents underwent training, of whom 30 were trained in W/T. The speed of the Allied advance however prevented the training being completed and Leitstelle Siegfried was disbanded before any operations had been undertaken.

8. ZSCHUNKE's last effort

ZSCHUNKE together with the rest of the staff of Leitstelle Siegfried withdrew to the Munich area. With the approval of BERNHARD, ZSCHUNKE suggested that he should return to Belgium posing as a D.P. and reestablish contact with his former agents in Belgium. The plan was successfully put into operation, and ZSCHUNKE returned to Brussels, where in June 1945 he made contact with one of his former W/T agents. The effort was however purely an individual one and was not symptomatic of any organised attempt by VI B to maintain post-defeat activity. In any case ZSCHUNKE's real motive was to get back to Belgium with his Belgian wife. ZSCHUNKE was arrested soon after his arrival.

Conclusion

The history of Referat VI B 2 is a long record of failure; with the exception of REICHE in Vichy, no sources of information were established which yielded any results of any value whatever. The reasons for the failure are many and are not peculiar to Referat VI B 2 alone - incompetent officers, lack of coordination in policy, personal ambitions and jealousies, lack of cooperation with other Aemter, lack of security in training of agents. Much sound and fury which signified nothing.

Part IV - Referat VI B 3 and its Activities against Switzerland.

A. The Period under JOST

1. SD Activities against Switzerland before 1939

The old SD-Hauptamt, Abteilung III/3, under JOST had met with some success in its work against the countries on Germany's eastern frontier prior to the setting up of the RSHA. There were good reasons why work in the East should have been more successful than in the West. In Austria, Czechoslovakia, and in the Polish Corridor there were very active German minorities and the constant stream of travellers crossing these frontiers provided a ready found source of information. In the West such favourable conditions did not exist except in the case of Switzerland and there only to a lesser degree. Nevertheless Switzerland represented the only country in Western Europe where the new Amt VI could build on the already existing work of the SD-Abschnitte. Operations against Switzerland had been directed from the SD-Leitabschnitte at Stuttgart, Karlsruhe, Muenchen, and Innsbruck in close collaboration with the old ~~SD~~-Oberabschnitt Sud West at Stuttgart under Hauptstuf Dr PETER and his assistant, Hauptstuf GUTEKUNST.

2. The First Efforts of Amt VI

The work of the old SD-Abschnitte had of course its obvious limitations in that all the work was directed from outside Switzerland and not from inside the country itself. The extended scope of Amt VI as compared with the SD-Hauptamt required direct representation within the country itself. For this reason therefore JOST chose as his Beauftragter in Switzerland Dr PETER of Stuttgart who was duly installed under cover of the German Legation at Berne in early 1940. PETER however did not long survive as JOST soon came up against a difficulty which not only hampered him but was to be one of the chief stumbling blocks facing SCHELLENBERG in his strenuous efforts between 1942 and 1945 - the reluctance on the part of the Swiss authorities to allow the SD to develop its activities within the country. PETER had to be recalled after only a few months. A similar fate befell Ostuf REICHE in the German Consulate at Geneva. REICHE too was recalled at the request of the Swiss authorities. (This REICHE is identical with the Vichy representative mentioned in Part III). An attempt was made to instal Hauptstuf GROEBEL as REICHE's successor, but this too met with no success. GROEBEL was recalled and acted for a time as Referent for Switzerland before being sent in 1942 to Rome, where he was killed after the fall of Rome.

3. The Position by the end of 1941

By the Autumn of 1941 therefore JOST had failed in his attempts to establish a permanent representative in Switzerland. The failure was a partial one, as the SD-Abschnitte still continued their work from inside Germany, obtaining information on Switzerland itself from the many German and Swiss nationals travelling backwards and forwards between the two countries. The pro-Nazi Swiss elements were also exploited.

The partial failure was however a serious one, as the war situation by the end of 1941 was such that Switzerland was one of the very few remaining countries in Europe where contact could be made with British and American elements, and where much needed

information on the U.K. and the U.S.A. could be obtained. By the end of the year SCHELLENBERG had become Amtschef, and the second phase began.

B. The Period under SCHELLENBERG

1. The Change of Policy

SCHELLENBERG was not slow to appreciate the potential value of Switzerland to Amt VI and its work; he fully realized the opportunities that neutral territory offered, and his conception of how Switzerland should be exploited led to a complete change in Amt VI policy regarding that country. Two essential changes were necessary. Firstly, to establish a permanent station within the country itself instead of operating from the outside, and secondly, to improve the standard of personnel in the Amt controlling operations against Switzerland. This meant that the officers operating from the SD-Abschnitte became available to the Amt where sweeping changes in personnel took place. The problem of installing an Amt VI officer in Switzerland was however not so easy to solve.

2. DAUFELDT's appointment

SCHELLENBERG's choice was ~~Ostuber~~ DAUFELDT. DAUFELDT had a long record of service in the SD where he had operated under JOST in the old SD-Hauptamt. He had been for a period of two years Gruppenleiter of VI D where he had been in charge of operations against the U.K. and the U.S.A. It was presumably because of his knowledge of the U.K. which he had studied before the war and of his experience in VI D that SCHELLENBERG chose him for the important task of looking after Amt VI interests in Switzerland. The choice was however a bad one, as DAUFELDT's record of success was not commensurable with his length of service. His work in VI D had been quite unsuccessful in face of considerable difficulties. But his failure in VI D was accountable not only by the difficulties he faced, but by his own incompetence. DAUFELDT has been variously described as a playboy, a nincompoop, and a fool. The subsequent course of events in Switzerland largely revolves round the personality of DAUFELDT.

3. DAUFELDT's Activities in Switzerland

DAUFELDT took up his appointment in the summer of 1942 as Vice-Consul at Lausanne. His assignment was to establish contacts in Switzerland with a view to obtaining information on the Allies, with particular reference to the sounding of Allied morale and the volume of economic trade between Switzerland and the Allies; further to assess the attitude of neutral countries towards the war, as well as that of the two German allies, Japan and Italy; to supervise diplomatic travel and to report on German emigres in Switzerland. Of these objectives the most important was of course the first, and that objective was one that would require direct contact with Allied circles in Switzerland. It was just such contact that DAUFELDT was careful to avoid, as his first concern was to avoid expulsion from Switzerland, which too active operations might have entailed. DAUFELDT's sources were therefore secondrate, and such sources, together with the neutral press, formed the bulk of his reports, which reports were voluminous rather than valuable. The position therefore by the beginning of 1943 was that SCHELLENBERG had succeeded in

establishing a permanent representative, but the representative was not taking full advantage of his position.

#### 4. Further Efforts to Exploit Switzerland

By the Spring of 1943 the war situation was already turning against Germany and the opportunities for exploiting Switzerland were becoming correspondingly less favourable. Amt VI work was therefore intensified and further determined efforts were made by SCHELLENBERG to improve the situation. Staf STEIMLE, previously Leiter of the SD-Abschnitt Stuttgart, and therefore familiar with the Swiss situation, had now become Gruppenleiter, and it is significant that he appointed as his Vertreter Stubaf HUEGEL, who at the same time fulfilled the function of Referent for Switzerland. Renewed activity developed along two lines.

Firstly DAUFELDT himself was instructed to organise a post-occupational network over the frontier in France through which contact could be maintained with Switzerland. For this purpose he was to liaise with the BdS Paris and with REICHE's successor in Vichy, Dr SCHMID. These efforts came to nothing.

The main effort was of course an attempt to increase the number of Amt VI representatives within the country itself. In this attempt SCHELLENBERG sought the cooperation of those Reich Ministries which had stations already established within the country with a view to exploiting the cover they afforded. The plan failed as the degree of cooperation between Amt VI and these Ministries - the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Economics, and the Auslandsorganisation - was never at any time very high. Relations with the Foreign Office in particular were far from harmonious. An added difficulty was the scarcity of suitable personnel. The general situation therefore by early 1944 had not improved; DAUFELDT still remained the sole representative.

#### 5. Developments in 1944

The year 1944 brought fresh hope to SCHELLENBERG, as two factors now operated in his favour. The Abwehr was absorbed in the Spring, and as SCHELLENBERG now had control over the Mil Amt as well as Amt VI, he envisaged the possibility of replacing Abwehr representatives already established within the country by Amt VI officers. The scheme however proved impracticable; Amt VI could not find the right material and the Abwehr was strongly opposed to the idea. Secondly, the changed situation in Italy where the Fuehrerbefehl was no longer operative, made it possible to work against the country from the Italian side of the frontier. Stubaf HUEGEL, the former Referent, had now become Leiter of the Abteilung VI of the BdS Italien, and was therefore familiar with the general situation.

Operations from Italy met with a limited amount of success under HUEGEL's direction, but only one of his agents was able to provide reports of any real value on economic matters. Indeed it was significant by this time that activities against Switzerland were directed not so much with a view to obtaining information about the Allies, but in order to contact Allied authorities in Switzerland for the purpose of initiating unofficial peace discussions - a plan directed of course by SCHELLENBERG and not reflecting the official German policy.

6. DAUFELDT's Expulsion and Subsequent Events

The situation in Switzerland deteriorated rapidly with the changing war situation. By March 1945 the Swiss authorities had requested the removal of DAUFELDT himself and Amt VI representation within the country itself ceased. There was however a replacement in the person of Graf ~~DOENHOF~~ who was appointed to the Consulate in Zurich. Surprisingly enough, DOENHOF's appointment was possible as a result of the benign cooperation of the Foreign Office, an event which did not however reflect any closer cooperation between Amt VI and the Foreign Office, but which was due to DOENHOF's own close personal friendship with STEENGRACHT of the Foreign Office. DOENHOF had had only a short period of training with VI D before his departure and was the officer responsible for the final mission of the notorious SETH. It need hardly be said of course that this unexpected assistance from the Foreign Office was too late to be effective. DOENHOF, who had in any case very little idea of what his functions were to be, was expelled soon after his arrival.

7. The Sonderlinien

There remains one aspect of Amt VI work in Switzerland to be dealt with which is of importance, not so much for the results it achieved, but as a reflection of SCHELLENBERG's conduct of Amt VI affairs. SCHELLENBERG did not allow himself to be bound by recognised channels, and when the official reporting channels of Amt VI fell short of his standards, SCHELLENBERG established where possible his own sources of information. These contacts have been referred to as his 'Sonderlinien'. Such a link existed in Switzerland in the person of ~~Hastuf~~ EGGEN, and the establishing of the contact was a reflection on the inability of DAUFELDT to produce the desired results. EGGEN travelled frequently to Switzerland in the course of his business and was exploited by SCHELLENBERG to establish contacts within the country; these contacts were on a high level and it was mainly through EGGEN that SCHELLENBERG maintained relations with the Swiss Intelligence Service. The extent to which this contact proved valuable to SCHELLENBERG is still a matter of doubt but the mere contact itself was a considerable achievement. EGGEN was also responsible for arranging SCHELLENBERG's visits to Switzerland.

This method of penetrating Switzerland was also adopted by STEIMLE, the Gruppenleiter who attempted to exploit Dr GARDEMANN as a personal agent. GARDEMANN had previously been employed in the German Embassy in Madrid, where he had acted as a personal informer for RIBBENTROP. STEIMLE's effort was however unsuccessful as it was not found possible to persuade the Swiss authorities to allow GARDEMANN to enter the country.

The personal contact arrangement was further in evidence when SONNENHOHL, a professional diplomat who had seen previous service in France, was sent to Switzerland late in 1944. SONNENHOHL was not an Amt VI representative in the true sense of the term, but, through a personal agreement with STEIMLE, provided the latter with excellent political reports on Switzerland. These in any case would have gone to the Foreign Office and were not the product of the Secret Service, but were symptomatic of the strained relations existing between the Foreign Office and Amt VI.

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8. Conclusion

It will be seen from the above review that Amt VI failed to exploit what should have been a fertile field. The failure was not due to any lack of appreciation on the part of SCHELLENBERG regarding the importance of Switzerland as a field of operations, but due to the difficulties which faced him in his efforts to improve the situation. There was of course the general difficulty of finding suitable personnel; had DAUFELDT been more competent or more enthusiastic the story might have been different. But there was no way of remedying this original mistake, as the subsequent difficulties proved insuperable - lack of cooperation from the Foreign Office and other ministries, the opposition of the Abwehr even after it had been absorbed, and, also of importance, the attitude of the Swiss authorities to any attempted development of SD espionage, especially when the general war situation from 1943 onwards turned against Germany.

Part V - Referat VI B 4 and its Activities in the Iberian Peninsula:

(Note:- Part V of this report must not be considered in any way as a liquidation report. The Amt VI representatives in Spain and Portugal have not yet been expelled from those countries so that it is not possible to assess with any accuracy the success which attended Referat VI B 4 and its work in the Iberian Peninsula. The following review therefore necessarily contains many gaps and inevitably several inaccuracies, which gaps and inaccuracies can only be remedied when some of the leading personalities in the Peninsula have been repatriated and interrogated. It is for this reason that this publication has been issued as a situation report only, though the first four parts can be treated as Liquidation Reports.)

A. General

1. The Importance of the Peninsula

The importance of neutral territory to Amt VI work in Western Europe has already been mentioned in dealing with Referat VI B 3 and Switzerland. This importance was considerably greater in the case of the Iberian Peninsula. Switzerland, though neutral, was surrounded by countries entirely under German domination; further, Switzerland attempted to maintain strict neutrality and was not disposed to grant any special facilities to Germany. In both these aspects the Peninsula offered much greater facilities; it had a seaboard, and the number of contacts which could be established with the outer world was thereby greatly increased. Moreover, agents earmarked for despatch to enemy territory, or to other neutral territories abroad, could be sent through Spain, while actual entry into Spain had been greatly facilitated after the French armistice, when German occupied France and Spain had a common frontier of a few miles near the Atlantic coast. Spain also offered an important observation post in the

Western Mediterranean, and a base for operations against North Africa in view of the Fuehrerbefehl operative in Italy. Secondly, unlike Switzerland, Spain, though a neutral country, was closely bound to Germany, and its exploitation thereby considerably facilitated.

Spain therefore occupied a unique position among the neutral countries in the war as Sweden, the only remaining neutral country in Europe apart from Switzerland (and of course Eire) was greatly restricted in its communications with the outside world, and in any case its normal volume of trade did not cover the same wide field as that covered by the Iberian Peninsula. It is not surprising therefore that Spain became the cockpit of espionage in the course of the war, and the fruits would fall to that country able to exploit its possibilities to the best advantage. It is hardly necessary to point out that this advantage lay very heavily on the German side; but even then the course of Amt VI activity in the Iberian Peninsula, especially in the initial stages, was not altogether smooth.


## 2. The Polizei Attache

The roots of German activity in Spain go back to the Spanish Civil War. The Condor Legion which took part in that campaign contained elements of the GFP, and several of the subsequent Amt VI representatives in Spain had seen service with the Condor Legion, a typical example being Stubaf MOSIG. JOST during his period of service as Leiter of Abteilung III/3 of the SD-Hauptamt had paid official visits to Spain in 1938 to foster liaison between the Spanish and German police services, and it was under this liaison that Amt VI developed its first penetration of the Peninsula. The facilities afforded however were not entirely favourable to Amt VI. The best cover would of course have been through the Foreign Office, but that department was throughout hostile to Amt VI activities in Spain, as elsewhere. It was therefore Amt IV which held chief sway in Spain through the powerful position of the Polizei Attache, who, though not officially acting as an Amt IV representative abroad, was in fact recruited from Amt IV, as were most of his staff. In Spain the Polizei Attache from 1939 until late 1944 was Kriminalrat WINZER.

The position of WINZER in Spain was especially strong; he had been attached to the German Embassy in Madrid as early as 1936-37, and returned to the capital in 1938 where he enjoyed the special support of HEYDRICH himself. He remained throughout a special protege of MUELLER, Amtschef IV, as MUELLER regarded the Polizei Attaches as an extension of his functions into foreign territory. WINZER was on very good terms with the Spanish police and with the Falange, and in the circumstances was not likely to welcome any activity on the part of the new Amt VI into territory over which he ruled in the interests of the RSHA. WINZER was killed in an air crash over French territory in September 1944 and was replaced by Krim Kom HAMMES, who had until then worked in Barcelona as an Amt IV representative under WINZER.

## 3. The complexity of Amt VI Activities

The pattern of Amt VI activities in Spain differs from that in other countries because of its comparative complexity. There was latterly no single Amt VI station through which Amt VI conducted its affairs. As explained in para 2, the Polizei Attache remained the chief RSHA representative in Spain and the Amt VI official



representation functioned under his control. This system had disadvantages for Amt VI, and in 1943 MOSIG was sent under camouflaged cover in the Sofindus firm so as to work independently of the Polizei Attache - the Grille organisation. Thirdly, the 'Sonderlinien' of SCHELLENBERG operated in Spain as in Switzerland (see Part IV, para 7) in the persons of von HOHENLOHE and Graf von PODEWILS. Finally, Oberfuehrer BERNHARD, the most important figure in Spain for Amt VI, was neither an Amt VI officer nor agent, but worked both for Amt VI and the Abwehr, and his activities covered economic as well as intelligence spheres. These separate developments were of course a gradual evolution.

B. The JOST Period (1939-41).

1. PLATH in 1939-40.

While the GIS started with an enormous initial advantage in Spain, this was not true of Amt VI, which entered too late into the field. In Spain, as in other countries, the same difficulties were encountered. The Foreign Office was resentful and unsympathetic, the Abwehr suspicious and uncooperative, while an added complication was the strength of the Polizei Attache, WINZER, who considered himself the sole representative of the RSHA and covering the interests of the SD. The general weakness of JOST and the poor quality of his Beauftragter were not likely to triumph over such difficulties, and the first period of Amt VI activities was, as elsewhere, a failure.

JOST's first appointments to the Iberian Peninsula were Hastuf PLATH to Spain and Hastuf FAST to Portugal. PLATH took up his appointment in Madrid shortly before the outbreak of war, where he soon came into conflict with WINZER, who insisted that PLATH could only work under him and submit his reports through him. This early did the Polizei Attache impose his ascendancy over Amt VI, an ascendancy which was maintained nominally until the end. PLATH was a failure and was recalled in the Spring of 1940 before being sent to the Eastern Front (in company with ZSCHUNKE of VI B 2) where he was killed in action. PLATH was in turn succeeded by Hastuf PFISTERER, who remained a short spell before being transferred to VI F. PFISTERER was replaced in 1941 by Ostuf SINGER who remained until the end.

C. The SCHELLENBERG Period (1942-45)

1. Changes of Personnel in the Amt

It was with the advent of SCHELLENBERG that Amt VI activities in Spain and Portugal developed along vigorous lines. The importance of the Peninsula was not lost on SCHELLENBERG and his changes involved both the Referat and the representatives in the countries themselves. The changes in personnel in the Amt were not of course confined to the Spanish Referat; SCHELLENBERG's general policy was to introduce into Amt VI some of the officers with whom he had been connected in Amt IV. Among these was Stubaf MOSIG, who served for a spell as Referent for Spain before going there in September 1943 on a special assignment. He had replaced Ostubaf KEINERT, and on his departure to Spain was in turn replaced for a short spell by Ostuf NEUBURG. NEUBURG was succeeded by Stubaf FENDLER who remained as Referent until the final collapse.



## 2. Oberfuehrer BERNHARD and Sofindus

Side by side with these changes within the Amt itself was SCHELLENBERG's intensified direction of activity within Spain itself. The most important development was his relationship with Oberfuehrer BERNHARD. BERNHARD was a prominent shipyard owner in Germany who lost most of his money in the early 1930s. Later he established contact with Franco in Morocco and acted as intermediary between Franco and Goering regarding the provision of transport planes for Franco's troops. Thanks to this early and invaluable service to Franco, BERNHARD subsequently became the most influential German contact between the German government and Franco's government, and personally enriched himself as head of the Sofindus firm. This firm represented the controlling agency of all German economic interests in Spain, arranging in particular for the import to Germany of valuable raw materials such as wolfram and tungsten. The facilities for espionage offered by Sofindus were obvious, and the firm was exploited both by the Abwehr and by the SD. It was only with the advent of SCHELLENBERG as Amtschef VI, however, that VI B exploited Sofindus to any extent.

The relationship between BERNHARD and SCHELLENBERG has been reported as a close and personal one though this has not been confirmed; in any case it is certain that BERNHARD extended the facilities afforded by Sofindus to Amt VI, whether on a personal or official basis. BERNHARD's personal contacts were of course invaluable. It was through BERNHARD that contact was established with SUNER, Franco's minister for Foreign Affairs until 1943. SUNER was a most important source on the political trends of the Franco government itself. Other valuable high-level contacts established through BERNHARD were CARCELLER, the Spanish Minister of Economy, BAU, the former Minister of Commerce and Shipping, and MUNCOS GRANDEZ, Franco's adjutant and former commander of the Blue Division. Another good source of information, though to a great extent an unwitting one, was General ARANDA, the leader of the Spanish opposition party. BERNHARD covered of course a very wide field in intelligence and economics, and SCHELLENBERG soon realised that Sofindus offered better scope for Amt VI work than did the official representative who was subordinated to the Polizei Attache, Ostuf SINGER.

## 3. SINGER in Madrid

PLATH had been eventually replaced by the permanent representative, Ostuf SINGER, probably by the end of 1941. SINGER's connections in Spain had gone as far back as the Civil War, when he had been a member of the Condor Legion. He took up his appointment as a member of the German Consulate in Madrid where he was attached to the Polizei Attache, WINZER, but the hold of WINZER over SINGER was however not so strong as it had been over PLATH. SINGER was responsible to WINZER on matters of discipline only and his reports were sent direct to the Amt. SINGER's assignment was to maintain contact with those members of the Spanish police and the Spanish Foreign Office with whom contact had been established by Amt VI, while he likewise acted as paymaster and communications officer for Amt VI agents in Spain.

SINGER had as his assistant Hastuf KRUEGER, who acted independently and was responsible for recruiting and running the important agent, SCHWARZ von BERG, who specialised in Spanish military circles. SINGER in his capacity was able to make contact with minor officials in the Spanish Foreign Office from whom details of records in the Spanish Foreign Office were obtained. These records contained accounts of visits from foreign representatives.

He also succeeded in contacting the Spanish police and the Spanish Military Intelligence Service.

4. MOSIG's Appointment - The Grille Organisation.

The disadvantages in SINGER's work from the point of view of SCHELLENBERG was his continued subordination to WINZER. The position in the first place was too open, and secondly Amt VI activities were by the nature of things known to the Polizei Attache. In order to circumvent these two difficulties, and at the same time to exploit more fully the facilities afforded by BERNHARD and his Sofindus organisation, SCHELLENBERG sent MOSIG in September 1943 on a special assignment to Spain. MOSIG together with three or four agents recruited from the Lehr-Regiment Kuerfuerst set up their organisation in Madrid known as the ~~X~~"Organisation Grille", having its own W/T station controlled by MOSIG's secretary, ~~Erl~~ ~~X~~BRUECKNER.

The special assignment given to the Organisation Grille was the exploitation of the Sofindus firm in social and commercial circles, and further to maintain the contacts initiated by BERNHARD, and enumerated in para 2 above. MOSIG's subordinates in this work were LACKNER, HOLTING, Ewald KRUSE, Hans WEISS, Erich DIETEL, Paul ANGER, and Franz STAUDINGER, all with appointments in various branches of the Sofindus organisation. In this way Amt VI was able to operate independently of WINZER.

5. SCHELLENBERG's Sonderlinien in Spain.

The third line of development in Amt VI activities in Spain was through SCHELLENBERG's personal 'Sonderlinien'. These were two in number, Prinz von HOHENLOHE and Graf ~~X~~PODEWILS. HOHENLOHE was an influential business man in Spain with extensive and excellent contacts in Spanish social circles. His reports, which were passed to SCHELLENBERG via SINGER, represented his own summary of political trends in Spain based on his contacts in political, business or military circles. Graf ~~X~~PODEWILS also had good social connections and was friendly with SUNER. Her reports dealt with the results of her conversations with representatives of foreign missions in Spain.

6. Developments in 1944.

By 1944 the change in the general war situation enabled the Allies to bring pressure to bear on the Spanish government regarding the expulsion of German nationals known to be carrying on espionage activities in the country. Owing to the influence of BERNHARD only a few minor personalities were expelled, but it became apparent to SCHELLENBERG that provisions would have to be made to meet a threatening situation. Attempts were made therefore to send more Amt VI officers to the Peninsula in case Allied pressure on the Spanish government should become effective. It is uncertain whether in fact any new replacements were sent though it is known that GUMPRECHT, who joined VI B 4 late in 1944 did go to Spain soon afterwards; he returned however after a short stay. It is believed that GUMPRECHT returned however to Spain early in 1945 in company with Hastuf KRUEGER, SINGER's assistant, and a certain Hastuf SCHUMANN who is otherwise unknown.

7. The I-Netze in Spain and Portugal

Arrangements were likewise made in 1944 for the organisation of I-Netze in Spain and Portugal. Spain offered of course

favourable conditions through the Sofindus organization especially in the transfer of sufficient funds to maintain the I-Netze for some time. Arrangements were left to MOSIG, but details of his work in this connection are still unknown. In Portugal VOLLBRECHT and NASSENSTEIN failed to achieve any results, though the latter is thought to have succeeded in penetrating a Brazilian firm for the purpose. Both in Spain and Portugal, however, one overriding consideration prevailed; the I-Netze had been planned on the assumption that some form of central authority would remain functioning in Germany itself, and as this condition was nullified by the German collapse, the I-Netze, even if they were successfully organized, were organized to little purpose.

Probably connected with the organization of the I-Netze was the mission entrusted in the Autumn of 1944 to a certain MEYER, who had previously been the W/T technician for Amt VI in Tangiers. MEYER was sent under cover of the Allgemeine Elektrische Gesellschaft to recruit Spanish born W/T operators. The network was meant to operate in the event of a diplomatic break between Spain and the Allies or when Allied pressure succeeded in having German representatives expelled from Spain. It is not thought however that MEYER met with any success in his mission as it was undertaken at too late a date. GUMPRECHT too, who has been mentioned in paragraph 6 above, had been given the assignment of recruiting some fifty Spaniards from a Spanish camp in the Tyrol, who were meant to be sent to Spain as intelligence agents. The agents were in fact recruited, but training was not undertaken owing to the speed of the Allied advance. The selected agents were assigned in the end to fighting units.

D. Other Amt VI Activities in Spain

1. ARNOLD in Madrid

Karl ARNOLD worked independently in Madrid through SINGER. Although stationed in the Peninsula, ARNOLD was in fact a VI D representative and operated on behalf of that Gruppe in the organization of a courier service to South America. His activities, together with those of MEYWALD, also a VI D representative, are dealt with in the War Room Publication on VI D.

2. Activities in Tangiers

Early activity against Tangiers had come under the control of ~~Hastuf~~ SCHMUCK alias ~~SCHMIEDOW~~, who was attached to the German Consulate in Tetouan in 1940. SCHMUCK's special assignment was to submit reports on public opinion in French Morocco, for which purpose his chief agent was the notorious John DOLLAR. SCHMUCK remained in Tangiers until January 1942 when he returned to Germany, being eventually sent to Portugal in February 1944 to work under SCHROEDER. Subsequent activity in Tangiers were under the control of ~~Ustuf~~ SCHULZE with his assistant, Kriminal Assistant SEIDEL. SCHULZE established contact with the Arab nationalist leader, YASSANI, from whose entourage he claimed to have recruited some fifty agents for operations in Spanish Morocco. SCHULZE made extravagant claims regarding his operations, and when the Consulate in Tangiers was closed in May 1944, he had great difficulty in explaining away the large amounts of money which had been expended by him for so little result. He was eventually dismissed from the Amt and later worked for the DNB. His assistant, SEIDEL, was expelled at the same time from Tangiers and later worked in Seville.

The exploitation of French North Africa after the Tangiers expulsion devolved on the newly formed VI B 4 (Parseval).

3. DOEHRING and Unternehmen Parseval

DOEHRING has already been referred to under VI B 2 in his capacity as a member of the Dienststelle of BdS Frankreich. In Paris DOEHRING had specialised in French North Africa, a subject in which NOSSEK too had shown considerable interest. During his period of service in France DOEHRING had made several visits to Spain with a view to establishing a channel through Spain for the despatch of agents into French Morocco. His plans for a network however were cut short by the invasion, and after the retreat from France Referat VI B 4 (Parseval) was formed with DOEHRING as Referent and having as his assistants Ostuf WIEDEMANN, Oschaf SCHNELL and Hans SEIDEL, referred to in paragraph 2 above. Details of enterprises undertaken by Parseval are still lacking. In the early part of 1945 however DOEHRING was attached to Leitstelle Walter (Part III, C, paragraph 7).

4. Miscellaneous Representatives

Ostuf ~~KALLAB~~ had the important assignment of acting as VI B 4 representative at Hendaye on the Franco-Spanish frontier, where he carried out his work under cover of the Sofindus organisation. KALLAB's function was to facilitate the passage of VI B agents from France into Spain, as well as documents and equipment which could not be sent openly to the country. He was assisted in this type of work by Paul ~~XANGER~~ who specialised in the smuggling of important material such as tungsten out of Spain.

E. Activities in Portugal

1. The Main Representatives

Information on Amt VI activities in Portugal is even less complete than that on its activities in Spain. JOST's first representative in Portugal was Ostuf ~~FAST~~ who is almost certainly identical with Waldemar ~~FAST~~, the VI C representative in Turkey, at present under arrest. FAST was replaced in 1941 for a short spell by Ostuf SCHOENBECK who had previously been Amt VI representative in Finland. Latterly under SCHELLENBERG the two Amt VI representatives were Stubaf ~~NASSENSTEIN~~ and Stubaf ~~VOLLBRECHT~~.

2. Polizeiverbindungsfuehrer and Amt VI.

The general situation in Portugal differed from that in Spain in two respects. Firstly there was no Polizei Attache as SCHROEDER, who took up his appointment in Portugal in October, 1941, was only recognised as a Polizeiverbindungsfuehrer. His position was not so strong as that of WINZER in Spain, but nevertheless his relations with Amt VI representatives were never cordial. Secondly the general attitude of the Portuguese government was not so well disposed towards Germany as that of the Spanish government.

3. Later Amt VI representatives

During the period 1942-43 Kurt ~~FOERSTER~~ had acted in the interests of Amt VI, but was expelled in March 1943 as a result of

an unfortunate attempt at recruitment of an agent which ended in failure. FOERSTER was replaced by VOLLBRECHT, who remained in Portugal from August 1943 onwards.

NASSENSTEIN acted in the dual capacity of VI B 4 and VI D representative as his duties involved specialisation on South American matters. It is not possible on available evidence to assess the work of VOLLBRECHT and NASSENSTEIN: it is significant however that SCHELLENBERG considers both as complete failures in their work.

## Part VI - Miscellaneous

### A. General Summary

In assessing the work of Gruppe VI B in the six years of its history it should be remembered that it is more than a little inaccurate to say that Amt VI evolved out of the old SD-Hauptamt III/3. The extension of SD activity from security operations to offensive operations and from the domestic to the foreign field was in fact a step which broke new ground. It was really only in Eastern Europe that the old SD-Hauptamt laid any good foundations for the work of the new Amt VI. Gruppe VI B, therefore, dealing with Western Europe, was faced with a difficult task, as only in the case of Switzerland was there any previous SD work which it could further exploit. For the Gruppe to have been successful therefore in its initial stages it would have required both energetic direction from the Amtschef combined with sympathetic cooperation from other organisations. Neither of these conditions were in fact fulfilled in the first two years of Amt VI activities in the west. Generally speaking therefore Gruppe VI B did not succeed in overcoming the difficulties with which it was faced. It failed almost dismally in France, Holland and Belgium: it did not achieve the success it might have done in the case of Switzerland, while Italy represented a case of lost opportunity, but for reasons not attributable to the Gruppe itself. But the failures in these countries were due not only to the opposition of other Aemter in the RSHA, to the hostility of the Foreign Office, nor to the lack of cooperation with the Abwehr, but also to the inefficiency and lack of imagination on the part of most of the leading personnel in the Gruppe. The results achieved were meagre in comparison with the effort expended. Only in the case of the Iberian Peninsula is it likely that the final assessment will reflect favourably on the work of Gruppe VI B, and while the final assessment is not yet possible in this connection, it would not seem that Amt VI took full advantage of the very favourable circumstances which existed in Spain.

### B. Arrests

Apart from Spain and Portugal, from which countries Amt VI representatives have not yet been expelled, the situation regarding arrests of personnel of Gruppe VI B can be considered as very satisfactory. The arrested personnel are shown in Appendix VII, and it is not likely that further interrogations will add much that is useful to the general picture of Gruppe VI B activities in France, Holland, Belgium and Italy. In the case of Switzerland the details are still lacking regarding the sources used by DAUFELDT, but his final interrogation report should complete this gap.

Main Sources

(a) On the general work of the Gruppe

PF.600,561	Brif SCHELLENBERG	Amtschef VI
PF.601,109	Stubaf HUEGEL	Referent VI B 3

(b) Referat VI B 1

PF.601,109	Stubaf HUEGEL	BdS Italy Abt. VI
PF.602,609	Staubaf KAPPLER	Polizeiattache
		Rome
PF.602,139	Stubaf HOETTL	VI E
SF.52/4/5(30)	Otto LECHNER	Secretary to
		KAPPLER

(c) Referat VI B 2

PF.602,735	Ostuf BERNHARD	Referent VI B 2
PF.601,267	Hastuf ZSCHUNKE	VI B 2
PF.601,080	Hastuf AHRENS	Abt VI BdS Holland
PF.	Hastuf SENNER	VI B 2
PF.	Haschaf ZUANG	VI B 2

(d) Referat VI B 3

PF.601,109	Stubaf HUEGEL	Referent VI B 3
PF.45727	Stubaf DAUFELDT	Representative in
		Switzerland

(e) Referat VI B 4

PF.602,422	Ostuf NEUBURG	VI B 3
PF.66168	John DOLLAR	VI B 4 agent

Distribution

Standard for Liquidation Reports

W.R.C.3a.  
17.10.45.

APPENDIX I

Chart of Distribution of Work in Amt VI from 1939 to 1945

	1939 - 1940	Early 1941	Mid 1941-1942	1942 - 1944	1944 - 1945
VI A	Administration etc.	General Intelligence Tasks Abroad (7 sections)	Administration etc.	Administration etc.	Administration etc.
VI B	Technical Section	Europe Africa Near East  (10 sections)	Slovakia Hungary Roumania Yugoslavia Greece Turkey Iraq, Iran Afghanistan	France Low Countries Switzerland Spain Portugal	France Low Countries Switzerland Spain Portugal Italy (since 1944)
VI C	Russia Baltic States Far East	Russia Far East  (11 sections)	Russia Japan China Finland Baltic States	Russia Near East Far East  (13 sections)	Russia Near East Far East  (4 sections by mid-44)
VI D	Hungary Slovakia Yugoslavia Roumania Bulgaria Greece Turkey	Anglo-American sphere  (9 sections)	Gr. Britain Br. Empire U.S.A. S. America Sweden Norway Denmark	Anglo-American sphere  (3 sections)	Anglo-American sphere  Scandinavia (from summer 1944)
VI E	Italy Spain Portugal Central and South America	Ideological Enemies abroad (6 sections (previously VI H))	France Low Countries Spain Portugal Italy Switzerland	Central Europe and Balkans Italy Scandinavia	Balkan States
VI F	France Low Countries Switzerland Luxemburg	Technical Section	Technical Section	Technical Section	Technical Section
VI G	Gr. Britain Br. Empire U.S.A. Norway	-	Ideological Enemies abroad	Research (from August 1942)	Research
VI H	Ideological Enemies abroad	-	-	-	-

NOTE: The above Chart serves merely as a rough guide to the organisational changes in Amt VI. The dates should be taken as approximate only.

APPENDIX II

Gruppe VI B Personnel at RSHA

Note: The location and function of personnel as given in these Appendices is roughly as at 1st January 1945. Several formations however which disappeared before then have been included owing to their importance; e.g. Abt. VI Bds Frankreich. As a result some personalities may appear twice under different formations. Arrested personnel are underlined.

Gruppenleiter            Staf STEIMLE  
Vertreter                Stubaf REICHLÉ

VI B 1 (Italian Referat)

Referent                Oblt HOHMANN  
                          Oblt HANSEN  
                          Ostuf JOHN  
                          Ustuf MOELLER  
                          Krim Ass BRINKMANN  
VI B 1 (Vat)            Hastuf REISSMANN (dead)

VI B 2 (France and Low Countries)

Referent                Ostubaf BERNHARD  
                          Hastuf ERNST  
                          Hastuf MARTSCHKE (1944)  
                          Hastuf ZSCHUNKE (Belgium)  
                          Hastuf HAUX  
                          Ostuf VERNUNFT  
                          Ustuf CROME (1943)  
                          Ustuf TENGLER  
                          Ustuf SCHOEFFLER  
                          Ustuf BOERDE  
                          Haschaf MEINEL  
                          Haschaf RICHETER  
                          Uschaf HUBNER  
                          Ang MAHLIS  
                          Ang GERSPACK

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APPENDIX II  
(cont)

VI B 3 (Switzerland)

Referent	Oblt HOHMANN
	Hastuf RADEN
	Hastuf WURDIG (1943)
	Ostuf <u>FELFE</u>
	Ostuf URBANEK
	KOS POERSCHKE
	Ang KROHNE
	Ang LAPPE

VI B 4 (Spain and Portugal)

Referent	Stubaf FENDLER
	Hastuf BAUS (1943)
	Hastuf LANGBEHN (1943)
	Hastuf ALISCH
	Ostuf WIEDEMANN
	Ostuf ENDEMANN
	Ostuf Dr NEUBOURG
	Ostuf WULFENN
	Haschaf SEITZ
	Oschaf VOLT
	Stuschaf SPECK
	Dr SCHLAARSCHMIDT
	Ang PRAUSER
	Ang GUMPRECHT
	Ang ROTTMANN
	Ang GODEFROY
	Ang METZGER
	Ang BENZ

VI B 4 (Pars)

	Hastuf DOEHRING
	Hastuf WENKHAUSEN

APPENDIX III

Referat VI B 1 Personnel at Outstations

BdS Italy

Stubaf HUEGEL

Hastuf SCHOENPFLUG

Ostuf RIED

Ustuf DIDINGER

Ustuf MAIER

Ustuf BANDORF

Ustuf LECHNER

Oschaf GIFFEY

Haschaf MUELLER

Frl. WENTZKY

Frl. WEILBACHER

Einheit Ida

Stubaf HASS

Ostuf SCHUBERNIG

Oschaf EBNER

Haschaf AGOSTINI

Haschaf GASTEINER

Schaf BOEHN

Schaf DAPRA

Schaf RINGOLD

Aussenkommando Bologna

Ostuf Ernst MOELLER

Aussenkommando Merano

Ustuf ZIRNBAUMER

Aussenkommando Milan

Ostuf ZIMMER

Aussenkommando Genoa

Ustuf MICHELSEN

Aussenkommando San Remo

Rottenf SCHOFFREGER

Aussenkommando Rome

Hastuf GROEBEL (1942) (dead)  
Stubaf LOOSS

BdS Adriatic Coast

Ustuf WOLFF

APPENDIX IV

Referat VI B & Personnel at Outstations

BdS Paris (1944)

Stubaf HAGEN (1942)	Ustuf BOURJEAU
Stubaf BICKLER	Ustuf REISSMANN
Stubaf <u>NOSSEK</u>	Ustuf WILD
Stubaf LANG	Ustuf <u>Gerhard PREIL</u>
Hastuf DETTERING	Ustuf Hermann DOBRITZSCH
Hastuf ALISCH	Ustuf RAHE
Hastuf ZUCHRISTIAN	Ustuf ZACH
Hastuf GUTEKUNST	Oschaf MUELLER
Hastuf <u>KUNZE</u>	Oschaf SCHNELL
Hastuf KOENIG	Haschaf ZUANG
Ostuf GERARDIN	Sdf KLEY
Ostuf LOBA	Dr KELLER
Ostuf SCHMIDT	Ang VOELKER

BdS Brussels

Hastuf <u>ZSCHUNKE</u> (1942)	Ustuf ECKERT (1943)
Hastuf <u>LAWRENZ</u>	Ustuf <u>ALLIGER</u> (1942)
Hastuf BAUS (1942)	Ustuf POLONI (1942)
Hastuf LOCHELT (1941)	Oschaf HENZE
Ustuf KRATZ	

BdS Holland

Hastuf <u>AHRENS</u>	Ustuf EGIDY
Hastuf <u>HINCKFUSS</u>	Ustuf JARL
Hastuf <u>FELFE</u>	Uschaf ASBACH (W/T)
Hastuf MUELLER	Stuschaf ULBRICH

Vichy

Hastuf REICHE (1942) (dead)  
Hastuf SCHMID (1944)

Metz

Stubaf MANNE

APPENDIX IV

(cont)

Strasbourg

Stubaf FREISE                      Krim Kom UHRING  
Stubaf SCHNEIDER

Marseilles

Hastuf SENNER

Unternehmen Bertram and Tosca

Stubaf GOHL                      Hastuf SENNER  
Hastuf Werner NEISSER

Leitstelle Walter

Staf BICKLER (and staff of BdS Paris above)  
Stubaf HUBIG                      Ostuf MORITZ  
Hastuf WENGER                      Ostuf ESCHELBOECK  
Ostuf HERMANN                      Ustuf WESTENBERGER  
Ostuf MORO                      ODENDAHL (W/T)

Leitstelle Siegfried

Stubaf WOLFF                      Stuschaf KATZBACH  
Hastuf LAWRENZ                      Stuschaf SCHUTZ  
Ostuf EINFELD                      Uschaf KROHNE  
Ostuf FRANKE                      Uschaf POLLMANN  
Haschaf BAAKE                      Ang VOELKER  
Haschaf VIERCK

APPENDIX V

Referat VI B 3 Personnel at Outstations

Representatives in Switzerland

Ostuf DAUFELDT

Graf DOENHOF

Adolf SONNENHOHL (Consular staff)

Representatives in SD-Stellen working against Switzerland

SD Stuttgart Ostuf BAUER (1944)

Hastuf OUNSZEIT

Ustuf EHMANN

Oschaf EISELE

Dr. HESS

SD Aussenstelle  
Loerrach

Ustuf BECKER

SD Aussenstelle  
Mulhouse

Stubaf BLECHER (suicide)

SD Aussenstelle  
Friedrichshaven

Hastuf BUCHELE

SD Leitabschnitt Munich Ostuf DAUSER

Ustuf HIERL

SD Aussenstelle Waldshut Ostuf KEMMET

SD Leitabschnitt  
Karlsruhe

Ostuf WANDHOFF

Miscellaneous

SCHELLENBERG's personal agent - Stubaf EGGEN

STEIMLE's personal agent - Dr. GARDEMANN

APPENDIX VI

Referat VI B 4 Personnel at Outstations

Representatives  
in Spain

(a) Subordinated to Polizei Attache WINZER

Ostuf SINGER

Hastuf KRUEGER

Ustuf KULAS

Hastuf ARNOLD (for VI D 4)

(b) The Grille Organisation under cover of  
Oberfuehrer BERNHARD

Stubaf MOSIG

Fritz LACKNER

Frl. BRUECKNER

Haschaf HOLTING (W/T)

Ewald KRUSE (Pielers Fur Company, Madrid)

Hans WEISS (Pielers Fur Company, Madrid)

Erish DIETEL (Sofindus, Madrid)

Paul ANGER (Marion Transport Company, Madrid)

Franz STAUDINGER (Minerales Mining Company,  
Madrid)

Ostuf KALLAB (Sofindus, Hendaye)

(c) Representatives in Tangiers

Hastuf SCHMUCK (Tangiers 1940-41)

Ustuf SCHULTZE (Tangiers until May 1944)

Hans SEIDEL (Tangiers until May 1944)

Oschaf LECHNER

Representatives  
in Portugal

Ostubaf SCHROEDER (Polizeiverbindungsfuehrer)

Ostubaf NASSENSTEIN

Stubaf VOLLBRECHT

Kurt FOERSTER (until March 1943)

- SUMBECK

Ostuf FAST (1939-40)

Hastuf SCHMUCK (previously Tangiers)

Representative at  
SD-Leitstelle Munich

Hastuf SCHWARZ

APPENDIX VII

Alphabetical Index of Gruppe VI B Personnel

(Arrested Personnel names underlined)

<u>Name</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Referat</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
AGOSTINI	Haschaf	VI B 1	Einheit Ida
<u>AHRENS</u>	<u>Hastuf</u>	VI B 2	BdS Holland. Arrested BAOR.
<u>ALTSCH</u>	<u>Hastuf</u>	VI B 2	Also VI B 4
ALLIGER	Ustuf	VI B 2	BdS Belgium 1943. Transferred VI E. Arrested USFET.
ARNOLD	Hastuf	VI B 4	Representative in Madrid; also VI D 4
ASBACH	Uschaf		
BAAKE	Haschaf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Siegfried.
BANDORF	Ustuf	VI B 1	BdS Italy
BAUER	Ostuf	VI B 3	Representative at SD-Stuttgart.
BAUS	Hastuf	VI B 2	Transferred VI A 2 in 1944.
BECKER	Ustuf	VI B 3	Representative at SD-Loerrach.
BENZ	Ang.	VI B 4	
BERNHARD	Oberf	VI B 4	Sofindes Company, Madrid.
<u>BERNHARD</u>	Ostuf	VI B 2	Referent VI B 2. Arrested USFET.
BICKLER	Staf	VI B 2	Leiter Leitstelle Walter.
<u>BLECHER</u>	Stubaf	VI B 3	Representative at SD-Mulhouse. Suicide.
BOEHM	Scharf	VI B 1	Einheit Ida.
<u>BOERDE</u>	Ustuf	VI B 2	
BRINKMANN	Krim. Ass.	VI B 1	
BUCHELE	Hastuf	VI B 3	Representative at SD-Friedrichshaven.
CROME	Ustuf	VI B 2	
DAPRA	Scharf	VI B 1	Einheit Ida.
<u>DAUFELDT</u>	Ostuf	VI B 3	Representative in Switzerland. Arrested USFET.
DAUSER	Ostuf	VI B 3	Representative at SD-Munich.
DEITERING	Hastuf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Walter.
DIDINGER	Ustuf	VI B 1	BdS Italy.
DOERITZSCH	Ustuf	VI B 2	BdS Paris.

APPENDIX VII  
(cont)

<u>DOENHOF</u>	Graf	VI B 3	Representative in Switzerland. Arrested Italy.
DOEHRING	Hastuf	VI B 4	VI B 4 (Parseval)
EBNER	Oschaf	VI B 1	Einheit Ida.
ECKERT	Ustuf	VI B 2	BdS Holland 1943.
<u>EGGEN</u>	Stubaf	VI B 3	Arrested Italy.
EGIDY	Ustuf	VI B 2	BdS Holland.
EHMANN	Ustuf	VI B 3	Representative at SD-Stuttgart.
EISELE	Oschaf	VI B 3	Representative at SD-Stuttgart.
EINFELD	Ostuf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Siegfried.
ENDEMANN	Ostuf	VI B 4	
ERNST	Hastuf	VI B 2	
ESCHELBOECK	Ostuf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Walter
FANELSA	Ostuf	VI B 2	Representative at SD-Metz.
<u>FELFE</u>	Ostuf	VI B 2	BdS Holland. Arrested BAOR.
FENDLER	Stubaf	VI B 4	Referent VI B 4.
FORSTER		VI B 4	Representative in Madrid.
FRANKE	Ostuf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Siegfried.
FREISE	Stubaf	VI B 2	Former Gruppenleiter. Representative at Strasbourg.
GASTEINER	Haschaf	VI B 1	Einheit Ida.
GERARDIN	Ostuf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Walter.
GERSPACK	Ang.	VI B 2	
GIFFEY	Oschaf	VI B 1	BdS Italy.
GODEFROY	Ang.	VI B 4	
GOHL	Stubaf	VI B 2	Unternehmen Bertram.
GUTEKUNST	Hastuf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Walter.
HAAGEN	Stubaf	VI B 2	Leiter Abt. VI BdS France 1942.
HAMMES	Krim. Kom.	VI B 4	Representative in Barcelona
HASS	Stubaf	VI B 1	Leiter Einheit Ida.
HAUX	Hastuf	VI B 2	
HESS	Dr.	VI B 3	Representative at SD-Stuttgart.
HERMANN	Ostuf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Walter.
HIERL	Ustuf	VI B 3	Representative at SD-Munich.
<u>HINCKFUSS</u>	Hastuf	VI B 2	BdS Holland. Arrested BAOR.



APPENDIX VII  
(cont)

<u>HUEGEL</u>	Stubaf	VI B 1	Leiter Abt. VI BdS Italy. Arrested Italy.
HUBIG	Stubaf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Walter.
HUBNER	Uschaf	VI B 2	
JARL	Ustuf	VI B 2	BdS Holland.
JOHN	Ostuf	VI B 1	
KATZBACH	Stuschaf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Siegfried.
KEMMET	Ostuf	VI B 3	Representative at SD-Waldshut.
KLEY	Sdf.	VI B 2	BdS Italy.
KOENIG	Hastuf	VI B 2	BdS Paris.
KROHNE	Uschaf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Siegfried.
KRATZ	Ustuf	VI B 2	BdS Brussels.
KRUEGER	Hastuf	VI B 4	Representative in Madrid.
KULAS	Ustuf	VI B 4	Representative in Madrid.
<u>KUNZE</u>	Hastuf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Walter. Arrested French Zone.
LANG	Stubaf	VI B 2	BdS Paris.
LANGBEHN	Hastuf	VI B 4	
LAPPE	Ang.	VI B 3	
LAWRENZ	Hastuf	VI B 2	BdS Brussels.
LOBA	Ostuf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Walter.
LOHELT	Hastuf	VI B 2	BdS Brussels 1941.
LOOSS	Stubaf	VI B 1	Aussenkommando Rome.
MAHLIS	Ang.	VI B 2	
MAIER	Ustuf	VI B 1	BdS Italy.
MARTSCHKE	Hastuf	VI B 2	
MEINEL	Haschaf	VI B 2	
METZGER	Ang.	VI B 4	
<u>MICHELSEN</u>	Ustuf	VI B 1	Aussenkommando Genoa. Arrested Italy.
MOELLER	Ustuf	VI B 1	
MOELLER	Ostuf	VI B 1	Aussenkommando Bologna.
MORITZ	Ostuf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Walter.
MORO	Ostuf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Walter.
MOSIG	Stubaf	VI B 4	Representative in Madrid.

APPENDIX VII  
(cont)

MUELLER	Haschaf	VI B 1	BdS Italy.
MUELLER	Oschaf	VI B 2	BdS France.
MUELLER	Hastuf	VI B 2	BdS Holland (1943)
NASSENSTEIN	Ostufaf	VI B 4	Representative in Portugal.
<u>NEISSER</u>	Hastuf	VI B 2	BdS Paris; transferred VI S. Arrested French Zone.
<u>NEUBURG</u>	Ostuf	VI B 4	Arrested American Zone.
<u>NOSSEK</u>	Hastuf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Walter; arrested French Zone.
ODENDAHL	Scharf	VI B 2	W/T operator Leitstelle Siegfried.
ONUSZEIT	Hastuf	VI B 3	Representative at SD-Stuttgart.
POERSCHKE	KOS	VI B 3	
POLLMANN	Uschaf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Siegfried.
<u>POLONI</u>	Ustuf	VI B 2	BdS Brussels 1943. Transferred VI E.
PRAUSER	Ang.	VI B 4	
<u>PREIL</u>	Ustuf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Walter; arrested Italy.
RADEN	Hastuf	VI B 3	
RAHE	Ustuf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Walter.
<u>REICHE</u>	Hastuf	VI B 2	Representative Vichy; dead.
REICHLE	Stubaf	VI B	Vertreter to Gruppenleiter.
<u>REISSMANN</u>	Hastuf	VI B 1(Vat)	Dead
RICHTER	Haschaf	VI B 2	
RIED	Ostuf	VI B 1	BdS Italy
RINGOLD	Scharf	VI B 1	Einheit Ida.
RISSMANN	Ustuf	VI B 2	BdS France.
ROTHMANN	Ang.	VI B 4	
SCHLAARSCHMIDT	Dr.	VI B 4	
SCHMIEDOW	Krim. Ass.	VI B 4	Representative in Madrid.
SCHMIDT	Ostuf	VI B 1	BdS Italy.
SCHMID	Hastuf	VI B 2	Representative at Vichy.
SCHNEIDER	Ostufaf	VI B 2	Representative at Strasbourg 1943.

APPENDIX VII  
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SCHNELL	Oschaf	VI B 2	BdS France.
<u>SCHOENPFLUG</u>	Hastuf	VI B 1	BdS Italy; arrested Italy.
SCHOEFFLER	Ustuf	VI B 2	
SCHOEFFREGER	Rottenf	VI B 1	Aussenkommando St Remo.
SCHROEDER	Ostuf	VI B 4	Representative in Portugal.
<u>SCHUBERNIG</u>	Ostuf	VI B 1	Einheit Ida. Arrested Austria
SCHUTZ	Stuschaf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Siegfried.
SCHWARTZ	Hastuf	VI B 4	Representative SD-Munich.
SENNER	Hastuf	VI B 2	Unternehmen Bertram.
SEITZ	Haschaf	VI B 4	Identical with SEIDEL.
SINGER	Ostuf	VI B 4	Representative in Madrid.
<u>SONNENHOHL</u>	Consul	VI B 3	Representative in Switzerland; arrested Italy.
SPECK	Stuschaf	VI B 4	
STEIMLE	Staf	VI B	Gruppenleiter.
TENGLER	Ustuf	VI B 2	
<u>UHRING</u>	Krim. Kom.	VI B 1	Representative at Strasbourg; arrested French Zone.
ULBRICH	Stuschaf	VI B 2	BdS Holland.
URBANEK	Ostuf	VI B 3	Was Abt. III BdS Holland.
<u>VERNUNFT</u>	Ostuf	VI B 2	Arrested American Zone.
VIERCK	Haschaf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Siegfried.
<u>VOELKER</u>	Ang.	VI B 2	Leitstelle Siegfried. Arrested American Zone.
VOLLBRECHT	Stubaf	VI B 4	Representative in Portugal.
VOLT	Oschaf	VI B 4	
WANDHOFF	Ostuf	VI B 3	
WEIDEMANN	Ostuf	VI B 4	
WENDTHAUSEN	Ostuf	VI B 2	
WENGER	Hastuf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Walter.
WIEDENMANN	Ostuf	VI B 4	
WILD	Ustuf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Walter.
WULFFEN	Ostuf	VI B 4	
WURDIG	Hastuf	VI B 3	
WOLFF	Ustuf	VI B 1	BdS Adriatic Coast.

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<u>WOLFF</u>	Stubaf	VI B 2	Leiter Leitstelle Siegfried. Arrested American Zone.
ZACH	Ustuf	VI B 2	BdS Paris.
ZIMMER	Ostuf	VI B 1	Aussenkommando Milan.
ZIRNBAUMER	Ustuf	VI B 1	Aussenkommando Merano.
<u>ZSCHUNKE</u>	Hastuf	VI B 2	Arrested BAOR.
<u>ZUANG</u>	Haschaf	VI B 2	Leitstelle Walter; arrested French Zone.
ZUCHRISTIAN	Hastuf	VI B 2	BdS Paris.

Addenda

<u>BIELSTEIN</u>	Hastuf	VI B	Gruppenleiter 1939-41; arrested in Denmark.
<u>ELLING</u>	Ostuf	VI B 1	Representative at Vatican; arrested Italy.
<u>FAST</u>	Hastuf	VI B 4	Representative in Portugal 1939-40. Probably identical with FAST of VI C (arrested BAOR)
GUMPRECHT	Ang.	VI B 4	
HOLTING		VI B 4	W/T operator Madrid
KALLAB	Ostuf	VI B 4	Representative at Hendaye
LECHNER	Oschaf	VI B 4	Representative in Tangiers 1944
<u>LECHNER</u>		VI B 1	Secretary to KAPPLER: arrested Italy.
<u>LORENZ</u>	Hastuf	VI B 2	Representative in France 1939; arrested.
PETER, Dr.		VI B 3	Representative in Switzerland 1939-40.
PFISTERER	Hastuf	VI B 4	Representative in Spain 1941.
<u>PLATH</u>	Hastuff	VI B 4	Representative in Spain 1939-40. Dead.
SCHMUCK	Krim Ass	VI B 4	Identical with SCHMIEDOW; representative in Tangiers 1940-42; later in Portugal.
SCHOENBEBECK	Ostuf	VI B 4	Representative in Portugal 1940-41.
SCHULTZE	Ustuf	VI B 4	Representative in Tangiers until 1944.
SEIDEL	Hans	VI B 4	Representative in Tangiers until 1944; later VI B 4 (Paris)
SUMBECK		VI B 4	Assistant to VOLLBRECHT in Lisbon.