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DISPATCH NO. MCK-W-4735

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TO : Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

DATE: 18 April 1950

FROM : Chief, Foreign Division M

SUBJECT: GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - Interrogation of Dr. Walter Friedrich SCHELLENBERG

Extracts of the Final Report on SCHELLENBERG relating to his negotiations with General von GEHLEN are inclosed. Reference is made to these extracts in MCK-W-4705.

Enclosure: 1
(3 copies)

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Final Report on the Case of Walter Friedrich SCHELLENBERG

Appendix VI

Ant VI - Post Defeat Plans

"The sudden deterioration of the military situation of Germany in the last months before defeat did not, according to SCHELLENBERG, allow German leadership to develop any post defeat plans. SCHELLENBERG maintains that the whole working method of the National Socialist system prevented any such premeditated schemes taking shape. *****

"Of great importance in this connection were SCHELLENBERG's discussions with Major General von GEHLEN. GEHLEN was until February 1945 'Chief Fremde Heere Ost'. He was an excellent general staff officer who enjoyed all round esteem. He possibly possessed the greatest understanding amongst the members of the 'Wehrmachtsfuhrungstab' for the 'Geheime Meldedienst'. He was SCHELLENBERG's strongest supporter within the army. This was shown by the acceptance of SCHELLENBERG's suggestion that all military attaches and I.C.S. of the Wehrmacht were to pass through the school of the 'Geheime Meldedienst'. The preparations for this were complete when GEHLEN was deprived of his post because he failed to form a correct estimate of the attack by the XI Ukrainian army from the direction of Berlin as well as Pomerania. Hitler had one of his usual attacks of rage and KALTENBRUNNER was delighted when he was able, addressing himself to SCHELLENBERG to declare in the course of a lunch party: 'This little sausage of von GEHLEN now has got to go West too - he probably relied too much on your poor intelligence service. Don't forget I don't dream of courting one day reproaches by the Fuehrer owing to your reports. In that case you would be most speedily dismissed'. SCHELLENBERG describes this particular performance as one of the many attacks of KALTENBRUNNER against him.

"Major General von GEHLEN in March 1945 asked SCHELLENBERG for a quiet talk in private. One evening he spent three hours with SCHELLENBERG. In the course of this talk GEHLEN estimated that military resistance would last another two months. Then the end had to be counted with. GEHLEN said that preparations had to be made for this case. The only man with the necessary imagination and energy to undertake this task was HIMMLER. HIMMLER, should, as Commander of the home Army, authorize SCHELLENBERG to build up, together with GEHLEN and the best general staff officers, a resistance movement and army on the lines of the Polish resistance. GEHLEN said that the army had the fullest confidence in SCHELLENBERG as an organizer and he, GEHLEN, and his best general staff officers, as well as many whom SCHELLENBERG did not yet know, would put themselves voluntarily under SCHELLENBERG's command. GEHLEN added that he would now pretend that he was taking four weeks holiday, but in reality he was going to 'Frankenstrupp' (a cover name standing for a prepared evacuation quarter of the OKW) in order to prepare his plan quietly. He had already asked for a comprehensive survey regarding the Polish resistance army. GEHLEN requested SCHELLENBERG to prepare the same on his side. The evening ended with SCHELLENBERG's assurance that he would think it all over thoroughly and then secure the decision of HIMMLER.

"SCHELLENBERG promised GEHLEN strictest secrecy. GEHLEN attached above all great importance to KALTENBRUNNER not being put into the picture. SCHELLENBERG discussed the matter with Dr. RAPP and asked for a report on the whole issue.

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Not more than ten days after SCHELLENBERG's talk with GEHLEN RAPP brought with him an excellent survey of the whole structure of the Polish resistance army, together with GEHLEN's request to transmit as soon as possible, preferably by the same courier, the written consent of HIMMLER. The courier explained orally that as GUDERINA was no longer chief of the OKH and as WENK was his successor, it would be a good thing if HIMMLER initiated WENK into the plan.

"SCHELLENBERG explained the whole plan to HIMMLER who declined it abruptly. He said verbatim to SCHELLENBERG: 'This is complete nonsense, if I should discuss this plan with WENK I am the first defeatist of the Third Reich. This fact would be served boiling hot to the Fuhrer. You need not tell this to your GEHLEN. You need only explain to him that I strictly refuse to accept the plan. Besides - it is typical of the high class general staff officer to sit in Frankenstrupp nursing post war plans instead of fighting'. SCHELLENBERG quickly changed the subject; otherwise, he thought, HIMMLER would not have stopped talking and no-one could have predicted what orders HIMMLER might have given inspired by a momentary mood. SCHELLENBERG informed GEHLEN and Dr. RAPP of the negative attitude of HIMMLER. As far as SCHELLENBERG knows no further development occurred."

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