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X-2 BRANCH
Hqs. Det., 2677th Regt., OSS
APO 512 U.S. Army

MICROFILMED
APR 12 1961
DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE
13 July 1945

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2006

PERSONAL TO: Earle B. Nichols, Colonel, G.S.C.,
Asst. A. C. of S., G-2, AFHQ
FROM: Lieut. James Angleton, C.O. SGI Units Z
SUBJECT: Plan CAESAR

A. STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

1. Three French citizens, possessing German documents, made contact with an OSS representative in MILAN and were in turn passed to this Unit.

2. Interrogation revealed that Subjects were active in the French Collaboration Movement and participated in the administration of two Jewish properties under the French Ministry of Jewish Affairs.

3. Agent Smith helped establish
Following the Allied invasion, Subjects escaped into Germany, where they resumed their activities with the Collaborationist Government at SIGMARINGEN. Due to pressure from the GIB, Subjects initiated a W/T school for agents destined for missions into France. Allegedly employed as a D/A by a writer.

4. While in BERLIN, Smith's report contains interrogation report
contact was resumed with Japanese diplomats, formerly known to Subjects at VICHY. Subjects were offered a position with the Jap IS, but declined.

5. However, a card of introduction to the Jap IS was given to one of the Subjects in the event he should change his mind.

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6. After the collapse of the German Armies, Subjects came to Italy, allegedly to offer their services to the American Intelligence Service and thereby avoid inevitable trial by the French. Arriving at MILAN from BOLZANO, contact was made with an officer in OSS who turned them over to this Unit in MILAN.

7. Subjects were flown to Rome and submitted to an interrogation by this Unit. The undersigned informed Col. J. W. FISCHER that these bodies were being secretly interrogated with a view to future use. Col. FISCHER offered all facilities at his disposal for the furtherance of the plan. Subjects were sealed off during interrogation and subsequently transferred under false names to their present confinement in the security prison, ROME.

B. BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS:

8. Subjects are:

a. Josef GARRETTE, son of Jules and Marie MALER. Born 9 May 1913 in LOS MASOS (Pyrenees). Residence, Place D'Ass 5, NIMES; Rue Mon Jardin 5, PARIS (lived at this address with his cousin Pierre MALER for a few months to learn the automobile business); Rue Quatre Septembre 29, ARLES (lived here until July 1939).

CIT. France

DPB

aka

Subject booked in Security Prison, ROME, under name Marco ROSSI.

Occupation: Represented the auto business for General Motors and Hotchkiss Co., working the territory of PROVENCE. In January 1943 took over two Jewish industries under the French Ministry for Jewish Affairs. Also manufactured patented

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wooden barracks
for the German
Command in the
Southern Zone.

Languages: French, Spanish
(Catalan), a
little Italian,
English and German.

Political Adherence: Anti-
de Gaulle.

Relatives: Father: Joseph
Mother: Marie
 MALER
Brother: Teofanio
 (34 years)
 living in
 LOS MASOS
 where he
 is adminis-
 trating
 family
 property.

Marital Status: Married Louise
PRADIER in 1932. Wife
born ARLES SUR RHONE.
Legally separated from
GARRETTE in 1943 for
incompatibility. Be-
lieved to be living at
Place d'Ass No. 5,
NIMES.

Son: Jean Claude, 7 years, living
with mother.

Uncles: Abbot in Abbey of HAUTCOMBE;
another uncle is a
priest in the Bretagne
region.

Documents: ~~PREMIER PASSE~~ Issued by
German Consulate BOL-
ZANO to GARRETTE under
4 May '4

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~~The name Josef~~
~~GARRIGA. Classi-~~
~~fied Subject as a~~
~~Spanish laborer.~~
Pass number 826/45.
Perforated number
36239 ("8" or "3")
43. Issued 4 May
1945.

Also calling card
from Viscount MONTONO,
introducing Subject
to any Japanese re-
presentative.

b. Jacques HAON, son of Alain and Ermine RIOU,
Born 4 December 1920 in ALES
(Region of GARD). Subject is
an only son. Parents living at
Faubourg du Soleil 17, ALES.

CIT: FRANCE

DPB

*GIS agent who helped
Josef GARRETTE establish
a W/T school for agents
destined for incursions into
France. Cited in GARRETTE's
interrogation report.*

aka

Subject booked in Security
Prison, Rome, under the name
Giulio SADINI.

Marital Status: June 1945 mar-
ried Reine CAMBI (born
in NIMES 13 April
1923). Has one son
named Marc born 18
July 1944, NIMES.

Last Residence: Avenue de la
Plateforme 24, NIMES.

Occupation: Subject worked in
the PARIS Workshops,
later joining GARRETTE
in exploiting Jewish
properties.

Documents: FREMDENPASS issued to
HAON by German Consu-
late, BOLZANO, under

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the name Johann
~~GAZALS~~. Classifies
Subject as Spanish
laborer. Pass num-
ber 828/45. Perfora-
ted number 36240
("S" or "8") 43. Is-
sued 4 May 1945.

~~X~~
C. Paul LEWIS,
CIT: FRANCE

^{DPB}
born ⁷⁴ April 1921 at PARIS. Sub-
ject's status is not included in
detail here. Traces from PARIS
indicate that he has served a
prison term for theft. He served
as interpreter to the above in
Germany for a few months.

Joseph Garritte, C.I.S. w/T instructor
Cited in Garritte's interrogation report.

^{aka}
Subject booked in Security Prison,
ROME, under the name Italo SPATARO.

G. FRENCH COLLABORATIONIST MOVEMENT:

9. After the French-German Armistice, GARRETTE, feel-
ing the shock and disillusionment following the defeat of
the French Armies, resolved that the German occupation would
be a long one and that the benefits gained from compromise
would greatly outweigh the inconveniences and hardships
which would result from personal participation in insur-
rection or passive resistance. Therefore, GARRETTE became
an enthusiastic member of the French Collaborationist Move-
ment in 1940, favoring a smooth workable relationship
between the French and German peoples.

10. GARRETTE advanced from a mere Delegate for the
Department of NIMES to President of the Group in NIMES. At
the end of 1941, HAON joined the Group and soon became his
close personal friend. Later HAON became the latter's per-
sonal secretary and looked after the administration of two
Jewish properties in NIMES for which GARRETTE was respon-
sible.

11. Both GARRETTE and HAON say that they received no
personal benefits from the administration. They admit that
huge profits, however, were realized from the construction
of wooden barracks for the German Command, even though it
was necessary to bribe the German military authorities for
these contracts.

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D. CONTACTS WITH GERMAN OFFICIALS:

12. While active in the Collaborationist Group, GARRETTE travelled widely over France, coming into contact with various German officials including:

- a. Dr. HEITTINGER, Head of the German economic missions with Hqs. in LYONS.
- b. KARLHUBER (fnu), Secretary to HEITTINGER.
- c. MULLER, Capt. (fnu), former member of the Armistice Commission in TOULON who joined the GIS in NIMES.
- d. GEISLER (fnu), Charge d'Affaires at VICHY, allegedly with the GIS in Africa.
- e. VON SPIEGEL, Consul General at the German Consulate in MARSEILLES.
- f. SENNER, Hans, GIS Chief for Southern France.
- g. NEISSER & WERNER, GIS official who worked W/T agents into Africa.
- h. NOSECK, Chief of the German political sections in Northern Zone of France.
- i. KLASSEN, Dr., head of propaganda service in German Embassy.
- j. HICKLER, Col., head of Political Intelligence Service for France.

13. GARRETTE's encounters with the GIS in France were purely of a political intelligence nature. Through their friendship his political and economic position was firmly established, and, though he denies any activities having a secret-service flavor during this period, he worked 100% to bring the French political parties into line with German policy.

E. ESCAPE TO GERMANY:

14. Fearing the rapid advance of the Allies in France,

GARRETTE and HAON, knowing that they would be quickly condemned by a French court (if not executed by the Maquis) decided to escape to Germany in August 1944.

15. The German Embassy invited both to live at the Brenner Park Hotel in BADEN-BADEN as "honored guests of the Reich". This offer was refused in order to maintain a certain independence of movement.

16. On 1 September 1944, Subjects travelled to CONSTANCE and, on receipt of an invitation from Ambassador Otto ABETZ, journeyed to SIGMARINGEN, where the seat of the new French Government was being prepared. Here were recruited the personalities of the French Collaborationist world, whom Subjects knew in PARIS and VICHY.

17. GARRETTE held two conferences with Ambassador ABETZ, who offered him an "important" position in the French Government. GARRETTE refused, saying he had no desire to participate in a phantom government.

18. ABETZ issued Subjects permits to remain at LAKE CONSTANCE until 15 April 1945. However, on 16 September 1944 Subjects returned to MEERSBURG having had but casual contact with the French Government.

19. On 3 November, Subjects travelled to BERLIN in order to seek authorization to visit Italy. They fully realized now that the eventual collapse of Germany was a certainty and that the speed of the Allied Armies would result in their eventual apprehension.

20. Their plan, therefore, was to obtain permission to enter Italy and contact a resistance group working under the auspices of the Allied I.S. A successful contact, Subjects believed, would give them partial reinsurance against the inevitable charges of collaborationism.

21. All attempts to gain proper exit permits failed because of the objections of the SD Col. BICKLER who, for a long period of time, was personally antipathetic towards GARRETTE.

F. PROPOSAL TO ENTER THE GIS:

22. It was during this visit to BERLIN in November that Subjects were summoned before an SD officer, MORITZ, who informed GARRETTE that Col. SPEINLE of RSHA desired to speak with him.

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23. STEIMLE began the conversation by reproaching GARRETTE for not having accomplished some act beneficial to the French-German cause. He compared unfavorably GARRETTE's inactivity during his stay in Germany with the excellent work carried out by other French Collaborationist movements, who were variously engaged in sending agents into France to work against the Allies.

24. Sensing STEIMLE's comments to be an order, GARRETTE felt obliged to participate in some form of GIS activity. STEIMLE's plan was to gather together a pool of French youths recruited from concentration camps and slave-labor gangs. This pool was to be divided into two groups:

- a. One group to gather intelligence by line-crossing, and,
- b. A second select group to be trained in W/T for parachuting into France to transmit political intelligence exclusively.

25. GARRETTE states he refused to organize the military intelligence group but instead accepted the assignment of setting up the school for W/T agents. GARRETTE returned to MEERSBURG and in the beginning of January succeeded in recruiting some 50 French youths. These recruits, GARRETTE states, volunteered immediately for the sole purpose of returning to their homes in France.

26. The school was held in the Deutsches Haus Hotel, MEERSBURG. GARRETTE states that the courses were mainly on French political thought and history, with emphasis on a study of the various political parties which held sway in France up to the outbreak of the war.

27. GARRETTE states that an acute shortage of W/T equipment prevented radio instruction. Therefore the original plan to parachute the agents was abandoned and, on instructions from BERLIN, 25 to 30 of the students were passed into France via Switzerland to gather political intelligence as line-crossers.

28. Both GARRETTE and HAON maintain that they privately instructed each student to regard the assignment as an excuse to escape from Germany. If GARRETTE may be believed, it is to be presumed that these youths present no counter-intelligence problem.

29. It is presumed that the remainder of the students made their way into Italy after the Armistice.

30. (Under Memo JZX-1518, 21 June 1945, this office circulated a list of the names of the above agents as remembered by GARRETTE and HAON.)

G. ESCAPE TO ITALY:

31. On 21 April 1945, a party composed of GARRETTE, HAON and LEWIS left MEERSBURG for INNSBRUCK. They were determined, together with other collaborationist compatriots, to escape inevitable capture from the advancing French troops and present themselves to the Anglo-Americans in Italy. LEWIS was in the party only because he has served as GARRETTE's German interpreter during the preceding four months.

32. Subjects were accompanied by a German NGO of the SD, Frederic GRIES, who was ordered to liquidate them en route. GRIES's role was disclosed prior to departure from MEERSBURG, and Subjects "lost" him at BOLZANO.

33. On May 1, Subjects crossed the BRENNER and proceeded to BOLZANO and MILAN, arriving in MILAN around the 9th of May. The first night in MILAN was passed in a factory which served to house refugees. The next morning, Subject, HAON and LEWIS took rooms in Hotel del Commercio and remained there until their departure to ROME. For purposes of identification, they made use of special passports issued to them by the German Consulate in BOLZANO. These documents classified them as Spanish nationals coming from labor camps in Germany.

34. Attempts to contact the Anglo-American IS were unsuccessful until Subjects casually met an American OSS Captain to whom they related their story. Subjects were subsequently brought to this Unit's office in MILAN and brought to ROME for interrogation.

H. CONTACTS WITH JAPANESE DIPLOMATS:

35. During his frequent travels in France, as the President of the Collaborationist Group for NIMES, GARRETTE became acquainted with the Japanese Ambassador who, in turn,

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introduced him to the First Counsellor of the Embassy, Viscount SAKAICHI MOTONO, son of an ex-minister of Japan.

36. With the Allied advance, MOTONO went to SIG-MARINGEN and was subsequently transferred to the Embassy in BERLIN. In BERLIN he was in charge of the Radio propaganda department. MOTONO was particularly qualified for this work as he possesses an extraordinary knowledge of languages and European culture.

37. During conversations with GARRETTE, MOTONO severely criticized Germany and the Nazi Party, deploring the excessive heaviness of the Nazi services, particularly the diplomatic corps. MOTONO's feelings were based on what he termed HITLER's "error of judgment" in attacking Russia instead of negotiating with it intelligently.

38. MOTONO expressed a great personal interest in intelligence subjects to GARRETTE, offering him, on various occasions, the opportunity to conduct espionage on behalf of the Jap IS. MOTONO desired intelligence concerning movements of the English and American Navies. He suggested to GARRETTE one day that a group of French youths be recruited and trained for sending into France and Spain to gather information on maritime traffic. This information he needed for preparing statistics on Allied merchant tonnage.

39. GARRETTE cordially refused all offers of service with the Jap IS but took great pains to maintain friendly relations with MOTONO and other members of the Japanese Embassy in Berlin.

40. Through MOTONO, GARRETTE made the acquaintance of KITA-RA, the Cultural Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy in BERLIN, who was in charge of maintaining the Embassy's liaison with political parties. At VICHY, KITA-RA occasionally performed the courier function of delivering the diplomatic bag to the Legation in Switzerland. He continued this duty after his transfer to BERLIN.

41. GARRETTE was further acquainted with two other Japanese diplomats in BERLIN, SATO and MAYEDA. GARRETTE states that they were active members of Jap IS whom he and HAON met while dining in BERLIN. The encounter was engineered by the SD officer, MORITZ, who arranged the party in order to induce SATO and MAYEDA to disclose information concerning the Japanese network in Switzerland, particularly the means by which contact was established in BERLIN.

42. GARRETTE states that the dinner proved to be a reverse penetration as the two Japs, who were fluent in German, pretended to have no knowledge of the language. Furthermore, the GIS officials drank heartily, giving away the purpose of the dinner as well as considerable information on the GIS.

43. GARRETTE met SATO and MAYEDA with MOTONO on a few other occasions and discovered that they maintained contact with French AGT through their Swiss network. Links with Japan were maintained originally through Turkey but later through Russia.

44. Though GARRETTE politely refused all offers of collecting intelligence for MOTONO, in December 1944 he did accept from MOTONO two letters of introduction which would permit him to enter into intimate relations with the Japanese IS should he ever desire to enter their employ.

45. The first letter given to GARRETTE by MOTONO was addressed to General SCHIMITSU, head of the Japanese Military Mission in Italy, who was then stationed at CORTINA D'AMPEZZO. This letter GARRETTE alleges to have destroyed at BOLZANO, fearing that it would fall into the hands of Partisans, since the letterhead read en clair, "Japanese Embassy, Berlin".

46. The second note was written on MOTONO's calling card in ideogram. It is addressed to all Japanese Embassies and states that the bearer will discuss a matter of great interest for French-Manchurian relations. This note is held by the undersigned.

47. GARRETTE last saw MOTONO at BAD GASTKIN in April 1945. It was MOTONO's intention to escape to the Russian-occupied zone and avoid capture by the Anglo-Americans.

I. INTERROGATOR'S COMMENTS:

48. Traces from PARIS confirm the GIS background of GARRETTE and HAON. Recent captures by the DSM of agents listed in our JZX-1518 of 21 June 1945 confirm that GARRETTE headed the espionage school in MEERSBURG. It is presumed, therefore, that Subject has given a substantially true account of his GIS career and has not attempted to mitigate his participation.

49. It is difficult to evaluate GARRETTE's reported relations with the Japanese; whether these were purely political or whether the invitation to join their IS is factual. Our records indicate that both SATO and MOTONO were members of the Jap Embassy in VICHY and later served in BERLIN. The same source confirms that MOTONO was in BAD GASTEIN in April of this year. It is interesting to note that the introductory card given to GARRETTE is a personal calling-card of MOTONO and the message itself is written in fluent Japanese. This tends to prove that the card itself is genuine.

50. There is a variation between GARRETTE's statement of what the card says and the translation made by this office. GARRETTE states MOTONO wrote: "To All Japanese Embassies: The bearer of this card is a most trustworthy man who should be used to our advantage." Our translation reads: "To Whomsoever in the Embassy: I present the bearer of this card to discuss a matter concerning French-Manchurian relations."

51. It will be necessary to conduct further cross-interrogations of GARRETTE and HAON to determine if the rendering given by GARRETTE indicates a deliberate falsification of the text in order to render himself attractive and valuable to the Americans as a double-agent. It is believed that further interrogation will clarify this point.

52. GARRETTE is a man of pleasant personality and of unusual self-assurance. For the present, however, he is in great fear of his life and professes that he will do anything to escape a transfer to French jurisdiction. From a psychological point of view, he appears to possess the stability and imagination which are necessary in a successful double-agent. The past years of political life have subjected him to many contacts and experiences which he appears to have handled with skill and insight, turning the particular situation to personal advantage and, with the exception of Col. BICKLER, increasing his circle of influential friends.

J. PLAN CAESAR:

53. It is requested that permission be granted this Unit to exploit GARRETTE as a D/A in the Japanese IS: this project to be carried out under the control of this Unit and, where necessary, by our colleagues in neutral countries.

54. On the basis of present interrogation GARRETTE possesses the necessary qualifications for a promising D/A:

- a. He has presumably the trust and confidence of the Jap IS.
- b. All information disclosed is confirmed from available sources.
- c. With our aid he can enter a neutral country and has the necessary cover-story and background to contact members of the Jap Embassy.
- d. GARRETTE is psychologically stable, having ability and initiative, which should enable him to develop and maintain a first-class penetration: particularly because his own future and interests depend on a successful mission.

55. A well-conceived plan should render any or all of the following advantages over the Japanese:

- a. A penetration of their espionage setup in Spain and Switzerland, including discovery of any Jap IS contacts in the Vatican.
- b. An opportunity to build up independent national networks in Italy and in neutral countries working into the Jap Service.
- c. Possibility of creating controlled W/T traffics to the Japs as well as opening a channel to their Service for the passage of forged documents which may in turn be passed by the Jap W/T control in unbroken ciphers to TOKYO. The clear text and the newly enciphered intercepted text would aid our "Y" people to break important traffics.

56. No detailed plan can be given until authority is first received permitting the employment of GARRETTE and the sealing off of HAON and LEWIS. With authorization to proceed, this office will work out the details with GARRETTE himself, whose methods of action and other characteristics must necessarily shape the nature of the operation, thereby defining its limitations and scope.

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57. It will not be difficult to manufacture a good cover-story for GARRETTE based essentially on the truth. GARRETTE can freely relate his travels from Germany to MILAN. In MILAN he perceived that the French authorities were arresting members of the MEERSBURG School and, therefore, knowing that he was "blown", his first inclination was to escape to Switzerland. This course of action he quickly abandoned, having noted the strong frontier control exercised by the Allies, and implemented by partisan brigades.

58. His only choice, therefore, was to make for the South, where there was a better chance to evade capture by obtaining aid from anti-de Gaullists or Fascists in the ROME area. He also entertained the idea of contacting the Spanish or Jap Minister to the Holy See for aid to eventually reach Spain. Bribing a Negro truck driver, he was taken during the night to ROME, where he remained hidden in a local pension.

59. It may be worthwhile for GARRETTE to factually present himself to a member of the Jap Legation to the Holy See to test the effects of MOTONO's letter and to request aid and instructions, if not temporary sanctuary. If the contact were successful, it may be possible for him to obtain papers or even a Vatican passport to enter Spain or Switzerland. Furthermore, if communication exists between the Jap Legation to the Holy See and its diplomatic representatives in Spain or Switzerland, a communication from the Jap Minister would serve to build up GARRETTE's bonafides. Any time lag in the cover-story could be attributed to the delay in ROME in discovering a means to contact the Jap Minister discreetly.

60. Another alternative which may prove most advantageous is to arrange the introduction of GARRETTE to this Unit's agent JK/004, a most trusted Italian police official who has worked closely with this office for a long period (during which time he has personally been responsible for the apprehension of over 30 enemy agents). JK/004 has spent many years of his life in France and speaks French fluently. By making him an old friend of GARRETTE who has always leaned towards the Fascist Party and is strongly anti-de Gaulle, JK/004 could serve as the reason for GARRETTE's coming to ROME. This would solve the problem of false documents easily available to

JK/004 as well as such matters as board and room, language difficulties, etc. JK/004's actual presence in ROME might serve another purpose in the event the future development of the plan necessitates a contact within easy reach of the Japanese Minister to the Holy See.

61. Depending on the choice of countries for GARRETTE's future work - e.g. Switzerland or Spain - the following alternatives are presented: By going factually to NAPLES and making inquiries as to employment on ships touching Spain, GARRETTE can gain first-hand knowledge of the difficulties in leaving Italy for abroad. Should his destination be Spain, this office will attempt to make the necessary arrangements for his departure. If the destination is to be Switzerland, through the aid of the Jap Minister to the Holy See or JK/004, the trip to NAPLES is unnecessary except for the purpose of giving factual background color to Subject which he can convincingly relate to the Japs in the Vatican, Switzerland or Spain.

62. GARRETTE's trip to Switzerland should be regarded merely as a contact point whereby he can gain an entree into the Jap service, perhaps relating what he has seen in NAPLES harbor as his first information. In Switzerland this Unit's representative could pass to GARRETTE a suitable D/A to be introduced by him into the Jap IS who, following GARRETTE's departure for Spain or Italy, can be used to instigate a separate penetration of the Jap IS in Switzerland.

63. There is a possible advantage that in going to Switzerland GARRETTE might encounter one of his Japanese friends from BERLIN who would vouch for his bonafide with no loss of time, giving GARRETTE the necessary entree.

64. The Jap Service in Switzerland may be in a position to facilitate GARRETTE's passage to Spain, depending on the means available to them. Failing this, having set up a penetration plan under the control of our Swiss representative, GARRETTE could make his way back to Italy and we would attempt to arrange his departure from NAPLES on a ship touching at some Spanish port.

65. In Spain GARRETTE's mission would be to follow the program outlined for Switzerland under the control of our Spanish representative.

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66. By factually enlisting JK/004 not only as GARRETTE's friend but as an ardent anti-de Gaullist and Fascist in great need of money, it would be possible to have JK/004 equipped with a W/T in ROME ready to transmit. Wherever GARRETTE made his effective contact with the Jap IS, he could state that JK/004 possessed a transmitter from the Fascist days and would signal at five-day intervals on agreed frequencies to establish a contact. This would offer us the opportunity to build up in Italy a notional network for a more intensive penetration of the Jap network. This W/T contact could also be developed as a controlled link between the Jap Legation to the Vatican and its Legation abroad, if other W/T communication does not exist. JK/004's presence and participation in the plan would offer GARRETTE an excuse to serve as courier for collecting documents, microfilms or for the bringing of funds necessary for JK/004's notional network.

67. As there is so much to gain in the execution of this plan, it is submitted that no deception should be injected into the channels of communication in order that the enemy regard GARRETTE with the greatest confidence. This Unit, as well as our representatives in Spain and Switzerland, is in a position to develop the individual contacts with the Jap IS, supplying the necessary intelligence and "high-grade" documents to induce the Jap IS to transmit in unbroken ciphers verbatim the text of documents supplied through our penetration.

68. Details as to the methods for controlling Subject in neutral countries can only be worked out after a definite course of action has been decided. However, letter-drops are available both in Switzerland and Spain whereby GARRETTE (with the use of secret writing) can notify our representatives of his arrival and in turn receive his instructions for a coordinated plan of action.

K. CONCLUSION:

69. There is little to lose in attempting this double-game with GARRETTE. He is a shrewd gambler who will take any risks (under present circumstances) to work his passage home. He is intelligent and capable and should be able to handle this calibre of assignment.

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70. GARRETTE is aware that we have the means to offer him a future asylum, depending on the success of the plan. Furthermore, by maintaining HAON, his closest friend, under our protection, there is partial guarantee against danger of GARRETTE attempting a triple cross.

71. Though participation from the DSM would have such obvious advantages as genuine documents, passage through France to Spain and an eventual pardon, it also presents certain inevitable risks. Having a DSM contact, GARRETTE might attempt to freeze us out, playing both ourselves and the Japs in behalf of the DSM. Furthermore, the DSM might refuse to permit the operation and insist that Subjects be delivered for trial. The point also is raised that an inclusion of the DSM will increase the circle of persons aware of the operation and consequently the risks of leakages or conflict on policy.

72. By excluding the French IS, GARRETTE will continue to regard the DSM as an ever-present danger and our own service as a sure sanctuary following the conclusion of the plan.

JAMES ANGLETON
1st Lieut., Inf.
SCI Units Z
Commanding

cc: SAINT Washington (2)
(2 copies personal to JJ001)
SAINT London (1)
(copy personal to Puritan)
CAESAR File (1)
File (1)

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