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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

23 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow ✓
Special Assistant to the President

The Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Further Views of Vice President Ky on
the Present Bombing Halt Negotiations

1. The following information was obtained on 23 October


a. After meeting with Ambassador Berger on 22 October, Vice President Ky described the bombing halt discussions with the U. S. mission as stalemated. Ky said that not only had the mission continued to oppose any face-saving GVN announcement of DRV concessions made to obtain a bombing halt, but Ambassador Berger went out of his way to indicate that no firm DRV concessions had in fact been offered.

b. Ky had a chance to talk to President Thieu while riding to the Supreme Court investiture on 22 October. Ky believes that Thieu is standing fast and is unlikely to concur in the U. S. position.

c. Ky believes the U. S. may announce an unconditional bombing halt without GVN assent. While he believes that such a rift between the two allies at this early stage would be most unfortunate, he continues to regard the compromise proposal he had earlier suggested to Ambassador Berger as the minimum acceptable GVN position. A GVN "surrender" now would set a dangerous precedent, encouraging the U. S. to try to override

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the GVN on future issues of even more vital interest to the Vietnamese. Allowing the U. S. to act on its own now and registering GVN dissent from the move would at least not handicap GVN freedom of action in the future.

2. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Thieu believes Ambassador Bunker may have engaged in a bit of duplicity. Supposedly Ambassador Porter told President Park of Korea that Thieu had accepted the bombing halt proposal at the same time that Ambassador Bunker was informing Thieu that Park had accepted it. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] perhaps based on a misreading of Thieu's usually placid initial reaction to any proposal, but information [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] seems to confirm that there is GVN malaise on this score.

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(b)(1)

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3. Prime Minister Huong's Press Director, Buu Nghi, who interpreted for the meeting, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the Korean Ambassador Shin Sang Chul told Huong on 21 October 1968 that Ambassador Porter told Park on 15 October 1968 that the GVN had already accepted a U. S. proposal for an unconditional bombing halt. Shin had been instructed by his government to confirm Ambassador Porter's statement with either Huong or Thieu. Huong took Shin's story to Thieu at once and now seems to believe that the USG was trying to dupe the GVN.

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