


24 January 1964

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WEEKLY SUMMARY

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C O N T E N T S

(Information as of 1200 EST, 23 January 1964)

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FRENCH RECOGNITION OF PEIPING	1
<p>The formal announcement may come next week, but an exchange of envoys will probably await resolution of French relations with Taiwan. Other governments are watching the three-way diplomatic maneuvering in the apparent hope that France will come up with an acceptable "two Chinas" solution.</p>	

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23 January 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY i

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FRENCH RECOGNITION OF PEIPING

France plans soon to announce formal recognition of the Chinese Communist Government, possibly by the first of next week [redacted]

[redacted] An exchange of diplomatic missions, however, will probably be held up pending a resolution of French relations with the Chinese Nationalist Government.

French officials profess to believe that Paris can recognize Peiping without admitting Chinese Communist rights to Taiwan and without the withdrawal of Taipei's representatives from Paris. Whether Paris really believes that it can exchange diplomatic missions and ultimately ambassadors with Peiping while retaining relations with Taipei is questionable. Little is known about the actual Paris-Peiping negotiations, however, and it cannot be excluded that additional agreements have been reached on specific points of mutual interest.

The Chinese Communists, playing for big stakes in the matter of French recognition are displaying a new diploma flexibility and have thus far remained silent in the face of Western press speculation concerning the "two Chinas" question. Peiping, however, has almost certainly not abandoned its claim to be the only legitimate government of China and thus to hold sovereignty over

Taiwan. It is therefore very unlikely to be willing to recognize even tacitly the existence of a separate government on Taiwan by agreeing to the existence of two embassies in Paris.

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Chinese willingness to avoid the issue temporarily probably reflects confidence that, while Paris need not break relations with Taipei at the time recognition of Peiping is announced, De Gaulle can be counted on to force a Nationalist withdrawal. Paris seems confident, however, that it is under no compulsion to push the Nationalists out if they do not break relations on their own volition.

The Chinese Nationalists continue to assert officially their unwillingness to maintain diplomatic relations with France if Paris recognizes Peiping. Taipei, however, may refrain from immediately severing relations with Paris, in the hope that Peiping would refuse to exchange diplomatic missions with France as long as the Nationalist mission remains in Paris.

Broad political factors appear to have induced the French to act at this time. De Gaulle probably sees a more rapid evolution of events in Southeast Asia opening the way for his favored neutral and independent status for the area, and he holds that Peiping's acquiescence is

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required to bring it about. Paris has long felt that the Chinese Communists, as the de facto government of a large and powerful state, have a legal right to recognition, and that the West can more effectively exploit Sino-Soviet differences if it is represented in both capitals. Finally, by taking this initiative, Paris is again demonstrating its own power on the world scene.

No other nation has announced an intention to follow the French lead at this time, although many are watching the three-way diplomatic maneuvering apparently in the hope that Paris can come up with an acceptable "two Chinas" solution. Canadian Prime Minister Pearson, who saw De Gaulle last week, indicated that Canada may take another look at its policy of nonrecognition if Taiwan's independence can be maintained, although another government official said that Canada would take no action prior to the US presidential elections.

Domestic political pressures for recognition of Peiping have increased in Belgium and Japan, but spokesmen for both nations say that they do not intend to recognize Peiping at this time.

[redacted] Paris has explicitly discouraged the 13 Paris-oriented states of the Afro-Malagasy Union (UAM) from recognizing Peiping, and that the French move probably will not set off a chain reaction of recognitions.

Several UAM states have already expressed their intention not to follow the French lead-- a position based on the dual considerations of showing their independence of France and maintaining relations with Taipei, which in three UAM states provides modest technical aid. Some of them, however, may be influenced toward eventual adoption of a "two Chinas" policy, or even abandonment of Taipei, by internal changes such as those which occurred in Congo (Brazzaville) and Dahomey last year.

Senegal alone of the UAM states has extended recognition to the Chinese Communists. This has not led to the establishment of diplomatic relations, however, because the Senegalese Government refused to break with Taipei-- which, in this instance, chose to stand fast. [redacted]

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