

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION RYBAT/SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. EGMA-56978
TO Chief, EE	INFO Chief of Station, Germany		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 32W-5-38/18 FF-UJRANDOM
FROM Munich Liaison Base	DATE 10 January 1962		RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
SUBJECT RYBAT UPHILL UJRANDOM Debriefing of []		MARKED FOR INDEXING	XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED FYI		INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY	

REFERENCE(S)
MUNI-9176

1. [] and his wife arrived in Munich the afternoon of 5 January and departed the evening of 7 January 1962. They stayed with [] [] was uneasy about being in Munich talking business with KUBARK, and requests that knowledge of the incident be restricted as far as possible. Although he is ever-willing to assist KUBARK when necessary and desirable, for purely personal reasons he does not want the word to get around that he has any connection with the intelligence business. Apparently his public relations firm has already lost a certain amount of official German Government business because it is a matter of record somewhere in Bonn that he is suspected of being an American intelligence officer. We told him we would certainly respect his wishes in this matter.

2. [] was briefed as follows: UJDROWSY and UJDRUM were arrested in early November 1961. Both of them have confessed working for the KGB since about 1950. Neither one of them is talking very much, but it is apparent that both of them worked industriously for their masters. He was told that unfortunately we could not satisfy his curiosity as to how these people were apprehended. He was told certain other things as the need arose, and these are duly noted where appropriate in the text of this dispatch.

3. In order to assist his memory after almost 5 years removal from the scene, he was permitted to read his contact reports and memoranda for the record on UJDROWSY and UJDRUM. He was also shown certain [] cards which contained no data more recent than of the time of his departure from Munich. He had two meetings with [] and was told we were most interested in any thoughts he might have, based on his experience in Munich, concerning the identities and/or locations of other existing penetrations of UPHILL and the German Government. He put the following comments on paper. These comments are interspersed with our own remarks which are based in part on discussions held with [] -- the two meetings mentioned above, plus several lengthy talks with []

A. "Herewith some random comments, based primarily on instinct and intuition, rather than on anything concrete. It must be borne in mind that these remarks come after a disassociation from the subject matter of more than four and a half years.

B. "UJDROWSY. For what it's worth, I am not, in retrospect, particularly surprised at the revelations, although I must obviously grudgingly admire the skill with which he carried out his dual functions. Knowing the man, I am sure that he was not content with the obvious role that seems indicated at the moment on the surface. I would rather tend to think that, given the now-known fact of his overriding loyalty to the East, he used all the powers and resources at his disposal to further the cause as he saw it. For that reason, I think that the following institutions should be closely scrutinized for UJDROWSY recruited agents in place: UPHILL (of course), the Bundeskanzleramt, the Auswaertigesamt, the Bundespresseamt, the SG, the BFV. It would be my contention that UJDROWSY used the ample freedom granted him by his job to contact, assess, and then recruit key personnel in each of the above. He is a painstaking worker. As a principal agent for the KGB, I would certainly assume that his loyalty to his masters was slavish, and that his devotion to their cause was exclusive; concomitantly, that he would devote his entire, not inconsiderable talent to furthering Eastern interests.

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(Munich Comment: During one of the discussion periods, [] admitted that UJDROWSY probably did not perform a recruiting function, but acted only as a spotter and assessor. His reasoning that UJDROWSY might also have recruited for the KGB is based on his personal assessment of UJDROWSY; i.e., that UJDROWSY would go farther than necessary in being a good KGB agent. Be that as it may, it does not really matter whether UJDROWSY was a recruiter or a spotter and assessor. The fact remains that most likely, because of UJDROWSY, the KGB has agents in some or all of the aforementioned federal offices. His reasoning is based not only on the fact that UJDROWSY has been extremely active over the years in the Bonn/Koeln area, but on his analysis of the LENA case.)

C. "It seems necessary to have as precise a rundown on the modus operandi involved in Fall LENA as possible. Lacking details, of course, I would be inclined to think from my dated knowledge that this operation was the key to UJDROWSY's actual activities, since it provided excellent cover for the transmittal of information, gave those concerned considerable mobility, and was, in UPHILL's eyes as of four years ago, a prize specimen. During my time, UJDROWSY demonstrated considerable freedom of access to and knowledge about some of Bonn's most sensitive offices. For instance, in LENA there were times when personnel who were key in the Bundeskanzleramt, the Bundespresseamt and the Foreign Office were mentioned. On a number of occasions, UJDROWSY actually interceded with the authorities for one reason or another, in order to keep LENA -- or so we at that time thought -- rolling along. I am quite sure that he had access to GLOBKE, for instance. I know also that on at least one occasion, he talked directly to a secretary in the Bundeskanzleramt. If we can take LENA as any kind of indication of what interests the Soviets -- not that one needs this guidance -- have, the abovementioned offices would certainly be of prime concern. And in his guise as a highly thought-of UPHILL officer, UJDROWSY would be a welcome visitor at any of the above. If we can in any way locate his contacts in these offices, it might provide a valuable clue for unearthing further penetrations -- which I think have to be assumed. It is interesting to note also that he is in SG custody. SAEVECKE, for instance, was a close acquaintance and perhaps a 'Dutzfreund'.

D. "UPHILL. Speculation is always possible, and sometimes rewarding, given the limited extent of my knowledge of the current circumstances and my sometimes vague recollections. At Headquarters, of those whom I knew, I would tend to suspect that if any of UJDROWSY's associates were tainted, they would be among the following: (This feeling is based on my memory of his own personal relationships with his colleagues.) While I would intuitively tend to think of @KUTZBACH as 'clean', I couldn't say the same about @HERMANN. HERMANN and UJDROWSY worked closely together over a considerable period of time. I have recently been told that HERMANN has moved from his former position, allegedly as a result of a squabble with UJDROWSY. If UJDROWSY had recruited HERMANN, and if he were in any way suspicious that he might be for the hurdles, what better way to attempt to divert suspicion than to manufacture a quarrel. I felt at the time of my tenure that HERMANN was to a considerable extent under the spell of UJDROWSY. At the moment, that feeling is even stronger -- if only in my nasty mind. Of the others in the Headquarters CE staff -- as of 1957 -- I should like to know a lot more about @Dr. HERDER. He has deep emotional feelings about the 20th of July, and even collaborated on a book about it. He is highly and articulately critical of present-day Western Germany. It is perhaps significant that he did an apprenticeship in the field under the tutelage of UJDRUM. He is a highly individualistic intellectual to whom a correctly phrased, intelligent, emotional and ideological appeal might be irresistible. For reasons that I can't properly explain, I should also think that @REIMER might be worth some scrutiny. I would assume that UJDROWSY would have been interested in recruiting the younger and more upcoming members of UPHILL. REIMER fits this category. Although I knew him only in passing, I have a peculiar feeling about him. @GREGOR might be another candidate, although again, I have no definite reason for fingering him. Of the others, either my knowledge is too skimpy, or time has erased the impressions that I had in 1957.

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(Munich Comment: The idea of Dr. HERDER being a KGB agent is an intriguing one, and as far as we can tell from the record, [] knew him better than any other KUBARK staffer. What [] does not know is that Dr. HERDER had been carping about UJDROWSY and Fall LENA for long before UJDROWSY was arrested. This fact should not, however, lead us to discount him out of hand. UPHILL has put out the story that Dr. HERDER suspected something was wrong with LENA and UJDROWSY, but they have not really been explicit about what he really suspected. In conversations [] has had with @STURM and @LUECKRATH, they have indicated that HERDER was positive the LENA case was controlled by the Soviets and that the only explanation for some of the strange happenings in the case is that something was wrong with UJDROWSY. HERDER did not necessarily conclude that UJDROWSY was working for the Soviets, but that he was fraudulent in his handling of the case. We plan to comment at greater length on Dr. HERDER in a separate dispatch. We would tend to discount [] suspicion of @REIMER, but as [] said, he did not know him very well. [] view that UJDROWSY would be interested in looking at the younger and more promising UPHILL staffers is however a valid point for us to keep in mind. Dr. HERDER would, of course, fall into this category.)

E. "Turning to the field, and specifically the UJDRUM relationship, I should very much like to know what the brethren are doing about @SCHUSTER. If a communality of background is any connection or indication, @SCHUSTER is certainly in the most exposed position -- he and UJDROWSY and UJDRUM are old friends from the war. @SCHUSTER was UJDRUM's boss, and was, officially at least, the link between UJDRUM and UJDROWSY. Even if innocent of any Eastern connections, he certainly could shed some interesting light on the entire complex. Purely as a matter of course, I would also want to keep a wary eye on the other identified members of the @SCHUSTER operation, as outlined in my EGLA-21494 of 21 November 1956, specifically @Walter LUDWIG (V-2070), @Gerhard SCHULZ (V-1401), and @REUTER (V-15400). It would probably be an impossible task, but it might be rewarding, if possible, to investigate the entire range of contacts established by the @SCHUSTER-UJDRUM echelon. Both have a common background with hundreds, if not thousands, of officials who are certain to be in relatively key positions in such bodies as the Land or Municipal police, the customs, LfV's, etc. I remember at one time picking up a remark that both @SCHUSTER and UJDRUM were actively searching out old colleagues in positions of authority, who could be of assistance to them in establishing their new-born Cologne operation.

(Munich Comment: UPHILL is, of course, looking into @SCHUSTER, but we are not as yet aware of what progress, if any, they have made. It is interesting to note that UJDRUM has already indicated in his interrogation that the KGB had been very interested in recruiting @SCHUSTER, and that they doubted it would be a difficult task. They asked UJDRUM to do it for them, and allegedly he refused. It should be noted here that as far as we can tell from the record -- and from our conversations with [] is the one KUBARK officer who had personal contact with all three of these gentlemen -- UJDROWSY, UJDRUM and @SCHUSTER. He saw all of them fairly frequently, and was fairly conversant with their operations. Unfortunately a great deal of what [] says he wrote for the record on his various dealings, including business trips, with these persons has somehow disappeared from MLB files. At least, the undersigned has never been able to locate it. Naturally [] would have great difficulty in reconstructing a clear picture of this complex at this late date. [] recalls that when his contact with @SCHUSTER was broken, @SCHUSTER gave him recontact instructions to be used in the event KUBARK had some reason for wanting to get back in contact with him. These are not available and [] cannot remember the details. As a rather humorous aside, [] recalls that on one of his frequent trips to North Germany with UJDROWSY, they were forced to stop driving rather late in the evening in order to get some sleep before proceeding. They stopped in a small village where the only Gasthaus had only one bed available. [] says this was a rather un-nerving experience at the time, and even more so in retrospect.)

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F. "Although I am told that GISKES is no longer active in the field of intelligence, it is possible that UJDROWSY used him to some extent, although this is purely intuitive. The connection would be the wartime one, i.e., Nordpole.

G. "As a side note, and although I am not really qualified to discuss it, I should also like to know considerably more about the relationships between UJDROWSY and the members of the headquarters or field staffs concerned with the overall positive Soviet operations scene. In this connection, I do not think that @CAESAR can be discounted.

(Munich Comment: [] recommends that if we are interested in delving into this aspect, it would be worth our while to talk to [] This might well be a fertile area of investigation, and we plan at sometime in the future to talk to him.)

H. "I am afraid that at the moment this is about the total of what I can contribute in the field of speculation. I hope that it is of some use in trying to uncover the labyrinth that I am sure UJDROWSY was able to establish in his long period of successful operation."

4. It is interesting to note that [] as an intuitive thinker (and personal contact of UJDROWSY, UJDRUM, and @SCHUSTER) came up with many of the right answers. He has promised to think more about the problem, and should he have any additional thoughts he might deem of value to us, he will communicate with [] He said that although he would be hesitant to do so, he would be willing to assist in any unilateral investigation we might wish to undertake, and for this purpose he would be willing to undergo LCFLUTTER for a new clearance. He was told that we did not foresee that this would be necessary, and he was visibly relieved. Precisely what he meant by unilateral investigation is discussed below.

5. [] asked if we really felt that UPHILL will tenaciously proceed with their investigation of their own organization, and whether they will see that the other obvious areas of penetration of the German Government are given close attention. It is his view that UPHILL will be inclined to minimize the extent of the damage, and will sweep certain items under the rug. He was told that thus far we have gotten a fair shake from UPHILL, and that as of now we have every reason to believe UPHILL will let the chips fall where they may in their investigation. HANLON is absolutely unconvinced of this, and for this reason made his statement about unilateral action, i.e., if the Germans are not going to do their duty, it is important enough for us to do it for them.

6. We would like to re-emphasize his request that his talk with us not become common knowledge. He also requests that his contact with KUBARK be restricted to [] He comes to Germany on business frequently, and it would be no problem for him to route himself through Munich should it be necessary for him to impart additional thoughts to us. We feel the present exercise definitely was worthwhile.

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