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ABSTRACT	
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Conversations with UTILITY, 24/25 September 1961.

1. Apart from the main matter that UTILITY took up here (discussed by Robert A. Ascham in DIR 13959), by far the most important subject reviewed was that of paramilitary operations. [ ] opened the subject at Ascham's house Sunday evening with a very strong and persuasive statement which covered both the need for standby paramilitary assets and the techniques that we have thus far found most useful in operations in Southeast Asia. [ ] and I followed up on Monday with a somewhat more detailed review of what we consider the need to be and the way to handle this requirement in Europe. In brief, we de-emphasized the paramilitary concept insofar as this suggests the establishment of contact with and leadership of resistance forces. Should these ever develop in East Germany on any scale, it would most likely occur in the presence of military operations. It is our view that this very exacting and large-scale operation is normally a defense undertaking both within the German and the American framework. We can support it but we cannot alone be responsible for it. So, therefore, concentrated on the reconnaissance team concept which is outlined in DIR 14945 dated 28 September. One sidelight which I found interesting was UTILITY's statement that what they really needed was another Brandenburg regiment, but on a smaller scale.

2. Ascham took up the WIDOWSKY matter on his own initiative late Sunday afternoon while he and UTILITY were having a private session. It is a little unclear to me whether UTILITY changed his mind about using our people for the illegal entry operation at that moment or whether, as he later protested, the conversations that had taken place in Karlsruhe had led him to the conclusion that illegal entry should only be undertaken on the basis of a proper warrant. In any case, in his talk with me about this subject he made it perfectly clear that he is no longer planning to undertake illegal entry. He went on to say

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that he would like to clear up the case sometime this fall and that he would use the polygraphs (not because he believes in such a wonderful machine but because he thinks it has a good psychological effect). He was most outgoing in expressing his thanks for the support we had given him in this case.

3. The change in STILWELL's thinking regarding the illegal entry was most welcome from our point of view since Ascham had come to the firm conclusion that he doesn't want to consider the risk involved in carrying out the illegal entry plan. This decision by Ascham is the background for SIR 14010 (the non-approval of surreptitious examination of UJWORSKY's car) and the explanation for the change from the position we took in DIR 10688 (approving our participation in the illegal entry of UJWORSKY's house).

4. I asked STILWELL to try to think of cases that could be used publicly in mounting a propaganda campaign in response to the recurring charges that West Germans and the Allies use Berlin as an espionage and sabotage center. He wrote this request down in a little notebook and will be prepared, I am sure, to discuss it further with you. Please follow up.

5. Our conversation about political reporting followed the same lines that previous conversations have followed. I emphasized the trouble we are having defending the reputation of STILWELL's organization in the light of the reporting that is given to us. He said that in this field he had authorized the release of reports to us directly from collection and before they had gone through evaluation. It takes two days to evaluate a report and in the interest of speed and timeliness he promised we would still want to get his political reporting as promptly as possible. I emphasized that it is most necessary to differentiate between reports that come from reliable sources and others. He replied that his people had made this distinction by sourcing reports as "A-G." (Clearly we find more that is dubious in the heap than they do, including "B" and "C" reports.) He then went on to a discussion of the harm that it does having these reports float around in the German government and among the Allies. He talked about duplication and false confirmation. I said that we would be coming forward with a plan to reduce duplication and ward against false confirmation but I emphasized that we would also want to work with him in devising a reports format that would bring more clearly to the reader's attention the distinction that we draw between adequately sourced reports and those that can be regarded as little more than rumor. He concluded that this is a problem that could not be solved within an hour and that therefore we would be in touch with him further in seeking solutions.

6. Having gone into this matter carefully I must say that there appears to be room for more imaginative and helpful work on the part of our own reports officers. On the one hand there seems to be a rather touching reliance on the F-9 warning signal. In plain fact, these reports are read by non-intelligence personnel and our private system of signals about reliability of source and presumed authenticity of content means very little. This forces us into the rather ridiculous situation of wanting to do everything to insure that STILWELL continues to give us all or most of his reports on the one hand and being embarrassed about their reception by our customers on the other. Would it not be possible to have the first sentence or so of a report clearly indicate

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