### WEST GERMANY'S ECONOMIC INTEREST IN FREE ASIA

Bonn's growing economic interest in the non-Communist countries of South Asia and the Far East is reflected in Vice Chancellor Erhard's trip through the area from 3 October to 8 November. Erhard has a new plan for expanding German markets in



ERHARD

underdeveloped areas which would increase West Germany's expenditures for technical assistance but would emphasize the promotion of private investments abroad, mainly through establighment of a \$420,000,000 government fund to guarantee private investors against the risks of currency exchange fluctuations and political instability.

## Asian Trade

Although the non-Communist countries of the Far East and South Asia account for only 7 percent of Bonn's trade, exports to that area increased 32 percent from \$551,000,000 in 1956 to \$730,600,000 in 1957. Over the same period, exports to the Western European area increased only about 13 percent. German exports to Japan almost doubled in 1957 and exports to India increased 36 percent. In contrast, German exports to France rose by only 15 percent and exports to the Netherlands -- Bonn's leading market -- increased only 12 percent. Prior to Erhard's de-parture, Bonn's leading foreign trade journal characterized German trade with Europe as "stagnating" as a result of the recent economic slowdown and attributed the increases in total German foreign trade primarily to expanded trading with "the developing countries."

Bonn's increasing exports to free Asia, however, have not

## SECRET

PART III

PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES

Page 5 of 12

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B NAZIWAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT. DATE 2006

### CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

20 November 1958

been compensated by an increase in imports. Because of exchange shortages in this area, West Germany is becoming a large creditor for this area as well as for Europe. One of Erhard's purposes was to investigate means by which "the developing countries" could increase exports to Bonn.

## Erhard's Trip

Erhard's five-week journey, which followed his attendance as Bonn's principal representative at the New Delhi meeting of the International Monetary Fund, took him to Burma, Thailand, South Vietnam, South Korea, Japan, and Pakistan, as well as India. While describing his trip as a "fact-finding" mission, he frequently pointed out that Bonn would consider grants in aid only in exceptional cases. He recommended that private foreign investment be sought to improve the quality of raw material exports. This would stimulate a demand for these materials in the industrialized countries.


Rrhard repeatedly stressed that the developing countries

in Asia could not expect investments by private German firms without some assurances that German experts could exercise managerial control. He openly criticized restrictions against foreign investors holding more than half of the capital of their corporations. In connection with protection of foreign investments, Erhard pointed to confiscated German assets which are still frozen. He has been under pressure from many German investors to settle this question before they will consider expanding overseas investments. In India and Burma, Erhard received assurances that German assets would be returned.

## The Erhard Plan

Prior to his departure, Erhard indicated the broad outline of a new German economic policy toward the developing areas. He will apparently use the high-level discussions which he held during the trip as the basis for formulating the details of the "Erhard Plan" for presentation to the legislature.

The plan is consistent with Erhard's economic philosophy of



**SECRET** 

...**v** 

## SECRET

### CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

20 November 1958

encouraging private initiative placing government in a secondary but effective supporting role. As a first step Bonn would extend the government-sponsored insurance guarantee on export credits to include guarantees against political risks on private investments abroad. Acting through the Hermes Credit Insurance Corporation, Bonn's guarantee would apply to over 80 percent of the value of the transaction.

ماريون والمارية

Erhard indicated that the government would establish a \$420,000,000 fund for these guarantees. The fund would prob- | aroused no enthusiasm in busiably be raised by floating a loan on the German market at an attractive interest rate.

Under the plan Bonn would also consider government-togovernment financial aid, although Erhard prefers to consider only loans and no outright gifts. The pattern for this program has been established in India and more recently in Greece.

Thailand During Erhard's stay in New Delhi, he Other confirmed Bonn's intention of granting India a \$100,000,000 development loan, repayable starting in 1964. During Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis' visit to Bonn, Athens was granted \$71,600,000 in economic aid, including a direct loan of \$47,000,000. Bonn will also continue its bilateral programs of technical assistance grants, which to date total \$23,-000,000, in addition to contributions to the UN Technical Assistance Fund. Immediately after his return to Bonn, Erhard called for an increase in Bonn's budget for technical assistance from \$12,000,000 to \$48,000,000.

Under the Erhard plan, the primary emphasis in government aid will continue to be on multilateral financing through international or regional institutions. To date Bonn has contributed or committed about three billion dollars to international organizations for foreign economic assistance, compared with about \$800,000,000 in economic assistance outside of these organizations.

Although German industry has been seeking government guarantees of foreign investment for some time, the Erhard plan has

#### WEST GERMAN TRADE WITH ASIA (MILLION DOLLARS)

UNCLASSIFIED 1954 1957 IMPORTS EXPORTS EXPORTS Afghanistan 7.8 15.2 9.2 4.6 14.5 Burnia 12.1 8.0 12.6 Ceylon Nationalist China 6.8 3.2 8.0 2.9 Communist China 47.6 41.2 37.1 53.2 268.4 73.9 60.1 India 195.4 45.1 79.7 **Ind**onesia 68.3 77.7 111.7 Japan 61.9 28.6 54.4 .9 Cambodia 1.7 1.0 2.3 1.3 Laos 2.0 South Vietnam .8 17.0 9.5 63.2 30.1 52.7 30.0 Malaya/Singapore 39.4 31.4 51.7 29.6 28.7 Pakistan 19.5 45.4 27.3 Philippines 21.8 7.2 27.4 8.6 South Korea 13.7 1.5 16.2 .9 22.0 24.5 21.6 31.2 397.2 730.6 433.0 551.4 TOTAL

20 NOVEMBER 1958

ness circles. Economic observers have pointed out that private German capital for foreign investment is limited by the financial burdens resulting from World War II, such as the London Debt Agreement and the restitution to Nazi victims, as well as by the burden of German re-

## Political Implications

West Germany's political ambitions in Asia are relatively

# **SECRET**

### CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

20 November 1958

modest. Erhard's trip was primarily oriented toward strengthening economic ties in the area. Bonn officials regard the Far East as an area too remote for exerting a decisive influence on the main German political problems, such as unification. Bonn's intention is to build up a reserve of good will in the area by expanding investments and technical aid while at the same time securing considerable economic advantage in terms of increased trade. German officials feel it is in Bonn's interest to maintain good relations with non-European countries, looking toward

the day when there might be an international commission on the German problem.

In the context of the cold war, however, Bonn now seems more inclined to play an active role in competing with Soviet bloc countries in the less developed areas. Erhard has publicly stressed that Europe has a vital interest in demonstrating to these areas that development of a "liberal" aconomic system offers a more attractive way of raising the standard of living than the totalitarian methods of the Communist bloc, particularly Communist China. (CONFIDENTIAL)