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
AMT VI of the RSHA

Gruppe VI C

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Gruppe VI C

Preamble.

Gruppe VI C has certain unique features among the Laendergruppen of Amt VI; it was the only Gruppe to retain the same designation throughout its history, suffering in addition less territorial modification than any other Gruppe, as it was since its creation responsible for the Far East and the USSR, the only changes being that it surrendered the Baltic States to Amt III in the course of 1941, balanced by the absorption in the same year of the Near and Middle East from the then Gruppe VI D. The Gruppe covered the widest sphere of all the Laendergruppen and from the start of the Russian campaign was the most important in the Amt for immediate operational purposes. As a result of the changing fortunes in the war on the Eastern Front, the Gruppe underwent frequent internal re-organization, especially in the last year of its existence when the changes were so frequent and so sweeping as to be difficult to unravel. Nor is it surprising that as its spheres of interest offered so few points of contact with the Western Allies except in the Middle East, comparatively little was known of the Gruppe, even at the final collapse. What is now known of the activities of Gruppe VI C in Eastern Europe and in the Far East has been learned only since the surrender, and that information is largely confined to the later years with the result that there are still many gaps in our present knowledge, which gaps are not likely to be filled to any great extent. The following review of the development of Gruppe VI C must therefore be read with these reservations in mind.

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PART I - THE DEVELOPMENT OF GRUPPE VI C 1939-45

A. The Situation at the Outbreak of War.

1. The General Position of Amt VI.

Overriding any particular considerations which affected the course of Amt VI activity in the different territories under review was the general position of the Amt on its creation in 1939. It has been pointed out in the Liquidation Report on Gruppe VI E that only in the case of that Gruppe was there any previous activity on the part of the old SD-Hauptamt which lent itself to immediate development in the creation of the new Amt. It must ever be borne in mind that the Auslandsnachrichtendienst was a new venture on the part of the SD, and prior to the outbreak of war no groundwork had been established in any theatre in Europe or outside it, apart from Eastern and especially South-Eastern Europe. The Amt began its work therefore under enormous initial disadvantages, which were in no way alleviated by the attitude of the Abwehr and the Foreign Office, nor by the weakness of the first Amtschef, JOST. An added complication was the shortage of personnel with the necessary background and knowledge of foreign countries - a factor of special importance in dealing with Gruppe VI C in so far as it dealt with countries such as Japan, China, the Dutch East Indies, Turkey, Syria, etc. In approaching the question of Amt VI operations in such territory therefore, one must not look for any prepared plan at the outbreak of war; such plans simply did not exist. The German principle of concentrating on one point at a time applied equally well in its intelligence as in its military operations. The Schwerpunkt in the first years of the war was remote from the Far and Middle East, and it was not until the summer of 1941 that Gruppe VI C became important as a result of the Russian campaign. Characteristically enough the main effort of the Gruppe was concentrated then on "Unternehmen Zeppelin". When that effort failed it was too late to exploit other territory such as Persia and Turkey to remedy the deficiency.

2. The Creation of Gruppe VI C in 1939.

The original Gruppe VI C which was a small one had a simple internal organisation on the following lines:-

<u>Gruppenleiter</u>		<u>Stubaf</u> ^V <u>VIETINGHOFF-SCHEEL</u>
<u>Referat</u>		<u>Referent</u>
VI C 1	Russia.	Hastuf WESTERNHAGEN
VI C 2	Baltic States.	Ostuf FOELKERSAM
VI C 3	Far East.	Maschaf HINNEY

The Gruppe had few personnel and had no Aufträge outside of Germany, for reasons which are self-evident, in view of the territory allotted to it. Little is known of its activities at this early stage, but it is not difficult to appreciate the situation with which the Gruppe was faced. It is to be noted that Turkey and the Near East did not come under the control of the Gruppe but were dealt with at that time by Gruppe VI D. (See Appendix I)

3. Referat VI C 1 and Russia.

In Russia the Foreign Office under Ribbentrop had just brought off its greatest triumph in the signing of the non-aggression pact which had temporarily removed the threat from the East and allowed the Army to concentrate on Poland. Ideologically speaking, however, the two countries were still diametrically opposed, and the situation was generally delicate enough for the Foreign Office to take a strong

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line against any attempt by the new and much scorned Amt VI to indulge in any activity which might jeopardise an uneasy truce. In any case the purely physical barriers imposed by the strict Russian security measures made it virtually impossible for JOST to introduce any representatives into the country under any cover, apart from diplomatic, which could only have been obtained with Foreign Office approval, and in that connection it is safe to say that it would have been easier for JOST to pass a camel through the eye of a needle. Amt VI therefore had no direct lines into Russia itself, an achievement it shared with the Abwehr at the time, as at a meeting between the SD and Abwehr representatives held at Prague in early 1940, it was stated that not one single source of information was available to the GIS in Russia itself. It should be noted however that before and after the creation of the RSHA, the Gestapoamt had been active in its security functions against the USSR.

Early Amt VI work against Russia was therefore conducted entirely from outside the country, and in the original organisation of Amt VI was not directly controlled by Gruppe VI C. It has been explained in the Liquidation Report on Gruppe VI A that under that Gruppe in the period 1939-40 were the Beauftragte controlling the Amt VI Referenten in the SD-Abschnitt throughout Germany. ~~Stubb~~ *SALISCH held the position of Beauftragter III Ost, and in this capacity controlled the following Amt VI Referenten at their respective SD-Lokalabschnitte:-

* SD-Lokalabschnitt Danzig	Haupt	ROEBB (later Beauftragter Finland.)
* " " MomeL	Ustuf	KURMIS (later of Unternehmen ANTON in Iran.)
* " " Kottowice	Ustuf	MATYSIAK
* " " Königsberg	Ustuf	LIST
* " " Pommern	Ustuf	WEIRAUCH (later Referent VI C 4.)
* " " Breslau	Haupt	KLEINERT (later of Gruppe VI A)
* KdS Cracow	Haupt	KIPKA (later Abt VI Bds Lwow).

The function of these Referenten was the collection of information regarding Russia from the interrogation of travellers and merchant seamen passing between the two countries; their reports were sent to Amt VI with copies to SALISCH at Blomberg. The Referenten maintained close liaison between themselves and held regular conferences at Blomberg under SALISCH. This activity continued until September 1940 when SALISCH was relieved of his position. (SALISCH later became Polizei Praesident in Blomberg and was shot by the Germans in February 1945 as a result of his desire to surrender Blomberg to the Russians), and thereafter the Referenten acted independently and more positively by attempting to establish their own contacts with suitable personalities in commercial, industrial, and scientific circles. It need hardly be said of course that operations of this type did not produce much intelligence of any value.

4. Referat VI C 2 and the Baltic States.

Little is known of the work of Referat VI C 2; it is to be presumed however that this Referat based its work on the former activity of the Blockstelle Tilsit which had been created in 1938 when the first attempts at an Auslandsnachrichtendienst were made. The Blockstelle had been under the command of Stubaf GRAEFE who was to become Gruppenleiter VI C by 1941 and the most important figure in the history of the Gruppe. It is to be noted however that JOST did not appoint any Hauptbeauftragter to the Baltic States, again no

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doubt owing to the influence of Russia, whose interest in that sphere had become most direct after the Polish campaign and the resulting partition in Eastern Europe. The exception was the posting of Hauptstuf SCHOENEHECK to Finland, later to be replaced by Hauptstuf BROHS. Finland however eventually passed to Gruppe VI D as a Scandinavian country, and the activities of BROHS there are dealt with in the Liquidation Report on that Gruppe.

5. Referat VI C 3 and the Far East.

Japan, as one of the Tripartite Powers, was in a position similar to that of Italy, where the Fuehrerbefehl prevented any open Amt VI activity until the Italian collapse. Espionage activities against Japan were therefore not officially encouraged, but even apart from that major consideration the position of Amt VI as far as the Far East was concerned was one where the normal difficulties facing the other Laendergruppen were greatly accentuated. The SD had no previous activity or even interest in that sphere which Amt VI could develop, while the personnel problem itself was insuperable. If it was difficult for the much more immediately important Gruppe VI D (VI G at the time under review) to find officers with sufficient background knowledge of the U.K. and the U.S.A. to set about its task with any competence, Gruppe VI C had little chance of improving on that state of affairs. Indeed it was not until the major reorganisation of the Gruppe in the summer of 1944 that any specialists in the Far East were introduced into the Gruppe. The liaison between the two Allies was at the best an official one, and the racial and ethnological differences between them was such as to create a lack of interest except in the military sphere. In any case the Far East was too remote from Germany for any special effort to be directed in that direction. Information on the Far East, including China and the Dutch East Indies, was obtained through official channels from the Japanese; no Amt VI representatives were sent to that theatre, the only RSHA representation being through the appointment in 1942 of the Polizei Attache, MEISINGER, a Bavarian friend of MUELLER, and quite incompetent from the intelligence point of view. It is significant that at this early stage, the Referat for the Far East was a mere Unterscharfuhrer.

6. Changes before the Summer of 1941.

Before the major change in the Gruppe took place with the start of the Russian campaign in June 1941, there were several changes of a minor character, with however only slight significance. VIETINGHOFF-SCHEEL had been replaced by Hauptstuf VOLLHEIM as Gruppenleiter, VOLLHEIM later to be involved in the alleged financial scandal round JOST, which was to be used for an excuse for the latter's removal from Amt VI by the summer of the year. The Far-Eastern Referat had been strengthened by the appointment of Hauptstuf WEIRAUCH as Referat. Apart from these changes, the general character of the Gruppe remained unchanged, though the preparations for the Russian campaign had prompted some intensification of effort against that country, but mainly through the Amt VI Referat of the Vertrabschnitt Wien, which had succeeded in establishing certain contacts with Hungary and Roumania as bases. The situation however changed entirely in the summer of 1941.

B. Developments after the beginning of the Russian Campaign

1. Reorganisation of the Gruppe

The turning point in the history of Gruppe VI C came in the summer of 1941 as a result of several independent factors. There was of course the Russian campaign which resulted in a concentration of effort against that country, and which led to the creation of Unternehmen ZEPPELIN, the most intense and coordinated effort undertaken by any Laendergruppe of Amt VI. The Gruppe for that reason

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alone became the most important in the Amt, and the degree of coordination of work between Amt VI and the armies in the field reached a level which was not paralleled in any other theatre of war. The Unternehmen Zeppelin, which is dealt with in Part II, had certain novel features not met with elsewhere in the Amt. Almost simultaneous with the beginning of the campaign was the virtual accession of SCHELLENBERG as Amtschef with the resultant clearing out of JOST's Old Brigade, which in Gruppe VI C involved the dismissal of VOLLHEIM and the appointment of GRAEFE. A further important feature was the assimilation of Turkey and the Near East from Gruppe VI D and Gruppe VI E, while with the rapid occupation of the Baltic States, that territory passed over to the control of Amt III, though the Gruppe still retained interest.

2. The Influence of GRAEFE.

The effect of GRAEFE's appointment as Gruppenleiter was greater than that of SCHELLENBERG as Amtschef. GRAEFE had been Leiter of the Blockstelle Tilsit in 1938, and was subsequently head of the SD-Unterabschnitt there until 1940, but it is not clear what his position was in Amt VI prior to his appointment as Gruppenleiter VI C. It is known that in 1940 he had been connected with the then Gruppe VI G, acting for a spell as Referent for the U.K., and even as Gruppenleiter in place of the incompetent DAUFELDT soon after SCHELLENBERG's arrival. His interest however was in the East, and with his appointment as Gruppenleiter VI C that interest was granted full scope. GRAEFE was a man of considerable ability and enterprise and it was chiefly due to his direction that the Gruppe developed considerably in the course of the following year, especially in the Unternehmen Zeppelin. His main effort was directed against Russia, and to a lesser extent in the Near East as a base for further activity against that country. His pet plan was the creation of a decentralised German control in the Ukraine, an enterprise which met with little support in the Foreign Office. The subsequent development of Gruppe VI C revolves very largely round the personality of GRAEFE.

3. Organisation in 1941.

The Gruppe before the end of the year 1941 was reorganised on the following lines:-

<u>Gruppenleiter</u>	<u>Stubaf GRAEFE</u>
<u>Referat</u>	<u>Referent</u>
VI C 1 Russian and Baltic States	Reiz Bat GERGENROHN
VI C 3 Ukraine	Hastuf DRECHTER
VI C 4-6 Japan	
VI C 7-8 China	
VI C 9 Manchukuo and Mongolia	Hastuf WEERAUCH
VI C 10 Thailand and French Indo-China	
VI C 11 Dutch Indies and Philippines	
VI C 12 Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan	Hastuf SCHUBACK
VI C 13 The Arab countries	Ang. EM

It will be noted that VI C 1 and VI C 2 were merged together, while GRAEFE's interest in the Ukraine was manifest by the creation of a special Referat VI C 3 to deal with that territory. The many subdivisions in the Far Eastern territory did not however indicate any increased activity in that sphere, as is evidenced by the fact that the Referat had a common Referent.

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4. The Near East Prior to Gruppe VI C Control.

(a) The General position at the outbreak of war:-

No special importance had been attached to the Near and Middle East as a theatre of espionage activity by Amt VI in the early days of the war, in spite of the obvious advantages offered by Turkey as a neutral country from which special efforts could be directed against the fertile field that the Arab speaking countries offered for espionage and subversion. There was no subtle reason for this lack of interest, and it is not necessary to go any further than the general weakness and inefficiency of the Amt as a whole to appreciate the situation. There was no well defined Amt VI policy regarding the Near East and the difficulties of personnel, training, and background must always be borne in mind. It was not until the summer of 1940 that the Amt made its first efforts at penetration in the Near and Middle East, and these efforts bore all the hall-marks of JOST's haphazard and normally futile methods, though curiously enough in this theatre the developments turned out better than Amt VI direction of affairs warranted.

(b) MOYZISCH and DUPLITZER in Turkey:-

XMOYZISCH arrived in Ankara as Amt VI representative in June 1940, being followed shortly afterwards by DUPLITZER, who took up his appointment at Istanbul. By early 1941 MOYZISCH had succeeded in establishing himself in the country with good relations existing between himself and the Foreign Office representative there, in itself no mean feat. His activities however were confined to Turkey itself on which country he was required to submit regular political reports. There had been no question of using the country as a base of operations against the neighbouring Arab countries. For reasons explained in Part III, MOYZISCH adopted a policy of caution in his affairs in Turkey, which in the absence of any precise instructions from LANGLOTZ, then Referat VI D 4 controlling Turkey, was in fact the best policy possible in the circumstances and which was to bear fruit in the coming years. DUPLITZER however had acted more in the normal fashion of the Amt VI *Bauftragte* with the usual results of pretension and bad fooling.

(c) GAMOTHA and MAYR in Persia.

The circumstances surrounding the recruitment, training and despatch of GAMOTHA and MAYR to Persia, where they arrived in October 1940, are dealt with in some detail in Part IV, as they are characteristic of the method or lack of method adopted by Amt VI in its early work. Little need be said of this early work, for the inefficiency of which they had every valid excuse in the circumstances. By the time both SCHELLENBERG and GRAEFE had taken over their new appointments, the Russian campaign had begun, the abortive Arab revolt took place soon afterwards, an almost immediate consequence of which was the occupation of Syria and later Persia by British and Russian troops, an event which took the German colony there completely by surprise, including MAYR and GAMOTHA. As far as Amt VI was concerned, the event brought to an end their representation there, and with the main effort of Gruppe VI C now directed towards the Eastern Front, the fact was accepted with resignation and without any alternative plan, a lack of foresight which hardly merited the windfall of MAYR's somewhat dramatic message through Tokio more than a year later. By the end of 1941 MAYR and GAMOTHA were just 'missing' as far as Gruppe VI C was concerned.

(d) The Near and Middle East by the end of 1941.

On the reorganisation of Gruppe VI C in 1941 therefore Referat VI C-12 had a fairly strong outpost in Ankara and

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a weak one in Istanbul, two ill-trained but enthusiastic agents in Iran who were soon to disappear, and no plans for the further exploitation of the two countries. VI C 13 competent for the Arab countries had neither representatives nor plans. The potential advantage that Vichy-occupied Syria had offered had disappeared on the occupation of the country by Allied Forces in June 1941. Efforts were made however under GRAEFE's direction to improve the situation. It was planned at first to instruct MOYZISCH to extend his sphere of interest beyond the borders to Turkey, but on the latter's protests, GRAEFE finally sent FAST to Ankara to operate under MOYZISCH, but with the specific assignment of using Ankara as a base for penetration into the neighbouring Arabic countries.

The other development of note was the appointment of Hastuf SCHUMACK as Referent for VI C 12. SCHUMACK was subsequently to become closely identified with all further Amt VI efforts in the Near and Middle East.

C. The Development of Gruppe VI C 1942-43.

1. Development of ~~Unternehmen~~ Zepplin in 1942.

The main feature of Gruppe VI C development during 1942 and 1943 was the expansion of Unternehmen Zepplin, which became a vast enterprise covering the whole Russian Front. Being essentially an operational enterprise the Unternehmen developed in the original stages independently of Gruppe VI C under the denomination of VI C (Z), coming however under the direct supervision of GRAEFE himself with Stubaf ~~HENGELHAUPT~~ as assistant, the latter being by this time Referent of the now combined Referate VI C 1-3. The actual commander of VI C (Z) was Stubaf ~~ROEDER~~, later liaison officer under Gruppe VI A with the Foreign Office. With the war in the East developing along very favourable lines after the beginning of the German Spring offensive in 1942 and with deep penetration into Russian territory itself, little attempt was made at any exploitation at this stage into the USSR from other bases such as Turkey and Scandinavia. It was not until later in 1943 that efforts were made to infiltrate Georgian agents into the Caucasus through Turkey with Turkish connivance. With the German armies outside Stalingrad by the Autumn and Rommel driving into Egypt in the summer, it looked as if the comparative neglect of the Middle East would be justified.

2. Developments in the Near and Middle East.

With the main effort of the Gruppe itself still concentrated in VI C (Z), developments in the Middle and Near East were comparatively minor in character. Notable, however, was the despatch of Stubaf ~~WOLFF~~ to Istanbul in June 1942 to operate there on behalf of Amt VI in equal status with MOYZISCH in Ankara. WOLFF was an Amt-IV officer and had considerable experience in that Amt; his assignment reflected the development of Amt VI policy in Turkey as apart from the Normal Amt VI functions he was instructed to make special efforts to establish close working relations with the Turkish Intelligence Service. This assignment had the special interest of both SCHELLENBERG and GRAEFE, both of whom saw possibilities in exploiting Turkey's fear of Russia to the advantage of Amt VI. Another appointment of interest was that of Hastuf MOHR, previously of Gruppe VI D, to Ankara to evaluate for Amt VI the reliability of the PASHA and REMO organisations, which were the main sources of information to the Amt on the Near East. These organisations, which however were not Amt VI enterprises, are dealt with in Part III.

There was still however, apart from the work of FAST in Ankara of which little is known, no great effort to exploit the Near East and the Arabic countries, and there is no indication from any source that FAST was in any way successful in whatever activity he was engaged in. The two Arab subversive leaders, the Grand Mufti and Raschid Ali, whose escape from Turkey was engineered by MOYZISCH, were not to become prominent until 1943.

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3. 'Unternehmen Otto' and the Middle East.

Reference has already been made in the Liquidation Report on Gruppe VI F to the creation in August 1942 of the special Referat VI F/O in Gruppe VI F to be known as Unternehmen Otto. This Referat, with executive functions over a wide sphere cutting across the Laendergruppen, reflects the confused policy of Amt VI at the time in the Near East. HASTUF MANDL was Referat for the Nheres-Ost Referat, and it was under this ill-conceived organisation that the first signs of agent-missions made their appearance in the Near East. This however was not manifest until the summer of 1943, with the despatch of agents through the VI F/O subordinate formations in Greece - Dienststellen 2000 and 3000.

4. The Crisis in late 1942.

The crisis of the war for Germany was in the late Autumn of 1942 with the failure to take Stalingrad and the success of the Allied counter attack at El Alamein. That crisis affected Gruppe VI C in a most immediate sense, as both these theatres were under the control of the Gruppe, and the Gruppe, like the German High Command, had virtually staked everything on the success of these military operations. The failure found the Gruppe forced to improvise where improvisation should not have been necessary. The neglect of the Near East in 1939-42 was to tell in 1943. Of the Far East it need only be said that it continued to play its unimportant role.

5. MAYR's Bolt from the Blue.

A ray of hope in the critical closing months of 1942 came from Tokio, whence arrived by a most circuitous route in August 1942 the message from MAYR, 'lost' in Persia since 1941, informing the Gruppe that both he and SCHULZE, the former I-Luft representative in Persia, had been actively engaged in preparing the ground in that country for further exploitation provided speedy help was forthcoming. The importance of this independent activity of MAYR and SCHULZE in Iran cannot be minimised when it is examined in the light of the general war situation in August 1942. The German armies were fighting in the foothills of the Caucasus and at the gates of Egypt. Had either army been able to break through, all the elements which precipitated the rapid fall of Norway, France and the Low Countries in 1940 were operative in Iran, the vital link between Russia and the Western Allies. The success of the Fifth Column prepared by MAYR in the north and SCHULZE in the south depended either on the success of the military operations or on speedy help by parachute operations. As events turned out, the autumn of 1942 saw the turning point in the military sphere which was not balanced by effective action by either Amt VI or the Abwehr in Iran. Nevertheless, MAYR's message offered an opportunity, and 1943 saw the attempt to take advantage of it.

6. Developments in 1943.

(a) 1943 saw the emphasis on VI C(3) lessened, and the efforts to find alternative scope in the Near and Middle East. In June 1943 MANDL sent two agents to Syria through Dienststelle 3000 with the vague mission of carrying out sabotage and moral subversive activities, a mission which failed completely. In the following month, SWIEDKOWICZ, a Pole, was sent from the same source to the Middle East with instructions to pass himself off as a Polish refugee with a view to being recruited into the Polish forces in that theatre, thereafter to carry out subversive propaganda - a mission which met the same fate as the first. Soon afterwards VI F/O ceased to exist, and the subordinate formations, Dienststellen 2000 and 3000, came under the control of Gruppe VI E, with the subsidiary assignment of acting as springboards on behalf of Gruppe VI C for the despatch of agents to the Middle East. It was under this modified organisation that the famous MERZ, who had been recruited by MANDL for Amt VI in May 1943, was eventually despatched to Syria in October of the same year

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with alleged instructions to organize sabotage activities in Iraq and Iran, although the exact purpose of the mission still remains doubtful, for which scheme he was to recruit Poles already in the Middle East. MERZ was given MOYZISCH in Ankara as an advance base and collaborator. This mission too was a failure, and a costly one, as it was through the interrogation of MERZ that such valuable information was obtained for the first time on the structure, personalities and activities of Gruppe VI C.

(b) Attempts to exploit the situation in Iran:

The critical sphere in the Middle East was however in Iran where much depended on the attempts to take advantage of the situation offered to the Amt by MAYR and SCHULZE. There one immediate danger from the Allied point of view had been removed by the capture of some of MAYR's documents by the security authorities, which documents had had the inestimable value of allowing the Allied authorities to know the enemy with whom they had to contend. Nevertheless the situation was still dangerous, and was in the event rendered less dangerous by the incorrect interpretation of the situation on the part of both Gruppe VI C and the Abwehr. The cooperation that had existed between the SD and the Abwehr in Persia had forced a corresponding degree of cooperation on the part of the same authorities in Berlin, and the operations carried out to exploit the situation were joint efforts. In this case however union was far from being strength, as the traditional rivalry could not be overcome. In addition, the situation lent itself to political exploitation, a fact which MAYR did not fail to stress, but which was not appreciated. To Amt VI, Iran was a supply line to Russia and that supply line called for sabotage. The failure to exploit Iran lay primarily in the divergence of view between MAYR and Gruppe VI C, and MAYR, the man on the spot, was best qualified to know. In the event, the FRANZ expedition, which landed in Persia in April 1943, was a sabotage mission, as was the ANTON expedition in the south in July. While MAYR was successful in modifying the purpose of the FRANZ expedition to suit his interpretation of the situation, he failed to impress the ambitious and impetuous KURMIS, leader of the ANTON expedition in the South. The situation in Iran as a result of these conflicting interests rapidly deteriorated, a further contributing factor being the changing war situation which was now going against Germany, the effect of which on the potential Fifth Column constituted by tribes can be imagined. A Fifth Column thrives only on the certainty of success, and the attitude of the tribes cooled appreciably, which was evident by the fact that SCHULZE and the KURMIS group spent the following winter under virtual arrest in the tribes they had intended to exploit. In the North the situation collapsed completely with the arrest of MAYR himself in August 1943.

(c) The Situation by the end of 1943:-

By the end of the year the writing was already on the wall. VI C (2) was meeting with increasing difficulties with the continued success of the Russian counter-attack, the opportunity offered in Persia had not been seized, and while efforts were now being made in the course of 1943 to exploit the Grand Mufti group, members of which were undergoing training in Germany, these efforts could not produce any results until 1944, when the situation had already irretrievably deteriorated. The Mufti enterprises themselves had developed too late to be effective, and even there the real driving force had not come from the Amt itself but from the efforts of LORCH of Gruppe VI C and his nephew WIELAND, leader of the ATLAS expedition in 1944. Arab activity in 1943 centred round REISSNER and KOHLHAAS, both of whom had had previous experience in handling Arabs in their activity with the Einsatzkommando Tunis in late 1942 and early 1943.

There was however one important exception to this general state of affairs in the CICERO material, which by the end of the year was becoming available from Ankara. This source was unquestionably the most important in the history of Amt VI and represented the greatest single 'scoop'. But even then it was not as fully exploited as it should have been.

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(d) Organisation of Gruppe VI C in late 1943

The organisational structure of the Gruppe had not changed much during the year, being on the following lines:-

<u>Gruppenleiter</u>		Ostufaf GRAEFE
<u>Referat</u>		<u>Referent</u>
VI C 1-3	Russia	Stubaf HENCKELHAUPT
VI C (Z)	Unternehmen Zppelin	Ostufaf ROEDER
VI C 4-6	Japan	
VI C 7-8	China	
VI C 9	Manchukuo and Mongolia	Hastaf WEIRAUCH
VI C 10	Thailand, French Indo-China	
VI C 11	Dutch Indies, Philippines	
VI C 12	Turkey, Afghanistan	Hastaf SCHUBACK
VI C 13	Arab countries	Ang. EM

D. Developments in 1944-45.

1. Death of GRAEFE

The year 1944 opened badly for Gruppe VI C with the death of its Gruppenleiter in early January as the result of a motorcar accident. The Gruppe had now lost its driving force, and until the appointment of Staf TRAPP at the end of the year, lacked the direction it had previously enjoyed. HENCKELHAUPT acted as temporary Gruppenleiter until the summer when Stubaf TSCHERSKY was appointed, an appointment which proved to be of short duration, as TSCHERSKY was dismissed for inefficiency before the end of the year, and was transferred to the Dienststelle Prutzmann. Meanwhile the situation on the Russian front continued to deteriorate with the inevitable consequences for VI C (Z) which began to show signs of disintegration.

2. Creation of Referat VI C 14.

In the course of 1943 Hastaf GAMOTHA, the representative who had been sent to Iran in 1940 and who had escaped after the occupation of the country in August 1941 by Allied forces, returned to Germany in a blaze of publicity and glory as a result of his adventures in making good his escape. Recognised as an 'authority' on Iran, he was given the assignment of preparing an operation to that country to be known as the 'Norma' expedition an enterprise which did not materialise, probably because GAMOTHA had no intention of returning to the country. In January 1944 however GAMOTHA was appointed Referent of the new Referat VI C 14, competent for Iran, a Referat which concentrated its efforts in the course of the year on the formation within Germany of a Quisling Iranian government, an enterprise which eventually led to the arrest of GAMOTHA himself in October 1944 as a result of the inevitable jealousies between all parties concerned in the affair, including SCHUBACK, who opposed GAMOTHA's nominee for the position of Prime Minister in the new government. The Referat was not responsible for any mission to Iran.

3. Operations in the Near East.

By the summer of 1944 the efforts of REISSNER and KOHLHAAS during the previous year began to take concrete form. KOHLHAAS was stationed in Athens acting there as the forwarding agency for agents sent to the country from REISSNER in Berlin. In July 1944 LETAY was sent to Syria to establish himself there and await further instructions from VI C, instructions which did not reach him as he was arrested.

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immediately on arrival. An effort was made to strengthen the chain between Berlin, Athens and the Middle East by the establishing of a further link in Istanbul in the person of the Greek EMMANUEL, whose function was to act as liaison officer between KOHLHAAS and missions sent by the latter to the Middle East through Turkey. EMMANUEL met the same fate as LETAY. In September 1944 the CHACUN group including one Arab of the Mufti organisation was despatched to Syria only to join LETAY in captivity.

The story of failure in these Near East enterprises was continued in the ATLAS expedition, which, after much preparation under VI C, WIELAND and THE MUFTI, much wrangling between the MUFTI and VI C as to who should be in charge of the expedition on landing, and many technical difficulties in equipping and despatching the mission, was finally despatched on the 5th October 1944 to Palestine, enjoying eleven days' liberty before being arrested by the Allied authorities. The MUFTI proved to be a costly failure. The only other operation to Arab territory involving the use of his followers was the TELAFER expedition which landed in Iraq in November 1944. This operation consisted of four Arabs without any German in charge, the Arabs being members of the MUFTI groups which had undergone training at the Hague sabotage school the previous year. The enterprise had been directed by the MUFTI himself and not by VI C, though of course the latter were aware of its nature. The group was provided with W/T, and had the mission of organising armed bands to attack Jews and Jewish interests in Iraq and Palestine. Two of the party were arrested a few hours after landing.

With the failure of the Atlas expedition, VI C activity in the Near and Middle East came to an end apart from the lone mission of RIZOS, who had been trained from July 1944 by KOHLHAAS and arrived in Turkey in February 1945 to be detained immediately on arrival. The nature of his mission remains obscure, but in any case the enterprise was a failure.

4. Reorganisation of the Gruppe

The Gruppe now underwent a major reorganisation in September 1944. The Gruppe was reduced to four Abteilungen, each with its own Referate, the structure of the Gruppe now being:-

<u>Gruppenleiter</u>		Staf RAPP
<u>Referat</u>		<u>Referent</u>
VI C 1	The Soviet Union	Stubaf LUMM
VI C 2		Stubaf HENGELHAUPT
VI C 3	The Near East	Hastaf SCHUBACK
VI C 4	The Far East	Stubaf WEIRAUCH

The development of interest was the increased attention now paid to the Far East, as it was now apparent that information on that theatre was badly lacking and the attitude towards the Japanese themselves was now hardening, even in official circles. Specialists with the necessary background were now introduced into the Abteilung and plans made for the despatch of agents to the Far East, but again the change came at too late a date to be effective. The subsequent development of Abteilung VI C 4 is dealt with in Part IV.

The subsequent changes in Gruppe VI C have no other significance than to indicate the growing confusion on all fronts, but especially in the East. In November the whole Gruppe was instructed to concentrate on Russia only, only small sections being left in Abteilungen VI C 3 and 4.

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The officers of these Abteilungen were sent to the various B&S in the East to act on behalf of Unternehmen Zepelin; meanwhile efforts were made through the Scandinavian countries to infiltrate agents into Russian occupied territory in the north, the Sonderkommando Nord under BROHS of VI D 3 being set up under the joint command of VI D and VI C. These desperate measures were only manifestations of growing disintegration and the Gruppe collapsed with the others on the general surrender in May 1945.

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Part II Amt VI and Russia:- Unternehmen Zepplin.

1. Early Activity

Little need be added to the remarks made in Part I, para A (3), regarding the early efforts of Amt VI in its work against Russia. It can be said that Gruppe VI C in this theatre was no better and no worse than any other Laendergruppe at this early stage of Amt VI development, with the exception of Gruppe VI B. The work against Russia had been conducted under the ill-conceived organization of the regional Beauftragte of the original Gruppe VI A: there were no direct sources of information within the country itself, and such information as was obtained was through the Amt VI representatives attached to the various SD-Abschnitte in Eastern Germany. That information was of little value. The situation was to change however by the summer of 1941 under the combined effects of the triple change - SCHELLERNECK as Amtschef, GRAUPE as Gruppenleiter and the beginning of the war with Russia.

2. Unternehmen Zepplin

The whole weight of the subsequent efforts of Gruppe VI C became centred on an enterprise known as 'Unternehmen Zepplin': it is almost certain that Amt VI work against Russia in any other direction either did not exist or was of very little consequence. There was a certain amount of activity directed by VI C through Turkey, employing KEDIA's Georgian circles, and towards the end, an effort to penetrate into Russia through the Scandinavian contacts: The KEDIA enterprise was of some value but the Scandinavian effort was merely an indication of the collapse of Unternehmen Zepplin on the Eastern Front in early 1945 and had no other significance. The idea was to exploit the Sonderkommando Nord under CELIARIUS and PROHS (See Situation Report of Gruppe VI D).

Unternehmen Zepplin was indeed a unique feature of Amt VI work and does not find any parallel in other Laendergruppen. It represented an enormous organization with extensive ramifications throughout the Eastern Front: it is not surprising that its development bore close relationship to the varying fortunes of war on that front a consequence of which is that it presents a comprehensive picture on broad lines, but a very confused picture in detail. Information on the organization has only been forthcoming since the collapse of Germany as previous to that only its existence was known, nothing of its internal structure, aims, methods and successes. The evidence at present available serves only to provide a general picture, as there are many contradictions in detail: for the purposes of this publication therefore, nothing more will be attempted than to provide the broad lines of its origin and development from 1941 onwards.

3. Origin of Unternehmen Zepplin

It seems probable that at the beginning of the Russian campaign, Gruppe VI C had none representation in the SDpo and SD Einsatzkommandos which moved forward with the Armies: nothing however succeeded like success on the Eastern Front - by the end of the year over a million Russian prisoners had been taken and it was from this enormous pool that Gruppe VI C developed its Eastern Front organization. Many of the Russian prisoners offered their services to the German I.S. and as a tactical expedient small Kommandos of such volunteers were formed under the direction of a German officer of senior N.C.O. in order to exploit their language knowledge and to help in the interrogation of further batches of PWs. These Kommandos passed under the control of

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Gruppe VI C, as it was realized that there was such good material in PW cages for espionage purposes.

4. Creation of Unternehmen Zepplin in 1942

The early exploitation of Russian PWs had been largely confined to tactical purposes: the first shock to the German advance in the winter of 1941 and stabilization of the front lessened considerably the emphasis on tactical exploitation and in the spring of 1942, chiefly due to the vigorous and far seeing policy of GRAFF, it was decided to concentrate the work of Gruppe VI C against Russia in developing the work of the small Kommando mentioned in the previous paragraph, enlarging the scope of these Kommandos and making available to the new organization all other sources of information about Russia available to Amt VI; mainly those provided by the various overt research institutes dealing with the East. In this way the new organization, henceforth to be known as 'Unternehmen Zepplin' was created, probably some time during the early summer of 1942.

5. Main characteristics of Unternehmen Zepplin

The new organization had some notable features: it enjoyed a high degree of independence, and had at first only slight connection with the central office of Gruppe VI C in Berlin. It operated primarily as a self-contained field unit working in close co-operation with the armies in the field. GRAFF as Gruppenleiter took of course a very direct interest in the development of the Unternehmen but his personal interest did not prevent his encouraging a high degree of decentralisation from Berlin. A very small directing staff maintained in Berlin under GRAFF, the main work is troop recruitment being carried out from the camps set up under the Hauptkommandos in the field.

In addition to the independent status of the new organization, the other most noteworthy feature was the high degree of concentration. The scheme was directed towards obtaining economic and political information regarding Russia from all possible sources, though mainly through the exploitation of Prisoners of War. The information thus obtained was to be handled by specialists on these subjects, a principle which entailed a high degree of collaboration with other institutions, mainly the Research Institutes on Russia which operated overtly before the war. A result of this was that Gruppe VI C under KRALLERT co-operated more closely with Gruppe VI C than with any other Laendergruppe. It is not surprising therefore to find that during the period of its most effective work, the obtaining of information, its evaluation, and collation with other information available reached a higher standard in Unternehmen Zepplin than in any other Gruppe.

The weakness of the system lay in its close dependence on military developments: when the German armies began their retreats, the effectiveness of Unternehmen Zepplin was correspondingly greatly decreased.

6. Methods of Unternehmen Zepplin

The basic method employed by Unternehmen Zepplin in its task of obtaining all manner of information concerning Russia was in the handling of Prisoners of War. The PW camps provided not only agent material but other necessary information for the training and briefing of agents - equipment, identity papers, local conditions, etc. The prisoners were subjected to an elaborate screening process, the first

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stages of which provided general information, at the same time sending out those prisoners who seemed suitable for espionage work, those candidates being sent to a series of camps for further training. The standards set in the earlier days of the enterprise were high - sabotage training lasted three weeks, while espionage training took as long as three months: the combined sabotage-espionage course lasted six months. It was a rule that agents recruited had to be volunteers for the work.

The original policy adopted was to recruit and train masses of PWs counting only on a certain percentage of returns. This procedure had however to be modified when the tide turned against Germany, and mass deployment of agents was dropped and a higher percentage of success was looked for.

7. Organisation of Unternehmen Zoppolin

Both the internal and external organisation of Unternehmen Zoppolin underwent such violent changes as a result of the ebb and flow on the Eastern Front, that there is little point in indicating anything more than its broad organisational lines. In the early stages Unternehmen Zoppolin acted almost independently of Gruppe VI C, being loosely controlled through Referat VI C I. By late 1943, it became known as VI C/Z having its own internal organisation on the following lines:-

* <u>Abteilung</u>	Leiter:-	Ostufar ROEDER	
VI C Z 1	-		Organisation
VI C Z 2	-		Administration
VI C Z 3	-		Operations
VI C Z 4	-		Recruiting and training.

The main emphasis of the organisation lay however in its external structure: the original small Kommandos which had been formed in late 1941 developed into a much more complex organisation of which the basic idea was that each Army Group operating on the Eastern Front had attached to it a Hauptkommando of Unternehmen Zoppolin. There were normally three such Army Groups - Nord, Mitte and Sud, but these groups were subject to such modification, especially in the final stage before the collapse. The Hauptkommandos in turn controlled a series of Abteilkommandos, which in their turn might control dependent Nebenkammandos according to operational needs. Each Hauptkommando was self-contained in its operations and training establishments.

In the summer of 1944, VI C/Z disappeared and came under the control of the now Abt VI C I: but owing to operational conditions, a further reorganisation took place in November of the same year when the internal structure was on the following lines:-

* <u>Abteilung VI C I</u>	Administration
VI C I/Z	Training
VI C I/2	Interrogation
VI C I/3	Operations
VI C I/2 (org)	Organisation and Supplies.
* <u>Abteilung VI C 2</u>	Soviet Union
VI C 2a	Erfassung
VI C 2b	Auswertung
VI C 2c	Poland.

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Under this scheme the information obtained by VI C I was passed to VI C 2 for evaluation. The Referat VI C 2c was formed as late as March 1945 with the purpose of organising the Polish National Movement set up to combat communism, and to avoid any signs of Nazi sponsorship.

The external organisation underwent similar changes, the most notable being the creation of Army Group 'WEICHSSEL, under which VI C (Z) directed two operations known as 'Unternehmen Wollenbrocher' and 'Unternehmen Dessau'. The changes during the latter stages were of course considerable: the entire Gruppo VI C concentrated on Russia except for small sub-sections of VI C 3 and VI C 4, the personnel of the Gruppo being despatched to the various BdS on the Eastern Front, the BdS themselves now receiving instructions to subordinate themselves to Gruppo VI C. The VI C representatives were placed in charge of hurriedly prepared Meldohauptkommandos with subordinate Meldokommandos which were responsible for passing back to Gruppo VI C all information obtained through the Dienststellen of the Sipo and SD in their areas. In this way, Stabaf WEIRACH was posted to Hungary and Hastuf WEYER to Slovakia.

In the general confusion in the days preceding the surrender, the whole organisation disintegrated and Unternehmen Zepplin came to an end.

8. Camps controlled by Unternehmen Zepplin

The following is a summary of the chief camps under VI C (Z) control, together with a brief summary of their functions:-

i) The Sandberg Training School:-

Sandberg was the main central training establishment of the advance training of agents recruited in the various PW camps and who had undergone preliminary training under the Hauptkommandos. The training at Sandberg lasted between four and six months and covered all aspects of espionage work, including W/T and sabotage. The camp had its own workshop for the preparation of false documents and was amply stocked with Russian equipment of all kinds. It is significant of the scope of Unternehmen Zepplin that at the height of its activity the Sandberg camp catered for as many as 2,000 agents at a time. In the later stages the strength of the camp varied between 800 and 1,000 agents.

The camp leader was originally Stabaf SCHORNTMANN, replaced early in 1943 by Ustuf RASCH who remained in charge for a few months only. RASCH was now succeeded by Hastuf SAKUTH who held the position until the end of 1943. His successor was Stabaf KURRCK who controlled not only SANDBERG but on the reorganisation of VI C (2) under Stuf RAPP in late 1944, became Inspector of all camps under the control of Unternehmen Zepplin.

Sandberg was evacuated in late 1944 as a result of the Russian advance and the main training school set up at TEPL in the Sudetenland.

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ii) The Sachsenhausen Camp:-

This camp was a small one and catered only for specialised training of groups already trained at Sandberg. The strength of the camp did not exceed 30 men. (See also Situation Report No. 11. on Gruppe VI F, page 9).

iii) The PLESKAL Camp:-

Pleskau was the main training camp under Hauptkommando NORD which specialised in the training of agents from the Northern territories, including the Baltic States and White Russia. Owing to the long distances involved, the Pleskau camp enjoyed a high degree of independence and the planning and execution of operations were carried out by the Kommando itself. Only enterprises of great importance were referred back to Berlin.

The camp was evacuated latterly to KAMBERG on the Erisian Peninsula. (Leiter: Stabst. Otto KRAUS).

iv) Training Camps of Hauptkommando Mitte:-

Owing to the force of operational conditions, Hauptkommando Mitte did not long remain independent; but passed under the control of Hauptkommando NORD. In the early part of 1944 the Kommando became 'Unternehmen H.H.U.' under Hauptkommando NORD. The camps were reportedly changed but when Hauptkommando Mitte was recreated towards the end of 1944, a training camp for the Kommando was established near KOLIM, east of BRAGUE. The Camp commander was Stabst. KRAUS, brother of Otto KRAUS of Hauptkommando NORD.

v) The TERN Camp:-

Reference has already been made in i) above to this camp, which replaced the former RIFE CAGE camp. TERN was set up early in 1945 and as a result of the rapid Russian advance was never completely organised. The Camp commander was Stabst. LUMM who set up his headquarters near Markonbad, the main camp being at TERN with subsidiary camps in the neighbourhood as follows:-

	<u>Leiter</u>
Holstein	- Ostst. KOETTING
Jaschtein	- Ostst. SCHNEIDER
GIEBELN	- Hauptst. SCHARNALLI
Koenigsvarb	- Ostst. JAKUBOVITICH
Markusgruen	- Ostst. WANDTUCH

An interesting feature was the school at Koenigsvarb which catered for the training of girls only, an indication of the thoroughness of the whole organisation. It is to be noted that the trainees included some French speaking girls, destined to be sent to Franco.

vi) The JABLON Camp:-

This camp was the original training school of Hauptkommando Mitte. (See (iv) above). The camp was closed in the Autumn of 1942 as the result of a bombing attack. The special feature of JABLON was that it catered also for the training of purely military units under a Russian colonel, the enterprise going under the code names of ~~X~~ 'Drushina I', ~~X~~ 'Drushina II' and ~~X~~ 'Drushina III'.

vii) The Auschwitz Camp:-

This camp under Ustuf HUHN dealt only with the training of Caucasians. The camp was disbanded early in 1944.

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viii) The Legionowo Camp:-

The Legionowo Camp in the suburbs of Warsaw was reserved for the training of Turkentans only. Very few Turkentans were eventually used for Unternehmen Zepplin operations, the majority of the trainees being transferred to the Turkentau Region for military operations. The camp, which was under the command of Stabaf LINKS, was liquidated in the latter half of 1943, the trainees being sent to the Sandberg camp.

ix) Camps of ^{V-}Hauptkommando Sud:-

Little is known of the training camps of Hauptkommando Sud: the Kommando had its headquarters in late 1942 in the Crimea near Jewpatoria, and the training camps, under Stabaf KURISJOK, Stabaf ROEDER (the original Leiter of the whole Unternehmen Zepplin) and Stabaf KLEINERT. The Kommando withdrew in the general German retreat but details of its locations and operations are lacking.

x) *Sonderlager 'T':-

Sonderlager 'T' was a special camp set up at Breslau-Oswitz where Russian volunteer technicians were enabled to carry on their research and construction work under favourable conditions. The enterprise yielded such good results that it was decided to extend its scope, the result being the formation of Sonderlager 'L'.

xi) *Sonderlager 'L':-

Sonderlager 'L' represented an extension of the activities of Sonderlager 'T' to include research into economic and statistical matters relating to the U.S.S.R. In this way valuable statistics, maps, charts, and information on the Russian communication system were made available to VI C (S) for use in their projected operations. In early 1944 the camp was transferred to BLANAU in the NIEDERDONAU area, as a result of the Russian advances and in order to establish closer liaison with the Forschungsdienst Ost at St. Lamprecht and with the Wapsee Institute at FLANKENBARTH.

9. SPECIAL ENTERPRISES OF UNTERNEHMEN ZEPPELIN.

i) The Einsatz General BESHANOW:-

General BESHANOW was a Russian IW who was chosen by VI C (Z) as the leader of an operation involving the dropping by parachute of hundreds of trained agents in the Archangel area where large PW camps, and concentration camps were situated. The scheme planned in early 1943, aimed at setting free the German PWs and inciting the internees in the concentration camps to revolt. For this purpose a special camp was set up in the Troppau area of Sudetenland. The operation was never carried into effect owing to suspicion of BESHANOW himself who was eventually sent to a concentration camp himself.

ii) *Unternehmen Ull:-

Unternehmen Ull was a large-scale sabotage enterprise undertaken by Gruppe VI C in the latter half of 1943: its objective was to lessen the productive power of Russian factories in the Urals area by attacking the electric power circuits supplying the factories. A group of some sixty Russians with the necessary local knowledge was formed under the leadership of a Russian refugee from Belgrade, Hastuf SELJENOV. The training was carried out at the Sonderlager 'L' (see above), which was responsible for the provision of all the necessary technical information.

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Owing to delays caused by the lack of aircraft the original scheme had to be abandoned and only part of the group was employed against alternative targets in the VOLOGDA area. No information is available on the results of the enterprise. The remaining trainees were subsequently used for sabotage operations in Croatia.

iii) Unternehmen VEINS:-

The leading figure in Unternehmen VEINS was the Georgian Sacha KEDIA, a cheese-merchant in Paris, who offered his services to the G.I.S. KEDIA claimed to have many contacts in the Caucasus area from whom information on Russia could be obtained. KEDIA's offer was accepted by Gruppe VI C (it is known that KEDIA was also connected in some way with Abwehr II at one time) and was eventually installed at BACHM on the Turkish Frontier. Through small groups of agents crossing the frontier, KEDIA passed weapons, sabotage and propaganda material into Russia and in return obtained quantities of printed material, books and periodicals of all kinds, most of which was made available to the research departments of Unternehmen Zeppelin.

The operation ceased to yield results after the spring of 1944 owing to the difficulty of maintaining contacts.

CONCLUSION

The above brief notes serve only to give some idea of the scope and comprehensiveness of Unternehmen Zeppelin: there is so far little indication of what measure of success attended Gruppe VI C for the enormous expenditure of time, training and agents involved in the scheme. It can, however, be said that Unternehmen Zeppelin was a far better conceived operational enterprise than any other undertaken by Amt VI, probably owing to the enterprise and enthusiasm of the Gruppenleiter, GRAEFE. The Unternehmen lost much of its effectiveness after his death, and was unable to stand the strain of the Russian advances in 1944. There are also indications that the Russian themselves were active in counter-espionage work against VI C (Z), with what all-round success is unknown, as only isolated cases of the results of their work have been mentioned.

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PART III - Gruppe VI C and the Middle East.

1. Controlling Referate.

In 1939-40 Turkey and the Near East came under the control of Referat VI D 5 under Hauptstuf HAGEN, Gruppe VI D at that time being responsible for the 'Sud-Ost', embracing the Balkan States and Greece as well as the territory of VI D 5. In this organisation therefore it was obviously the intention that penetration of the Near East should be carried out from Greece, in support of which theory there is the fact that MOYZISCH in 1940 was briefed for his mission to Turkey by LANGLOTZ, Referent VI D 4 covering Bulgaria and Greece. The territory remained under the same Gruppe when it was renamed Gruppe VI B in 1940-1. In 1941 Turkey, the Near and Middle East finally passed to Gruppe VI C, VI C 12 being competent for Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan, under Hauptstuf SCHUBACK, while VI C 13 dealt with the Arab countries under Ang. EM. This organisational structure continued until January 1944 when the new Referat VI C 14 was created under Hauptstuf G/MOTHA to deal with Iran. Finally in September 1944, Abteilung VI C 3 became competent for the whole area under Hauptstuf SCHUBACK. The sub-divisions of the Abteilung are so far unknown.

2. Prominent Personalities.

Apart from the Gruppenleiter, Oststuf GRÄFFE (now dead), the most prominent personality concerned with the Near East was Hauptstuf SCHUBACK, Referent VI C 12 since 1941, and later Leiter Abteilung VI C 3. The other VI C officers closely identified with the preparation and despatch of missions were Stabstuf BEISSNER, the so-called Arab expert of Amt VI who joined the Gruppe in 1943 after a period of service in dealing with Arabs in the Einsatzkommando Tunis. With him was Hauptstuf KOHLHAAS also of the Einsatzkommando Tunis, BEISSNER, acting as Referent VI C 13, and KOHLHAAS being stationed in Greece as the despatching agency from that territory. KOHLHAAS had replaced Hauptstuf TAPPENBOECK and Hauptstuf EYLITZ in that capacity. Haschaf LENGLING acted for a short period as Referent VI C 13 in 1943 before being arrested for fraud. SCHUBACK's deputy was Oststuf BELLING. It is worth nothing that so far none of these personalities have been arrested. *nothing?*

3. Turkey

(a) MOYZISCH in Ankara:-

The first Amt VI efforts at the exploitation of the Middle East as a field of operations did not take place until the summer of 1940, when MOYZISCH was sent to Ankara by LANGLOTZ, then Referent VI D 4. MOYZISCH took up his appointment as assistant Commercial Attache in the German Embassy in June 1940, being followed shortly afterwards by DUPLITZER, who took up a similar appointment in Istanbul.

MOYZISCH possessed no special qualifications for the post he had to fill, but in his case certain factors operated in favour of Amt VI resulting in MOYZISCH proving to be one of the more successful Hauptbeauftragte chosen by JOST. There was no well organised policy behind the appointment of MOYZISCH and there was very little connection between the more impressive paper organisation of Amt VI in 1939-40 and the actual work carried out by it. MOYZISCH however had the misfortune in German eyes of having Jewish blood in his veins, and in consequence welcomed the appointment to neutral territory where he would be reasonably safe from any action taken against him because of his suspected Jewish parentage. His subsequent activity in Ankara was dependent on two considerations - his concern not to indulge in any activity that would either lead him to fall foul of the Foreign Office representative or which would promote bad relations between himself and the Turkish authorities, either of which eventualities might lead to a request for his recall to Germany, together with

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his equally great concern to give sufficient satisfaction to Amt VI in order that his recall would not come from that direction. MOYZISCH therefore pursued a policy of caution, one which suited Amt VI well, as the normal Hauptbeauftragte appointed in the early days, sharing MOYZISCH's lack of training and background, had not carried in establishing bad relations all round.

(b) DUPLITZER in Istanbul.

The contrast was well marked in Istanbul where DUPLITZER young, untrained, and erratic, soon got himself into the bad graces of the German Consul, with the result that his recall was frequently urged both by the Consul and by MOYZISCH himself. DUPLITZER, however, stayed put and was the only representative in Istanbul until the arrival of WOLF in 1942.

(c) Influence of GRAEFE in 1941.

The original assignment given to MOYZISCH had been simply to submit regular reports on the political situation in Turkey, without any suggestion of using the country as a base for operations against neighbouring territory. The value of Turkey as such a base was not lost on GRAEFE when he took over as Gruppenleiter in 1941, as was evidenced by his instructions to MOYZISCH to extend his functions to cover the Near East. Eventually it was decided to allow MOYZISCH to carry on in Ankara and to supplement him by the appointment of PAST, whose specific assignment was to work independently of MOYZISCH and working from Ankara, to recruit agents for penetration into the neighbouring Arabic countries.

(d) The Appointment of WOLF in 1942.

The major development of note in 1942 was the appointment of Rgt. Rgt WOLF as Vice-Consul in Istanbul, a position he took up in June of that year. WOLF, curiously enough, was an Amt IV officer, his previous experience having been confined to conducting special investigations on behalf of Amt IV in Norway and the Low Countries. While therefore untrained in Amt VI work, WOLF had had considerable experience in his own police duties and was well fitted for the assignment he was given. This assignment was that of establishing close and personal relations both with the Turkish Police and Turkish Intelligence Services in order to exploit the possibility of working with them, while in addition he had the task, more in keeping with his previous experience, of supervising consular and diplomatic circles in Turkey with a view to checking any attempts on the part of those circles to contact the Allies, and also to discover whether any channels of communications existed through Turkey between resistance organizations in German occupied territory and their headquarters outside the country.

(e) Relations with the Foreign Office Representative in Turkey

A notable feature of Amt VI work in Turkey was the relationship between the Amt VI representatives and von PAPPEN, the Foreign Office representative. The customary relationship between these two services in other spheres was never cordial and the reasons for the state of affairs in Turkey was due not only to MOYZISCH's conciliatory and cautious attitude, but to the fact that PAPPEN himself did not see eye to eye with RIBBENTROP and found MOYZISCH useful at times for circumventing normal channels. The exchange of information between the two departments was free, a fact which enhanced the reputation of MOYZISCH in the eyes of Amt VI. PAPPEN on occasions passed reports through Amt VI rather than through his own channels, especially when these reports contained recommendations contrary to RIBBENTROP's own policy regarding Turkey, with the hope that they would reach HIMMLER through SCHELLENBERG.

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(f) Relations with the Turkish Intelligence Services.

With the reorganisation of the Gruppo in the summer of 1944 and the joint appointment of GRAEFTE and SCHELLENBERG as Gruppenleiter and Amtschef respectively, there started a series of attempts to establish collaboration between Amt VI and the Turkish Intelligence Services. At that time and during the course of the following year, the general war situation was very much in favour of Germany and the time seemed opportune to woo the Turkish authorities from their official standing with the Western Allies. The hope of success in this venture lay not only in the generally favourable situation, but also in the fact that Turkey, while seeking friendship with the Allies, had also a deep-seated fear of the Soviet Union.

GRAEFTE himself visited Ankara soon after his appointment to urge MOYZISCH to take the first steps, and in early 1942 a meeting took place between MOYZISCH, PAPAN, and PERKEL, the head of the Turkish I.S., a meeting which however produced no results. The efforts were continued during the next year and SCHELLENBERG himself visited Turkey in July 1943 for a similar purpose but again without success.

The importance attached to this matter by Amt VI was evidenced by WOLF's appointment to Istanbul in June 1942, one of his specific assignments being to establish contact with the Turkish Intelligence Service. The official meetings between the two services were, however, arranged only through MOYZISCH in Ankara, WOLF confining himself to establishing contact with a certain PERRUH, working for the Turkish I.S., a contact which in any case did not materialise until early 1944.

The efforts of Amt VI in this direction were a failure in the essential points, as no working arrangement was ever agreed to; the Turkish attitude was of course conditioned by the developments on the fighting fronts, her early policy being to maintain a balance between Germany and Britain without committing herself to either side, but after the Russian successes from 1943 onwards, her concern was to act as intermediary between the two powers with a view to strengthening her position against Russia. In the circumstances, therefore, it was never Turkey's policy to compromise her intelligence service with Germany, while at the same time making unofficial contacts for immediate benefit to herself.

(g) Contacts with the Turkish Intelligence Service.

The result of this manoeuvring on both sides was that from 1942 onwards both MOYZISCH and later WOLF had established contacts with the Turkish I.S. without any definite policy being agreed on. MOYZISCH on his side had established relations from an early date with BAYRAMOGLU, who was connected with the Turkish I.S. and through whom various approaches were made by that service on matters involving both Turkish and German Foreign policy in the Mediterranean, especially regarding the status of the Dodecanese Islands under Italian control. It was BAYRAMOGLU too who acted as intermediary between PAPAN and PERKEL prior to their meeting in early 1942, while after the break in Turkish-German relations in the summer of 1944, he again approached MOYZISCH with an offer that he should act as an intermediary between Berlin and the Western Allies with a view to inaugurating peace-talks, a move which would have suited Turkey's foreign policy. This approach was abortive. Throughout their association, however, BAYRAMOGLU furnished MOYZISCH with information on diplomatic matters of interest to Germany.

The approach to WOLF in February 1944 through PERRUH had similar motives, and after preliminary discussions, PERRUH gave more definite indications of good faith by supplying WOLF with information on the imminence of the Vormehron volte-face and subsequent information on the efforts of Germans in Turkey to seek the right of Turkish asylum. Again, in May 1944, the Turkish authorities connived at, and even assisted in the passage of Georgian agents of Abwehr II over the Turco-Russian border, under the leadership of the Georgian minority leader, KEDLA. The approach took concrete form immediately prior to the formal severance of relations between Turkey and

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Germany with the suggestion from the Turkish side that the German representatives should remain in contact by W/T with PERRON to whom a W/T net was provided for the purpose, in order that a link should be maintained between WOLF and Berlin. Through this means WOLF and SPRENG, the Consul, kept in intermittent contact with Berlin until January 1945.

(h) Other Contacts in Turkey.

Apart from a few paid agents of minor importance, the contacts for information purposes established by MOYZISCH were in journalistic circles such as the Transocean and DNB services and in business circles, most of whom were Germans established in Turkey with good connections. In addition, he collaborated closely with LOKI, a Japanese diplomat in the country politically well informed, who also supplied MOYZISCH with Russian newspapers for onward transmission to Berlin, and with WUUTANEN, the Finnish military attache in Ankara, who offered in August 1944 to send information on behalf of MOYZISCH to Berlin as well as to Helsinki in the event of the latter being unable to maintain contact in view of the impending break in Turco-German relations. This arrangement was left in the hands of MOYZISCH's W/T assistant PATEK for technical details.

In Istanbul WOLF established contact with representatives of the Bulgarian Intelligence Service, who supplied information on the general political situation, and with an agent of the Czech I.S. which however represented an attempt at penetration by that service. A more notable contact in view of subsequent events was that with URLATIANO of the Roumanian I.S. From early 1943 onwards WOLF was in close touch with URLATIANO who supplied information on the internal Roumanian political situation. When URLATIANO was relieved of his position as Consul in May 1944, steps were taken by SCHUBACK to recruit him as a stay-behind agent in Turkey; this recruitment is dealt with under the 'Mob' organisation below.

(i) The 'Mob' Organisation.

The 'Mob' organisation was the name given to the stay-behind network to be set up by Amt VI in Turkey in accordance with the general instructions to all Amt VI representatives in neutral and occupied territory to prepare I-Netze and R-Netze in the event of Allied invasion or expulsion from neutral territory. Instructions for the preparation of the network were given to both WOLF and MOYZISCH in the course of 1943, but while the scheme was regarded with a certain amount of enthusiasm in Berlin, it received a very lukewarm reception from both Amt VI representatives in Turkey. In Istanbul KROEGER, the W/T operator at the Consulate-General, was recruited for the purpose, but though agreeing to the assignment, had no intention of carrying it out. WOLF for his part pleaded lack of trained personnel, pointing out that only URLATIANO was equipped for such a task. It was for this purpose therefore that SCHUBACK visited Turkey to contact URLATIANO personally and to make arrangements. The other links in the Istanbul sector were provided by VI C. Marion GRAB arrived in Turkey in November 1943 as a link, but left for Germany again in August 1944 on the instructions of WOLF himself, as he considered him completely blown with the Turks. At about the same time SCHUBACK sent a Swiss, Louis MUELLER, to act in a similar capacity, but the link did not operate. Finally, an Italian named GENOVESI arrived in February 1944 to set himself up with the help of DUPLITZER. GENOVESI, however, destroyed his act as he considered the mission too dangerous. The main hope in Istanbul was URLATIANO; the link operated for a short time only, but his activities were known to the Turkish I.S., as PERRON revealed in making his approach to WOLF in January 1945.

If the success of the Mob organisation was very limited in the Istanbul area, the position in Ankara was still weaker as a result of the attitude of MOYZISCH, who took steps to ensure that the scheme would not work. Two agents were recruited on instructions from Berlin, but in one case MOYZISCH gave no instructions to the agent concerned, in the other case altered the final instructions from Berlin regarding the date on which contact was to be established in order that the link would not become effective.

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In the circumstances therefore it is not surprising that the attempts at a network in Turkey were a complete failure.

(j) The Break in Turkish Relations with Germany.

The break with Turkey came in August 1944; as a result the German representatives in the country were interned, including all the Amt VI personnel. Operations came to an end, except for the link which was preserved through the Turkish I.S., as explained in paragraph (g) above, and for the offer of WITTEN mentioned in paragraph (h), the results of which are unknown.

(k) The Cicero Material.

The Cicero case represents the greatest scoop on the part of Amt VI in any theatre of their operations. From November 1943 until March 1944 MOYZISCH in Ankara was successful in establishing a source of information which provided material of consistently high importance obtained from direct access to secret documents relating to British interests in the Middle East. The material thus obtained was passed immediately back to Amt VI, but it is a somewhat incidental feature of the Cicero material that its importance was such that in the eyes of Amt VI it was treated with reserve, as it was suspected of being in the nature of an allied plant. Intelligent use of the material might have given the Germans invaluable information on the Second Front. In addition to this military information, the documents provided high grade political information. The source stopped completely in March 1944.

(l) The Remo Organisation.

The exact nature of the PASHA and REMO organisations is still one of the unexplained points in the Middle East, and it is only possible at the moment to indicate the broad lines of the available evidence.

The leading personality was a certain Dr. REICHERT who was the Near East representative of the Deutsche Nachrichtenbuero in Cairo before the outbreak of war. REICHERT was deported as an undesirable alien, and from the end of 1940 continued his work in Turkey, where he remained until the beginning of 1942. Through his connections with the DNB, REICHERT was instrumental in building up a well-organised information service with sources probably in Cairo itself. The organisation was not directed either by Amt VI or by the Abwehr, but the information obtained by REICHERT was made available to these two departments according to its nature. In addition REICHERT also supplied information to the Embassy, the Propaganda Ministry, and the Foreign Office. His chief assistant in this activity was an Italian journalist, named ZAMBONI.

The information supplied by REICHERT's organisation, which went under the name of PASHA in the Abwehr and REMO in Amt VI, was of sufficiently high quality to make SCHELEMBERG suspicious of its authenticity. It was for this reason that Husein MOHR was sent to Istanbul in 1942 with the assignment of working with REICHERT in order to establish whether or not the information obtained through these sources was genuine or smoke.

The sources of the PASHA and REMO organisation are still unknown, and unfortunately REICHERT himself cannot supply the answer as he was killed in an accident early in 1943. ZAMBONI returned to Italy in July 1943 when the network ceased to operate. ZAMBONI himself was arrested in Rome and sent to Berlin for interrogation, as the Germans themselves were still uncertain as to the reliability of REICHERT's organisation.

ZAMBONI is now under interrogation at AFHQ, and the results of his interrogation may be instrumental in clearing up the outstanding points in the REMO organisation. The other personality who should be treated as a priority target in connection with this still outstanding problem is Husein MOHR himself, who returned to Germany some time in 1944, and was last reported in April 1945 at Rooter in Southern Germany.

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4. Persia

(a) Recruitment of MAYR and GAMOTHA:-

The first efforts of Amt VI at exploiting Persia as a sphere of operations were indeed half-hearted, but made a good illustration of the working methods of the Amt at that early date. Early in 1940 Ramon GAMOTHA and Fran MAYER volunteered for service in the Middle East and were accepted by JOST as prospective Beauftragte for the Amt in Persia. Neither of the new recruits had any background experience of the country whatsoever, nor was their knowledge of the language on any higher level: their qualifications for intelligence work apart from these two not inconsiderable factors were likewise nil. Nor could they in the position in which they found themselves look to Amt VI for guidance and training as the Amt had nothing to offer them. There was no Referat at that time competent for the country and the best that JOST could do for them was to attach them for a spell to the then Gruppo VI H under Starf KNOCHEN (later B&S Paris) which purported to specialise in such subjects as Freemasonry, Semitism etc. outside Germany, the connection between that Gruppo and Iran not being too clear. Nevertheless the two agents spent a short spell there virtually wasting time, although the Amt did rise on occasion to the provision of a few books on Persia itself. JOST meantime was engaged in his normal difficulties of trying to persuade the Foreign Office to grant the necessary visas.

Tired of waiting both MAYR and GAMOTHA applied to be returned to the Army, a request which was granted. Eventually however the visas were ready by August 1940, and after a false start which took them as far as Moscow before returning to Berlin because of further complications with the Foreign Office, the two Beauftragter finally left for Persia in October.

(b) Mission of MAYR and GAMOTHA:-

In reality, their troubles now only began, not however by reason of the complexity of the mission assigned to them, which consisted merely of making themselves acquainted with the country and their surroundings pending the receipt of further instructions from Berlin. They were inevitably rated to come into conflict with the Foreign Office representatives. Their position on arrival therefore was that they were both untrained in intelligence and in W/T, had received no instructions in sabotage methods, had been unable to obtain any accurate information on the country itself prior to their departure, were given no connections already existing in the country which they could profitably exploit, had been given no channel of communications apart from the Foreign Office, which facilities were promptly refused them and last but not least, had been given no specific instructions on the nature of their mission. It is hardly surprising therefore that the success or otherwise of their stay in Iran would depend entirely on the intelligence and enthusiasm which they themselves displayed and not on any guidance from Amt VI.

(c) The Allied Occupation in August 1941:-

As events turned out their official stay in the country was destined to be of short duration. In August 1941, Russian and Allied troops occupied the country following on the attempted Arab revolt, an event which took the German colony completely by surprise and which caused both MAYR and GAMOTHA to seek their own way of escape. GAMOTHA succeeded after a hazardous journey in reaching Turkey where he was interned for a spell before returning to Germany in 1943 while MAYR sought refuge among the tribes with whom he had established contact. The results achieved by the two during their stay had of course been negligible, except for the contacts which MAYR had made among the tribes, a factor which was to prove of importance later. MAYR remained in hiding throughout the winter during which time of course he was out of contact with Amt VI who were unaware of his whereabouts.

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(d) SCHULZE at Tabriz:-

During MAYR's stay in Teheran he had contacted Dr. SCHULZE, the I Luft representative at Tabriz. SCHULZE had arrived there in May 1941 to carry out normal Abwehr functions. In August 1941 SCHULZE attempted to escape into Afghanistan but was arrested near the border and returned to Teheran, where he was successful in obtaining sanctuary in the German Legation, claiming diplomatic cover. While negotiations were proceeding for his transfer to Allied authorities, SCHULZE succeeded in escaping and remained in hiding in the Teheran area for some eight months, in company with his wife. The situation therefore during the winter of 1941-42 was that both Amt VI and the Abwehr had representatives in hiding in Persia without however either service being aware of their location or being able to make contact with them. The subsequent events in Persia depended entirely on the personal initiative of these two representatives.

(e) Developments in February 1942:-

MAYR for his part remained politically inactive during the winter months in the Teheran region and it was not until early in 1942 that he felt safe enough to restart his activities. By this time MAYR had got the 'feel' of the country, and had already conceived himself in the role of a second 'Lawrence of Arabia', this time however on behalf of Germany. His early first steps were to create and foster an effective 'fifth column' among the Persian tribes which offered good scope for such work. In February he was successful in re-establishing contact with SCHULZE by means of one of his couriers VAZIRI while at the same time he visited the Japanese Legation in Teheran to discuss the situation with the Japanese there. Meantime a meeting was arranged between MAYR and SCHULZE, when it was mutually arranged that the two should agree to a functional division of interest in Persia, MAYR to concentrate on the fostering of a fifth column and the organisation of a political espionage system, while SCHULZE would deal with military matters. In April MAYR again contacted the Japanese Legation now due for expulsion and at this meeting the Legation bequeathed MAYR with five old W/T sets, while MAYR gave the Japanese a message to be sent to Berlin via Ankara and Tokyo giving an account of the situation and suggesting a code which might be used if MAYR were successful in getting his W/T sets to work.

The following month SCHULZE's position in Teheran became too difficult owing to the arrest of one of his couriers. It was then decided that the division between MAYR and SCHULZE should be geographical and not functional, MAYR to remain in the North, while SCHULZE would be responsible for all activities in the South. SCHULZE therefore left for the Qashgh territory, establishing good relations by promise of delivery of arms and ammunition from Germany, maintaining at the same time contact with MAYR in the North by means of the courier system. SCHULZE also set about the preparation of a landing ground for the expected expedition from Germany. At the same time he had been provided with one of MAYR's W/T sets to attempt to establish contact with Berlin.

(f) Attempts to contact Berlin:-

The major weakness in the situation was of course that neither MAYR nor SCHULZE had found it possible to contact Berlin, and the continual success of their operations depended on help being provided from the quarter in order to keep the tribes in good humour. In August MAYR sent a courier to contact the German Embassy in Ankara carrying with them a letter signed on behalf of SCHULZE which requested the despatch of a W/T operator from Berlin and of course, money. The letter also suggested a code which should be used in sending any reply.

It is interesting to note the method suggested by MAYR for receiving messages from Berlin, a method he had already proposed in the message given to the Japanese in Teheran in April. The suggestion was that the Germans should send their reply quite openly through the 'Kameradschaftsdienst' broadcasts to German Forces, using at the same time

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the simple code proposed by MAYR. It was in fact by this method that MAYR learned in the course of August that the message given to the Japanese in Teheran had reached Berlin via Ankara and Tokyo; in October a similar message was received through the same channel confirming the arrival of the courier in Ankara and promising that a courier was on the way to MAYR with a message, a false ray of hope for MAYR as when the courier did in fact arrive with a message in the shape of a small pill wrapped in paper, it was beyond even the ingenuity and resource of MAYR to discover what message the pill or paper contained. Nothing daunted, MAYR sent a further courier in January 1943 to Ankara, this time with much more definite and business-like proposals, giving three alternative landing-grounds for projected parachute operations and a code whereby the type of mission and the landing ground to be used would be indicated. In February a reply was received that operations were in course of preparation.

(g) Events in Berlin:-

After the occupation of Persia in August 1941 both the Abwehr and Amt VI were completely unaware of the fate of their representatives in the country and were as a result quite ignorant of the activities of MAYR and SCHULZE during the winter of 1941-42. Until MAYR's message was received from Tokio therefore, both services had been pursuing independent lines for further operations in the country, the Abwehr on their side making some effort to use the Persian colony in Germany for the purpose, while Amt VI had taken no more vigorous action than the sending of EAST to Ankara with instructions to exploit the Middle East territory. No specific plans were therefore in course of preparation, though it is to be remembered that in the course of 1942 the German armies were already penetrating deep into Russian territory, and VI C presumably did not attach too great importance to Persia in the expectation that they would enter the country by military operations. The expected and much-heralded success in the East would make everything else quite simple.

The arrival of the first message from Tokio preceded by a few weeks only what was to prove the turning point in the war: in September both Stalingrad and Cairo seemed about to fall, by October the Allies were counter-attacking in the desert and Stalingrad remained uncaptured and a Russian counter-attack was on the way. Interest in Persia therefore increased as that country represented a slender link between the two powers. At the time therefore when the importance of Persia in the general pattern of the war became apparent both the Abwehr and the SD suddenly became aware that they had active and enterprising representation in the country, and both services set about exploiting the unexpected wind-fall.

(h) Preparation for Expedition:-

The collaboration between MAYR and SCHULZE presented problems to Berlin, as both the Abwehr and Amt VI claimed that exploitation of the situation was their affair. Finally it was agreed that any mission sent in reply to the appeals of MAYR and SCHULZE should be under joint control, a factor which in fact was greatly to weaken the effectiveness of the operations. In addition neither service was inclined to be guided by the recommendation of MAYR, whose specific request was for a W/T operator, money and arms. To the SD however, Persia represented a supply line to Russia, and their main interest was to sabotage that supply line. The expedition therefore which was sent to Persia in the course of the following year failed to exploit the situation to the best advantage and a potentially dangerous situation for the Allies did not fully materialise. The expeditions were ill-conceived and rendered ineffective the good work of both MAYR and SCHULZE during the long period in which they had operated alone.

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(i) The Franz Expedition:-

The Franz expedition consisted of six agents, Ustuf BLUHME, Ustuf ROCKSTROH, Ustuf HOLZAPFEL, Ustuf GRILLE, Obergefreiter KOENDGEN and Obergefreiter KOEHL. The SD personnel of the above had been in training at the Oranienburg Camp where their training had commenced at the end of 1942. The importance attached to their mission by Amt VI is evidenced by the fact that the party was invited to a party at which KRIEGER, SCHILLER and GRUBER were all present. Of the Abwehr personnel KOENDGEN and KOEHL, KOENDGEN had been a member of the Brandenburg Division while KOEHL had previous experience in Persia itself where in fact he had already met MAYR in 1941. The Abwehr party therefore would have suited MAYR's purpose, but VI C insisted on representation with the result that the final party of six was eventually despatched landing in Persia in the first days of April, the party soon being reduced to five as a result of the death of KOEHL.

The nature of the mission given to the Franz expedition in so far as it involved sabotage did not meet with MAYR's approval but in this instance he was successful in persuading the party to abandon their mission and conform to his ideas. The party split into two groups, BLUHME and KOENDGEN going South as the 'Dora' expedition, with whom contact was maintained by W/T, the Dora group being unable to contact Berlin directly. In addition a courier system was maintained. It is to be noted that early in August the Dora group received further arms and ammunition from Germany by parachute.

(j) The Anton Expedition:-

Meanwhile SCHULZE in the South was finding it increasingly difficult to maintain good relations with the Qashgai tribes as his repeated promises of help from Germany were not materialising. When SCHULZE therefore learned by courier of the safe arrival of the Franz expedition for his territory in the South, a request which MAYR duly passed on to which there came the ominous reply that plans were already underway without however any indication of the nature of the expedition or its personnel. MAYR's fears that again the expedition would be wrongly planned and conceived were only too well founded. MAYR's conception was still that the situation in Persia lent itself to political exploitation while Berlin thought only in terms of sabotage. On July 16th the Anton expedition landed in the South consisting of four agents under the leadership of Ustuf KURMIS with Kurt PIWONKA, Kurt HERBERS as W/T operators and a Persian interpreter, FARZAD. Though the party was primarily SD, Abwehr II had collaborated in the training and preparation, FARZAD having been an Abwehr agent prior to joining the expedition. The choice of personnel was unfortunate as KURMIS showed no intention of either acting under MAYR or even co-operating with him being the typical Nazi fanatic, young, impetuous and intransigent. KURMIS had been in 1940 Leiter of Amt VI on the SD-Abschnitt Memel.

(k) Deterioration in the Situation:-

It is a curious and significant feature of events in Persia at this time that where MAYR and SCHULZE had met with no little success in establishing good relations with the tribes and fomenting a potentially dangerous 5th Column within the country during the period in which they acted singly without help from Berlin, the situation generally deteriorated when they succeeded in their primary object of establishing contact with Berlin. The main reason of course lay in the fact that the policy adopted by Berlin did not agree with that which had been in operation for over a year in Persia.

In the space of five months three expeditions had been successfully carried out - the Franz expedition in the North, the reinforcement operation for the Dora Group, and the Anton expedition in the South, though the Bertha operation which was planned to reinforce Franz did not materialise.

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In spite of these operations however the situation was not improved: apart from the lack of cohesion in policy between Berlin and Persia itself, there was the additional factor that with the war situation now going against Germany, the tribes themselves were less disposed to co-operate, especially in the South where SCHULZE had been living on unfulfilled promises. Indeed SCHULZE's and KURMIS's group remained virtual prisoners throughout the winter of 1943 and were unsuccessful in making any W/T contact with Berlin. Meanwhile the Qashgai brothers themselves were under arrest in Cairo and negotiations were opened up for an exchange of personnel. Finally in March 1944 SCHULZE and three others were handed over to the British authorities, KURMIS however avoiding capture by committing suicide.

The situation in the North had come to a head even more rapidly. In August 1943 a Persian army officer was arrested and admitted having been in contact with MAYR. Through this lead ROCKSTON was arrested with his W/T set on the 14th, MAYR himself the following day, and HOLZMANN on the 16th. The arrest of GRILLE, the other member, was not long delayed. The Dora Group was liquidated soon afterwards. Thus by October 1943 the MAYR/SCHULZE enterprise had been virtually ended.

5. Syria, Iraq, Palestine.

(a) General:-

The general picture giving the background of Amt VI activity in those countries has already been given in Part I. There was of course no direct representation in any of those countries and exploitation of the territory was variously carried out from Turkey under FAWT and DUBLETTER, under the Unternehmen OTTO in 1941-43 and directly by Gruppe VI C in 1943-45. The following paragraphs therefore merely summarise the missions which were directed by these various controlling agencies, in chronological order.

(b) The Papadopoulos Mission:-

The Papadopoulos mission in June 1943 represented the first attempt by Dienststelle 5000 under VI F/O to penetrate the Middle East, the mission given to Papadopoulos and his companion LAVIENTLIDES being one of sabotage and moral subversion. The mission was a failure although LAVIENTLIDES was eventually released after interrogation and made his way to Cairo. The operation was an unimportant one, except that it was the first sign of any Amt VI activity in the Middle-East theatre.

(c) The Swedkowitz Mission:-

X SWEDKOWICZ was a Pole employed from 1940 in the organisation TODT until his recruitment in December 1942 by the SD-Abschnitt Klagenfurt. That Stelle then handed SWEDKOWICZ over to Amt VI, where VI F/O recruited him for a sabotage and subversive mission. The Unternehmen Otto had only recently been created under the order of HIMMLER (see Liquidation Report on Gruppe VI F) and the Naheres-Osten Abteilung came under the control of Gustaf MANDL, later of Gruppe VI E. SWEDKOWICZ was trained in sabotage, handling of weapons, and cypher, but not in W/T as his channel of communication was to be by letter to a cover-address in Prague. After about five months intermittent training SWEDKOWICZ was finally despatched early in July via Austria, Jugoslavia and Greece to proceed through Turkey to either Palestine or Syria with instructions to join the Polish Forces or obtain employment in some capacity with the Poles, posing as a refugee. Once established he was to communicate through his cover-address giving details of his location, when steps would be taken to contact him through another agent. SWEDKOWICZ crossed the Turkish frontier on July 20th and gave himself up to the Turkish police, but was soon broken under interrogation.

(d) The Merz Mission:-

The Merz mission remains still uncertain as to its exact purpose: Kriminaloberassistent MERZ had been a member of the Kripo since

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1935, who in the course of 1943 had been active on behalf of Gruppe VI D of Amt IV in Poland combatting Polish resistance movements. In the course of this work MERZ became acquainted with the leader of a Polish movement who openly suggested a rapprochement between the movement and the Germans, also suggesting that contact should be made with the Polish forces in the Middle-East with a view to presenting a united front against the Russians. The suggestion did not meet with official approval but later when MERZ had been transferred to the Sipe Hamburg he was summoned to Amt VI through the recommendation of BYLITZ of VI C whose acquaintance he had made a few months before at a Kommando's course and who was aware of his Middle-East plan. It was now suggested that the plan be put into operation under Amt VI control. The subsequent events leading up to the actual mission are complicated in the extreme and irrelevant to the purpose of this publication: in October 1943 MERZ was sent on a mission similar to that given to SWEDKOWICZ, that is to establish contacts in the Middle-East with Polish circles, and once these contacts had been established, Amt VI could exploit them to its own advantage. It was intended in due course to organise a sabotage network working against the supply lines through Iraq and Iran. The sabotage side of this mission came under MANDL of VI F/O, while the espionage aspect was dealt with by VI C 13. MERZ was broken, and then not completely, only after long and detailed interrogation. His mission of course was a failure.

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(e) The Emanuel Case:-

The Emanuel case represented the first attempts of VI C 13 in the course of 1943 to strengthen its links from Berlin to the Middle East through Athens and Turkey. Since the end of 1942, VI C 13 had had representatives in Athens firstly through BYLITZ subsequently through TAPIENBOECK and finally KOHLHAAS, their function being to facilitate the passage of agents into the Middle East. To strengthen this chain still further EMMANUEL was sent to Turkey in April 1944, to contact DUPLITZER in Istanbul and assist the passage of agents through Turkey. EMMANUEL was arrested in Turkey on arrival.

(f) The Chaoun Group

The Chaoun group consisted of Raymond CHAOUN, his wife and a Tunisian Arab, a member of the Mufti group: CHAOUN had been recruited for his mission through the Diemastatello in Paris following on his arrest in Southern France early in 1944, after it had been learned that he had a knowledge of Syria. After a short stay in Berlin under VI C 13 CHAOUN and his wife were sent in the first stage of their mission to Athens where they were looked after by KOHLHAAS and where they were introduced to their W/T operator BLAMA, who had received his training with the Mufti group at the Itaque and Lehnitz. The mission given to the Chaoun group was to organise a political espionage network in the Damascus area. The party was arrested on landing on the Turkish coast.

(g) The Letay Mission:-

The Letay mission closely resembled that of the Chaoun group: LETAY was recruited at the end of 1943 by VI C 13 through Stuber/NOETTL of VI E, after GAMOTHA had failed to persuade him to join the still-born 'Norma' expedition. It had been planned that LETAY would be despatched to Syria through KOHLHAAS in Athens and EMMANUEL in Turkey but this arrangement fell through and only after considerable delay was LETAY finally sent on his mission late in August 1944. LETAY surrendered on arrival and confessed to the nature of his mission.

(h) The Rizos Case:-

The Rizos mission was the last effort of VI C in the Middle East. RIZOS had been active on behalf of the Italian I.S. as early as 1941

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and was responsible for the recruitment of several agents despatched to the Middle East from Italy. On the collapse of Italy he was contacted by the Germans and questioned about the agents for whom he had been responsible. Quite contrary to fact RIZOS succeeded in persuading TAPPENBOECK of VI C 13 that a network still existed and suggested that he be sent to revive it in the interests of Amt VI. In July 1944 KOHLHAAS became case officer for the enterprise and RIZOS was sent to Berlin for final training. He was sent on his mission on February 1945 and was arrested in Turkey on arrival and handed over to the British authorities. A noteworthy feature of the mission was the large sum of £50,000 carried by RIZOS.

(i) The Atlas Expedition:-

The Atlas expedition to Palestine in October 1944 was the only effort on the part of Gruppe VI C to exploit the Mufti group, which for nearly two years had been a source of considerable expense to the Amt. During the course of 1943, the Mufti group of agents had been under training in sabotage and W/T but no clear picture for their use seems ever to have been established by VI C. In point of fact the Atlas expedition was conceived in its initial stages by Dr. LORCH of Gruppe VI C (Forschungsstelle Orient) who submitted to GRUPE late in 1943 a detailed plan which he entitled the 'Operation ELIAS' setting out a comprehensive course of action to be adopted by Amt VI to exploit the Arab situation. LORCH's nephew (Oblt) WIELAND formerly of the Lehrregiment Brandenburg offered his services for a mission on Palestine both to Abwehr I and II before being accepted by Amt VI. WIELAND now took over the ELIAS expedition, renaming it Atlas, at the same time making use of the Lehrregiment Brandenburg to suitable material for personnel. From this source he finally recruited Lt. FRANK and Oberfeldwebel DEININGER. Liaison was established with the Mufti group from which two further agents were recruited Abdul LATIF and Hassan SALIH. Preparations for the expedition occupied the greater part of 1944, involving much discussion with the Mufti regarding the control of the mission, it being finally decided that the technical preparations should be in the hands of WIELAND and Gruppe VI C, but that on landing the German part of the group should merely act as a link between the Arab part and the Mufti. The mission given to the expedition was likewise in two parts, the Arabs to organise guerrilla bands to work against Jews and Jewish interests in Palestine and control them, the German party to provide the W/T communication and act as technical advisers in the training of the Guerilla bands. It was agreed that the German party would not undertake any independent action.

The expedition finally started in October 1944 after some delay, WIELAND, FRANK and LATIF being arrested eleven days after landing.

(j) The Iraqi Expedition:-

The Iraqi parachute expedition which landed in Iraq in November 1944 consisted of four agents of the Mufti group who had undergone sabotage and W/T training at the Hague and Lehnitz. The training and planning of the operations were much more under the control of the Mufti than in the case of 'Atlas' and it is noteworthy that no Germans were included in the party. The mission given to the group was that of organising armed bands to fight the Jews both in Palestine and Iraq so that in substance the mission had an aim similar to the Atlas expedition. Of the party, two were arrested almost immediately, the other two, including the leader of the party Abu SALIH managing to escape. It is not known what success or otherwise was obtained by the two agents remaining at liberty.

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Part IV. Gruppe VI C and the Far East.

1. Controlling References:-

In the original organization of Abt VI, Referat VI C 3 under Haachaf HINNEY and Reg. Abst. WILHELMER (who died in late 1940) was the competent Referat for the Far East, this remaining in force until the expansion of the Gruppe in 1941 when the Far East was spread over Referat 4 - 11, with the following sub-divisions.

Referat VI C 4-6	-	Japan
VI C 7-8	-	China
VI C 9	-	Manchukuo, Inner and Outer Mongolia.
VI C 10	-	Thailand and French Indo-China.
VI C 11	-	Dutch Indies and Philipinos.

The next organisational change occurred at the time of the general reorganisation of Gruppe VI C in September 1944 when the Gruppe was divided into Abteilungen, each Abteilung having its internal Referate. The Far East now came under the control of Abteilung VI C 4, having the following internal organisation:-

Referent : Stabst WEIRACH

Referat VI C 4a	Intelligence	Ang. KIRPPEL
VI C 4a I	Recruiting and briefing of agents.	WILHELMER
VI C 4b	Scientific Analysis	Ostuf LEO
VI C 4b I	Press and Journalists	KLINGENBERG
VI C 4c	Evaluation	CLASSEN
VI C 4c I	Preparation of Reports	WEINERT.

2. Personalities:-

The Abt VI personalities concerned with the Far East were few in number and contained few specialists until the creation of Abt VI C 4 in September 1944. From 1940 until 1944, the leading personalities were Haachaf WEIRACH, Haachaf MEYER, Ostuf LEO and Haachaf HINNEY. The former Referent WEIRACH had no specialist qualifications for the post he held, his chief virtue being his industry and conscientiousness. MEYER had been in charge of Indo-China but was transferred to Abt VI C 3 (The Near East) in October 1944. Of these early personalities only Ostuf LEO had any specialist qualifications. He had been the former director of the Propaganda Office of the Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete in Tokyo, and had studied in Japan for many years, received his doctorate there. His knowledge of Japan was therefore extensive.

On the creation of Abt VI C 4, several new personalities with considerable qualifications were introduced into the Abteilung, the most outstanding being Ang. KIRPPEL and Ostuf CLASSEN, both of whom had considerable Japanese background. (CLASSEN had previously been in VI C in 1941, but had spent the years 1942-44 in active service at the Front). The other newcomers, Uffz. KLINGENBERG and WEINERT had no special qualifications.

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3. Representatives Abt VI C 4:-

VI C had no representatives in the Far East: the only representation on behalf of the RSHA was through the Polizei Attache MEISINGER, a Bavarian friend of WELTER Attache IV who was quite unsuited to his task and produced no results. MEISINGER had assistants in Hongkong and Shanghai. In 1940 a Dr. Werner KOWEN had gone to Japan to study there and was contacted by Abt VI with a view to working for them, an enterprise which led to nothing. KOWEN was a member of the S.S. Munchener Bewegung who limited his Far Eastern activity to wild liaison with MEISINGER.

4. Abt VI and the Japanese:-

Until the creation of Abt VI C 4 in September 1944 Abt VI activity in the Far East had been on a very restricted scale as a result of official policy which regarded Japan as an ally to be trusted, falling into the same category as Italy, where the Fuhrerbefehl had forbidden espionage activities of any kind. It was considered that a true picture of the situation in the Far East could be obtained through official channels and through the various Japanese representatives in Berlin itself. The official attitude to Japan was a friendly one, but neither WEITZEL had displayed the same confidence in their ally. There was however no recognized link between the intelligence services of the two countries though to a lesser extent contact had been established through Onodera in Stockholm and through a contact of HOYZISCH in Ankara.

5. Activities after the Creation of Abt VI C 4:-

This official attitude continued to exist until the end but with the creation of Abt VI C 4 in September 1944 the unofficial attitude underwent a marked change. Personnel with the necessary qualification were introduced into the Gruppe and the work of Abt VI C 4 was henceforth directed towards providing the authorities concerned with a true picture of the Far Eastern situation based on its own sources of information and not on the official Japanese statements. In support of this policy steps were taken to recruit V-Männer for the Abteilung and in addition missions were planned for the despatch of agents to the Far East itself. The recruitment of V-Männer was in order primarily to conduct espionage operations against the Japanese in Europe. This activity met with no little success as the specialists in the Gruppe already had well established contacts in Japanese circles and in a short time the Abteilung not only issued a monthly report giving a general picture of the Far Eastern situation but also issued an appendix to the report forecasting the trend of future events. This type of work against the Japanese was greatly facilitated by the attitude of the Abteilung itself which tended to be anti-Japanese in contrast to the official policy. This development in VI C 4 activity however was of short duration as by the end of the year all VI C activity was devoted to the situation on the Russian Front.

6. Sources of Abt VI C 4:-

The main sources open to VI C 4 were of two kinds - through direct intelligence from the Far East through MEISINGER and through exploitation of Japanese circles in Europe itself. (MEISINGER proved to be a complete failure and it was mainly due to this that steps were taken to set up an independent network in the Far East by the despatch of V-Männer by submarine from Germany). This latter move was rendered inoperative owing to the deterioration in the general war situation.

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Organisation of Abt VI C 4:-

The organisation of the new Abteilung has already been given in paragraph I above. The Abteilung was divided into three Referate, one concerned with Erfassung, one with analysis and the third with evaluation. VI C 4a, the Erfassungs referat received all reports which it classified and passed to VI C 4c for final evaluation, that Referat being responsible for the preparation of the consolidated final report for presentation to the higher authorities such as the Amtschef, the Cds, the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Propaganda. Reports were also passed by VI C 4a to VI C 4b which acted as the link between the Abteilung and the Ostasien Institute under Gruppe VI G. Referat VI C 4b was also responsible for the maintenance of a card index on East Asiatic personalities in public life.

8. Sources Available to Abt VI C 4:-

a) V-Leute

Mainly through CLASSEN and KIRFEL, the following V-Leute were at the disposal of the Abteilung, most of them having connections with Japanese circles in Germany:

Admiral FORSTNER	Director of the Deutsch-Japanische Gesellschaft, Berlin.
Legationssr. BRAUN	Far-East Department of the Foreign Office.
Dr. JAKOB	Assistant to BRAUN.
Herr SCHARFEN	Liaison officer for the Japanese Embassy to the Press Department.
Hr. Alla MEYER	Chief Secretary in the Manchurian Legation.
Herr VOGELER	Chief Secretary to the Japanese Military Attaché.
Herr FERNBERG	Secretary in the Manchurian Legation.
Frau Dr. GERNBERG	Scientist with East-Asian connections.
Von HOPPELSTEN	Chief of the Indo-Chinese Colony Berlin.
Dr. RICHTER	Head of Germano-Manchurian Economic Union.

b) German Sources:-

i) Abteilung C 4 of the OKW:-

Provided intercepts of Far-Eastern W/T traffic.

ii) Deutsche Nachrichtenbüro.

iii) 'Transocean' Information Büro.

iv) Sochausdienst; the W/T listening station of the Foreign Office.

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German Sources continued.

v) The 'Stoland' Referat in Hamburg, which is reported to have provided information of value from a source known as BORIS, details of which are lacking.

vi) The Ostasien Institute of Gruppe VI C under Prof. DONATH.

c) Outside Sources:-

i) The Polish Attache - MEISINGER in Tokio.

9. Abteilung VI C 4 and its projected plans in the Far East:-

a) Despatch of agents:-

It was planned by Abt VI C 4 to set up its own network to operate in the Nanking area. For this purpose it was proposed to send Dr. KIRFEL as adjutant to the Air Attache there to work under cover as an interpreter, having as his chief agents Indo-Chinese Tran van TRONG, van MUC and van WAW, who would respectively be placed with would respectively be placed with auxiliary W/T sets at Shanghai, Indo-China and Kalgen. The agents were given W/T training through VI F. The scheme was abandoned owing to the irruence of the German collapse.

b) Liaison with the Japanese:-

It was also proposed to set up a VI C 4 Liaison post with Onodera in Stockholm but this project did not materialise. The general relations of Gruppe VI C with the Japanese have already been dealt with, and they can be briefly described as being of mutual distrust and suspicion. The Stockholm project was an isolated one and was not indicative of any general improvement between the two countries.

10. Conclusion:-

It is not difficult to arrive at the conclusion that the work of Abt VI C 4 was a failure: the reasons for this failure have been aptly summarised by the Referat himself, WEIRAUH, who has pointed out the lack of co-operation from the Foreign Office, lack of qualified personnel, the enormous distances involved, lack of directive from higher levels, and the general lack of interest in Far Eastern matters. The Abteilung had no independent sources of its own and was hardly competent to handle what information it did receive from other sources, mostly overt.

Arrests:-

There is still a serious gap in arrests affected among personnel of Gruppe VI C as far as the Middle East is concerned. So far all the information obtained on Abt VI activities against the Middle East has been obtained chiefly from captured agents themselves or from members of Abt VI not directly concerned with such activity. The target personalities concerned are the following:-

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Ostuf BELLING	-	VI C 3
Stubaf BEISSNER	-	VI C 3
Hastuf GAMONIA	-	VI C 3
Hastuf MATSIJAK	-	VI C 2
Hastuf MOHR	-	VI C 12
Stubaf SCHUBACK	-	VI C 12

Any of the above personalities under arrest should be interrogated on the identity of Amt VI agents despatched to and employed in the Middle and Near East. It is not considered necessary to interrogate any further on the organization and personalities of the Gruppe itself.

W.R.C.3.
28.2.46.

Distribution: Standard for Situation Reports.

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APPENDIX I

Chart of Distribution of Work in Amt VI from 1939-1945.

	1939 - 1940	Early 1941	Mid 1941-42	1942 - 1944	1944 - 1945
VI A	Administration etc.	General Intelligence Tasks Abroad (7 sections)	Administration etc.	Administration etc.	Administration, etc.
VI B	Technical Section	Europe Africa Near East (10 sections)	Slovakia Hungary Roumania Yugoslavia Greece Turkey Iraq, Iran Afghanistan	France Low Countries Switzerland Spain Portugal	France Low Countries Switzerland Spain Portugal Italy (since 1944)
VI C	Russia Baltic States Far East	Russia Far East (11 sections)	Russia Japan China Finland Baltic States	Russia Near East Far East (13 sections)	Russia Near East Far East (4 sections by mid-44)
VI D	Hungary Slovakia Yugoslavia Roumania Bulgaria Greece Turkey	Anglo-American sphere (9 sections)	Gr. Britain Br. Empire USA S. America Sweden Norway Denmark	Anglo-American sphere (3 sections)	Anglo-American sphere & Scandinavia (from summer 1944)
VI E	Italy Spain Portugal Central and South America	Ideological Enemies abroad (6 sections) (previously VI H)	France Low Countries Spain Portugal Italy Switzerland	Central Europe Balkans Italy Scandinavia	Balkan States
VI F	France Low Countries Switzerland Luxemburg	Technical Section	Technical Section	Technical Section	Technical Section
VI G	Gr. Britain Br. Empire USA Norway	-	Ideological Enemies abroad	Research (from August 1942)	Research
VI H	Ideological Enemies abroad	-	-	-	-

Note: The above Chart serves merely as a rough guide to the organisational changes in Amt VI. The dates should be taken as approximate only.

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APPENDIX II

Organisational Changes in Gruppe VI C 1939-45.

1. Organisation 1939-41.

Gruppenleiter - Ostubaf VIETINGHOFF-SCHEEL.

<u>Referat</u>	<u>Sachgebiet</u>	<u>Referent</u>
VI C 1	Russia	Hastuf WESTERNHAGEN
VI C 2	Baltic States	Ostuf FOELKERSAM
VI C 3	Far East	Haschaf HINNEY

2. Organisation 1941-42.

Gruppenleiter - Stubaf GRAEFE

<u>Referat</u>	<u>Sachgebiet</u>	<u>Referent</u>
VI C 1-2	Russia & Baltic States	Reg Rat GIRGENSOHN
VI C 3	Ukraine	Hastuf DRESSLER
VI C 4-6	Japan))))) Hastuf WEIRAUCH
VI C 7-8	China	
VI C 9	Manchukuo & Mongolia	
VI C 10	Thailand & French Indo-China	
VI C 11	Dutch Indies & Phillipines	
VI C 12	Turkey, Iran, & Afghanistan	Hastuf SCHUBACK
VI C 13	The Arab countries	Ang EM

3. Organisation 1942-44.

Gruppenleiter - Ostubaf GRAEFE

<u>Referat</u>	<u>Sachgebiet</u>	<u>Referent</u>
VI C 1-3	Russia, Baltic States, and Ukraine	Stubaf HENGELHAUPT
VI C(Z)	Unternehmen Zeppelin	Ostubaf ROEDER
VI C 4-6	Japan))))) Hastuf WEIRAUCH
VI C 7-8	China	
VI C 9	Manchukuo, Mongolia	
VI C 10	Thailand, French Indo-China	
VI C 11	Dutch Indies, Phillipines	

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APPENDIX II
(cont)

VI C 12	Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan	Hastuf SCHUBACK
VI C 13	Arab countries	Hastuf BEISSNER
VI C 14	Iran (after Jan 1944)	Hastuf GAMOTHA

4. Organisation late 1944-45.

Gruppenleiter.- Staf RAPP

<u>Abteilung</u>	<u>Sachgebiet</u>	<u>Abteilungsleiter</u>
VI C 1	Administration	Stubaf LUMM
VI C 2	Russlandabteilung	Stubaf HENGELHAUPT
VI C 3	Nah-Ostabteilung	Hastuf SCHUBACK
VI C 4	Fernostabteilung	Stubaf WEIRAUCH

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APPENDIX III

Alphabetical Index of VI C Personnel 1939-45.

(Note:- The Roster after the summer of 1945 is shown only when definitely known. Arrested personnel are underlined.)

NAME	RANK	ROSTER -6.11. 1944-45	REMARKS
AUGSBURG	Hastuf	VI C (Z)	Later joined VI WA. Brother of Dr AUGSBURG
AUGSBURG Dr	Stubaf	VI C 2	Provisionally Art VII. Deputy head of Wannsee Institute
AUTRATA	Unschaf	VI C 2	
<u>BACKHAUS</u>	Hastuf	VI C 2 (1943-4)	Arrested 22.6.45. British zone
BAMER	Stamm	VI C I	
BARDOWITZ	Hastuf	VI C (Z)	C.O. of school at Markuseggen 45.
DAYER	Rottf	VI C Z	
BECK Prof.	Ang		Training in Porada
BEINZE Dorothea	Ang	VI C Z	
BEISSNER	Stubaf	VI C I 3 VI C 3	Reported in Milan January 1945.
BELLING	Ostuf	VI C I 2 VI C 3	Reported in Innsbruck May 1945.
BELLINGHAUS	Hastuf	VI C (Z) VI C 2p	Dealt with Polish volunteers for VI C (Z)
BERNGER	Ang	VI C Z VI C I	
BERNDT	Ang	VI C 4-11	
BLUMBERG	Ustuf	VI C 3	Dismissed end of 1944
<u>BOBACH</u>	Oschaf	VI C I	Dead
BOEKKE	Uscha	VI C Z	
BOES	Ustuf	VI C Z	Moldenhauptkommando Sued
BOLDT, Fr1	Sachb	VI C	Forschungsdienst Ost
BOSCHENEN Fr1 Kzl Ang		VI C I 2	Transferred to Istanbul 1942-43
BOSSE	Ostuf	VI C	
BRAUN Ursula	Ang	VI C Z	

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NAME	RANK	REFUGEE REFUGERAT	REMARKS
		-6.14. 1944-45-	
BROSE	Ustuf	VI C 2p	
BUCHMANN	Hastuf	VI C Z	C.O. of a Zppelin Kdo
<u>BUNMEISTER</u>	Ostuf	VI C 2	Dead
DIJECH	Hachaf	VI C	In Sandberge Training Camp
CHRISTENSEN	Stubaf	VI C VI C	CO of Moldohptkdo Nord 3.45. at Weichsol 3.45.
<u>CLASSEN, Prof.</u>	Stubaf	VI C 4	Arrested British zone
COED, Fr1	Ang	VI C 13	Discharged 1944
DIETTER	Stubaf	VI C I Z/bg	Head of P// section
DITGES	Hastuf	VI C 3	
DITTRICH	Hastuf	VI C I	
<u>DRESSLER</u>	Hastuf	VI C Z	Deputy Leiter, in command Kdo Suod. Dead.
<u>DRESSLER, Frau</u>	Ang	VI C 3	Dead
DULKEIT	Ustuf	VI C 2a	
<u>DUPLITZER</u>	Stubaf	VI C 3	Representative in Turkey. Arrested British zone.
ECKHARD	Hastuf	VI C 3	Swede reported to be now in Sweden
EDER, Dr	Hastuf	VI C 12	
ENGELMEYER	Hastuf	VI C	VI C Representative with B&S CRACOW
<u>EM, Dr</u>	Ang	VI C 13	Dead
EVERHARDT	Stuschaf	VI C Z	
EYLITZ	K.K.	VI C 12	
<u>FAST</u>	Ostuf	VI C 3	Representative in Turkey. Arrested in British zone
FAUST	Hastuf	VI C Z	
FELTEN	KOS	VI C 12	
FENNER	Hastuf	VI C Z	Leitor Abt C, Haupt Kdo Sud 1941
PETTKOTTER	Hachaf	VI C Z	
FRIEDERSAENGER	Unchaf	VI C Z	Moldohptkdo Suod

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NAME	RANK	REFERAT -6.44. 1944-45	REMARKS
PLEISCHER	Uacha	VI C Z	Went to Hevelinstitut and 1944
POELKERSAM	Ostuf	VI C 2	
GAEGLER	Hauptf	VI C Z	Security Officer VI C 2
GALLMEISTER	Ing	VI C 4	
GAMOTHA	Hauptf	VI C 12 VI C 3	Reported to have deserted to Russians in Vienna 4.45.
GIRGENSOHN	Hauptf	VI C Z	Dead
GRAEFFE Dr	Ostuf	VI C	Dead. Gruppenleiter 10.11-43
GRAMOWSKI	Hauptf	VI C 12 VI C 3	Transferred to Gestapo in 1944.
GRESIPE	Ustuf	VI C Z	Member of Haupt Kdo of VI C(Z)
GRUEN	Stubaf	VI C Z	Liaison officer of Hpt. Kdo South
GRUENING	Ing	VI C 12 VI C 3	
HANDRACK Dr	Hauptf	VI C 2b	
HANISCH	Ostuf	VI C Z	
HART, Frl	Ang	VI C I	
HASSELBACH	Ostuf	VI C(Z)	Member of Wansoo Institute
HAUSMANN	Stubaf	VI C I	Deputy Leiter VI C 1945
HEIMANN	Hauptf	VI C Z	
HOELLEWIG-LARSEN	Hauptf	VI C 12	
HORNHILHAUPT	Stubaf	VI C 1-3 VI C 2.	Reported at Tegernsee April 1945
HUBSCHMANN	Ang	VI C 3	
HUNTSCHE	Stubaf	VI C 1. VI C 3	
HOEYER	Ostuf	VI C 4	Transferred to Slovakia as VI Resr. to UAS WITISKA (1.45) at Salzburg 4.45.
HINNEY	Untuf	VI C	Transferred to Italy before 5.44.
HOEHNSCHEID	Ostuf	VI C Z	Moldbptkdo Sud...
HOTNS	Stubaf	VI C Z	Head of training school of Hpt. Kdo Nord.

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NAME	RANK	REGIMENT	REMARKS
HOMSELBARTH	Stubaf	VI C 13	Previously Abt III Sds Athens
HOPPMANN	Krim Rat		In Havelinstitut end 1941.
HORACK	Sturmwann	VI C 12	Arrested Vienna
HUBIG	Stubaf	VI C Z	Head of a training Camp of VI C (Z)
HUBNER	Untuf	VI C Z	VI C 2b
HUEBNER	Ustuf		VI C I
HUEGEL	Uschaf		
HUHN	Hastuf	VI C	Deputy Head of Training Camp Topl.
INSAR	Ustuf		VI C 2a
JACKO	Schutzso	VI C Z	
JAKUBOVITCH	Ustuf	VI C Z	CO of school at Koenigswardo
JANTHUR	Pol. Sch.	VI C Z	
JOBKE	Ustuf	VI C 12	
JOERGENS	Hastuf		VI C I
JUNG	Hastuf	VI C Z	Loft UZ in Oct. 42.
KEMPF	Stubaf	VI C 2	Chief of Dienststelle FRANKEN Markt Redwitz.
KEITEL, FrI	Ang		VI C 4 Secretary to "FEIRAU"
KERN	Stmann	VI C Z	
KLEBER	Stubaf		VI C (Zbg)
KIRFEL Dr.	Uffz		VI C 4 Arrested British Zone
KIROVAR	Ostuf	VI C (Z)	Estonian, head of Aussen Kdo of VI C (Z)
KLEINERT	Stubaf	VI C Z	Leiter of VI C (Z) Kdo. 1942-43
KLEINHAUS	Uscha	VI C	Specialist Turkestan Activists.
KLINDWORTH	Ustuf	VI C Z	VI C 3
KLINGELHOFFER	Stubaf		VI C Z Arrested British Zone
KLINGWORTH	Ustuf		VI C 2

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NAME	RANK	REMERIT -6.44. 1944-45.	REMARKS
<u>KOETTING</u>	Ostufaf	VI C Z	Arrested by Czech authorities. CO of school at Hofstein.
KOSLOWSKI	Rottf	VI C 12	At Ankara 1942-43
KOTHSCHOUBEY	Ostuf	VI C I	VI C I in 1941-42
KRAUS H.	Stubaf	VI C Z	Chief of Hpt. Kdo. Mitto till end of 1944
KRAUS O.	Stubaf	VI C Z	2 Kdo NOTD, 1945
<u>KRAUSE</u>	Ostuf	VI C 12	CO of W/T station in Turkey 1942. Arrested.
KROCKER	Hschaf	VI C Z	
<u>KURMIS</u>	Ostuf	VI C 12	Dropped by parachute in Iran and arrested. Committed suicide. 1945.
KURRECK	Stubaf	VI C Z	Sent to Italy Feb 1945
KUSCHIN	Untuf	VI C Z	CO espionage school at Teichwald under Kdo Mitto. 1944.
LANGNER	Unschaf	VI C Z	
<u>LAUTENDACH</u>		VI C 2	Arrested American zone
LEUGELING	Hastuf.	VI C 13	Involved in fraud and arrested by German authorities May 1944.
LEO	Ostuf	VI C 4	Japanese expert
LEPEL von	Ostuf	VI C 2	
LIEBENSCHEL	Ostuf	VI C Z	Transferred to VI A on amalgamation of UZ and VI C November 43.
LOECHELT	Hastuf	VI C Z	At Ulrich near Salzburg April 45. Formerly VI B later VI F end 1944.
LOSCH	Hschaf	VI C Z	
LUMM	Stubaf	VI C I	In charge of agent training for VI C(Z)
MEHLEERT	Hastuf	VI C(Z)	In charge of agents' identity papers.
MEHRING	Ustuf	VI C Z	Security officer VI C Z
<u>METZ</u> Paul		VI C Gos	Arrested American zone.

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NAME	RANK	REFERRAT -6.44. 1944-45.	REMARKS
MACH	Krim Kom	VI C 12	
MARSCHKE	Uschaf	VI C Z	
MATSIK	Hastuf	VI C 12 VI C 2(?)	
<u>MAYR</u>	Hastuf	VI C 12	Representative in Iran 1941. Arrested in Teheran mid-43.
MENEBROCKER	Uschaf	VI C Z	
MOHR	Hastuf	VI C 12	Representative in German Embassy Ankara (mid-44). Returned to Berlin 44. Formerly VI D.
MOLLICK Dr	Ang	VI C 3	
<u>MOYZISCH</u>	Stubaf	VI C 12	Representative in Turkey. Detained British zone.
NEUMANN- RIPPERT	Ostuf	VI C 12	Transferred to Amt VII 44.
NAEHLER	Hastuf	VI C I	Liaison with VI F.
OLZSCH	Hastuf	VI C 2	Head of Turkistan Institute
OPITZ, Frh.	Ang	VI C 2b	
<u>PATEK</u>	Ang	VI C 12	In Ankara in 1943. Arrested.
PAULSEN	Ostuf	VI C	
PAUST	Hastuf	VI C I VI C I	Transferred Horrogruppe SCHONNER 1944.
PLONGER, Frh	Ang	VI C 2a	
PFISTERER	Hastuf	VI C 12	1943 in Greece and Tunisia for VI - later VI F.
PFITZNER	Hastuf	VI C 12	Transferred to VI F 1943.
PIUSS	Rottf	VI C 3	
PRIES	Ostuf	VI C I	
PROSSDORF	Ustuf	VI C	
QUOOS	Ostuf	VI C	Later to VI F.
RADLOFF, von			In Porschungsdiens Ost 1944.
RADTMACHER Frh.	Ang	VI C 2a	

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NAME	RANK	REFERAT -6.44. 1944-45	REMARKS
RAJLITZKY von	Stubaf	VI C	Later VI C representative Bda Slavonia was L.o. in VIJASSOW COMMITTEE.
RAP	Stubaf	VI C	Gruppenleiter VI C 1942-43.
ROEMER Dr	Ostufaf	VI C Z	Later VI A.
ROHRIG	Stubaf	VI C(Z)	Head of Abt A of a Hauptkommando, later VI C Representative at Prague.
ROHMANN Dr	Hastuf	VI C Z	
ROSENMULLER	Oschaf	VI C Z	
ROULEAU	Ustuf	VI C 13	
RASCH	Ustuf	VI C Z	Head of Sandbergo Camp 1943.
SADOWSKY	Ustuf	VI C(Z)	
SAKUTH	Hastuf	VI C I	(11.43.) Head of Sandbergo Camp after RASCH.
SALZMANN		VI C Z	
<u>SCHAFER</u>	Stubaf	VI C Z?	Believed killed
SCHARNELLI	Hschaf	VI C Z	CO of school at Glatzen
SCHINKOWSKI	Stubaf	VI C Z	Leitor of Zeppelin Kdol. in 1942-43. Later VI 2b.
SCHOFENMANN	Stubaf	VI C Z	Head of Sandbergo Camp. Left January 1943.
SCHRAEDER	Oschaf	VI C Z	CO of school at Jagerheim
SCHROEDER	Ustuf	VI C	Deputy for REICHERT
SCHUBACK	Stubaf	VI C 12	
SCHROER	Hastuf	VI C 1-3	Later L.o. to General VIJASSOW
SCHULZ	Hastuf	VI C Z	Moldobptkdo. Suod. Former VI B
SCHULTZ	Hschaf	VI C 13	
SCHUMACHER	Ostuf	VI C 10	
SCHWARTZKOPF		VI C I	June 1945. Last seen Flonsburg.
SEMJENOW	Hastuf	VI C(Z)	Head of Unternahmen VIM.
SEMJENOW	Ustuf	VI C Z	
SIELINSKI	Hschaf	VI C 2	

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NAME	RANK	REFERAT -6.44. 1944-45.	REMARKS
SPECKER	Ostuf	VI C 3	
• SPECKERMANN	Ostuf	VI C 12	Disgraced early 1945.
STADEN von		VI C I VI C 2a	
STAISCH	Interpretor	VI C 3	In Iran 1943. In Berlin 45.
STEINBACH	Ostuf	VI C Z	Moldochptkdo Sued.
STEINBERG	Ostuf	VI C 12	Transferred to Istanbul 1943.
STEUDEL Dr	Hastuf	VI C 2a	Arrested American zone
STINAUER	Stusche	VI C I	
STIGLMAYER Frl.	Ang	VI C I	
STOLTZE	Stubaf	VI C Z	
SZONN	Uscha	VI C Z	
<u>TEICH</u> Dr	Hastuf	VI C 2b	Arrested British zone
TEPPENBOECK	Stmann	VI C 13	
THOM	Hschaf	VI C Z	
TSCHERSKY	Ostuf	VI C	Head of VI C from 5.44. Transferred Dienststelle Prutzman.
UNGLAUF	Hastuf	VI C	Head of Training Camp of the Unternehmen WU in 44.
UDET	Hschaf	VI C Z	
UNGERN- STERNBERG	Sachb	VI C	
VIETH	Hastuf	VI C Z	
VIETINGHOFF- SCHEEL	Stubaf	VI C	Gruppenleiter 1940.
VOLLHEIM	Ostuf	VI C	Gruppenleiter 1941.
<u>VORNDRAN</u> Dr	Ang	VI C 12 VI C 3	Arrested American zone.
<u>WEIRAUGH</u>	Stubaf	VI C 4-11 VI C 4	Transferred 12.44. as Abt. Loitor VI to Bds Hungary. Detained at USPT.
WEISE	Ostuf	VI C 13	
<u>WELLHOFNER</u>	Hastuf	VI C 12	Transferred to VI B 1943. Arrested British zone.
WERNER		VI C Z	

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NAME	RANK	REFERAT -6.44. 1944-45.	REMARKS
WESTENHAGEN von	Hauptf	VI C I	
WIECK Dr	Ostuf	VI C 2b	
WILKENLING	Rottf	VI C 4	
<u>WINALI</u>	Ostuf	VI C 2	Arrested by Czech authorities.
<u>WOLFF</u>	Stubaf	VI C 12	'42 VI representative at Istanbul. Detained British zone.
WONDRATSCH	Ostuf	VI C I	
WORTMANN	Ostuf	VI C 2	Moldenhede Sud
ZINKE	Stubaf	VI C 2	Went to VI S.
WULLWEBER	Reg Asst.	VI C 3	Referat VI C 3 1939-40. Died late 1940.

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