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CSDIC/CMF/SD 90

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XARZ-4365

FIRST DETAILED INTERROGATION REPORT ON

STURMBANNFUHRER Hans Wilhelm EGGEN

This report contains information on Source's contacts with the SWISS Intelligence Service during the war; on the liaison between SCHELLENBERG and the Head of this Service; on the relations existing between the Swiss Government and its General Staff; on Source's relations with the Japanese; on his part in the attempted surrender negotiations; and on personalities.

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CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
1. SOURCE	
(a) Personal Details	2
(b) History and Career	2
(c) Assessment	2
2. WORK FOR FUEHRUNGSHAUPTAMT AND CONNECTIONS WITH AMT VI	3
3. CONTACTS WITH SWISS G.S. INTELLIGENCE /	3
4. RELATIONS SCHELLENBERG-MASSON /	4
5. INTERNAL RELATIONS BETWEEN SWISS G.S. AND BUNDESRAT	5
6. SOURCE'S PART IN SURRENDER NEGOTIATIONS	7
7. RELATIONS WITH JAPANESE	7
8. REFERAT VI/WI	7
9. HOW THE HOECHST BRIDGE WAS SAVED	8
10. PERSONALITIES	8

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C.S.D.I.C.,
C.M.F.

was: 1 Dec 45.

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(H.T. SHERGOLD), Major I.O.,
O.C., Army Section, C.S.D.I.C., C.M.F.

10312
Dec 1945
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1. SOURCE

(a) Personal Details

Name : ~~EGGEN~~ *EGGEN* Hans Wilhelm
 Alias : None
 Rank : ~~SS Sturmbannfuhrer~~
 Unit : SS Fuehrungshauptamt
 ID No. : None
 FP No. : None
 Party No. : Forgotten (3 million plus)
 SS No. : Forgotten
 Home Address : ~~BERLIN~~, *BERLIN*, Konstanzestrasse 10, *Germany*
 Captured : CHIASSO, 5 Oct 45
 Secret No. : M 45/846
 Interrogated : CSDIC, CMF, 12-20 Nov 45

(b) History and Career

Source is the son of a wealthy Amtsgerichtsrat and business man and was born at WENNINGSEN (HANOVER) on 5 Jun 1912. He went to school in HANOVER, did a year's military service with the Reichswehr, and then went to University in TUEBINGEN (1933/4 and 1935/6) and BERLIN (1934/5) where he studied law. He joined the Nazi Party and at the same time the Allgemeine SS in 1933, claiming that it would otherwise have been impossible to continue his studies and general student activities. In 1936 he went into a textile firm in BERLIN in order to get an insight into business methods and in 1937 did the same with a banking firm in BREMEN, finally taking up the management of his own family business (Warenvertriebs G.m.b.H.) in BERLIN (Tauentzienstr. 12A) in 1938. This firm was an international import and export business dealing in various commodities.

At the outbreak of war Source was called to the colours as a Lt on the Wehrmacht reserve and was posted to Reiterregiment 9, then stationed on the West German frontier. In Mar 40, because of his experience in the import and export business, he was recalled from the Army and posted to the Auslands- und Devisen Referat (Foreign and Currency Dept) of the SS Fuehrungshauptamt (FHA), shortly afterwards being promoted to Obltn of the Wehrmacht. In 42, as the result of a general order covering all Wehrmacht reserve officers working in SS organisations, Source was transferred from the Wehrmacht to the Waffen SS with rank of Obersturmfuehrer. He was promoted to SS Hauptsturmfuehrer in 43 and to SS Sturmbannfuhrer in 44. He worked with the FHA throughout the war and maintains that his contacts with Intelligence were purely incidental. In the latter stages of the war he was instrumental in securing the release from GERMANY of the GIRAUD family (Mar 45) and the American General VANNEMANN. In Apr 45 he helped to prevent the blowing-up of the frontier bridge at HOECHST and after the German collapse remained in SWITZERLAND. In Jun 45 he was arrested by the Swiss authorities in connection with a charge brought against Oberst Brigadier MASSON, the Head of the Swiss G.S. Intelligence, and subjected to prolonged interrogation. Nothing, however could be proved against him and Source was released in Oct 45.

(c) Assessment

Source is the smooth, German business-man type who expresses a distaste for "Nazis" by stressing the "good old German family atmosphere", from which he comes and his preference for the Wehrmacht as opposed to the SS. He appears to have used his connections with the SS chiefly in order to feather his own nest and his many useful contacts in SWITZERLAND to keep on good terms with the Nazi "big shots" without becoming too involved himself. Although he seems to have been fully co-operative it is probable that he has told his story in such a way as to put himself in a more favourable light.

Reliability : Fairly Good.

(Interrogated by A.G.E.S.)

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2. WORK FOR FUEHRUNGSHAUPTAMT (FHA) AND CONNECTIONS WITH AMT VI RSHA

From Mar 40 onwards Source was employed by Amt IX (Beschaffungsamt) of the FHA in negotiating purchases of material abroad for the Waffen SS and in this capacity carried out the necessary liaison work between the FHA on the one hand and the Reichswirtschafts Ministerium (RWM), which controlled the allotment of foreign currency for purchases abroad, and the Rohstoffamt which controlled the allotment of raw materials for such purchases on the other. As the officer chiefly concerned with negotiating foreign currency matters for the FHA, he was also entrusted with arranging for the payment of pensions, etc, to the relatives of Auslandsdeutsche who had been killed on active service and for this purpose also liaised with the Erzeugungsamt. Similarly his work also led to a certain amount of liaison with the Wirtschafts und Verwaltungshauptamt (WVHA) which acquired certain commodities from abroad: his principal contact at the WVHA was SS Gruppenfuehrer LOERNER. (He never came in contact with the Chief, SS Obergruppenfuehrer POHL.) Finally his work brought him into contact with Amt VI of the RSHA, since all foreign contracts for the Waffen SS required the personal approval of the Amtschef of VI. In this way Source came into personal contact with SS Brigadefuehrer JOST and later with SS Gruppenfuehrer SCHELLENBERG. Source, as representative of FHA, also got his passport and visas through this channel which was much more expeditious than the usual one through the Foreign Office. Source maintains that although he met various members of VI/Wi in SCHELLENBERG's waiting room and in the mess he had no official connections with the Referat at all.

3. CONTACTS WITH SWISS G.S. INTELLIGENCE

One of Source's earliest business deals in SWITZERLAND was with the Swiss Timber Syndicate (Holzsyndikat) for the delivery of wooden huts to GERMANY. There were considerable difficulties owing to the attitude of the German Industry Commission (DIKO) which had stopped the delivery of certain iron parts necessary for the completion of the huts in order to try to enforce certain financial demands that the Swiss did not wish to meet as they considered them in conflict with agreement made with the Allies. The work on the huts was therefore at a standstill when Source came on the scene, but he was able finally to smooth out the difficulties between the DIKO and the Timber Syndicate and get the contract completed. During these negotiations, which earned him considerable respect from the Swiss, Source made the acquaintance of a certain Dr RITZBURG (nom-de-plume "SCHWERTENBACH") whom he later learned was Hauptmann MAYER of the Swiss General Staff Intelligence. It was apparently usual for the Swiss I.S. to have a representative present at all important negotiations between Swiss and foreign firms.

After the conclusion of these negotiations MAYER asked Source if he might be willing to render a service to SWITZERLAND and do something to improve the relations between the two countries which were not good at that time. Source agreed and was introduced to a "Press representative" who explained that it would help a lot if the German newspaper "IPA" published in SWITZERLAND could be closed down, since it was making violent attacks on the Swiss C-in-C, General GUYSSAN. Source, who realised that these attacks were a clumsy attempt to lower the prestige of the Swiss Army among German-speaking Swiss and secure sympathy and possible recruits for the Wehrmacht, agreed to do what he could. He went to see the Chief of the SS Hauptamt Gruppenfuehrer BERGER and explained that the propaganda being carried out by "IPA" was having precisely the opposite effect of that intended and alienating all Swiss sympathy. BERGER had the paper closed down.

Source subsequently learned that the "Press representative" was none other than Oberst Brigadier MASSON, the Head of the Swiss General Staff Intelligence. Both he and MAYER became friends of Source as a result of his work in connection with the suppression of "IPA" and Source was subsequently a frequent guest at MAYER's home at SCHLOSS WOLFSBERG.

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- 4 -

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When later in 1941 SCHELLENBERG took over Amt VI at the RSHA and Source among others was required to give the new chief an outline of his activities abroad. For the RSHA, he told SCHELLENBERG of the "IPA" affair and of the resultant good relations with MASSON and MAYER. SCHELLENBERG expressed his approval of this: some months later he began to show great interest in this contact.

4. RELATIONS SCHELLENBERG-MASSON

The relations between SCHELLENBERG and MASSON started about Christmas 1941. GUYSSA (the Swiss C-in-C) had asked MASSON to try and secure the release of a Swiss agent named MOERGELI who was interned in GERMANY, and MASSON knowing that Source had direct access to SCHELLENBERG on account of his work in SWITZERLAND, asked Source to see what he could do. Source put the case to SCHELLENBERG in BERLIN and the agent was shortly afterwards released and returned to SWITZERLAND. The reasons for this action are unknown to Source but he assumes from later happenings that the VI Amtschef wished to set up a personal connection with the Head of the Swiss General Staff Intelligence.

In fact in the spring of 1942 Source was asked to arrange a meeting between the two and it appeared that they had already discussed this, the initiative coming from SCHELLENBERG. With the help of MAYER the meeting was arranged and took place at WALDSHUT on the German-Swiss frontier. Source was not present at the conversations but thinks it likely that the question of SWITZERLAND's attitude in the event of a German attack was the main subject of the talks: he knows that the Swiss were at that time anxious to know why the Germans were holding a number of divisions in the Black Forest and the German General Staff on their side wanted to assess the Swiss determination to resist. This was quite fixed and Source is certain that MASSON made this clear to SCHELLENBERG. At the same time, from what he knows of MASSON's attitude to neutrality, Source is equally certain that there was no exchange of intelligence on this occasion.

A sequel to this meeting came at the end of 1943 when the Germans were planning to invade SWITZERLAND and take over the railways and the transport system in order to facilitate the movement of troops and supplies to meet the Allied threat on the Italian mainland. At the last meeting in BERLIN before the final decision to do this was taken, SCHELLENBERG had declared that not only would the Swiss resist the invasion with all the means at their disposal, but would also destroy their railways and important tunnels. This declaration and certain commercial considerations led to the abandonment of the enterprise. Immediately afterwards Source was summoned by SCHELLENBERG and instructed to inform MASSON of what had occurred and to arrange another meeting. This was done and MASSON and SCHELLENBERG met for the second time in Nov or Dec 43 at MAYER's home at SCHLOSS WOLFSBERG. Source again was not present at the conversations and cannot state with any certainty what was discussed, but thinks as before that any exchange of intelligence extremely unlikely.

In early 44 a stir was caused in GERMANY by the forced landing in SWITZERLAND of a new Me 110 equipped with all the latest night-fighter devices which the Swiss Bundesrat had refused to return as not in accordance with neutrality. After a conference between representatives of the Luftwaffe, SKORZENY and SCHELLENBERG, it had been decided to try to solve the problem by friendly approach and Source was entrusted with the task of negotiation. With the help of MASSON he succeeded in arranging for the machine to be destroyed on the DUEBENDORF airfield in exchange for which favour the Swiss asked to be allowed to buy twelve Me 109G. On his return to GERMANY Source was summoned to HEALER's HQ to report on the incident: this he did and secured the Reichfuhrer's agreement to the sale of the aircraft. Six of these were delivered shortly afterwards for a price of 3,000,000 Swiss Frs and a further six some time later for a similar sum.

It was also about this time (May 44) that SCHELLENBERG tried to obtain

- 4 -

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information from MASSON on the Allied plan for the landings on the Continent and in particular when they were due to take place. Source was asked to try and get this information from MASSON and he approached the Swiss I.S. Chief in the matter; MASSON, however, refused to listen or give such a request consideration.

In the closing stages of the war the connections between MASSON and SCHELLENBERG chiefly concerned the release of prominent internees in GERMANY and negotiations for a surrender, in both of which matters Source was the intermediary. In early 45 MASSON was urging the release of the Belgian King, Paul REYNAUD and DE GAULLE's sister: SCHELLENBERG, although sympathetic, was not willing to take responsibility for these actions owing to fear of KALTENBRUNNER. SCHELLENBERG did, however, manage to secure the release of the GIRAUD family and Source was entrusted with the task of bringing them from FRIEDRICHSDORF and getting them over the frontier. In Apr 45 Source smuggled out the American General V. NEMANN: this had been another request of MASSON's to SCHELLENBERG which the latter had agreed to without consulting KALTENBRUNNER or HIMMLER.

The reasons for the continued contacts between SCHELLENBERG and MASSON were, Source thinks, the following:-

(a) SCHELLENBERG, supported by HEYDRICH and later by KALTENBRUNNER and HIMMLER, was anxious to absorb the Abwehr and get rid of CANARIS and by maintaining a connection with the Head of the Swiss General Staff Intelligence had outmanoeuvred the Abwehr and had good material to reinforce the argument for its absorption by the RSHL.

(b) Further, in his plan for outmanoeuvring RIBBENTROP (whom HIMMLER wanted to see replaced by a less powerful rival), SCHELLENBERG planned to use the MASSON connection for opening negotiations with the Allies for a compromise peace. Such peace talks had been planned since the time of HEYDRICH and contemplated securing Allied support for a continued struggle against RUSSIA.

MASSON for his part was interested in the connection with SCHELLENBERG as it represented a means of securing advantages for SWITZERLAND not obtainable by other means; he was also interested in getting the Abwehr out of SWITZERLAND (some of its reports on the alleged activities of foreign Intelligence Services had caused the Swiss General Staff considerable annoyance); and finally he was interested in seeing the war brought to an end and thought SCHELLENBERG sufficiently powerful to be able to effect something in this direction.

SCHELLENBERG was of course always hoping to obtain intelligence of the Allies through MASSON but never met with any success, as MASSON insisted on a strict neutrality.

5. INTERNAL RELATIONS BETWEEN SWISS GENERAL STAFF AND BUNDESRAT

② The contact between MASSON and SCHELLENBERG had a certain effect on the relations between the Swiss General Staff, more particularly Gen GUYSAN, and the Bundesrat. These were apparently strained, a state of affairs that dated from the time of the German invasion of FRANCE, since when GUYSAN had kept up close personal contact with certain high-ranking French Generals, laying down in agreement with them certain points with reference to possible developments of German military operations. The Swiss Bundesrat, convinced of a German victory, reproached GUYSAN with not maintaining neutrality and told him that he was a stumbling block to good relations between SWITZERLAND and GERMANY. The Swiss General Staff on the other hand, which, through MASSON, bore the brunt of combating German espionage activities in SWITZERLAND, was a sharp opponent of the Bundesrat's extreme tolerance to GERMANY, which manifested itself in large credit allotments and agreement to the setting up of Auslandsorganisationen. Moreover, GUYSAN was very pro-Allied and Swiss officers, with few exceptions, were anti-German.

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In view of the above position therefore the Bundesrat greeted very warmly the opening of personal contact between MASSON and SCHELLENBERG and as a mark of its appreciation voted for the promotion of MASSON from Oberst to Oberst Brigadier but at the same time decided to try and set up its own direct contacts with the RSHL in the hope that more substantial favours than those secured by MASSON (suppression of "IPA" and information on the possible invasion of SWITZERLAND) might be obtained. Accordingly on the orders of Bundesrat von STEIGER (then Minister of Justice and now Bundespräsident), the head of the Swiss Fremdenpolizei, Dr ROTMUND, went to BERLIN in early 43 to set up contact between the Swiss police and the RSHL. SCHELLENBERG, however, saw in this an undermining of and a danger to his own contact with the Swiss General Staff and arranged that although ROTMUND was to be received with the utmost cordiality he was to return to SWITZERLAND with his mission unfulfilled. The Bundesrat made a second attempt in 1943 and sent Kommissaer MAURER of the Bundesanwaltschaft to BERLIN with similar mission but once again SCHELLENBERG intervened.

The failure of these two missions caused von STEIGER to view the MASSON-SCHELLENBERG connection with a less favourable eye. At the same time the relations between GUYSAN and the Bundesrat became more tense, owing to the increasing hostility shown by the Swiss officer class to the Bundesrat, and the great popularity of GUYSAN both with the Armed Forces and the civilian population, which was in marked contrast to the relationship between the Bundesrat and the population.

To offset these developments therefore the Bundesrat, in particular Bundesrat KOBELT, made a third attempt to set up its own connections. On the excuse that he might not always be available either through ill-health or for service reasons, MASSON was told to put Polizeioberst MUELLER, who was also 2 i/c to MASSON in the Swiss I.S., in contact with Source. This was done and during the winter of 1943/4 Source met MUELLER several times. The latter was at pains to explain that the contact with MASSON would only be of value to GERMANY and SWITZERLAND as long as general mobilisation obtained in SWITZERLAND and while GUYSAN had full powers, but that when this state of affairs ceased and the Bundesrat re-acquired full powers he (MUELLER) in his peacetime capacity as Polizeioberst would enjoy a greater trust of the Bundesrat than MASSON. In short, contact with MUELLER would be more profitable in the long run for all concerned.

Source did not accept this view of things and the contact did not ripen. MUELLER, seeing that the plan of approaching SCHELLENBERG through Source was not succeeding, attempted to do so through the Swiss Military Attache in BERLIN, Major BURGHART, and put certain information on the Allied forces at his disposal for passing to SCHELLENBERG. Source does not know what this information was exactly, since it was passed over his head but thinks it chiefly concerned Allied O of B in ITALY and in FRANCE: on one occasion (only) in about Oct 44 BURGHART gave Source a list with the divisional numbers of about ten British Divisions then in FRANCE for transmission to SCHELLENBERG. The latter accepted all the information offered but nevertheless did not alter his relations with MASSON or make advances to MUELLER.

When the outcome of the war became finally obvious and an Allied victory a certainty, the Bundesrat changed its policy and ceased to seek any contacts with GERMANY. In an attempt to show the Allies that any previous contacts had been disapproved of and only tolerated because of force of circumstance, preparations were made to bring a case against MASSON and he was deprived of his rank and forced to retire. Source was arrested shortly before he was due to return to GERMANY and for three months (Jul-Oct 45) continually interrogated in an effort to produce material. These investigations were arranged by von STEIGER, KOBELT and MUELLER and it was intended to publish the results in the Swiss Press in order to turn public opinion against Gen GUYSAN and in order to justify a lengthy imprisonment of Source. The enquiry, however, produced no such results and MASSON was reinstated in his rank and position, and Source released. MUELLER on the other hand has now retired.

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6. SOURCE'S PART IN SURRENDER NEGOTIATIONS

During the latter part of 1944 during one of his visits to MAYER's home at SCHLOSS WOLFSBURG, Source made the acquaintance of two American Vice-Consuls, Mr LOUGHBOROUGH and Mr DOENISCH, who were also friends of MAYER. Discussion on the war situation with these Americans soon made it clear to Source that GERMANY's only hope at that stage was to sue for peace. During his next visit to SCHELLENBERG in BERLIN Source reported on these conversations (which had been quite informal and not done on anyone's instructions) and urged SCHELLENBERG to see HIMMLER. SCHELLENBERG, however, was not willing to do this, since he would have to do it through KALTENBRUNNER with whom he was on extremely bad terms and who would undoubtedly use the occasion to get rid of SCHELLENBERG. He therefore suggested that Source should try to see HIMMLER through Gruppenfuehrer JUETTNER, the Head of the PHA. This was done, but Source arrived at HIMMLER's HQ at an unlucky moment when the Reichsfuehrer was too tired to see him and only succeeded in getting the substance of his message conveyed by HIMMLER's ADC. Source had no connection with the negotiations carried on in SWITZERLAND by Obergruppenfuehrer WOLFF.

7. RELATIONS WITH JAPANESE

In the early part of 44 during a visit to the Reichswirtschaftsministerium in connection with his foreign currency work, Source was introduced to General-Direktor SCHLAR, a Director of the Deutsche Reichsbank and President of the Japanese Committee in GERMANY. SCHLAR mentioned that the Japanese were anxious to negotiate contracts in SWITZERLAND for the purchase of nautical and other equipment and Source was asked to help. An invitation to dinner with the members of the Japanese Committee followed: here Source met Bino SAKAI, assistant to the Japanese Naval Attache, KOJIMI, and several other Japanese all of whose names he has forgotten with the exception of a Col OTANI. During conversation the Japanese showed great interest in Source's connections with the RWM and suggested that he might be able to secure Swiss francs for them. In return for this they suggested that they could be of service in starting negotiations with the Russians (the project of a German compromise with RUSSIA was very much in the air at that time) since JAPAN was still at peace with the Soviets.

Source referred these matters to SCHELLENBERG who was scared of the talk of negotiating with the Russians since he knew that if he were the first to talk openly of it at the RSHA it would cost him his head. He nevertheless encouraged Source to maintain the contact (as representative of the PHA) and keep him informed of any developments.

Source therefore continued to meet SCHLAR and SAKAI from time to time. It was clear that the Japanese were convinced that GERMANY had lost the war and were anxious to manoeuvre themselves into as favourable a position as possible with the Russians and secure as many economic advantages as possible from the impending collapse of GERMANY. SCHELLENBERG made no move, but when in the summer of 44 SAKAI asked Source if he would call on General OKAMOTO in ZURICH, SCHELLENBERG told him to do this and see what he could find out. Source duly called on the General but found him seriously ill from a paralytic stroke and came away without receiving any message or discovering for what reason SAKAI had asked him to call. (Source is certain that no Russian was mentioned in connection with this affair and maintains that he did not know that SAKAI was an Intelligence Officer).

8. REFERAT VI/VI

Source was never employed by this Referat but in the course of his contacts with Amt VI met various members of it. Most of them were former employees in commercial firms who had got into the RSHA in one way or another and hopelessly unequal to the task they were supposed to do. The three successive Referente, Regierungsrat SEBASTIAN, SS Sturmbannfuehrer ZEIDLER and Professor SCHMIED were of a better class but without experience

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in international commerce and therefore incapable of coping with the problems set them. The Referat totalled at most ten including clerks.

The programme of VI/Wi was to carry out espionage through German business men with connections in foreign countries. Very few could be found who were willing to do this since their business depended on maintaining good connections with foreign countries. Attempts by VI/Wi to bring pressure by interfering in the granting of passports and visas incurred the open hostility of business men and the little that might have been achieved was ruined by these "petty police" methods. The observations made to Source on the Referat by business acquaintances were scathing. SCHELLENBERG told Source that he had never once received any information of the slightest value from VI/Wi. This fact and many others concerning SCHELLENBERG's Dept, Source points out, can be checked by referring to the two secretaries, Frl SCHINKE and Frl ERDMANN.

9. HOW THE HOECHST BRIDGE WAS SAVED

In the last weeks of the war Source was at HOECHST on the Germano-Swiss frontier after getting the American Gen VIEHMANN into SWITZERLAND. The area KONSTANZ-BREGENZ-FELDKIRCH, at first declared "open", was suddenly redeclared a battle area by Gauleiter HOMER, who ordered the demolition of all RHINE bridges and frontier bridges between SWITZERLAND and GERMANY. Source declares that he saw no sense in this order, particularly since it would mean that the living remains of BELSEN camp and large numbers of wounded, which were coming through the area would be cut off from the care of the Swiss Red Cross services. He therefore decided to prevent the blowing up of the bridges, communicated his decision to the Swiss frontier officer, Hpt GOETZ, and asked him for a detachment of Swiss who would work under the direction of a trusted Austrian frontier guard, Inspektor OBERMAYER. Source claims that he kept the local German guards in conversation and allowed a large number of refugees on to the bridge so that the Swiss were able to clear the demolition charges without being seen and get back into SWITZERLAND. Source and OBERMAYER followed them. Just before leaving GERMANY, Source was approached by an escaped British PW Major named DODGE who asked for help. Source took him into SWITZERLAND. The following night OBERMAYER went back in civilian clothes to bring his family to safety, was caught by German guards and shot on the orders of HOMER.

10. PERSONALITIES

ALENDROT

SS Hauptsturmfuehrer in Referat VI/Wi. Formerly at RWM.
Age about 40.
About 1.75m tall, hair turning grey.
(BERLIN - early 45)
(cf. CSDIC (UK)/SIR.1728)

BERGER

SS Gruppenfuehrer. Head of SS Hauptamt.
Gave orders for suppression of "IPA" in 1940.
(cf. CSDIC (UK)/SIR.1728 where he is said to be a PW)

BURGHART

Major. Swiss Military Attache in BERLIN who passed information on Allied O of B to SCHELLENBERG for Polizeioberst MUELLER.

DAUFFELDT, HANS

PW.
Originally in Amt VI, RSHA, later Vice-Consul in LAUSANNE, until expelled in early 45.
Enjoyed the protection of SCHELLENBERG although considered very inefficient. Contacts with Source purely friendly.
(BERLIN - Mar 45)

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DODGE Major. British PW whom Source helped to escape from GERMANY into SWITZERLAND (see para 9).

ERDMANN, Prl Secretary to SCHELLENBERG.
Age about 24. From BERLIN.
About 1.60m tall, thick set, blonde hair.
(BERLIN - Apr 45)
(cf. CSDIC (UK)/SIR.1728)

GOETZ Hauptmann. Swiss frontier officer who assisted Source in preventing the blowing-up of the HOECHST Bridge (see para 9).

GUYSAN General. C-in-C Swiss Army.

H
HOLZACH, PAUL Hauptmann in Swiss General Staff Intelligence known to Source through MASSON and MAYER.
Very anti-German as a consequence of German brutalities in BALKANS where HOLZACH had relations. Nearly arrested in 1943 in STUTTGART when on a mission for Swiss I.S.
(ZURICH - early Oct 45)

HOSE Civilian employed in Referat VI/Wi. Formerly an employee with Norddeutsche Lloyd.
Age about 45.
About 1.70m tall, slim, dark hair.
(BERLIN - early 45)

JUETTNER SS Gruppenfuehrer. Head of FHA until Jul 44 when he became Bde in succession to FROMM.
Very intelligent and considered straightforward.
(cf. CSDIC/CMF/SD 42, para 5(c))

KOBELT Swiss Bundesrat who instructed Polizeioberst MUELLER to set up contact with SCHELLENBERG through Source (see para 5).

LAY SS Standartenfuehrer. Head of Amt IX in FIA. Former office boy. Sjt/Maj in World War I.
Age about 45.
About 1.75m tall, bald.
(BERLIN - Apr 45)

LOENGER SS Gruppenfuehrer. 2 i/c at Wirtschafts und Verwaltungsamt with whom Source came in contact in connection with foreign purchases.
(cf. 1 SC/CSDIC/SD 26 para 6(c))

H
MASSON, ROGER Oberst Brigadier. Head of Swiss General Staff Intelligence.

MAURER Swiss Kommissar of the Bundesanwaltschaft sent to BERLIN in 1943 by von STEIGER to attempt to set up connection with RSHA (see para 5).

H
MAYER, PAUL (DR) Hauptmann in Swiss General Staff Intelligence.
Alias: RITZBURG
Pen Name: SCHWERTENBACH
wof
(ZURICH - early Oct 45)

2

CSDIC/CMF/SD 90

MUELLER Swiss Polizeioberst and during war 2 i/c to MASSON. At instigation of ROBELT set up contact with Source and SCHELLENBERG. Passed information on Allied O of B to SCHELLENBERG through BURCHLERT (q.v.).

OKUMOTO Japanese General in ZURICH on whom Source was asked to call by SAKAI (q.v.). Died from stroke after defeat of JAPAN (see para 7).

OHMI Japanese Army Colonel in BERLIN interested in securing commercial advantages for JAPAN through the Japanese Committee (see para 7).

ROTMUND, Dr Head of Swiss Fremdenpolizei, sent to BERLIN in 1943 by Bundesrat von STEIGER to attempt to set up contact with RSHA.

SAKAI Civilian Assistant to Japanese Naval Attache in BERLIN. Has English wife in GENEVA (see para 7).

SCHLEER Generaldirektor. Director of Deutsche Reichsbank and President of Japanese Committee in BERLIN. In close touch with Reichswirtschaftsministerium. Introduced Source to SAKAI (see para 7).

SCHINK Swiss. Director of Cottonificio Italiano MILAN. Introduced to Source by his brother-in-law Hauptmann WUEST who was his guard while interned in summer 45. Offered Source hospitality in MILAN.

SCHMIED SS Standartenfuhrer. Professor. Head of Referat VI/Wi in succession to ZEIDLER. (BERLIN - Mar 45)
(cf. 1 SC/CSDIC/SD 26, para 6(a)(1) and CSDIC (UK)/SIR.1728)

SEBASTIAN Regierungsrat. Head of Referat VI/Wi until early 44 when he fell out with SCHELLENBERG and was transferred to Waffen SS as OR. Age about 35.
About 1.70m tall, fair hair.
(BERLIN - early 45)
(cf. CSDIC/CMF/SD 23, para 4(a))

SEIBERT Ministerialrat in charge of Swiss Dept at RWM and very hostile to RSHA's attempts to use commercial channels for espionage in SWITZERLAND.

STEIGER, von Swiss Bundesrat, formerly Minister of Justice now Bundespräsident, interested in setting up contact with RSHA (see para 5).

SUDECK SS Untersturmfuhrer in Referat VI/Wi. Formerly in textile business. Age about 42.
About 1.83m tall, well built.
(BERLIN - early 45)

②

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CSDIC/CAF/SD 90

VANNEMANN

American General formerly with U.S. Embassy in BERLIN and interned by the Germans whom Source got over the frontier into SWITZERLAND in 1945 (see para 4).

ZEIDLER

SS Sturmabfuhrer. Head of Referat VI/Wi until mid 44 when he left to go to a University as student.

Age about 40.

About 1.80m tall, slim build, haggard face, bald. Woolly-minded.

(BERLIN - early 44)

(cf. 1 SC/CSDIC/SD 26, para 6 (a)(i), and CSDIC (UK)/SIR.1728)

ZIRSCH

SS Standartenfuhrer. Head of "Verwaltung der Zeugante" (control of arms distribution) at FHA.


Age about 48.

About 1.75m tall, stout, going bald. "Sjt Major" type. Heavy drinker. Unintelligent.

②

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3

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- 12 -

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