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26 October 1945

German Intelligence Service

TO: SAI WF, Washington
FROM: SAINT, London *rd*
SUBJECT: Amt VI of the RSHA

Excerpt from:

1. Attached herewith is a copy of the Liquidation Report No. 7 on Subject, Gruppe VI B. All further distribution is shown below.

Attachment: 1 copy of subj. rpt.

- Distr: Washington
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6. DAUFELDT's Expulsion and Subsequent Events

The situation in Switzerland deteriorated rapidly with the changing war situation. By March 1945 the Swiss authorities had requested the removal of DAUFELDT himself and Amt VI representation within the country itself ceased. There was however a replacement in the person of Graf DOENHOF who was appointed to the Consulate in Zurich. Surprisingly enough, DOENHOF's appointment was possible as a result of the benign cooperation of the Foreign Office, an event which did not however reflect any closer cooperation between Amt VI and the Foreign Office, but which was due to DOENHOF's own close personal friendship with STEENGRACHT of the Foreign Office. DOENHOF had had only a short period of training with VI D before his departure and was the officer responsible for the final mission of the notorious SETH. It need hardly be said of course that this unexpected assistance from the Foreign Office was too late to be effective. DOENHOF, who had in any case very little idea of what his functions were to be, was expelled soon after his arrival.

7. The Sonderlinien

There remains one aspect of Amt VI's work in Switzerland to be dealt with which is of importance, not so much for the results it achieved, but as a reflection of SCHELLENBERG's conduct of Amt VI affairs. SCHELLENBERG did not allow himself to be bound by recognised channels, and when the official reporting channels of Amt VI fell short of his standards, SCHELLENBERG established where possible his own sources of information. These contacts have been referred to as his 'Sonderlinien'. Such a link existed in Switzerland in the person of Hastuf EGGEN, and the establishing of the contact was a reflection on the inability of DAUFELDT to produce the desired results. EGGEN travelled frequently to Switzerland in the course of his business and was exploited by SCHELLENBERG to establish contacts within the country; these contacts were on a high level and it was mainly through EGGEN that SCHELLENBERG maintained relations with the Swiss Intelligence Service. The extent to which this contact proved valuable to SCHELLENBERG is still a matter of doubt but the mere contact itself was a considerable achievement. EGGEN was also responsible for arranging SCHELLENBERG's visits to Switzerland.

This method of penetrating Switzerland was also adopted by STEIMLE, the Gruppenleiter who attempted to exploit Dr GARDEMANN as a personal agent. GARDEMANN had previously been employed in the German Embassy in Madrid, where he had acted as a personal informer for RIBBENTROP. STEIMLE's effort was however unsuccessful as it was not found possible to persuade the Swiss authorities to allow GARDEMANN to enter the country.

The personal contact arrangement was further in evidence when SONNENHOHL, a professional diplomat who had seen previous service in France, was sent to Switzerland late in 1944. SONNENHOHL was not an Amt VI representative in the true sense of the term, but, through a personal agreement with STEIMLE, provided the latter with excellent political reports on Switzerland. These in any case would have gone to the Foreign Office and were not the product of the Secret Service, but were symptomatic of the strained relations existing between the Foreign Office and Amt VI.