

DD / S REGISTERED

FILE QTM 4-4

5 February 1968

MEMORANDUM**SUBJECT: Effect of VC TET Offensive on RDC, PRU and SCG Programs**EO
13526
3.5(c)

1. Data in this memorandum is compiled from all situation reports received as of 051400 EST in VAS/RAC.

2. I Corps

A. Quang Tri

1) Reports received to date indicate RDC Team No. 1 has killed 10 VC and captured seven weapons; Team No. 12 has killed five VC and captured one weapon. (020900 H)

2) The enemy now holds about two thirds of the RD campaign area mostly in Trieu Phong District. The allies are going to be forced to go in and root out these forces, which may wreak havoc on the hamlets in the process. (030400 H)

3) Because of withdrawal of ARVN battalions to Quang Tri City RD Teams have been relocated to provide them with the best possible security under the circumstances. The teams have encountered few VC attacks and sustained few casualties, but their field strengths are low due to the confusion resulting from TET and the current VC offensive. The teams have been resupplied with ammunition where required. The RD control group has shown definite ineptitude in reorganizing teams, exploiting the psywar opportunities, and conducting required administration. (031000 H)

~~SECRET~~

4) PRUs served as reaction units in Quang Tri City and sped from one spot to another clearing out enemy activity. (042000 H)

B. Thua Thien, Hue

1) The 50 PRUs in their Hue compound have repulsed five attacks, were surrounded by approximately two VC companies, were short of ammunition, and have had no food for two days. (011330 H)

2) The PRU was forced out of its compound south of Hue City by the VC and was moving towards YD 768204. The VC occupied the compound and were destroying it. The PRU required ammunition and resupply will be attempted morning of 2 February by helicopter. (012220 H)

3) The 50 man PRU, reportedly twice driven from its compound in the southwest part of Hue, has withdrawn to Huong Tuy District Headquarters for resupply. Huong Tuy is about five miles southeast of Hue along Route 1. The PRU has been providing tactical information of value to Marine forces via a radio link with a PRU advisor now attached to the Marine Regimental Headquarters. (042400 H)

C. Quang Nam

Thirteen of the 30 RD Teams in Quang Nam have not been in radio contact. Six teams 1 KIA each; one team, 2 KIA; 1 team, 1 WIA; and nine teams had contact with the VC but suffered no casualties. The RD control group was again in operation and more details are expected soon. Six of the teams were being used in Hoi An on other duties. (021800 H)

D. Danang

All four RD Teams have been pulled into Danang City hall as security force. Approximately 20 cadre are detailed to assist in various medical facilities in the city and to assist in various "help the people" projects on a temporary basis. (051800 H)

E. Quang Tin, Tam Ky

During the 31 January attack PRU members captured 19 VC individual and crew-served weapons, including one 57mm recoilless rifle. PRUs killed 23 VC (U.S. advisors body count) and captured one VC. Two PRUs slightly wounded and damage to PRU camp was minimal. One VC battalion attacked from northwest striking PRU compound and ARVN compound on PRU E flank. ARVN soon withdrew to PIC leaving flank open. The PRUs put the area under fire with 3 MG and 5 M-79s plus their individual weapons. At about 0515 hours the PRUs began to receive intense machine gun fire from the area abandoned by ARVN. At 0645 hours 30 PRUs moved toward area from which the MG fire came and captured the MG, which later turned out to have been left behind by the ARVN unit. 3.5(c)

F. Quang Ngai

1) The RDC compound received SA and recoilless rifle fire the night of 30-31 January. The VC captured a RD driver and held him for 12 hours. He said the VC claimed their target was the RD house and compound. The status of RD teams is generally unknown. RD Team No. 14 at An Luong Hamlet, BS 2649750, Son Long Village, Son Trich District claims to have captured more than 300 VC laborers. Americans consider this probably exaggeration. The PRUs are on the job. The RD compound is well organized, indigenous guards have done a good job, exhibiting fire discipline as all stood by their posts. (011200 H)

2) Only three RDC have been reported KIA, but this figure may increase when all reports are in. (031000 H)

3) The VC generally by-passed the RD Teams. Some teams have moved in close to district compounds to support local GVN forces. The PRUs have been showing a good count, keeping casualties low (two WIA) and disrupting the enemy. All districts are happy with the PRU effort. (042000 H)

G. H Corps

A. Binh Thuan

RD Teams are in their original locations and are operational with only one wounded in action. Quarter Zone teams are also operational and unharmed. PRUs operating

in Thien Giac District have been hit by air strikes, casualties unknown. (021545 H)

B. Darlac

No information has been received during the past five days by American advisers concerning the situation of Vietnamese RD Teams in the province. (041100 H)

C. Ninh Thuan

The PRU are in contact with a VC force ten kilometers southwest of Phan Rang. At 042150 hours a regional force unit was in contact with VC force in a 1967 RD hamlet seven and one half kilometers southwest of town. The VC have been concentrating their destructive efforts against all hamlets in the province that were included in the 1967 RD plan and which are currently not protected by RD Teams. They have been collecting rice from these hamlets and destroying everything that represents the GVN. The 1968 RD hamlets, in which there are RD teams located, are not being hit. At present approximately 300 RDC who have not yet been deployed in 1968 program hamlets are being used to augment Phan Rang internal security forces. (042200 H) See
5 February 1968 for list of hamlets.

3.5(c)

D. Phu Yen

RD Teams had encountered only light attacks and appeared to be in little trouble. (021545 H)

E. Pleiku

On night 31 January 1968 PRU personnel set up listening posts and road blocks around American advisers compounds and the Pleiku Montagnard Training Center. Because of heavy fire from unknown sources, some thought to be ARVN, these people pulled back into the compound areas. One PRU WIA from what was considered ARVN fire. (011830 H)

~~SECRET~~

F. Tuyen Duc

Census Grievance sources report VC are tired and hungry but plan to stay in Dalat City until 7 February. They will resume attack on 10 February. RDC and TCRD in Tuyen Duc Province have reported negative action with all teams in good condition and in place. (051330 H)

G. Binh Dinh

No information.

H. Khanh Hoa

No information.

I. Kontum

No information.

J. Lam Dong

No information.

K. Phu Bon

No information.

L. Quang Duc

No information.

4. III Corps

The pacification program seems to have been by-passed by the VC. No single RD team is known to have been the target of an attack and there are no reports of Provincial Reconnaissance Unit or Census Grievance casualties. Apparently the targets were the towns with the RD groups being unimportant in this instance. Undoubtedly some of the cadres on TET visits will have been injured or have become so discouraged so as not to return, but all in all it appears as though the pacification personnel may have escaped serious injury. (021500 H) See 2 February 1968.

3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~**A. Bien Hoa**

Five of the seven RD Teams have been contacted and are in no immediate danger. Team No. 4 in Cong Thanh District and Team No. 6 in Long Thanh District have not been contacted. The last contact with Team No. 4 prior to TET holidays revealed 20 cadre present. No means exists to contact Team No. 4 because bridge is out. Two members Team No. 4 reported captured but untested source suggests that they managed to escape. The SCG office in Long Thanh District reportedly destroyed but CG chief says all papers were removed and hidden prior to destruction. (012400 H)

B. Binh Duong

Fhu Lee Village, about two kilometers from province capital, was mortared and attacked at 0345 hours 3 February. Two RDC KIA, 2 WIA. (031200 H)

C. Dinh Long

Fifty percent of RDC are in their assigned positions because of TET holidays. A spot check at one RD site south of the province capital only three RDC were found on duty even though two teams were assigned to the site. The CAS officer was told other cadre on duty but they had gone to town to shop. (012400 H)

D. Gia Dinh

One RDC reported KIA night 3-4 February 1968, possibility exists that he was killed by friendly troops. (041600 H)

E. Long Khanh

One Trung Son cadre MIA along with nine weapons. 2400 hours 3 February 68 PRU augmented security force at U.S. civilian compound. (031600 H)

F. Tay Ninh

RDC evacuated from their hamlets to respective district towns to augment existing District security forces. (032400 H)

- 6 - ~~SECRET~~

G. Binh Tuy

Province quiet.

H. Hau Nghia

No information.

I. Long An

No information.

J. Phuoc Long

No information.

K. Phuoc Tuy

No information.

5. IV Corps

A. An Xuyen

1) CIA office communications knocked out. (020900 H)

2) In Caman City three PRU KIA and five WIA. (021800 H)

3) SCG reporting of VC activities, military strength, etc. PRU losses light - three KIA, five WIA. PRU assisted ARVN during daylight hours hunting down VC in the city. On night of the attack the PRU captured the secretary of the U Minh II Battalion along with a village party chapter member who were caught coming out of a movie theater. (032400 H)

B. Bac Lieu

1) 1 PRU KIA (031200 H)

2) Both VC TET attacks were thwarted by PRU intelligence and action (4 February IV Corps Sitrep).

C. Chau Doc

1) Small PRU element helped drive off VC with CIA officer and Navy Seals on 31 January.

- 7 - ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2) **Forty PRUs in Chau Doc town. (032400 H)**

D. Dinh Tuong, My Tho

1) **CIA compound has been held and re-established contact with operations center. (020900 H)**

2) **The RD and CG houses and equipment were destroyed during the siege. (021800 H)**

3) **RD warehouse was occupied by VC and is ten percent destroyed. All RD office and team supplies along with arms and ammunition which were stored at the warehouse are gone and rumors have it that it may have been looted or moved to province chief's house for safekeeping. The status of RD Teams throughout the province is unknown at this time. Special Police came to defense of RDC compound which except for few bullet holes is unscathed. (032400 H)**

E. Kien Giang

1) **CIA office communications in Rach Gia, capital of Kien Giang, were knocked out. (020900 H)**

2) **The PRUs took part in defense of Rach Gia 31 January. RDC house was one of first targets and received 15 explosive projectiles, both B-40 rockets and rifle grenades, from 20 man terrorist group. Although house was largely destroyed, the VC failed in their mission to occupy the position, as guards, even though wounded, continued to deliver effective fire. All personnel took cover safely on the roof and survived without casualties. (032400 H)**

3) **All units including PRUs have done excellent job in defending the city and in taking offensive action. (051800 H)**

F. Kien Hoa, Ben Tre City

CIA personnel at Flans office with 17 PRUs have good defensive position -- all other civilians in MACV compound. (021800 H)

~~SECRET~~

G. Kien Tuong, Moc Hoa

1) VC tried to blast the CIA compound wall but guards curtailed their action with automatic weapons fire. Personnel in the compound were originally going to retreat to their bunker but the province chief asked them to hold off until dawn. It appeared primary targets of VC were province chief's house and CIA compound. One guard and PRU WIA and have been evacuated to hospital. (020900 H)

2) Third target of VC was pacification advisor's compound. Two RDC KIA including one who was believed leading VC from point to point, showing them where the installations were. One RDC was WIA by ARVN as he was leading a captured VC out of a house. This man was the RDC deputy leader. The PRU and RDC were used as defensive forces -- did an excellent job and are still effective units.

H. Phong Dinh

RD command post at Neo Kho in Phong Phu District was attacked during the night and results are unknown although believed insignificant. (031200 H)

I. Vinh Binh, Tra Vinh

There is little known yet about the RD Teams although there have been no indications of casualties or disruption. SCG is intact and PRU had one KIA. (031800 H)

J. Vinh Long

1) CIA personnel were evacuated to the Vinh Long City airport. (020900 H)

2) PRU and armed propaganda team formed defense around PRU compound and although VC made no attack they suffered heavy casualties from friendly air strikes. (032400 H)

K. An Giang

No VC activity reported.

L. Ba Xuyen

No information.

~~SECRET~~

M. Chuong Thien

No VC activity reported.

N. Go Cong

No information.

O. Kien Phong

No information.

P. Sadec

No information.

6. To date casualties for all programs are reported at 21 KIA, 13 WIA and three MIA. Casualties of RDC Truong Son, SCG and PRU so far reported are far from complete and may be expected to raise significantly. Damage and destruction of installations and equipment in most cases has not been reported and it is too early to estimate replacement requirements.

MR. TURNER - 6 Feb 68

MR. COFFEY - 6 Feb 68

MR. BANNERMAN

B-2/3

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
TO: DDS		6 Feb 68
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
7D26		
REMARKS:		
FROM: SAVA		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION