

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

FE/1/PC/C]

NO.

148-CWA 01

DATE

23 July 1952

	TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
			REC'D	FWD'D		
1.	C-FE/1/PC		24 July	24 July	[]	Dispatch drafted by []
2.	OC/PC/FE		JUL 25	1952	[]	
3.	R1/DP		28/7		[]	JUL 28 1952
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 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2007

SECURITY INFORMATION

AIR

146-00001

JUL 29 1952

Chief, WASHINGTON, []

Chief, WASHINGTON, Washington, D.C.

operational

Briefing of DTILLAR representatives

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 DATE: 18 JUN 1980 REVIEWER []

1. We have already notified you briefly by cable that DTILLAR has selected Identity 1 as its representative for Indonesia. Identity 1 was formerly Executive Director of Identity 2 and has been given a year's leave of absence from that organization to take up the assignment with DTILLAR. He will depart from San Francisco for Indonesia by ship on 22 July and is scheduled to arrive in Djakarta via SIF on 22 August.

2. Fortunately, we had an opportunity to meet Identity 1 shortly after he had been selected. We were able to persuade him that simply to travel to Indonesia as the representative of DTILLAR would be likely to harm his chances of developing a program in that country because of the Indonesian's deep suspicion of any attempts to influence them. At our suggestion he decided to put the primary emphasis on his continuing relationship with Identity 2 and mention his connection with DTILLAR as a consultant to the president of that or anination with the commission to recommend a program for Indonesia. Since he can also legitimately mention his connections with several other well-known organizations such as Identity 3, we feel that the Indonesians will be less suspicious of him and will therefore give him a better chance to work slowly to publicize DTILLAR.

3. An indication of the Indonesian's feelings on the matter was gained during his interview with the Ambassador. Although extremely polite and friendly, the Ambassador was completely uncooperative in terms of suggesting names of people Identity 1 might contact in Indonesia or even in advising on such matters as visa, housing, travel arrangements, etc. The Consul General in New York was somewhat more cooperative and Identity 1 received a temporary visa in about three weeks' time.

4. All who met Identity 1 feel he is a good choice for the job. He is an older, scholarly-type gentleman with considerable background in Asian affairs, particularly China. He appeared to agree completely with our feeling that DTILLAR must proceed very slowly in Indonesia and not try to make a big splash. His background and character are in keeping with such an approach. We feel that he definitely helped us to convince DTILLAR headquarters of the wisdom of this

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method of approach which we have discussed numerous times with their people but have never been sure as to whether it had been accepted there.

5. Mind was able to spend a fair amount of time with Identity 1, briefing him on the existing situation in Indonesia and discussing possible fields of operation for DTPILLAR. Mind suggested that the aim of DTPILLAR should very definitely be to build up local groups and to stimulate them to community action rather than to attempt to publicize DTPILLAR itself. Identity 1 was advised to mix freely and naturally with all types of people, including official and unofficial Americans, Dutch, Chinese and Indonesians, without allowing himself to become too closely associated with any particular group. Mind suggested an initial period of getting to know the local people before attempting any operations whatsoever.

6. When the time for starting operations came, the emphasis might be put initially on non-political projects such as adult education, health improvement, aid to universities, etc. within the Indonesian community. One specific idea that was discussed was the stimulation of an Indonesian committee to prepare for free elections. It is felt that such a committee would be likely to be welcomed by prominent Indonesians and could provide a mechanism for community action of a positive nature which might later be used for more direct anti-Communist activities. Another specific project discussed was the sponsoring from Manila of a movie film on the Philippines which was recently produced under private sponsorship and puts considerable emphasis on the assistance the U.S. has given the Philippines; Identity 1 will discuss this further with the DTPILLAR people in Manila on his way out.

7. Identity 1 was told that the field in the Chinese community was wide open and would probably be the easiest area for him to operate within. He was cautioned not to scare off the Indonesians by pushing ahead too quickly with Chinese groups but on the other hand not to neglect the potential in the field. It was suggested that by putting the emphasis on persuading the Chinese to become good Indonesian citizens and on helping them to combat communist subversion within their own ranks, the Indonesians would be less likely to take exception to his activities in this field. It was thought that a good place to start would be in the Chinese schools and press media.

8. In all of this briefing it was emphasized that we preferred not to try to work out a detailed program from here but rather to give him certain broad guidance to assist him in his initial exploration and program development. We put heavy emphasis on the need for close cooperation between Identity 1 and yourself in the field and tried to point out that not only would this prevent mixups but that you would be in a position to assist him considerably by name checks, suggested contacts, etc. We asked that he try to talk over his plans with you fully before embarking on any actual operations. We, therefore, did not mention any of the specific proposals which have come to our attention over the past year but preferred to let you brief him on any of these which you

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think are still alive and worthwhile at the time he arrives.

9. Identity 1 was informed that Happiness and the [] Director had at one time been told of McClain sponsorship of DTPillar, but that they were not aware of the details. He was advised not to discuss this aspect with them unless they mentioned it to him and then only so far as necessary. It was suggested that he try to establish friendly relations with them, discuss the perfectly overt aspects of DTPillar's work there and seek their opinion occasionally, but to avoid getting involved with them in his day-to-day operations.

10. With the exception of project [] Identity 1 was not briefed in detail on any of our existing projects. He was informed that (a) we were in touch with several top leaders within the Indonesian Government, (b) that we were working closely with several Moslem organizations and that he should be particularly careful to inform us of any contemplated activities within this field to avoid hampering our operations, (c) that we were encouraging a commercial operation involving distribution of books and some publications including textbooks and (d) that we were working with several people in the labor field mostly on an unwitting basis because of their extreme susceptibility and that we suggested that DTPillar should probably not get involved in this field on any large scale.

11. [] Identity 1 was briefed by our financial contact who is taking his place with Identity 2. We did this because of the natural connection between the two which will give Identity 1 a legitimate reason for keeping tabs on and reporting on the activities of the unwitting principal agent. Identity 1 will send his reports directly back to our contact in Identity 2 but you should be able to keep yourself informed and perhaps exercise some direction to [] through contact with Identity 1 as well as through []

12. Finally on the matter of contact arrangements, Identity 1 was given your true name and told that you would initiate contact with him as soon as you felt it appropriate. It was considered best to avoid the impression of excess clandestinity created by the use of pseudonyms, but he was cautioned not to reveal your status to anyone else. He was warned that he would undoubtedly be watched by the Indonesian security service and that therefore any connection with our agency must be carefully protected. He was also told that any sensitive materials should not be kept in his possession and should be turned over to you for safe keeping and forwarding by our communications channels. However, it was felt that it was better to brief him to act perfectly normally in his DTPILLAR WORK which is overt and to let you handle his briefing on contacts with you.

13. We are very hopeful that you will be able to establish friendly relationships with Identity 1 in the field and work closely with him. As you know, we have been anxious to see a mechanism such as DTPILLAR established in Indonesia and feel that with careful development it can become a most useful operational mechanism.

FE/I/PC []
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[]
Identity S.C.

Chief, FE

SECRET FE/Rod Hussey