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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES/METHODS/EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

20 June 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: NMIC RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting on DIPPIAR attended by [ ]

[ ]  
1 June 1951, [ ] office.  
(Verbal report by SAI prior to submission of  
Form 1 Report to ADPC)

1. [ ] reported that, in his opinion, the recent trip to San Francisco made by [ ] and himself, to investigate certain activities and allegations concerning Project DIPPIAR was generally successful. He found Mr. Greene cooperative after initial suspicion on Mr. Greene's part was alleviated. [ ] pointed out that his observation of Mr. Greene was that, although he displayed outward calm, he seemed to display some nervousness at [ ] presence.

2. The general conclusion drawn from a series of meetings indicated a few substantial security violations leading to some suspicion of government interest. However, some of the allegations referred to in the memorandum from CAL/CT from SAC/D/CIS, 31 May 1951, were technical and not of serious consequence. In addition to the security violations delineated in this memorandum, some additional breaches were found when they arrived in San Francisco.

3. More specifically, it was found that:

a. There was no extensive disbursement of funds not talk of large resources. Therefore, this criticism was not justified.

b. That there were several instances of improper handling of classified documents; guarded conversations in front of unwitting people, the promiscuous use of the telephone; references to "Washington", "headquarters", and "WIA".

c. Security practices were carried out contrary to generally accepted conduct.

(1) It was found that cover story was, in some instances, not properly presented.

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(2) The exposure of documents in private offices which necessitated them being turned over when unwitting persons came into the office.

(3) obvious closed-door conferences.

(All of which leads to a suspicion of some kind of secret operations. [ ] felt that it was possible to explain these in light of certain confidential activities of DTPILLAR.

d. Hiring practices are indiscriminate with improper investigation; i.e. a person was hired "off the street" without any investigation into her background at all. In another instance, Stanford University Research people known to be leftist were hired for research assignments.

e. Mr. L. K. Little, in the presence of unwitting people referred to "local office of CIA".

f. Mr. Ed Kennedy, Administrative Officer, for DTPILLAR seems to be the least security conscious of any member of the organization.

g. It is known that the trash has to be burned, thereby creating suspicion of some type of government interest.

4. Indicated actions:

a. General tightening up of security measures and specific detail of a competent security officer.

b. The urgent need for a permanent President, who must be, among other qualifications already outlined, a man of considerable standing in the community and well-known for his participation in public affairs:

(1) To insure the continued interest of DTPILLAR members.

(2) To alleviate the possibility of them taking "the ball by the horns" and moving ahead by themselves without proper liaison with this headquarters.

c. It is considered advisable that the whole base of DTPILLAR be broadened to include labor, religious, and racial group participation on DTPILLAR.

d. Because Mr. Ed Kennedy has alienated almost everyone on DTPILLAR and Mr. Brayton Willbur has gone on record by saying that if Kennedy stays, he will not, it is recommended that Mr. Kennedy be removed as quickly as possible and with the greatest possible grace. It is felt that under the proper circumstances he could be quite useful in another capacity, but not with DTPILLAR.

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e. On my DTPILLAR

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4. Monthly S.M.I. Conference should be held on the campuses of universities of the UPRRA members and for the specific purpose of reviewing projects, objectives, budget matters, and target dates because the public will soon expect UPRRA to have further concrete accomplishments.

5. Mr. Green for an note to arrive in Washington sometime around June. It was suggested that he be advised of:

a. The security problem, and

b. The necessity for implementing projects for UPRRA undertaking.

6. The meeting concluded by noting that there was really no cause for alarm but that appropriate action must be taken on the subject as outlined above.

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