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DOCUMENT NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
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CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010  
AUTH: HM JBR  
DATE: 7 REVIEWER: [ ]

21 December 1951

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 2020  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR: FE/PL

SUBJECT : Terms of Reference - CFA.

REFERENCE : Memorandum for OFE dated 18 December 1951, sub-  
ject as above.

1. As per your request, there are listed below comments on the Terms of Reference for the Committee for a Free Asia.

2. As a general comment, it would seem initially that the Committee for a Free Asia is not entirely sure of what it should do other than not duplicate USIE activities. Paragraph 3(4) states that the Committee should be engaged in developing personnel who could be trained for intelligence duties, stay-behind, or other covert missions in time of war. A further comment is that targets and priorities within each country are set forth in country annexes presently in preparation. This branch admits of possible misunderstanding of CFA; however, we have gone on the assumption that CFA would not enter into stay-behind or other covert missions in time of war. If what is intended by the statement quoted above is that CFA will act as a spotter for persons who could be trained and utilized by the operating branches, it is believed that would be a worthwhile activity. Likewise, if CFA is to take the branches' country plan and use it as a guide for activities other than in a policy sense, it would seem that some duplication of effort would result. Moreover, the extent to which the operating branch would want CFA to be involved in its covert activities should be subject to close review and coordination.

3. Examples of activities to be undertaken by RFA seem appropriate, providing coordination with proper field stations is effected. However, the extent to which the development of an Asian commercial news gathering organization would parallel or duplicate present or planned activities of the operating branches should certainly be investigated.

4. Appendix II of the reference document contains much doctrine. It is regrettable, however, that the restrictions placed on operational aspects of CFA's political and psychological warfare programs are not further delineated. Admittedly, such a delineation would be a difficult task but would be of extreme value to both CFA and OPC. As far as this branch is concerned, the statement that CFA will not be subject to operational control of the area station chief should be opened to revision. It must be realized that should CFA operate in Japan under the terms of agreement between General Smith and General Ridgway, certain staff officers of

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would necessarily know of the true affiliation of CFA. Since this is so, these same officers would turn [ ] n as the controlling agent over CFA. It seems both unfeasible and impracticable that [ ] should accept responsibility for CFA and yet have no control over it.

5. Likewise, because of the light and possibly deteriorating cover under which CFA will work in the Far East, FE-3 very strongly takes the position that CFA cannot tap covert resources except in specified and closely coordinated instances.

6. FE-3 fears lest it suddenly find an OPC operational entity within its area of responsibility operating without control and possibly counter to carefully developed plans and policies. The matter of coordination in both the field and Washington, we believe, requires additional and exhaustive studies. FE-3 firmly believes that CFA can be usefully and profitably integrated into the structure of operations in the Far East. It is imperative, however, that both OPC operational personnel and CFA personnel fully understand their mission and limitations and proper field of operation.

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