

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

THE COMMITTEE FOR A FREE ASIA

TOPICS OF REFERENCE

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1. General Functions and Objectives

CFA is an instrumentality of OGC for (1) the conduct of PW including political warfare and (2) to a lesser extent for providing cover for OGC covert activities.

The general objectives are, through PW, to further U. S. objectives in Asia by stemming the tide of communism and rolling it back in the following ways:

- a. Developing and encouraging anti-communist native leadership which will in turn make it possible for Asians to help themselves in the fight against communism.
- b. Denying leadership, including professional personnel and other assets, to the communists.
- c. Encouraging the development of organizations (political, youth, women's, labor, religious, etc.) whose major goals are consistent with U. S. objectives.
- d. Developing situations overtly which may be exploited by OGC covertly.

2. Guiding Principles

Although many CFA activities will be overt, CFA will not be precluded from undertaking confidential activities, appropriately coordinated, when such are essential to the accomplishment of its missions in a specific area. For example, CFA may appropriately assist financially the Youth Crusaders for Democracy in the Philippines in a confidential manner without publicizing the source of such funds. It may also, for example, operate or subsidize a bookstore in Hong Kong for the distribution of appropriate publications, without publicizing such relationship. It will also be necessary in most Asian countries to undertake radio operations sponsored by local groups, using existing stations and indigenous talent, without the appearance of the CFA or RFA label (which will of necessity be a U. S. label, at least initially) in order for such programs to find best acceptance among Asians. It will also be necessary to utilize native groups to further CFA objectives in other ways, with the CFA and U. S. sponsorship played down as far as possible.

However, CFA will not engage in confidential activities which are not consistent with its publicly announced objectives.

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GFA's is a delicate and complicated undertaking which will require different techniques and approaches in each area. Until GFA gains experience and evaluates opportunities in the field, it will not be possible to define exactly or delimit all activities which it should undertake.

Guiding principles setting the general course of GFA and RFA operations are set forth below. Some leeway in their application in the early phases of operations is recognized as necessary. It is also expected that recommendations for revisions will be forthcoming from GFA if it is found that its general objectives may not be accomplished within this frame of reference.

a. Although initially it will not be possible, GFA should work toward removing the U. S. label - private and public - from its operations and take on an Asian coloration.

b. GFA should operate as far as possible through local groups - not necessarily sub-committees of GFA. Policy guidance from OPC as to the use of GFA by a specific group will be requested in each case.

c. GFA activities, including RFA, should be decentralized as far as possible and transferred from San Francisco to Asian countries. However, central control will be retained in San Francisco.

d. GFA should as a general principle not undertake activities of the kind presently carried on or planned by USIS or other official overt U. S. agencies. The type of activities within the cognizance of USIS are set forth in Appendix A. However, there may be some occasions in which GFA can either take a more strident line or slant material of the type normally produced by USIS in a way which would not be appropriate to USIS. However, the USIS line has toughened and this area in which GFA can operate and in which USIS cannot has narrowed. There may also be certain activities of the type set forth in Appendix I, which GFA may be able to undertake in certain areas more appropriately than USIS or in addition to USIS. Through close coordination in the field and in Washington, these may be spelled out and non-duplication insured.

## Radio Free Asia

RFA should be guided by the general policies set forth above. More specifically:

1. RFA should gradually eliminate broadcasts which bear the U. S. label from San Francisco. RFA should be a voice of Asia.

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2. RFA should generally avoid the kind of program which VOA broadcasts and for which the U. S. Government can accept responsibility (in this regard there are few restrictions to be placed on VOA as respects the toughness of its anti-communist line).

3. Operations should be transferred to Asia and decentralized as far as possible so that broadcasts can be made under the sponsorship of local groups through local stations, as near as possible to the target audience. Broadcasts should be made via medium wave where possible. The Committee, however, will not be precluded from operating local stations in certain areas where existing stations are largely Government controlled and have their own editorial policy which would be likely to prohibit the successful execution of the Committee's mission.

4. Examples of the kinds of activities which can be undertaken by RFA are:

\* a. Broadcasts designed to influence political elections, under specific instructions and controls.

b. Broadcasts aimed at assisting specific local labor, youth, teachers, women or other groups whose goals are consistent with long range U. S. interests.

c. Influencing the development of leadership by giving hearing to selected leaders and withholding it from others.

d. Openly encouraging the subversion of the Chinese Communist Government.

e. Take stands against specific persons and specific groups: the corruption of an undemocratic politician; the leaders of communist-dominated unions.

f. Present as truth the probable or possible when its falsity cannot be disproved by the enemy.

g. Encourage debates and discussions, loaded as required.

h. Expose communist informers in non-communist controlled areas more freely than can VOA.

i. Enlist the aid of Asian intellectuals who might be fearful of the association with an official Government program.

\* Note: It is not proposed that RFA identify itself with or sponsor the cause of any person or political party. It may, however, sponsor or support specific programs and movements and it will at all times be anti-communist.

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5. It is recognized that news such as that provided by FANA and features such as those already broadcast directly by RFA remain important aspects of a gray psychological warfare program as well as audience-gaining assets. RFA will follow the general principle, however, of furnishing such news and features to local groups for their use rather than for direct production under the RFA label.

It is considered that the development of a strictly Asian commercial newsmaking organization, specializing in local news and not seemingly subsidized by a U. S. instrumentality, is advantageous to the U. S. Government as a whole as well as to the over-all objectives and activities of the Committee.

### 3. Targets and Priorities

The targets to which CFA should address itself are in order of priority:

\* a. The overseas Chinese (including those in the U.S.) with particular effort directed at:

(1) Developing leaders friendly to the United States who would be able to communicate with and ultimately influence other Chinese overseas and on the China mainland.

(2) Denying leaders, professional personnel and other key personnel to the Communists.

(3) Assisting where possible in the rescue and relocation of key Chinese who are presently homeless and starving.

(4) Developing personnel who could be trained for intelligence duties; or stay behind or other covert missions in time of war.

- b. China
- c. Korea
- d. Burma
- e. Thailand
- f. Indo-China
- g. Malaya and Indonesia
- h. Japan
- i. The Philippines
- j. India

Targets and priorities within each country are set forth in country annexes presently in preparation.

\* Note: It is understood, however, that work with the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asian communities must be so handled that it will not work to the detriment of the Committee's work with indigenous groups in those areas.

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4. Coordination

In order to insure that CIA objectives are consistent with national objectives and to insure non-duplication of GHS and other similar activities in the field, close coordination between State, OGC and CIA is essential. Adequate arrangements exist for coordination between State and OGC at the Washington level. Machinery for field coordination will be worked out as the program develops.

Equally important is the need for close coordination between CIA and OGC activities in the field to insure non-compromise of OGC covert operations and to define fields of activity for CIA and OGC. An initial statement of OGC-CIA coordination is set forth as Appendix II.

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APPENDIX I

\* Listed below are examples of activities undertaken by the Department of State and/or ECA. Normally the association of such activities with the U. S. government is either acknowledged or, if not, the association if it became known would not embarrass the U. S. government or discredit the activity.

a. The Voice of America broadcasts.

b. Contracts for purchase of published materials for event distribution abroad, including subscriptions to magazines, purchase of additional copies of books, pamphlets or other printed material prepared by foreign organizations, publishing houses, trade unions, et cetera.

c. Contracts for dissemination of information materials such as posters, pamphlets, or leaflets, motion picture films, still photos, exhibits, et cetera.

d. Contracts with publishers, motion picture producers, and other producers of information media for production of materials for foreign distribution.

e. Direct production and dissemination of material which may be attributed to the United States Government without serious embarrassment or produced and/or disseminated without attribution to any source.

\* Extracted from USIS publication dated November 1, 1951, Subject: USIS and Indigenous Operations.

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APPENDIX II

OPC - CFA Coordination

CFA will enter into no confidential relationship involving an activity which is not consistent with its announced objectives and for which it could not therefore risk exposure.

CFA may not engage in other types of clandestine or unconventional warfare without prior specific OPC headquarters approval.

No restrictions will be placed upon CFA's overt information-gathering activities. Certain restrictions must, however, be placed on operational aspects of its program -- political and psychological warfare -- and on confidential activities.

Field coordination between the covert station chief and a witting representative of CFA will be required both for purposes of mutual assistance and to avoid impairment of the covert mission by CFA activity.

CFA will not, however, be subject, except in emergency situations, to the operational control of the area station chief. In case of conflict between the station chief and the CFA representative, the issue will be resolved by CFA and OPC at the headquarters level. The views of the station chief, however, are important to the proper development of CFA operations and should be available to the CFA field representatives.

OPC does not take the position that CFA cannot tap covert resources and in fact assumes that both the covert missions and CFA must largely utilize the same assets within certain areas. Any approach by CFA to a covert contact or group must, however, be coordinated in advance at the field or Washington level.

The method of field coordination may vary according to local conditions.

In addition to field coordination (which in most areas will not be possible until the development of a CFA field staff), arrangements will be worked out for coordination between CFA and OPC at the Washington level.

All CFA representatives proceeding to the field will be adequately briefed prior to their departure.

OPC assumes responsibility for the counter-espionage protection of CFA.

Operations involving the use of CFA as cover for OPC covert missions will require CFA-OPC approval at the headquarters level.

All communications of a covert nature between CFA and its field representatives must presently be transmitted through OPC covert channels. Other communication arrangements will be developed after further study.