

PP STAFF COORDINATION

PROJECT: DTLINEN	
AMENDMENT NO.	DIVISION EE
X RENEWAL + <i>Re-documentation</i>	BRANCH
TERMINATION	DESK Germany

STAFF CONCURRENCE				MEMORANDUM ATTACHED		
ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	SIGNATURE	COPY NO.	DATE	YES	NO	DATE
Covert Budget Br.	<i>[Signature]</i>	2	1 Oct. 56			
SSA/DD/S	<i>[Signature]</i>	2	4 Oct. 56			
PP/ICD/Press	<i>[Signature]</i>	3	27 Sept.			
PP/OPS/PR	<i>[Signature]</i>	3	10/10/56			
PP/C/OPS		1				
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3025 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2007						

RECOMMENDING APPROVAL		
CPP	SIGNATURE <i>[Signature]</i>	DATE 22 Oct 56
A/DD/P/P	SIGNATURE <i>[Signature]</i>	DATE

(This space reserved for comments of SSA-DD/S; CPP; A/DD/P/P.)

11 funds available.

Document No.
No Change In Class. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> Declassified
Class. Changed to: TS S C
Next Review Date: 09/10/10
Auth.: 113 70-3
Date: 09 OCT 1980

Division Project Clearance Sheet

PROJECT CRYPTONYM: DTLINEN

SUB-PROJECT CRYPTONYM: N.A.

AMENDMENT NUMBER: RENEWAL AND REDOCUMENTATION

DEVELOPED BY: [Signature] EE/G 29 Aug. 1956
Case Officer Organization Date

REVIEWED BY: Thomas Polgar 29 Aug '56
Chief, EE/Germany Date

[Signature] 30 Aug 56
Act Chief, EE/Plans/EEW Date

[Signature] 5 Sept 56
Chief, EE/Admin Date

[Signature] 12 Sept
Chief, EE/Operations Date

[Signature] CI/Staff 11 Sept 5 Sept 56
Date

[Signature] FI/CCB/NEC 17 Sept 56
Date

Date

Date

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Date

Date

FORWARDED BY: [Signature] 18 Sept 56
Chief, Eastern European Division Date

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PROJECT OUTLINE

Project Cryptonym or Subject: DTLINEN

Sub-Project Cryptonym or Identification: N.A.

Renewal and redocumentation for Fiscal Year 1957.

Originating Division: EE

a. Division Chief:	()	Ext. 2062
b. Branch Chief :	Thomas Polgar	Ext. 3311
c. Case Officer :	()	Ext. 3904

Target Area: East Germany

Type of Project: Psychological and Political Warfare

Financial Mechanism: Subsidy

Funds requested: () for Fiscal Year 1957

Current Status: Operational since 1949 under authorization of Project Outline (EARTHENWARE), approved 24 May 1949; Project Outline (Revised), approved 16 August 1949; Project Amendment No. 1, approved 29 August 1950; and Renewal for FY 1955,⁵⁶ approved 30 December 1954.

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1. OBJECTIVE

To harass and weaken the Soviet administration of East Germany (including East Berlin) and the East German puppet regime, to help retard East German economic development, to help promote and sustain popular anti-Communist resistance within East Germany, and to help expose conditions within the Soviet Zone to the Western world

2. ORIGIN AND POLICY GUIDANCE:

a. Origin:

- (1) NSC 5412, approved 15 March 1954
- (2) NSC 162/2, approved 30 October 1953
- (3) NSC 174/1, approved 23 December 1953
- (4) NSC 160/1, approved 13 August 1953
- (5) NSC 5404, approved 25 January 1954
- (6) RSB D-21
- (7) Project Outline (Earthenware), approved 24 May 1949
- (8) Project Outline (Revised), approved 16 August 1949
- (9) Project Amendment No. 1, approved 29 August 1950
- (10) Renewal for FY 1955; approved 30 December 1954

b. Whence Proposed: The project originated in the field.

3. SITUATION:

a. Since the inception of Soviet occupation in 1945, the U.S.S.R. has been able to establish effective controls over the population of East Germany and East Berlin through its own military forces and security police, and through the instrumentalities of its East German proteges. The lives of the residents of the Soviet Zone have been systematically regimented for the purposes of political indoctrination and remilitarization and the economy has been rigorously regulated in order to maximize its strategic contributions to the Soviet bloc. There is every indication that the ultimate Soviet aim is to gain political and strategic control of all Germany.

b. Despite Soviet-sponsored indoctrination efforts and repressive measures, a substantial amount of popular dissatisfaction with the Communist regime exists throughout East Germany and East Berlin, and there remains a considerable resistance potential. So long, however, as Soviet military forces remain in East Germany in strength and the Soviet Union refuses to agree to the political reunification of Germany there will be few practical prospects for achieving East German liberation from Communist control without resort to military action. On the other hand, it is essential from the U. S. standpoint to prevent the complete Sovietization of East Germany, and to

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minimize its strategic economic, military, and political contribution to the Soviet bloc.

n/w
c. In view of present U.S. policies against the use of aggressive military action to reduce Soviet power, and in the light of the probably indefinite continuation of Soviet control in East Germany, the U.S. faces the difficult task of sustaining, increasing, and exploiting East German popular resistance over a relatively long period of time, pending some decisive shift in the balance of power in favor of the non-Communist Western nations. The U.S., through CIA, must exert every possible effort to discredit the Soviet Union and the East German Communist regime in the eyes of the East German people, strengthen popular East German support for U.S. European integration policies, demonstrate that the East Germans have not been forgotten or abandoned by the West, and persuade them that they have the power to alleviate their condition to some extent through their own current resistance actions.

o/s
d. The Fighting League Against Inhumanity (Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit) (KgU), which has been subsidized and guided by CIA since its inception in 1949, was originally conceived for the purpose of exposing to the residents of both East and West Germany the conditions existent in prisoner-of-war and concentration camps in the Soviet Zone. A secondary purpose was to provide a source of useful information concerning the psychological situation within East Germany. Since 1949 the KgU has increased in size from a small group to approximately 75 West Berlin headquarters employees and approximately 80 covert Soviet Zone contacts. A West German office of the KgU, located at Hanover, is staffed by 4 employees. During an average month the KgU distributes propaganda material ranging from several hundred thousand items to over two million items. This distribution is accomplished by balloon operations and by extensive mailing from within East Germany and from the Federal Republic into East Germany. The KgU, under CIA guidance, conducts administrative harassment operations in the Soviet Zone, based largely on information received from its East German covert informants and on mail intercepts. These operations, frequently involving the production and carefully targeted distribution of falsified administrative instructions, have resulted in the disruption of certain East German governmental and Communist Party activities, causing the expense of East German Government time, energy, and money. During an average month the KgU debriefs approximately 20 members of the People's Police and 25 visitors of interest to the KgU's office for East German State Security matters; interviews and assists 1,500 visitors to its overt West Berlin headquarters; processes 1,000 search service cases for persons missing in the Soviet Zone; and interviews 35 visitors to its covert office, from which potential covert workers are chosen. Also, the KgU turns over an average of approximately 200 intelligence reports to the Berlin Base intelligence section every month. The West German office of the KgU organizes activities of a speakers team of six to eight persons. The speakers team participates in public rallies, film showings, lecture programs and similar activities. In an average month 60 to 90 such meetings are held, attended by a total of from 3,500 to 10,000 persons.

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e. Project DTLINEN (formerly EARTHENWARE) was originally approved by COP on 24 May 1949, as a sub-project of project QKDEMON, to support the KgU and its propaganda and resistance activities. Renewal FY 1955⁵⁶ approved by DD/P 30 December 1954.

f. Apart from occasional small gifts from West Berlin and West German organizations and individuals, the KgU receives its entire financial support from CIA.

g. Certain problems have arisen which have entailed an extensive review of the mechanism (See para. 11 j).

4. PROPOSAL:

It is proposed that CIA continue to subsidize the KgU for the Psychological Warfare purposes indicated.

5. OPERATIONAL OUTLINE:

a. Sub-proposals or Tasks: CIA will continue to provide operational guidance to the KgU and to subsidize the organization to defray its expenses for the following:

(1) That portion of the KgU's organizational overhead expenses that is not provided for from other financial sources. CIA subsidies will cover salaries, rents, and necessary administrative expenses associated with the maintenance of the KgU's overt and covert organization. *ju*

(2) The production and East German distribution of leaflets, pamphlets, and other publications denouncing East German and Soviet practices and personalities, encouraging passive resistance, and informing the East German population on international, West German and local East German developments. *ju*

(3) The preparation and execution of administrative harassment operations designed to ridicule, confuse, and undermine the efficiency and effectiveness of East German governmental and Communist Party offices. *re wanted*

(4) The East German distribution of defection - inducement propaganda directed at Soviet military personnel at special occasions, usually during the spring and fall maneuvers. *u/w*

(5) The maintenance of secure contact with KgU covert East German co-workers for information gathering, operational, counter-espionage, and positive intelligence purposes. (See FI Annex) *ju*

(6) The furnishing of advice and assistance to, and the debriefing of, refugees arriving at the KgU refugee processing offices and visitors to the overt KgU headquarters, as well as the preparation of records and file checks on refugees at the request of West Berlin and West German governmental refugee processing offices. *i/w*

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(7) The preparation of records, reports, and statistics regarding East German prisons, detention camps, labor camps, political prisoner camps, etc., for propaganda exploitation through special publications, overt news media and West German and West Berlin governmental outlets.

(8) The preparation of articles concerning conditions in the Soviet Zone and related matters for dissemination in Western magazines and newspapers.

11/10
(9) The organization of public rallies and similar activities in West Germany.

b. Key Personnel:

1/10
(1) The principal agent, who is the incumbent head of the KgU. A member of the KgU since its inception, he has headed the organization since 1952 and has been responsible to a great extent for the increase in the scope of its operations. He has proven to be a reliable worker. He has Full Operational Approval. (C-11037, 29 December 1954)

1/10
(2) The deputy to the principal agent, who is chief of the Operations Section of the KgU. Originally brought into the KgU in January 1951 for a CE assignment, he shortly thereafter took over his present position. Due to his efforts, the organization's compartmentation has been increased and the overall security appreciably strengthened. He has a Full Operational Approval. (JU-8897, 28 April 1952)

c. Indigenous Groups:

(1) The KgU West Berlin and West German headquarters staff consists of approximately 80 persons who are employed within the seven main sections and six specialized subsections of the organization. The main sections are as follows:

- 1/10
I - Political and Public Affairs,
II - Personnel and Administration,
III - Refugee Affairs,
IV - West German Office (Hanover),
V - Search Service and Social Welfare,
VI - Central Files,
VII - Operations.

The specialized sub-sections are at present as follows:

- VIII - MFS Affairs (East German Security Service),
IX - Educational Affairs,
XI - VOPO (People's Police) and GDR National Army Affairs,
XII - Academic/Church Affairs,
X - Political Functionaries Affairs,
XV - Political Prisoners Affairs.

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(2) Section VII (Operations) handles approximately 80 East German co-workers who are debriefed in West Berlin for operational and positive intelligence and receive propaganda and administrative harassment material for infiltration and distribution.

d. Target Groups: The targets of KgU propaganda activity are the populations of East Germany and East Berlin, and, to a lesser degree, West Germany and Western Europe. Targets of administrative harassment operations are Soviet Zone governmental and Communist Party offices and officials.

e. Duration: Indefinite.

f. Graphic Illustrations: NA

6. SECURITY:

a. (1) Cover: Both the principal agent and his deputy are knowledgeable of the fact that they are working for a U.S. intelligence service and no cover is utilized by the CIA field case officer vis-a-vis these personnel in contact with them. As the organization has an internationally known overt function of aiding and giving advice to East Germans, as well as carrying out a vigorous anti-Soviet campaign within both West Berlin and West Germany, its covert operations are being conducted behind an overt facade. [The KgU is registered with German authorities as a public organization.]

(2) Funding Cover: CIA funds are camouflaged as donations from organizations and individuals sympathetic to the aims of the KgU. At present, however, no backstopping exists for this funding and the field case officer personally turns over the CIA subsidy to the Principal Agent. In view of the fundamental weakness of this procedure an intensive review is now in process at Field and Headquarters aimed at establishing a more secure funding mechanism.

b. Knowledgeability:

(1) The key personnel are knowledgeable of U.S. intelligence involvement. [It is presumed that they suspect CIA is the U.S. agency concerned.]

(2) Although never officially informed about U.S. financial support, German employees of the West Berlin KgU headquarters must be presumed to suspect that an Allied Power, and probably the U.S., subsidizes the KgU. These probable suspicions would be based on Soviet and East German allegations, allegations in Western news media, local gossip, and the magnitude of KgU activities.

(3) Selected individuals of the U.S. Defense and State Department and the West German and West Berlin governments and of the British intelligence service are knowledgeable of CIA interest in the KgU. (See paragraph 11 j)

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biograph
c. Operational Security: Standard operational security precautions, including the use of safe houses, compartmentation etc. are observed. All KgU headquarters personnel have been cleared or are in the process of clearance. All East German co-workers have been name-checked both in the Field and at Headquarters.

d. Risks:

NEW
(1) The KgU has frequently in the past been accused by East and West German news media of being an instrument of a United States intelligence service. Considering this and the fact that selected representatives of the West German and West Berlin governments have been made witting of CIA interest in the KgU, it is believed that repercussions in the event of a compromise would not be very great in Western Germany or Europe, and that only little capital could be made of such an event by the Communist authorities. As the KgU is engaged in a basically humanitarian and anti-Communist program, it is believed that exposure of U.S. Government interest would cause little or no adverse reaction in the United States.

HW
(2) A continuing risk involved in this project is the kidnapping of key personnel by agents of the East German or Russian security services.

e. Personnel Disposal:

HW
(1) No serious difficulties are anticipated in the disposal of either of the key personnel either before or after the termination of the project. Both of them are under written contracts covering termination procedures.

HW
(2) Although CIA does not have a direct or formal responsibility for other KgU headquarters personnel, and could effectuate the disposal of such personnel during the life of the project through instructions to key personnel, it is probable that, in the event of project termination, CIA would find it necessary for operational or moral reasons to assist in the secure and amiable termination/disposition of KgU staff personnel. On the basis of previous experience with the termination of similar projects, some individual disposal problems are considered likely.

HW
f. Disaster Plan: Transfer of key personnel involved in this operation and the abandonment and/or destruction of incriminating materials in the event of a hot war will take place in accordance with the disaster plan of the German Station.

7. COORDINATION:

a. Relation to Other Projects:

HW
(1) The KgU on special occasions renders assistance to the REDCAP program of the SR Division by ballooning into East Germany Russian and

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German language propaganda material aimed at inducing defection among Soviet military personnel in East Germany.

(2) The KGU coordinates some of its activities with, or distributes propaganda material for, other CIA supported organizations such as the Investigating Committee of Free Jurists ([]) the SPD Ostbuero ([]), the CDU Ostbuero ([]), Die TARANTEL (Project ICAPAGAN), Werbebuero Cramer (ICASSOCK), COLLOQUIUM Verlag ([]) and the West Berlin Trade Unions ([]).

(3) Project DTLINEN supports the CIA Berlin Base's counterespionage and Soviet defection programs. To this end the KGU occasionally refers selected East German personnel to an outside contact office for further processing. In addition, the KGU furnishes the Berlin Base case officer with positive information produced as a by-product of its East German PP activities. Such information is transmitted to the Berlin Base Reports Section. (See attached FI Annex for further details).

b. Significance within Over-All Program in Area: Project DTLINEN along with [] represent the two major CIA assets not aligned with or elements of bona fide West German/West Berlin political or social organizations and engaged in anti-Communist resistance operations directed against the Soviet Zone of Germany.

c. Extent of coordination:

(1) The project was originated by the German Station and has been coordinated with all appropriate CIA components at headquarters. As stated above, the intelligence material gathered as a by-product of this project is passed to the Reports Section of the Berlin Base. In addition, personnel of interest to the CASTABIA and REDCAP programs are passed to an FI-controlled agent ([]) for debriefing and final disposition.

(2) Selected personnel of the State and Defense Departments have been orally briefed on the purposes and activities of the project.

(3) Key individuals in the Federal Republic and West Berlin governments have been informed of U.S. interest in the KGU, and general policies affecting certain CIA-supported KGU activities have been discussed by the German Station with these individuals (see paragraph 11 j, Special Considerations). Representatives of the British Intelligence Service have been informed of U.S. support for the KGU.

(4) Internal CIA coordination is effected through CPP and SSA-DD/S on a need to know basis as required within DD/P.

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8. CONTROL:

a. Nature of:

(1) Control over the project will be exercised by means of the administration of the financial subsidy and supervisory guidance by CIA personnel.

(2) No serious control difficulties are envisaged as pertaining to the Principal Agent and his deputy. Both are highly motivated ideologically.

b. Administrative Plan: The revised administrative plan for project DTLINEN was approved by the Acting DD/A on 3 April 1954.

c. Reports: Standard report requirements will be observed.

9. BUDGET DATA:

a. Total CIA Funds Required for Fiscal Year 1957: [] (See Attachment A.)

b. Availability of Funds: Funds in the above amount have been included in Eastern European Division Operational Program for Fiscal Year 1957.

c. Non-CIA Funds: NA

d. Foreign Currency: NA

e. Funding: See paragraph 6 a (2) (Funding cover). All funds are accounted for in accordance with provisions of the Projects Administrative Plan and/or CFR's.

f. Financial History:

Fiscal Year 1953 - Authorization:	[]	Obligation:	[]
Fiscal Year 1954 - Authorization:	[]	Obligation:	[]
Fiscal Year 1955 - Authorization:	[]	Obligation:	[]
Fiscal Year 1956 - Authorization:	[]	Obligation:	[]

g. Future Requirements: It is anticipated that a total of [] will be required for Fiscal Year 1958.

10. SUPPORT DATA:

a. Total CIA Personnel: Total CIA personnel necessary for this project are one field and one headquarters case officer, as well as several assistants, all on a part-time basis. These personnel are currently available. No CIA personnel are charged to the Project.

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- b. Material: See Logistical Annex attached.
- c. Communications: NA
- d. Other CIA Support: NA
- e. Support from Other United States Agencies: CIS support is arranged locally.

11. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS:

a. Current Status: Approved and operational under original project outline as amended.

b. Commitments: Written agreements with the Principal Agent and his deputy specify that they will receive assistance ~~from CIA~~ should they, because of their activities on behalf of DTLINEN, be forced to evacuate Berlin for security reasons. Such assistance would entail a resettlement bonus, transportation to West Germany for the employee involved and his immediate family, pay for a three month period, and whatever assistance is possible in obtaining a new job. In addition, should either of these personnel be kidnapped or otherwise rendered incapable of supporting his family because of DTLINEN activities, CIA would continue to submit monthly pay checks to his family for a period of one year.

c. Effectiveness:

(1) The impact of KgU administrative harassment operations has been reflected by reports of KgU co-workers and other CIA agents, reports of counter-measures which the GDR government has been forced to take, and numerous accounts in the East German press warning the population to be on their guard against KgU activities.

(2) Evidence of KgU propaganda effectiveness has been afforded by testimonials from a large number of People's Police officials and other East German residents who have come to the KgU headquarters for advice as a result of reading KgU propaganda material.

(3) The West German and West Berlin governments, as well as the Red Cross and other private organizations, request information from the KgU on refugee matters. The KgU's search service on people in East Germany is utilized by a number of West German private and governmental organizations.

(4) The favorable international reputation of the KgU has been reflected by articles in several leading American and European newspapers and periodicals. However, in 1955 the KgU received some unfavorable publicity in West-German newspapers as an alleged American spy center.

d. Anticipated Results:

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list w/ 2 data

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(1) On the basis of past experience with project DTLINEN, it is expected that continued CIA support of the KgU will yield a fair return on the funds and case officer time devoted to the project. The KgU possesses demonstrated operational capabilities within East Germany, has maintained a satisfactory security standard, and has proven responsive to CIA guidance.

(2) KgU propaganda production and distribution operations are expected to help sustain East German resistance morale. The administrative harassment operations are expected to help lessen the efficiency of East German governmental, economic, and Communist Party activities.

(3) KgU research and reports on conditions in East Germany are expected to continue to be valuable in helping educate West Germans as to the incompatibility of the Communist and Western systems.

e. Evaluation:

(1) General, overall project effectiveness will be assessed on the basis of overt media, intelligence reports from other CIA agents and East German refugees, and popular reaction to the KgU in West Berlin and West Germany.

(2) Reaction to printed propaganda will be judged both by letters received from the Soviet Zone and by reports of the interviews with the East German and East Berlin residents who voluntarily visit the overt headquarters in West Berlin. The effectiveness of administrative harassment operations will be judged by directives and other counter-measures of the East German government, attacks in the Soviet Zone press and radio, and reports from KgU co-workers and other CIA agents. The services of CIS will continue to be utilized for this purpose.

f. Policy Questions: An unresolved policy question is to what extent, and under what circumstances, the Federal Republic and/or West Berlin governments should assume increased participation in determining the policies for and supervising the operations of the KgU. See paragraph 11 j, Special Considerations, for the background of this policy question.

g. Congress: NA

h. Extra-Agency Action: NA

i. Proprietary Companies: NA

j. Special Considerations:

(1) In the summer of 1952, the German Station officially advised representatives of the Federal Republic and West Berlin governments that the U.S. Government was furnishing guidance and financial assistance to the KgU. The German Station also furnished a statement of intentions to

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a representative of the Federal Republic government acknowledging a proper German governmental interest in East German resistance activities and indicating that a cooperative U.S. - German governmental relationship regarding such organizations as the KgU was foreseen. Since the summer of 1952, periodic policy discussions between German Station and Federal Republic representatives have been held, but the CIA operational relationship with the KgU has not been materially altered.

(2) In the summer of 1955, when the KgU received large scale unfavorable publicity as an alleged U.S. spy center in East and West German newspapers, CIA increased its attempts to reach a cooperative understanding with the West German - West Berlin governments regarding the future of the KgU. A joint commission was formed consisting of representatives of CIA, the West German Ministry for All German Affairs and the Berlin Senate in order to evaluate past and current activities of the KgU and to make recommendations for the future. At the present time the results of the reevaluation and the recommendations are outstanding. By request of the German government the administrative harassment operations of the KgU are at present limited to activities targeted directly against the GDR government and the Communist Party. Operations against the East German economy, particularly those involving third countries, have been deemphasized. This temporary policy will be reviewed after the recommendations of the commission have been announced.

k. Liquidation: NA

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FI ANNEX TO PROJECT DTLINEN

CRYPTONYM: DTLINEN

1. Area of Operations: East Berlin and East Germany.

2. Purpose:

To utilize the CIA-subsidized Fighting Froup Against Inhumanity (Kampfgruppe gegen Ummenschlichkeit) (KgU) to collect positive intelligence on the area of operations by:

a. passing to the Reports Section of the Berlin Base information collected as a by-product of the PP activities of this group, and,

b. turn-over of co-workers and visitors with a high intelligence potential to CIA for direct exploitation and control.

3. Background:

a. Raw debriefing reports of KgU co-workers and visitors which appear of positive intelligence value are turned over to the Berlin Base case officer by the Principal Agent or his deputy. Those reports are passed to the Berlin Base Reports Section for evaluation and possible dissemination. Approximately 200 raw intelligence reports are so submitted by the KgU in an average month.

b. Visitors to the KgU's West Berlin headquarters who have information of apparent value to give on Communist, police, and military personnel and operations in the Soviet Zone are directed to an outside CIA-controlled office for further debriefing and final disposition. No further contact with them is maintained by KgU.

c. Co-workers and visitors of the KgU who are believed to have a high positive intelligence potential may, after security approval has been obtained, be turned over to the direct control of CIA case officers. In this event, they will be separated from any future contact with the KgU.

d. Separation from the KgU of those co-workers and visitors who are subsequently controlled by CIA agents outside of the KgU or directly by CIA case officers (see paragraph 3b and c) is necessary in view of commitments made to the West German government that the KgU would not be exploited for intelligence purposes.

e. For general background information on the project see paragraph 3 of the PP Project Outline.

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4. References: See paragraph 2 of the PP Project Outline.

5. Objectives:

To collect positive intelligence on a by-product basis and to spot continuing sources of information on the East German Communist Party, Security Service, People's Police and other Soviet Zone targets.

6. Target: See Paragraph 5 above.

7. Tasks: See Paragraph 5 above.

8. Personnel:

a. Pseudonyms and cryptonyms: The pseudonym of the Principal Agent is Charles H. Newham. The cryptonym of his deputy is [] .

b. Personnel data: See paragraph 5 b of PP Project Outline.

9. Operational and/or Security Clearance: See paragraph 6 c of PP Project Outline.

10. Cover: See paragraph 6^a of PP Project Outline.

11. Contact and Communications: See paragraphs 6 c and 10 c of PP Project Outline.

12. Control and Motivation: See paragraph 8 of PP Project Outline.

13. Equipment and Other Support: See paragraph 10 of PP Project Outline.

14. Coordination: See paragraph 7 c of PP Project Outline.

15. Timetable: Indefinite.

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Project DTLINEN Logistical Annex

PERIOD: Fiscal Year 1957

1 July 1956 through 30 June 1957

1. A total of [] will be required for logistical support, through KUBARK facilities, for Fiscal Year 1957.

2. This sum represents the cost of procuring 16,000 J-100 Balloons. Special procurement will be required due to the relatively short storage life of this item. In effecting procurement, specific delivery dates will have to be established to ensure shipment of a minimum of 1,500 per month. The requirements for July and August have been met by "borrowing" from existing KUBARK stocks.

ITEM NO.	STOCK NO.	NOMENCLATURE	QUANTITY	UNIT	UNIT PRICE	TOTAL COST
1	3/6660-005-6145	Balloon, Meteorological, 100 Gram, Uncolored Neoprene, ML-159A, S/E Dewey & Almy Co., "DAREX" J-100 Sterility Code 2	16,000	ea	[]	[]

[]
EE Logistics Officer

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PROJECT FINANCIAL DATA		PROJECT CRYPTONYM DTLINEN			
		FISCAL PERIOD COVERED 1 July 195 6 THRU 30 JUNE 195 7			
*MAY NOT EXCEED SECRET CLASSIFICATION		RESPONSIBLE STAFF OR DIVISION EE			
		CASE OFFICER C D			
A. PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS					
Indicate number and type of personnel required and estimated total compensation for salary, allowances, travel and related employee benefits. Include everyone paid from project.					
TYPE	NUMBER		ESTIMATED COMPENSATION		
	U. S. PERSONNEL	FOREIGN NATIONAL	BASE SALARY	ALL OTHER	TOTAL
STAFF EMPLOYEES					
STAFF AGENTS					
CAREER AGENTS					
CONTRACT AGENTS					
CONTRACT CONSULTANTS					
DETAILED PERSONNEL					
FIELD AGENTS					
MILITARY					
ALL OTHER					
TOTAL A.					
B. SUPPLIES, MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT					
Indicate amount required in applicable spaces. Attach complete supporting list for each.					
COMMO	CHEMICAL	QUARTERMASTER SUPPLIES	OTHER SUPPLIES		
\$	\$	\$	\$		
MEDICAL	ORDNANCE	SPECIAL DEVICES	OTHER EQUIPMENT		
\$	\$	\$	C D		
TOTAL B.	C D				
C. OTHER OPERATIONAL EXPENSES					
Indicate volume and nature of expenses such as (1) maintenance of two operational houses abroad (2) spot purchase of information, etc.					
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;"> <p>Document No. _____</p> <p>No Change In Class. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Declassified</p> <p>Class. Changed to: TS S C</p> <p>Next Review Date: 09/10/10</p> <p>Auth.: HR 70-3</p> <p>Date: 09 OCT 1980</p> </div>					
TOTAL C.					
D. SUBSIDY OR PROPRIETARY PAYMENTS					
If funds are to be turned over to individuals or groups in large lump sums to be expended by the individuals or groups at their discretion to accomplish an agreed-upon objective, explain the type of financial accounts, factual verification or statements, if any, other than a receipt for the lump sum, which will be obtained.					
TOTAL D.	C D				
TOTAL FUND REQUIREMENTS (A + B + C + D) \$C. D					