

SECRET
KAPOK

AIR

REF ID: A6672

10 January 1955

: Chief of Mission, Frankfurt
Attn: []
: Chief, SE

INFO: Chief, BOB

- Operational/CADREY
- Transmittal of Revised DTLINER Project Outline

RFP: A. RUEW-320, 9 July 1954
 B. RUEW-722, 18 October 1954
 C. Fiscal Regulation FN 20-2-2, 8 December 1954

1. We are forwarding under separate cover the revised DTLINER project outline (together with the KUPIRE Annex), which was approved on 30 December 1954.

2. In addition, we wish to reiterate our request for the prompt submission of memoranda of oral agreement with both Neuman and [].

APPROVED:

7 January 1955/ekb

Distribution:

- 3 - COM w/att. A, B and C (3 copies of each)
- 3 - BOB w/att. A, B and C (3 copies of each)
- 1 - RI w/o att.
- 2 - EE/PP/G

Attachments: UNSEPCOV

- A. Odd-numbered pages
- B. Even-numbered pages
- C. Identities to A & B.

EE/D/COP

Document No.	
No Change to Class.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> Declassified	
Class. Changed to:	TS S C
Next Review Date:	091010
Auth.:	HR 73-3
Date:	09 OCT 1980

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2007

EE/PP/G

KAPOK
SECRET

KAPOK SECRET

Identity 1 Project Outline

1. OBJECTIVE

To harass and weaken the Soviet administration of East Germany (including East Berlin) and its German collaborators, to help retard East German economic development, to help promote and sustain popular anti-Communist resistance within East Germany, and to help expose conditions within the Soviet Zone to the Western world. This project supports an ineffective KUBARK-guided administrative harassment and propaganda organization engaged in helping further these objectives in East Germany.

2. ORIGIN AND POLICY GUIDANCE

a. Origin:

- (1) ODAPSE 5412, approved 15 March 1954
- (2) ODAPSE 162/2, approved 30 October 1953
- (3) ODAPSE 174/1, approved 23 December 1953
- (4) ODAPSE 100/1, approved 13 August 1953
- (5) ODAPSE 5404, approved 25 January 1954
- (6) ODLKXK D-21
- (7) Project Outline (Earthenware), approved 24 May 1949
- (8) Project Outline (Revised), approved 16 August 1949
- (9) Project Amendment No. 1, approved 29 August 1950

b. Whence Proposed: The project originated in the field.

3. SITUATION:

a. Since the inception of Soviet occupation in 1945, the USSR has been able to establish effective controls over the population of East Germany and East Berlin through its own military forces and security police, and through the instrumentalities of its East German proteges. The lives of the residents of the Soviet Zone have been systematically regimented for the purposes of political indoctrination and camouflaged remilitarization and the economy has been rigorously regulated in order to maximize its strategic contributions to the Soviet bloc. There is every indication that the ultimate Soviet aim is to gain political and strategic control of all Germany.

b. Despite Soviet-sponsored indoctrination efforts and repressive measures, a substantial amount of popular dissatisfaction with the Communist regime exists throughout East Germany and East Berlin, and there remains a considerable resistance potential. So long, however, as Soviet military forces remain in East Germany in strength and the Soviet Union refuses to agree to the political reunification of Germany on the basis of genuinely free and impartially-supervised all-German elections, there will be few practical prospects for achieving East German liberation from Communist control without resort to

KAPOK
SECRET

KAPOK SECRET

military action. On the other hand, it is essential from the PBPRIIME standpoint to prevent the complete Sovietisation of East Germany, and to minimize its strategic economic, military, and political contribution to the Soviet bloc.

direct
add:
Spina
Spilure

c. In view of present PBPRIIME policies against the use of aggressive military action to reduce Soviet power, and in the light of the probably indefinite continuation of Soviet control in East Germany, PBPRIIME faces the difficult task of sustaining, increasing, and exploiting East German popular resistance over a relatively long period of time, pending some decisive shift in the balance of power in favor of the non-Communist Western nations. The task is complicated by the suppression of the 17 June 1953 disturbances, which evidenced the extent and intensity of East German popular dissatisfaction, but which did not and could not lead to liberation or materially improved conditions for the East German people; by the failure of the January 1954 Berlin conference to achieve a political basis for reunification; and by Soviet steps to formalize the division of Germany through the bestowal of so-called "sovereignty" on the East German puppet regime. In the face of these inherent problems, PBPRIIME, through KUBARK, must exert every possible effort to continually discredit the Soviet Union and the East German Communist regime in the eyes of the East German people, strengthening popular East German support for PBPRIIME European integration policies, demonstrating that the East Germans have not been forgotten or abandoned by the West, and persuading them that they have the power to alleviate their condition to some extent through their own current resistance actions.

d. Identity 1, which has been subsidized and guided by KUBARK since its inception in 1949, was originally conceived for the purpose of exposing to the residents of both East and West Germany the conditions existent in prisoner-of-war and concentration camps in the Soviet Zone. A secondary purpose was to provide a source of useful information concerning the psychological situation within East Germany. Since 1949 the Identity 1 has increased in size from a total of 15 members to 85 overt West Berlin headquarters employees and 185 covert Soviet Zone contacts, and has shifted its operational emphasis from propaganda to administrative harassment. Identity 1, under KUBARK guidance, has conducted extensive administrative harassment operations in the Soviet Zone, based largely on information received from its East German covert informants. These operations have resulted in the disruption of certain East German governmental and Communist Party activities, causing the expense of Soviet time, energy, and money. During an average month, in addition to 80 administrative harassment operations, Identity 1 has distributed 700,000 KUGONW items in the Soviet Zone, mainly by balloon operations; mailed 10,000 warning letters to Soviet Zone functionaries and Communist sympathizers; debriefed 100 members of the People's Police and 75 visitors of interest to the Identity 1 office for East German State Security matters; interviewed and assisted 2,500 visitors to its overt West Berlin headquarters; processed 1,000 search service cases for persons missing in the Soviet Zone; and interviewed 50 visitors to its covert office, from which potential covert workers are chosen. Also, Identity 1 has turned over an average of 500 KUPIRE reports to the Berlin Base KUPIRE section every month, as well as screening out on an average of 10 persons per month of possible interest to the Berlin Base GART section for the CASTABIA or the REDGAP program.

KAPOK SECRET

KAPOK

SECRET

e. Identity 2 (formerly BARTHENWARE) was originally approved on 24 May 1949, as a sub-project of project QUIDEMON, to support Identity 1 on a limited basis. A new project outline, approved on 16 August 1949, established Identity 2 as an independent project for the support of Identity 1 and its KUGOWH and resistance activities. Project Amendment No. 1, approved on 29 August 1950, authorized the expansion of Identity 1 operational facilities.

f. Outside of occasional small gifts from West Berlin and West German organizations and individuals, Identity 1 receives its entire financial support from KUBARK.

4. PROPOSAL:

It is proposed that KUBARK continue to subsidize and direct the administrative harassment, KUGOWH, and KUPIRE activities of Identity 1 in order to further project objectives.

5. OPERATIONAL OUTLINE:

a. Sub-proposals or tasks: KUBARK will continue to provide operational guidance to the Identity 1 and to subsidize the organization to defray its expenses for the following items:

(1) That portion of Identity 1's organizational overhead expenses that is not provided for from other financial sources. KUBARK subsidies will cover all salaries, rents, and necessary administrative expenses associated with the maintenance of Identity 1's covert organization and will help provide for similar expenses required to maintain Identity 1's overt staff and office.

(2) The preparation and execution of administrative harassment operations designed to ridicule, confuse, and undermine the efficiency and effectiveness of East German governmental and Communist Party offices. Such operations may involve the production and carefully-targeted distribution of falsified administrative instructions or other special methods that have been approved by headquarters.

(3) The editing, printing, and East German distribution of leaflets, pamphlets, and other publications denouncing East German and Soviet practices and personalities, encouraging passive resistance, and informing the East German population of international, West German, and local East German developments. These publications may either be attributed to Identity 1 or camouflaged as to source.

(4) The East German distribution of defection-inducement propaganda directed at Soviet military personnel.

(5) The maintenance of secure contact with regular Identity 1 and East German co-workers for information gathering, operational, CART, KUPIRE purposes.

KAPOK

SECRET

**KAPOK
SECRET**

(6) The furnishing of advice and assistance to, and the debriefing of, refugees arriving at the Identity 1 refugee processing offices and visitors to the overt Identity 1 headquarters, as well as the preparation of records and file checks on refugees at the request of West German and West Berlin governmental refugee processing offices.

(7) The preparation of records, reports, and statistics regarding East German prisons, detention camps, labor camps, political prisoner camps, etc., for Western propaganda exploitation through overt news media and West German and West Berlin governmental outlets.

(8) The preparation of articles concerning conditions in the Soviet Zone and related matters for dissemination in Western magazines and newspapers.

b. Key Personnel:

(1) The principal agent, who is the incumbent head of Identity 1. He is forty-four years old, a German by birth, and is a former SPD party functionary. A member of Identity 1 since its inception, he has headed the organization for over two years and has been responsible to a great extent for the increase in the scope of its operations. He has proven a reliable worker. He has full operational clearance.

(2) The deputy to the principal agent, who is chief of the Operations Section of Identity 1. He is thirty-one years old, a German by birth, and a former official in the German Criminal Police in Berlin. Originally brought into Identity 1 in January 1961 for a GART assignment, he shortly thereafter took over his present position. Due to his efforts, the organization's compartmentation has been increased and the overall security appreciably strengthened. He has a full operational clearance.

c. Indigenous Groups: The Identity 1 West Berlin headquarters staff consists of 88 persons who, with the exception of members of the executive and advisory committees, are employed within the seven sections of the organization. These sections are as follows: I - Political and Public Affairs, II - Personnel and Administration, III - Refugee Affairs, IV - People's Police Office, V - Search Service and Social Welfare, VI - Central Files, and VII - Operations (the covert section). The covert section (for whose support the majority of the KUBARK subsidy is used) has a staff of 15, five in the central office, and two in each of five field divisions. To these field divisions (one for each of the former East German Länder) a total of 125 East German co-workers regularly report to give positive intelligence and to receive administrative harassment and propaganda material for infiltration and distribution. All co-workers have been name-checked both in the field and at headquarters.

d. Target Groups: Targets for administrative harassment operations are Soviet Zone governmental and Communist Party officials. The target for KUGOW activity is the population of East Germany and East Berlin, and, to a lesser degree, West Germany and Western Europe.

**KAPOK
SECRET**

KAPOK SECRET

e. Duration: Indefinite

f. Graphic Illustration: NA

6. SECURITY

a. Cover: Both the principal agent and his deputy are knowledgeable of the fact that they are working for a PBFIRME intelligence service and no cover is utilized by the KUBARK field case officer vis-a-vis these personnel in contact with them. KUBARK funds are camouflaged as donations from organizations and individuals sympathetic to the aims of Identity 1. As the organization has an internationally known overt function of aiding and giving advice to East Germans, as well as carrying out a vigorous anti-Soviet campaign within both West Berlin and West Germany, its covert operations are being conducted behind an overt facade.

b. Knowledgeability:

- (1) The key personnel are knowledgeable of PBFIRME KUPIRE support. IS !!
- (2) Although never officially informed about PBFIRME financial support, German employees of the West Berlin Identity 1 headquarters should be presumed to suspect that an Identity 3, and probably PBFIRME, subsidizes Identity 1. These probable suspicions would be based on Soviet and East German allegations, allegations in Western news media, local gossip, and the magnitude of Identity 1 activities.
- (3) The West German and West Berlin governments, SMYOFIA, and [] are all knowledgeable of ODYOKE interest in Identity 1.

c. Operational Security: Standard operational security precautions, including the use of safe houses, etc., are taken by KUBARK field case officers in all contacts with key personnel of Identity 1. Furthermore, no information that would prejudice other KUBARK operations has been or will be passed to these personnel. All Identity 1 headquarters personnel have been cleared or are in the process of clearance. Compartmentation and other operational security measures are carried out among the covert personnel under direction of the chief of the Identity 1 Operations Section, who receives continuous guidance in security matters from the KUBARK field case officer. In addition, the personnel, organization, and operational security practices of Identity 1 are being constantly reviewed and analyzed by KUBARK both in [] and at Headquarters in order to identify and overcome operational weaknesses.

d. Risks: The most serious risk involved in this project would be incurred by the kidnapping of either of the key personnel. As Identity 1 has received favorable international publicity and support for its anti-Communist activities, it is believed that repercussions in the event of a compromise would not be very great in Western Germany or Europe, and little capital co

M. G. H. H. H. H.

KAPOK SECRET

KAPOK
SECRET

be made of such an event by the Communist authorities. Furthermore, as Identity 1 is engaged in a basically humanitarian and anti-Communist program it is believed that exposure of ODYOKE interest would cause little or no adverse reaction in PEPRIKE.

e. Personnel Disposal:

(1) No serious difficulties are anticipated in the disposal of either of the key personnel either before or after the termination of the project.

provided in contract
(2) Although KUBARK does not have a direct or formal responsibility of other Identity 1 headquarters personnel, and could effectuate the disposal of such personnel during the life of the project through instructions to key personnel, it is probable that, in the event of project termination, KUBARK would find it necessary for operational or moral reasons to assist in the secure and amiable termination/disposition of Identity 1 staff personnel. On the basis of previous experience with the termination of similar projects, some individual disposal problems are considered likely.

f. Disaster Plan: Transfer of key personnel involved in this operation and the abandonment and/or destruction of incriminating materials in the event of a hot war will take place in accordance with the [] disaster plan.

7. COORDINATION:

a. Relation to Other Projects:

(1) In assistance to the REDCAP program and [] Identity 1, under KUBARK guidance, distributes Identity 4 material aimed at Identity 5. Identity 1 distribution costs due to this activity are reimbursed from []

(2) Upon occasion, Identity 1 has coordinated its activities, without KUBARK intercession, with such other KUGOWN-supported organizations as [] and []. In addition, Identity 1 has distributed KUGOWN material published by KUGOWN-supported projects LCPAGAN and []

(3) Identity 2 supports the KUBARK Berlin Base's GART and Identity 5 programs. To this end, the chief of the Identity 1 Operations Section, or his designee, refers selected East German personnel to an outside contact office for further processing. In addition, Identity 1 furnishes the Berlin Base case officer with positive information produced as a by-product of its East German KUGOWN activities. Such information is transmitted to the Berlin Base KUFIRE Section.

b. Significance within Over-All Program in Area: Identity 2 constitutes one of the major KUGOWN anti-Communist resistance operations directed against

KAPOK
SECRET

KAPOK

SECRET

the Soviet Zone of Germany. Identity 1 is the principal KUGONE-supported instrumentality for administrative harassment operations against East German and Soviet governmental and against Communist Party offices and functionaries within the Soviet Zone.

c. Extent of Coordination:

(1) The project was originated by [] and has been coordinated with all appropriate KUBARK components at headquarters. As stated above, the KUPIRE material gathered as a by-product of this project is passed to the KUPIRE section of the Berlin Base. In addition, personnel of interest to the CASTANIA and RENGAP programs are passed to a KUPIRE-controlled agent for debriefing and final disposition.

(2) Cleared personnel of ODACID have been orally briefed on the purposes and activities of the project. There is regular coordination between representatives of [] and [] pursuant to policy measures as pertaining to Identity 1 and its activities.

(3) Key individuals in the Federal Republic and West Berlin government have been informed of PPRIME interest in Identity 1, and general policies affecting certain KUBARK-supported Identity 1 activities have been discussed by [] with these individuals (see para 11 j, Special Considerations). Representatives of ENYOPIA have been informed of PPRIME support for Identity 1. Certain responsible officials of Identity 1 maintain a continual liaison with various offices of the Federal Republic and West Berlin governments, as well as other private organizations, on matters of mutual interest affecting overt Identity 1 activities (Identity 1 prepares statistical reports on East German prison and detention camps for the use of governmental offices, assists the Red Cross by giving aid and advice to refugees from the Soviet Zone, and serves as the distributor of West Berlin governmental funds to needy persons). This liaison, which is conducted with the knowledge and approval of KUBARK, does not impair KUBARK control over Identity 1 and does not interfere with the fulfillment of the Identity 1 covert mission.

d. CONTROL:

a. Nature of:

(1) Direct control over the project will be exercised by the Berlin Base by means of the administration of the financial subsidy and supervisory guidance. Secondary control will be exercised by [], while final control will rest with Headquarters.

(2) No serious control difficulties are envisaged as pertaining to the Principal Agent and his deputy, as both are satisfied with their present positions and highly motivated ideologically.

- 7 -

KAPOK
SECRET

**KAPOK
SECRET**

b. Administrative Plan: The revised administrative plan for Identity 2 was approved on 3 April 1954.

c. Reports: The usual reports requirements, as outlined in KUBARK regulations, apply to this project. Reports on administrative harassment and other covert activities are consolidated by the Principal Agent and submitted to the field case officer for transmission through the Chief, SOJARFUL to Headquarters.

9. BUDGET DATA:

a. Total KUBARK Funds Required for Fiscal Year 1955: []

b. Availability of Funds: KUBARK funds in the amount of [] have been authorized for Identity 2 within the KUGOWH Program for Germany for FY 1955.

c. Non-KUBARK Funds: NA

d. Foreign Currency: NA

e. Funding: See Section I of the Administrative Plan.

f. Financial History:

FY 1953 - Authorization: []

FY 1954 - Authorization: []

Obligation: []

Obligation: []

g. Future Requirements: It is anticipated that a total of [] will be required for FY 1956.

10. SUPPORT DATA:

a. Total KUBARK Personnel: Total KUBARK personnel necessary for this project are one field and one headquarters case officer on a part-time basis. These personnel are currently available.

b. Material: NA

c. Communications: No communications facilities beyond those now available to [] are necessary.

d. Other KUBARK Support: NA

e. Support from Other PBFIRME Agencies: No support from other PBFIRME agencies is required other than that presently available to [].

11. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS:

a. Current Status: Approved and operated under original project outline as amended.

**KAPOK
SECRET**

**KAPOK
SECRET**

b. Commitments: Although no written commitments have been made to either the Principal Agent or his deputy, they understand that they will receive assistance from KUBARK should they, because of their activities on behalf of Identity 2, be forced to evacuate Berlin for security reasons. Such assistance would entail a resettlement bonus, transportation to West Germany for the employee involved and his immediate family, pay for a three month period, and whatever assistance is possible in obtaining a new job. In addition, should either of these personnel be kidnapped or otherwise rendered incapable of supporting his family because of Identity 2 activities, KUBARK would continue to submit monthly pay checks to his family.

c. Effectiveness:

(1) Identity 1 has grown from a group of 15 people whose task it was to uncover derogatory information about Soviet Zone practices into a major KUBARK-supported administrative harassment and propaganda organization with a headquarters staff of 88, and 128 East German co-workers.

(2) The impact of Identity 1 administrative harassment operations has been reflected by eye-witness reports of Identity 1 co-workers and other KUBARK agents, reports of counter-measures which the GDR government has been forced to take, and numerous accounts in the East German press warning the population to be on their guard against Identity 1 members as perpetrators of crimes against the state. Over the past 12 months the Identity 1 has carried out 157 major administrative harassment operations, which may be divided into the following categories: false instructions and invitations (70); countermanding of East German governmental and party instructions (16); false information (41); warnings to governmental and party functionaries (8); true anti-Communist information under false letterheads (16); demands for payment of notional accounts (8); falsified orders for materials (8); and forged postage stamps and documents (4).

(3) The nature of some of these operations makes their effectiveness difficult to assess, but the majority have been strongly criticized in the Soviet Zone press and governmental bulletins. Others have given more tangible proof: falsified postage stamps carrying a "slow-down" slogan, which were widely distributed and appeared on numerous franked envelopes, reportedly induced the East Berlin postal authorities to introduce special procedures for examining mail, thus lessening postal efficiency; issue of falsified notices of an "inventory sale" at the State-Owned Stores allegedly cost the East German government DM 8,000,000 in losses.

(4) One of the most successful of recently-undertaken operations was directed against the East German Ministry of Trade. A falsified letter, purportedly originating with the Ministry, was mailed to a number of the GDR's customers in Switzerland, Sweden, Holland, Spain, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Finland, and China, advising them that the GDR could not accept orders for the coming year because of its critical economic and financial situation and because trade with these firms had not resulted in the propaganda value which the GDR had expected. As a result, three East Berlin

**KAPOK
SECRET**

**KAPOK
SECRET**

papers carried simultaneous articles denouncing the letters as vicious falsifications, and the Ministry was forced to write all its customers (not knowing to which ones the falsifications had been sent) explaining that forged letters had been sent. These bona fide letters were then intercepted by Identity 1 and another forgery immediately mailed out. This operation resulted in a waste of time and effort within the Ministry and lowered the GER's prestige abroad; as a by-product, the operation produced a list of firms engaged in West-East trade.

(5) Evidence of Identity 1 KUGOWH effectiveness has been afforded by testimonials from a large number of People's Police officials and other East German residents who have come to the Identity 1 headquarters for advice as a result of reading Identity 1 KUGOWH material.

(6) The West German and West Berlin governments, as well as the Red Cross and other private organizations, request information from Identity 1 on refugee matters. The Identity 1 search service on people in East Germany is utilized by a number of West German private and governmental organizations.

(7) The favorable international reputation of Identity 1 has been reflected by articles in Time, the New Yorker, the New York Herald Tribune, the New York Times, the Christian Science Monitor, and other leading American and European newspapers and periodicals.

d. Anticipated Results:

(1) On the basis of past experience with Identity 2, it is expected that continued KUBARK support of Identity 1 will yield a fair return on the funds and case officer time devoted to the project. Identity 1 possesses demonstrated operational capabilities within East Germany, has maintained a satisfactory security standard, and has proven responsive to KUBARK guidance.

(2) Identity 1's administrative harassment operations, which will be continually refined and gradually expanded, are expected to help lessen the efficiency of the East German governmental, economic, and Communist Party activities, both through the delays and waste motion induced by successful administrative harassment operations and by causing the East German authorities to devote time and funds to efforts to detect and forestall harassment operations. This reduced efficiency should contribute in some measure to the reduction of East Germany's contribution to the Soviet bloc. It should also help induce a climate of uneasiness among Soviet and East German authorities by evidencing the extent of organized resistance. At the same time, it should strengthen the East German will to resist by demonstrating the practicability of effective resistance and causing popular disrespect for Communist administrative organization and procedures.

(3) Identity 1 KUGOWH production and distribution operations are expected to help sustain East German resistance morale. Identity 1 support to REDCAP under [] should also have an effect.

**KAPOK
SECRET**

**KAPOK
SECRET**

(4) Identity 1 research and reports on conditions in East Germany are expected to continue to be valuable in helping educate West Germans as to the incompatibility of the Communist and Western systems.

e. Evaluation:

(1) General, overall project effectiveness will be assessed on the basis of independent intelligence and overt media, reports from other KUBARK agents and East German refugees, and popular opinion in West Berlin and West Germany. In addition, the detailed and lengthy monthly reports submitted by the Principal Agent will be reviewed both in the field and at headquarters.

(2) The effectiveness of administrative harassment operations will be judged by directives and other counter-measures of the East German government, attacks in the Soviet Zone press and radio, and reports from Identity 1 co-workers and other KUBARK agents. The services of Identity 8 will continue to be utilized for this purpose.

(3) Reader reaction will be judged both by letters received from the Soviet Zone and by reports of the interviews with the East German and East Berlin residents who voluntarily visit the overt headquarters in West Berlin.

f. Policy Questions: An unresolved policy question is whether, to what extent, and under what circumstances, the Federal Republic and/or West Berlin governments should be allowed increased participation in determining the policies for and supervising the operations of Identity 1. See para 11 j, Special Considerations, for the background of this policy question.

h. Extra-KUBARK Action: N.A.

i. Proprietary Companies: N.A.

j. Special Considerations:

(1) In the summer of 1952, [] officially advised representatives of the Federal Republic and West Berlin governments that ODYOKE was furnishing guidance and financial assistance to Identity 1. [] also furnished a statement of intentions to a point of contact in the Federal Republic government acknowledging a proper German governmental interest in East German resistance activities and indicating that a cooperative PBRIME-German governmental relationship regarding such organizations as Identity 1 was foreseen. Since the summer of 1952, periodic policy discussions between [] and Federal Republic representatives have been held, but the KUBARK operational relationship with Identity 1 has not been materially altered.

(2) With the possibly imminent restoration of full Federal Republic sovereignty through implementation of the London agreement, Federal Republic governmental pressure on KUBARK to achieve greater or complete influence and control over such KUBARK-sponsored East German resistance activities as Identity 1 has increased. Since a legal basis for the continued presence

**KAPOK -
SECRET**

KAPOK
SECRET

of PEPRIME and Identity 3 in West Berlin will continue to exist, it is probable that PBPRIME could indefinitely retain reserved powers affecting the security and administration of West Berlin, which would technically permit continued exclusive PEPRIME control over such PBPRIME Sector groups as Identity 1. In practice, however, for political reasons, PBPRIME will probably not choose to exercise its reserved powers for this purpose to the same degree as heretofore.

k. Liquidation: NA.

KAPOK
SECRET

KAPOK
SECRET

KUPIRE ANNEX TO IDENTITY 2

1. Area of Operations: East Berlin and East Germany
2. Purpose: To utilize Identity 1 to collect KUPIRE material on the area of operations through passing to the KUPIRE Section of the Berlin Base both information collected as a by-product of the KUGOWN activities of this group and those indigenous personnel whose knowledge may assist the section in the CASTABIA program and the REDCAP program.
3. Background:
 - a. If any of the visitors to Identity 1 headquarters are thought to be of interest to the CASTABIA or REDCAP programs, they are directed to an outside KUPIRE-controlled office ([]) for further debriefing and final disposition. No further contact with them is maintained by Identity 1. During the past twelve months, Identity 1 has sent an average of ten persons a month to the ([]) office.
 - b. All reports and information submitted by Identity 1 co-workers and visitors to the Identity 1 headquarters are screened for potential KUPIRE value. Reports of this nature are then transmitted by the Identity 2 field case officer to the KUPIRE section of the Berlin Base. During the past twelve months an average of 600 KUPIRE reports a month have been forwarded to this Section.
 - c. For general background information on the project see paragraph 3 of the KUGOWN Project Outline.
4. References: See paragraph 2 of the KUGOWN Project Outline.
5. Objectives: To establish penetrations of the East German Communist Party, State Security Service, People's Police, and other Soviet Zone governmental functions for KUPIRE purposes. ✓
6. Target: See paragraph 5 d of KUGOWN Project Outline.
7. Tasks: See paragraph 5 above.
8. Personnel:
 - a. Pseudonyms and cryptonyms: The pseudonym of the Principal Agent is Charles H. Newham. The cryptonym of his deputy is ([]).
 - b. Personnel Data: See paragraph 5 b of KUGOWN Project Outline
9. Operational and/or Security Clearance: See para 6c of KUGOWN Project Outline
10. Cover: See para 6 a of KUGOWN Project Outline.

KAPOK
SECRET

KAPOK
SECRET

11. Contact and Communications: See paras 8 c and 10 c of KUGOWN Project Out
12. Control and Motivation: See paragraph 8 of KUGOWN Project Outline.
13. Equipment and Other Support: See paragraph 10 of KUGOWN Project Outline.
14. Coordination: See paragraph 7 c of KUGOWN Project Outline.
15. Timetable: Indefinite.

KAPOK
SECRET

KAPOK
SECRET

IDENTITIES

- Identity 1 - Fighting Group Against Inhumanity (FgU)
- Identity 2 - Project DTLINER
- Identity 3 - Allied power (forces)
- Identity 4 - Russian language propaganda
- Identity 5 - inducing defection among Soviet military personnel
- Identity 6 - CIS

KAPOK
SECRET