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SPECIFY AIR OR SEA ROUTE

DISPATCH NO. MB-1-9056

SECRET

TO : Chief, Foreign Division
FROM : Chief of Station, Karlsruhe
SUBJECT: GENERAL. "LITZE" (E) FRANK
SPECIFIC: Progress Report - CALAMITOUS-1
Ref : MB-1-8146

DATE: 23 May 1951

1. Shortly before the writing of reference report, [] was designated to be CALAMITOUS-1's case officer upon the departure of [] for home leave. This was done so that we should have a chance to exploit the lead mentioned in paragraph 3 of reference memo before giving CALAMITOUS-1 over to the GANTLEY chain. That lead has come to naught and it does not look as if it ever will come to anything, but in the meantime, CALAMITOUS-1 has not been idle. In the first place, he turned up [] (see MB-1-8150)

2. At the beginning of April, CALAMITOUS-1, after being briefed by [], was dispatched to Dresden to assist in the evacuation of Dr. Otto ECKHARDT and family, which was done in connection with the [] operation. [] knew that ECKHARDT, one of his sources, was in imminent danger of arrest so we removed him from the Ray Jones in order to create an impression of omnipotent efficiency with [] and in order to protect that operation. CALAMITOUS-1 arranged ECKHARDT's evacuation with admirable dexterity and as far as we know, left no tail-tale traces showing who was responsible. But after this good work, CALAMITOUS-1 gave ECKHARDT his address with the result that when ECKHARDT was evacuated to Japan and not immediately resettled, he wrote CALAMITOUS-1 to ask that [] be informed of his plight and to beg []'s help. ECKHARDT sent two letters; CALAMITOUS-1 answered one. Fortunately, there seem to have been no untoward repercussions of CALAMITOUS-1's foolishness. He also told ECKHARDT that [] is an American, which was unnecessary and stupid. Unfortunately, these two examples of CALAMITOUS-1's poor security consciousness only came to light after he was well involved in his next assignment.

3. On 9 April CALAMITOUS-1 was sent to Dresden again. This time to take delivery of a complete Soviet officer's uniform from [] who had procured it from []. Prior to being sent, CALAMITOUS-1 was briefed in general terms on the job to be done, namely, receive a Soviet uniform from an unidentified person in Dresden and bring it to Berlin, and was asked if and how he thought he could do the job. Subject suggested various schemes, the most likely being that he should hire the services of Horst JONES, 66 Langestr. Dresden A 20 actually to carry the uniform on the trip. JONES is a fireman for the

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Reichsbahn on the Berlin-Dresden run. CALAMITOUS-1 had had black market dealings with him in the past and on the previous trip to Dresden for ECKHARDT, he had stayed over night at the JONES house. CALAMITOUS-1 was told that if he could not procure the services of BROUSE and if he were not able to hit on some safe, secure method of getting the uniform to Berlin on this trip, he should cache it in some fashion rather than try to force the pace with his own spur-of-the-moment arrangements. CALAMITOUS-1 was then briefed on the rendezvous which [] had established with []. It should be noted that this rendezvous was ideally arranged with alternate meeting times on 10, 11 and 13 April. Both CASABA-2 and CALAMITOUS-1 had been told not to discuss his work with the other and under no conditions to give names and CALAMITOUS-1 was particularly instructed not to make further contact with CASABA-2 besides that which had been arranged.

4. CALAMITOUS-1 arrived in Dresden on the afternoon of 9 April, whereupon he went to the rendezvous point to reconnoiter the area for escape routes, etc., in the event of trouble. Next he went to the JONES house where he spent the night. During the evening he had the opportunity to proposition BROUSE and BROUSE not unwillingly consented to carry the package for CALAMITOUS-1 in return for some coffee. In the morning (10 April) he made the rendezvous with []. [] told CALAMITOUS-1 that she had not been able to bring the boots and great coat or account of their bulk. She said that she could not meet him again until tomorrow (11 April) to transfer them to him. CALAMITOUS-1 had already arranged with BROUSE to travel up to Berlin on the train leaving on the evening of 10 April because BROUSE would be firing the train so that he could take the parcel. CALAMITOUS-1 would be a passenger on the same train and would thus be in Berlin with BROUSE to receive the parcel upon arrival. Therefore CALAMITOUS-1 claimed that he could not wait until the 11th and must have convinced [] that some other arrangement was necessary. It was decided that after his arrival in Berlin with that part of the uniform which [] had already given him, he would send an innocuous telegram to Frau Margarita JUBNSCH, Arnholzallee 24 B, Dresden E which would be the signal for her to deliver the boots and great coat to BROUSE who would bring them to Berlin. Frau JUBNSCH is the sister of [].

5. After making these arrangements with [], arrangements, it should be noted, which directly contradicted his instructions, CALAMITOUS-1 returned to Langestr. 66 where he met BROUSE and they subsequently got the two parcels stowed in the coal bunker of the locomotive. When BROUSE had been propositioned the evening before he had shown no undue reluctance whatever in carrying the parcels for CALAMITOUS-1 even though he had been told that their contents were to remain unknown. But when CALAMITOUS-1 told him that on 13 or 14 April there would be another package delivered to his house by an unidentified person for him to bring to Berlin on his 15 April run, BROUSE balked and said he wanted to scrap the whole deal. BROUSE's new-found reluctance was, presumably, engendered by the fact that he had had a chance to inspect the contents of the parcels he already had and by the additional task of the third parcel, about which he could have known nothing at the time he agreed to the deal. CALAMITOUS-1's remedy for BROUSE's reluctance was to tell him that if he did not carry the parcels, he (CALAMITOUS-1) would set the "ITD" on him. This threat turned the trick and the first two parcels arrived in Berlin safely with CALAMITOUS-1 on 12 April.

6. After his arrival in Berlin, CALAMITOUS-1 sent the telegram to Frau WUENSCH signalling her to deliver the boots and coat to GROHSE and subsequently reported to [redacted]. At this point there was nothing to do but wait and pray that the threat CALAMITOUS-1 had applied to GROHSE would not so disaffect him that in spite of the 500 Ostmarks he had been promised for the job, he would turn sour and report the whole business to the police who would then lay in ambush for [redacted]. CALAMITOUS-1 was confident that his judgment of GROHSE warranted the action he had taken and stoutly maintained that GROHSE was in no position either to fail to bring the boots and coat or to report the whole business to the police. He was, apparently, correct in his estimation of GROHSE who appeared on the morning of 15 April wearing the boots and carrying the coat (which had been dissected so that it looked like so many rags). But GROHSE pleaded that although he was well satisfied with his fee, he did not care to have anything more to do with such traffic.

7. After we had the entire uniform in Berlin, CALAMITOUS-1 was taken to task for the evident disregard of his instructions. Suffice it to say that he almost convincingly rationalized each point, claiming that he was on the spot and that it was up to him to make the best of the situation. In effect, he argued that his task was to get the uniform to Berlin, which he had done, and that as the "field commander" he could not be bound by narrow limitations. It was, to be sure, difficult to upbraid him too severely, for the fact was that he had succeeded. Also, before going into the matter too deeply, we wanted to hear what [redacted] had to say about the meeting with CALAMITOUS-1 and her visit to GROHSE's house.

8. [redacted] saw [redacted] in Berlin on 17 April. She reported that CALAMITOUS-1's security had been deplorable: He had grouched about his pay. He had discussed the American case officers he had dealt with and had asked [redacted] about the ones she knew. He had bragged about his accomplishments. But [redacted] did say that the delivery of the boots and coat to GROHSE had gone smoothly. Therefore, when [redacted] asked [redacted] what she should do with another uniform that [redacted] had procured, [redacted] instructed her to deliver it to GROHSE as before. [redacted] did this because he had not seen [redacted]'s Contact Report covering CALAMITOUS-1's debriefing of his trip and therefore did not know that GROHSE had been threatened by CALAMITOUS-1 or that GROHSE had said that he wanted no further part of running Soviet uniforms. [redacted] had not seen this report because it was temporarily lost en route to him. When late on 17 April [redacted] and [redacted] did get together it was evident that [redacted] might be walking into at least an unfriendly reception if she were to take another uniform to GROHSE. In subsequent discussions it was decided that on account of [redacted]'s value, CALAMITOUS-1 should be sent to Dresden post haste in an attempt to head off [redacted] before she could get to GROHSE.

9. CALAMITOUS-1 was briefed on 19 April to depart with the first train on 20 April. Upon arrival in Dresden he was instructed to write a short note to [redacted] telling her not to go to GROHSE's. This note was to be delivered to Frau WUENSCH at Arnoholzallee 24 B who was to arrange for its transmittal to [redacted]. Upon delivering the note, CALAMITOUS-1 was instructed to wait at the GROHSE house (he claimed to be persona grata chez GROHSE in spite of the threat he applied) in order that he would be on hand should [redacted] not receive the note in time and come to GROHSE's. CALAMITOUS-1 was admonished not to have any more intercourse with Frau WUENSCH than was absolutely necessary and that under

no conditions was he to go to [redacted] quarters. He was also instructed how to arrange for the transfer of the uniform to Berlin should he get it. All these detailed instructions are of little, or at least only of academic, interest in view of the events as they developed because the former bear no relation whatever to the latter.

10. CALAMITOUS-1 left Berlin at 0600. 20 April and arrived in Dresden at about 0830. He wrote the letter to [redacted] and then took it to Arnholzallee 24 3 where the door was answered by Frau WUENSCH. He tried to give WUENSCH the letter for [redacted] but WUENSCH said that since [redacted] was expected to return shortly he should wait for her and deliver the note personally, which he (we imagine willingly) did. While he was waiting for [redacted] he met [redacted] what, for lack of more definite knowledge about the relationship, we shall call the common law husband of Frau WUENSCH, Walter Julius POHL. (Other characters who seem to have established a form of residence at this address will be introduced as the drama develops). CALAMITOUS-1 claims that POHL said he was on leave but it later developed that he had been suspended from his position as a chief mechanic with an SEA motor pool installation in the near vicinity because he had swindled the Russians in a matter involving some motors. POHL generally informed CALAMITOUS-1 about himself, but CALAMITOUS-1 claims he said nothing about the reason for his presence in Dresden, a claim we find most difficult to accept at its face value.

11. When [redacted] returned, she told CALAMITOUS-1 that she had just come from GROHSE's where she had learned that GROHSE had told his "chief" about taking a package to Berlin (why he had confessed to this is not explained) and as a result Frau GROHSE had developed a severe case of nerves about the whole affair. Upon hearing this [redacted] departed without mentioning to GROHSE that she had another package. As a result of this report, CALAMITOUS-1 decided that it would be unwise for him to visit the GROHSE establishment again in spite of the assurances of eternal welcome he had received during his past visit there.

12. At this point, according to CALAMITOUS-1, WUENSCH and POHL did not know what his relation to [redacted] was or why he was in Dresden, nor did they know that [redacted] was in contact with Americans. Almost as if to contradict this, however, CALAMITOUS-1 learned that [redacted] had come to Berlin on 17 April with POHL, the latter having come to deliver a uniform to "an American Captain" at an address in the American Sector. Thus, [redacted] knew what the reason for POHL's 17 April journey was, but he did not know what hers was - according to [redacted] as reported by CALAMITOUS-1.

13. Because [redacted] was expected at Arnholzallee 24 3 some time that afternoon and because he had no place else to go, CALAMITOUS-1 settled down to wait. At about 1500, when [redacted] was out shopping, Major (fnu) VASSILEV of the Red Army put in an appearance. He had come to collect a quilt and a radio which he had left there. VASSILEV departed within a few minutes (he did not see CALAMITOUS-1) whereupon POHL explained his visit. POHL said that he had been host to many Soviet officers who came to Arnholzallee 24 3 to drink because they are forbidden to frequent local establishments. At the same time, the Russians were able to indulge in the other forbidden fruit, German Frauleins. VASSILEV was one of these guests and he had a girl friend named Inge (fnu) whom he had given several expensive presents. But when VASSILEV was away from Dresden (apparently rather frequently) Inge played fast and loose with a local secret policeman; thus Inge became a bone of contention between VASSILEV and the policeman. In a routine police check of documents, Inge was found with a photograph

of VASSILEV which came to the policeman's attention and he, knowing that it is forbidden for Soviet officers to have their photographs taken, used this as blackmail to win Inge away from VASSILEV. In connection with this attempt, the policeman organized a raid on the POHL house on the night of 19/20 April (this was before CALAMITOUS-1 had arrived there) apparently believing that VASSILEV and Inge were at the house at that time. VASSILEV was not at the house, nor was Inge, but [redacted] was. When POHL became aware that his house was being raided he managed to stall the raiders long enough for [redacted] to tear himself away from [redacted] and take it on the lam out the kitchen window. Eventually POHL convinced the raiders that neither VASSILEV nor Inge were his guests that night. POHL said that he had learned that VASSILEV had been placed on charge on account of the Inge affair and was to report to the local Kommandatura by 1800 on the 20th for immediate return to the Soviet Union. When CALAMITOUS-1 heard this he suggested to POHL that he (CALAMITOUS-1) might take VASSILEV to the sanctuary of Berlin, but POHL squashed the suggestion by pointing out that VASSILEV is a convinced Communist and that it would be too dangerous to put such a suggestion to him. CALAMITOUS-1 later explained that he had thought he would bring VASSILEV to us as a sort of "Bring-'em-Back-Alive" feat, which shows CALAMITOUS-1's eagerness or stupidity, or perhaps both. It was later learned that VASSILEV had returned to the Kommandatura and had not defected as first reported.

14. Shortly after VASSILEV departed, [redacted] arrived and told CALAMITOUS-1 that he could return that evening at 2045 with the missing parts of the uniform. [redacted] and CALAMITOUS-1 spent about an hour together before [redacted] left. At about 1700 [redacted] returned from her shopping trip at that time the following characters were in the house: CALAMITOUS-1, [redacted], POHL, WUENSCH, Erika (POHL's 18 year old daughter) one or two illegitimate POHL-WUENSCH children and the 5-6 year old [redacted] child by her first marriage. At about 1730 [redacted]'s child dislocated his arm so POHL and [redacted] rushed him to the hospital where he was left because the arm was more seriously hurt than at first thought. The doctor said that the child would probably be in the hospital for 6 weeks. [redacted] returned promptly at 2045 and he and CALAMITOUS-1 conversed about conditions in the S.U. until about 2130 when POHL and [redacted] returned from the hospital. During this period CALAMITOUS-1 claims that he did not discuss either his work with [redacted] or visa versa, but on the basis of past performances it is assumed that they compared operational experiences and probably even discussed future plans. The adults then ate (and from the expense account CALAMITOUS-1 presented upon his return, it looks as if this organization bought them a rather sumptuous dinner), after which they prepared for bed. POHL, WUENSCH and their individual and collective off-spring took one bedroom; [redacted] and [redacted] took the other bedroom and CALAMITOUS-1 made do with a couch in the kitchen-cum-dining room. CALAMITOUS-1 had decided that there would be no sense trying to leave Dresden that evening (20/21) and in any event there was no train until 0400 22 April which he had planned to take.

15. At about 0930 the doorbell was rung. A quick survey of Arnholzallee showed a Russian officer and a woman on an adjacent corner about 50 meters away. They could not see who was at the door. POHL, CALAMITOUS-1 and [redacted] held a quick council of war and decided not to answer the door, thinking that someone merely wanted to avail himself of POHL's speakasy or flop-house facilities. The ringing persisted and in time a Russian officer and a VoPo were spotted at the back of the house while the Russian officer, who turned out to be a Colonel and the local Commandant, the woman, who was an interpreter, a Russian Lt. and

two civilians appeared at the front door. Those at the door continued to ring while those in the apartment continued to ignore it. The stalemate continued for 20 (sic) minutes whereupon the front door was broken down. In the meantime CALAMITOUS-1 had done his best to hide the uniform which until this time had not been concealed. When the intruders began breaking down the door and it had become quite evident that they were not to be ignored, [redacted] who by that time had managed to get dressed and who had reached a nervous breaking point, decided to make a break for it. Accordingly, and with pistol drawn, he took it on the lam out the same kitchen window he had used for the same purpose the evening before. CALAMITOUS-1 reported that [redacted] struck the VoPo and/or the Russian who were guarding the back of the house; [redacted] says that he did not strike either. But in any case they agreed that [redacted] made the break successfully. None reported shots being fired.

16. From this point on there is some difference of opinion as to what happened. CALAMITOUS-1 states that he was not present for all events so he is unable to say just what did and did not occur in the other rooms; he remained in the kitchen. CALAMITOUS-1 was effecting sleep when the Colonel and his entourage entered the kitchen. They checked his documents with limited thoroughness, but he says he is certain his name was not written down. They grilled him about his presence at the house. He replied that he had come to collect some money POHL owed him and to buy a part for a motor car. A search of the kitchen was made in his presence. They then asked him what he knew about the Russian officer from Chemnitz (the fact that he was from Chemnitz seems to have been the cogent factor) but he denied that there had been a Russian officer there - at least he had not seen any. All denied the presence of a Russian, but when the guards who had been at the back of the house reported to those who were in the house about the flight of [redacted], POHL asserted that he had just been one of the officers who regularly came to his house for a drink. The Colonel and his assistants insisted the officer was from Chemnitz, but this was as insistently denied. POHL told the Colonel that he did not know the man's name, but that if the Colonel would assemble all his officers he would identify the man. The inquisitors then returned to CALAMITOUS-1 who feigned a nonchalant innocence. While he was being questioned he reached for a cigarette for which one of the civilians handed him a lighted match. Because the hand of CALAMITOUS-1 did not shake while he held this match, he was pronounced innocent and allowed to return to his rest.

17. The investigation was then moved into the other rooms so that CALAMITOUS-1 did not hear all that was said. The questioning of POHL continued for an hour with POHL, who knew and was known to all of the visitors, stoutly maintaining his position that he did not know the name of the officer and even if he did, he would not give the name because the man was guilty of nothing more than having sought something to drink. Eventually the raiders left, taking none of the occupants of the house with them.

18. After the coast was clear CALAMITOUS-1 suggested that the uniform and the various papers and belongings of [redacted] that were at the house be burned because he felt that the Russians would almost certainly put in another appearance the following morning. It was atypical of them to make either such a casual search or to leave such a situation without following up. POHL feared

the tall-tale smoke and [] would not permit []'s belongings to be burned. Partly because the others felt this way and partly because he felt he should leave while he could, CALAMITOUS-1 left the house on foot about 0330. He walked to a taxi rank where he found a man who drove him to Machnow (a few kms south of Berlin) where without difficulty he boarded a train for Berlin, arriving at about 0600, 21 April.

19. What had happened to [] and what should [] do? CALAMITOUS-1 reported that just before [] had jumped through the window he had said that he would try to get to Berlin, the assumption being that he was the one the raiders were after. It was known that he had his papers and sufficient money with him and it was also known that he had a civilian suit stored at a house in a village about 30 kms from Dresden. Until news of [] to the contrary was received, we had no definite reason to think [] had not defected. In fact, we suspected that the whole story had been invented to justify the premature defection of [] and []. [] could not leave Dresden at once on account of the child who was in the hospital although she told CALAMITOUS-1 that she would leave as soon as she could get him or sooner, if necessary, trusting to her sister to bring the child to Berlin at some future date.

20. [] debriefed CALAMITOUS-1 on the morning of 21 April. [] debriefed him again that afternoon. His story was checked and rechecked for discrepancies and he was questioned about the various obvious incredible points *of again* the 23rd and 25th. Through all of this CALAMITOUS-1 stuck by his story, although he was the first to admit that it was quite incredible. The only point that he has conceded is that he invented a minor character whom he claimed to have paid 200 Ostmarks which he thought he could pocket. He persisted with the request that we suspend judgment at least until we had checked the story with [] which was subsequently done.

21. On 20 April POHL arrived in Berlin with the uniform, as CALAMITOUS-1 had arranged. POHL told his story which agreed in substance with that which CALAMITOUS-1 had told but disagreed with it in many details. Where CALAMITOUS-1 had said that the midnight raiders numbered 7 or 8, POHL accounted for 14 or 15. CALAMITOUS-1 said that when he left the house at about 0330 there were no signs of it being under surveillance, while POHL claimed that there were four posters watching the back of the house although there were none in front, which he could only account for by the supposition that the Russians had underestimated their audacity by suspecting that none of them would dare to leave the house by the front entrance. In any case, POHL related what had happened after CALAMITOUS-1 had left: In the morning Arika POHL, the 10 year old daughter had waited in a park near []'s house, met him and arranged a rendezvous for him and LAGABA-2 for the evening of 21 April. On 25 April POHL was visited by two VoPo who questioned him further and then searched his house. Also on 25 April, POHL was called to the Soviet Kommandatura where he was further questioned about the events of the nights of 17-20 and 20-21 April by a Russian Major who received the same replies that POHL had given before. After continued questioning, POHL was dismissed and asked to call CALAMITOUS-1 the next time he came to Berlin, which was done in the event that he were needed for further questioning.

22. [] saw CALAMITOUS-1 again on 30 April. At this meeting CALAMITOUS-1 immediately announced that he believed that POHL's story was cut from whole cloth and that those parts of it which differed from what he had said were most

certainly lies or exaggerations or both. According to CALAMITOUS-1, POHL is very much no good and very untrustworthy. He predicted that he would end in a Russian jail because he was stealing from them as well as blackmarketing under their noses with their goods. CALAMITOUS-1 also confessed that in order to discover what had happened at the POHL house after his departure and because he did not trust POHL ever to bring the uniform to Berlin he had sent GROMIS, the railroad stoker, to POHL's house to collect the uniform and to try to discover what had happened. CALAMITOUS-1 had briefed him for this unauthorized mission on the 26th and GROMISE had called at the POHL house on the morning of the 27th. POHL told GROMISE that he did not have the uniform and that it had already been sent to Berlin. GROMISE did not return to Berlin to tell CALAMITOUS-1 what had happened until after POHL had been here on the 29th. CALAMITOUS-1 explained that he had done this in order to discover for himself whether or not he was in danger and whether or not it were safe for him to go into Russian territory in the future. The wrath with which this confession had been received made no lasting impression on CALAMITOUS-1. As late as 17 May CALAMITOUS-1 suggested that he might write FRAN WENZSCH to discover what had subsequently happened.

23. [] showed on 2 May for her regular meeting with []. She confirmed most of what CALAMITOUS-1 had related and the basic facts of POHL's story besides. She thinks that CALAMITOUS-1 drinks too much and is a fool. She also related that POHL had been arrested on 30 April for the theft of Soviet property. We were then set to wondering whether POHL would talk. Against his talking was the fact that he was involved in trafficking in Soviet uniforms on his own hook besides being an accessory to the []-CALAMITOUS deal, and CALAMITOUS-1 claims that he was so involved in swindling the Russians that if they uncovered his past deals, he would surely be a goner. On the other hand there was the evident hope for him that by turning witness against the [] and CALAMITOUS-1 he might be able to induce the Soviets to be lenient with him. CALAMITOUS-1 was told of POHL's arrest so that he could decide for himself whether he was in immediate danger. He reckoned that POHL would not dare to talk and that he, therefore, was safe. [] arrived in Berlin to stay on 13 May. She said that she had learned that the police were looking for her because POHL had talked.

24. The significance of these events to the [] operation is probably considerable and for that reason they have been reported at such length. Their relation to [] will be dealt with in a subsequent despatch. We feel that CALAMITOUS-1 by his independent waywardness and untruthfulness has shown that he cannot be controlled sufficiently for us to be able to use his undoubted talents. He is certainly on the criminal fringe and we are convinced that he has been cheating us on money matters. There is also the possibility that CALAMITOUS-1 is a controlled agent, for it will be noted that all the people he has turned up to date are suspect. In an attempt to confirm or tentatively disprove this suspicion, CALAMITOUS-1 will be put on the CARRIAGE shortly. After that test we shall have another look at his case to determine whether he should be dropped or turned over to the MATERY chain.

25. Operational expenditures charged to CALAMITOUS-1 have been heavy, but it should be remembered that much of the money was for extraneous projects such as the evacuation of EGGLART and the procurement of Soviet uniforms, which were urgently needed at the time. A total of 1632 West Marks and 2210 East Marks has been spent on or through CALAMITOUS-1 to date. CALAMITOUS-1 was paid a bonus

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of 200 West Marks for the first Dresden trip for uniforms and 300 West Marks for the second. A total of 150 West Marks and 350 East Marks was spent on the evacuation of ECKHARDT. The first trip for uniforms cost 170 West Marks and 560 East; the second cost 200 West and 1100 East.

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