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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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**Assassinations of Anti-Tito
Yugoslav Emigres**

Aleksa Kapicic was a Consul at the Yugoslav Consulate General, New York, who requested political asylum on January 6, 1970. From 1949 until 1961, he was an employee of the UDBa (Yugoslav Administration for State Security) and from 1961 until his request for asylum, he was employed by the Yugoslav State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs. He furnished the following information to Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on January 12 and 14, 1970:

Ever since the creation of Yugoslavia following World War I, Yugoslavia has been plagued by the animosity existing among its ethnic groups. Following the Communist takeover at the close of World War II, many supporters of Ante Pavelic, Chief of the Independent State of Croatia, and a German ally, and Draza Mihailovic, leader of the Serbian Nationalist "Chetnik" Forces, fled to Western Europe, the United States and Australia. These people joined various emigre organizations which have the goal of either destroying Yugoslavia or changing its system of government. In order to maintain the security of the Yugoslav state, Yugoslav intelligence has had as its prime objective the penetration and neutralization of these groups.

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S E C R E T

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During 1968 and 1969, there have been numerous murders of prominent opponents of the Communist regime of Yugoslavia. The victims were prominent anti-Tito Yugoslavs residing in Western Europe. These assassinations were considered necessary by Yugoslav intelligence primarily for two reasons: 1) in order to eliminate the adverse publicity generated by these anti-Tito groups, and 2) retaliation for attacks on Yugoslav Government representatives and diplomatic establishments in various parts of the world. These assassinations have increased during the past two years because the UDBa has increased its contacts with the thousands of Yugoslav workers who emigrated to the nations of Western Europe on a temporary basis in order to secure employment. This situation makes it relatively simple to infiltrate agents provocateurs into the nations of Western Europe. These agents will take advantage of the factional squabbling of the various Yugoslav ethnic elements. Also at this time Yugoslav intelligence is not concerned with world opinion.

All individuals engaged in active and outspoken opposition to the Government of Yugoslavia are known to the UDBa and their extermination is ordered if the proper conditions exist and the act can be securely implemented.

For example, the Consul assigned to the Administration for Investigation and Documentation (UID) will report on the activities of a prominent anti-Tito leader. (The UID is the intelligence section of the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs.) He will be the judge as to the necessity and feasibility of this individual's liquidation. He will report his recommendations to Belgrade where the Chief of the UID will weigh all the pertinent factors such as adverse publicity, whether the plan is functional and the necessity of this individual's extermination. If permission is granted, the respective Consul will be responsible for the necessary arrangements to implement his plan. The executioners are not employees of Yugoslav intelligence, but usually small-time Yugoslav hoodlums who have emigrated to the West. They do not receive any special training, only the necessary instructions. They are paid cash for their services.

- 2 -

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

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There have not been any political assassinations of Yugoslav emigres in the United States because the necessary conditions conducive to the infiltration of agents provocateurs into the various Yugoslav organizations do not exist. Also it would be extremely difficult to aid the assassin in returning to Yugoslavia.

The Slovenian contingent of the UDBa receives special training in the art of kidnaping. They have responsibility for all kidnapings in the area of Trieste when Belgrade desires an individual returned to Yugoslavia. The UDBa was instrumental in the kidnaping of a considerable number of Yugoslavs between the years 1949 and 1961. These kidnapings were ordered because the UDBa feared the infiltration into Yugoslavia of agents working for foreign organizations and directed from areas bordering on Yugoslavia. It was feared that these agents were responsible for numerous acts of sabotage and also for the fermenting of unrest and dissatisfaction among student groups. If the victim was of prominent stature he would be brought to Belgrade for interrogation; cases involving individuals of lesser stature would be handled in Slovenia. Examples of this procedure would be the kidnaping and execution of Colonel Ocokoljic, a Chetnik leader kidnaped at Trieste in 1958, and Father Kruniclav, Draganovic, kidnaped in Trieste in 1967.

- 3* -

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