

The President's Daily Brief

November 10, 1976

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
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NOTES

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South Korea



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Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev displayed his continuing interest in progress in USSR-US relations during the dinner last night for visiting Polish party chief Gierek.

Brezhnev said that Moscow considers the adoption of specific and effective measures to curb the arms race as essential and realistic. He expressed the hope that now that the elections in West Germany and the US are over, the USSR could count on more interaction in solving major bilateral and international problems.

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The Egyptian cabinet shuffle announced yesterday may help to strengthen the management of Egypt's shaky economy.

Long-time Egyptian economist Abdul Munim Qaysuni was given the newly created post of deputy prime minister for financial and economic affairs--a portfolio that will give him overall supervision of the ministries dealing with economic matters. Two close associates of Qaysuni have been named to head the ministries of economy and finance. Qaysuni's reputation as a capable economist may help to attract some of the reputable economists who had left government service in frustration over political restrictions or economic mismanagement.

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Zambia
Rhodesian

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The latest session of the multiracial Namibian constitutional conference that began this week in Windhoek, the territorial capital, will consider a resolution calling for the establishment of a multiracial interim government to manage the transition from the present territorial administration to an independent government.

A target date for independence proposed by the constitutional committee is December 31, 1978.

South Africa's goal for Namibia apparently is a loose federal system that would permit the whites--who comprise 12 percent of the population--to control the area's mineral resources. Non-white delegations, on the other hand, want a central government--dominated by non-whites--to control natural resources.

Non-white delegates are likely to reject any interim arrangements that perpetuate existing ethnic

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homelands unless a start is made toward setting up a central government responsive to the non-white majority.

South African Prime Minister Vorster has said his government will consider favorably any draft constitution or any interim recommendation that is adopted by a plenary session of the conference. So far, however, he has not clearly backed the one moderate member of the white delegation who has served as mediator between his hard-line colleagues and non-white delegates.

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The Yugoslavs [redacted] to permit repair of some Soviet naval ships at the naval shipyard at Sibenik.

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Soviet naval ships now officially use only the extensive and modern repair facilities at Tivat; access to the repair facility at Sibenik would eventually allow repair of more warships simultaneously.

The loss of access to the extensive repair facilities in Egypt last April prompted Moscow to increase efforts to gain expanded access to Yugoslav naval shipyards. The Yugoslavs probably would impose more restrictions than the Egyptians.

The Soviets want increased access to large shipyards in the Mediterranean primarily for submarine repair. Sibenik was last seen on satellite photography in 1975. Its primary repair facilities--both completed and under construction--could not accommodate the Soviet attack submarines used in the Mediterranean, although the facilities could be improved either by new Yugoslav construction or by sending a large Soviet drydock to the port.

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The deployment of the Arab security force in Beirut was delayed by procedural differences yesterday.

Syrian contingents of the security force preparing to enter the capital halted their advance east of the city while leaders of the large Christian militias conferred again with Lebanese President Sarkis. The talks are aimed at arranging a simultaneous entry of Syrian forces into Christian and Muslim quarters of the city.

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USSR

We present here the Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate, "Soviet Military Policy in The Third World."

The Soviets perceive the Third World as a primary arena for the USSR's competition with the West and with China. Existing political constellations and ongoing Soviet programs suggest the following area priorities:

--The Middle East will remain the major focus of Soviet military activities in the Third World. As long as Soviet relations with Egypt remain sour, Syria will continue to be the largest recipient of Soviet military aid in the area. Moscow will probably emphasize efforts in other Arab countries--Iraq, Libya, and Algeria.

--Southern Africa is the area of greatest current potential for the USSR. The Soviets will doubtless be alert to opportunities to exploit troubles there even though they will have little ability to control or even predict developments.

--In other areas, India, Somalia, and Cuba will continue to be the focal points of Soviet military policy. Moscow apparently intends to go on looking for new clients, but the Soviets do not seem to expect any major changes in Asia or Latin America in the immediate future.

As they have been expanding their activities in the Third World, the Soviets have seen a reduction in Western military presence and influence there. The Soviets have given their highest priority to areas of strategic importance such as the Middle East but have also taken advantage of opportunities to use their military activities to weaken the West in areas as far flung as Cuba and Angola. While the Soviets continue to support the spread of Communism, the ideology of potential clients has not generally hampered the development of a military relationship; pragmatism and opportunism will be the Soviet guide in seeking new military relations.

There are a number of factors which inhibit growth of Soviet military presence in the Third World:

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--The intense nationalism of most Third World countries makes them determined not to grant more than minimal use of facilities for Soviet forces.

--Regional powers have emerged which are loath to see any outside power play a dominant role.

--The Soviets are vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the Third World politics, changes in domestic regimes, and reversals in the attitudes of local leaders.

--The Soviets have been able to make only limited advances in competing with Western cultural, political, and economic influence.

--The continued presence of US and other Western military forces in the Third World remains an inhibition on Soviet military activities.

Despite major setbacks in Indonesia, Egypt, and the Sudan, the Soviets are convinced that their efforts in the Third World have significantly increased Moscow's prestige and influence in world affairs and have contributed to Soviet national security. The motivation of Moscow's military activity is an aspect of its overall competition with the West, expressed in the Third World in efforts to weaken Western military, economic, and political positions while strengthening those of the USSR. Competition with China in this same arena reinforces this motivation. Given Soviet persistence, it is extremely unlikely that any future setbacks would cause the USSR to reverse course.

To achieve their objectives the Soviets use a variety of military instruments in Third World countries. Military aid has been Moscow's principal instrument, and its use is likely to increase. Over the last ten years Moscow has signed some \$15 billion worth of arms agreements, and two thirds of that amount was negotiated in the last five years. The Soviets have little interest in reaching agreements to restrain arms deliveries. Their efforts to expand their influence rest so heavily on this instrument that they would regard restrictions on military aid as drastically curtailing their opportunities.

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In recent years, the Soviets have been exporting more of their latest and best conventional equipment. Air defense missiles and interceptors will continue to be among Moscow's best selling items. Increasingly sophisticated weapons will require Third World clients to rely more heavily on Moscow for spares, credits, and advisers to train local personnel.

The Soviets continue to regard insurgencies as instruments to advance their position, and will support such groups as the PLO and guerrilla movements in southern Africa. We believe that Moscow will probably continue to act more boldly than in years past in support of liberation movements. Moscow's confidence has been bolstered by its current perception of Western disinclination to counter Soviet activities in the Third World, its tested experience in supporting Cuban forces in Africa, and its improved military capabilities. Soviet aid, often small in absolute terms, can have a decisive effect in unstable situations such as Angola. Soviet-Cuban cooperation in supporting a national liberation movement there may be repeated if suitable opportunities arise, but only when both countries judge such activity to be in their interest.

The Soviets deploy military forces to the Third World--primarily naval and air--which share in potential wartime missions and perform a variety of political and military roles by demonstrating Soviet support to Third World countries. Barring serious long-term crises or other unusual circumstances, Soviet general purpose naval deployments will probably not increase greatly in numbers but will grow significantly in capabilities. But Soviet air deployments to distant areas will often require overflight and staging privileges which the USSR may find difficult and sometimes impossible to obtain.

As Moscow's military presence in distant areas has increased, Soviet needs for supporting facilities have risen. The Soviets will almost certainly continue to seek access to facilities primarily in the Mediterranean and to a lesser extent in West Africa and the Indian Ocean.:

--In the Mediterranean, we believe that Soviet prospects for gaining access to facilities comparable to those they lost in Egypt are dim.

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--In the Atlantic, the Soviets probably hope to obtain port and air facilities in Angola as a hedge against further troubles in Guinea.

--Given the assets they have in Somalia, the Soviets have less pressing requirements for additional facilities in the Indian Ocean but will continue looking.

In Third World crises Soviet forces have been used to provide assistance to the USSR's clients. The most extensive recent effort was in Egypt in 1970 when the Soviets deployed, over a period of months, aircraft and surface-to-air missiles manned by Soviet pilots and missile crews operating under their own command and control network. The Soviets have also endeavored to inhibit possible US actions and provide a visible symbol of Soviet support by interpositioning naval forces. Nevertheless, Moscow will be careful to avoid actions which risk precipitating a direct military confrontation with the US.

The Soviets have other military forces which could be employed in the Third World. Although Soviet ground, airborne, and amphibious forces are designed primarily for operations near the USSR, their training, coupled with the diversity and quality of their equipment, gives them a capacity to act in crisis situations. The Soviets have never conducted a military campaign in the Third World but, should they decide to intervene rapidly on the ground, the Soviets could send airborne units or small naval infantry contingents. Much larger ground forces could be moved by the Soviet merchant marine if there were enough time and no opposition.

Over the next decade, force improvements will continue to enhance Soviet capabilities to assist clients by supplementing local defenses. The USSR will be able to make more credible demonstrations of force and the Soviet navy will have better capabilities for interposition. The Soviets will also improve their capabilities for direct assault. But beyond the range of land-based air support, Soviet capabilities will still be deficient to carry out an amphibious assault against determined opposition by sizable armed forces. The Soviets will face the same problems as today of limited air cover and assault lift and vulnerable lines of communications.

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Although Soviet capabilities for direct assault will remain limited, that will not keep Moscow from continuing its efforts to cultivate military relations with Third World countries and to support insurgencies. Soviet involvement in conflicts in the Third World is likely to take the form of interpositioning naval forces, participation of advisers in combat, and the introduction of air defense units to assist a client.

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