

# The President's Daily Brief

August 9, 1976

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
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## August 9, 1976

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# FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



GREECE-TURKEY: Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios informed the US embassy in Athens on Saturday that the Turkish ship Sismik I had conducted seismic research in disputed waters off the Greek island of Lesbos the previous night for several hours. Bitsios suggested that the ship had entered the disputed area a second time, but provided no details.

Athens protested to Ankara on Saturday, calling on the Turks to avoid further violation of "the sovereign rights of Greece" but not threatening specific action against the ship.

Ankara has rejected the Greek note, according to the press. Without actually confirming the Greek allegation, Turkey reasserted its right to conduct research in contested areas and warned Athens against interfering with the Sismik. The area of operation, over which Greece lodged its protest, falls within a larger region in which the Turks had earlier announced the ship would operate from August 6 to 16.

The Greek cabinet met in special session yesterday to consider Turkey's rejection of its protest, and is expected to issue a statement today.

LEBANON: Fighting continued in east Beirut throughout the weekend as Christian forces moved to consolidate their control over the Muslim enclave of Nabaa and Tall Zatar refugee camp.

The Christians have been taking advantage of Damascus' repeated postponements of the Syrian-Palestinian-Lebanese truce committee meeting. The Syrians gave no reason for their cancellation of the meeting that was to have convened Saturday. Although the request may have been prompted by President Asad's preoccupation with forming a new cabinet, it seems more likely that the Syrians are employing delaying tactics as a means of assisting the Christians.

The Red Cross, having evacuated only 74 people from the Tall Zatar refugee camp on Friday and having

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
been fired on by snipers at the pick-up point, has abandoned further efforts to enter the camp. The announcement of the Red Cross' decision apparently prompted some 400 families to flee the camp on 50X1 their own this weekend. Red Cross officials have accused 50X1 the Christians of shelling the Beirut airport Friday while a Red Cross plane was on the runway. 50X1 <u>The Phalangists</u>/ have been less effective than formerly in check 50X1 Christian extremists.

President Franjiyah and Camille Shamun are the leaders who are probably most responsible for Christian violations of the cease-fire and for the heady confidence among Christians that they can achieve a total military victory.

SYRIA: President Asad yesterday installed the new cabinet headed by Prime Minister Khulay-fawi.

Four principal members of the previous government, including Foreign Minister Khaddam and Defense Minister Talas, retain their posts. The present cabinet, like the former one, is dominated by the Baath Party and Sunni Muslims.

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EGYPT-LIBYA: Prelimi-
nary analysis of over-
head photography taken
in late July indicates
no significant build-
up of ground forces on
either side of the
Egyptian-Libyan border.

No ground forces were detected at Siwah, and ground activity at Matruh and Sollum appeared to be at levels similar to those observed prior to the reported build-up.

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Photography

did show:

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--a total of eight new surfaceto-air missile battalions at Matruh, Sollum, and Sidi Barrani;

--twelve MIG-21 fighters and nineteen L-29 jet trainers at Matruh; and

--a new airfield under construction at Sidi Barrani.

On the Libyan side, nineteen Mi- 50X1 rage 5 fighters were seen at the

airfield near Tobruk

The Libyans have positioned three additional SA-2 missile firing battalions around the field, and they are constructing a new graded-earth landing strip west of Tobruk.

The photography also confirmed earlier reports of a military build-up in southeastern Libya. Two Mirage 5s were at Kufrah, the first fighter aircraft ever detected at this airfield. Elements of a mechanized infantry battalion were noted at a military installation north of the airfield.

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Egypt claims it has "definite evidence" that Libya was responsible for the explosion of two bombs in a government building in Cairo yesterday that injured 15 people.

A high official in the Egyptian Ministry of Interior has charged that Libyan President Qadhafi personally planned the incident.

With relations between the two countries in their present state of deterioration, Egypt would be inclined to charge Libya with responsibility for any terrorist act. Further influencing Cairo's attitude, however, are the numerous instances of Libyan-sponsored sabotage in Egypt over the last two years. Most of these were on a smaller scale than yesterday's bombing.

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#### GREECE-TURKEY

We present here the substantive points of an alert memorandum of August 7 on Greek-Turkish tensions and judgments on the Greek-Turkish military balance.

Both Turkey and Greece hope to avoid conflict in the Aegean, but the war of nerves is escalating as each side seeks to prevent the other from winning advantage. The odds still appear against large-scale conflict, but the possibility cannot be ruled out.

It should be noted that both governments see it to be to their immediate interest to impress the US and other states with the serious nature of the confrontation. Each evidently feels, at this stage, that it must assert a hard line and show determination lest it weaken its tactical position, play into the hands of its rival, and give its domestic critics ammunition. Both governments are sufficiently vulnerable to domestic pressures so that it would be politically very difficult for either to make public concessions of the kind that may be needed to get off a collision course.

Two recent developments have added to the urgency of the confrontation:

--One is the Turkish announcement of August 5 that the Sismik would operate in an area which includes disputed waters between the islands of Lesbos and Limnos. (The Turks had previously indicated that, at least for some days to come, it would stay in non-contested waters.) Ankara could of course avoid the disputed portions of this area, but in view of the publicity given to this voyage it seems likely that the government feels committed to have the ship spend at least a brief period in contested waters.

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As for the Greek side, the bulk of Greek naval forces-including most of the submarines--have been at sea since the Sismik entered the Aegean. Most of these forces are probably operating in the northern Aegean. Greek ground forces are in a high state of readiness. Over the past several months, the Greeks have made some ground force movements into Thrace and the larger Aegean islands; these may have been part of regular summer redeployments, as the Greeks claim, but it is doubtful that Ankara so interprets them.

Following are the main judgments of a just-completed interagency memorandum on the Greek-Turkish military balance.

The Greek perception of Turkey as the principal threat has led the Hellenic Armed Forces to undertake preparations designed to improve substantially their prospects in any conflict with Turkey. Specific factors which have improved the Greek position since 1974 include:

- --The reorientation of Greek ground forces away from the northern border areas and toward the Turkish border and the major Aegean and Dodecanese islands.
- --The modernization of the Hellenic Armed Forces--especially the air forces.
- --Increased Greek preparedness in terms of additional active duty personnel, a recently exercised mobilization system, and a growing pool of trained reservists.
- --The degradation of Turkish military capabilities resulting from the US arms embargo.

These changes have reduced the Turkish military advantage in the Aegean and in Thrace, but not enough to affect decisively the outcome of a conflict there. Turkey maintains quantitative superiority in virtually all respects except major naval surface combatants, although the geographic dispersion of Turkish military forces tends to offset somewhat their overall force advantage.

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Α2

Turkey's proximity to the Greek Aegean islands presents serious constraints on Greek defensive capabilities there and the Turks could probably attack and occupy one or more of the major Greek islands. They could not do so, however, without mounting a major military operation which would prove costly, deplete military stockpiles, and risk expansion to a broader war.

In Thrace, forces currently facing each other at the Evros/Meric (Maritsa) River border are roughly matched in capabilities. Required river crossings against prepared defenses would lead to high casualty rates for the attacking force, and neither force would be capable of sustained deep penetrations into the other's territory.

Given the constraints on logistical resources on both sides, the duration of high intensity conflict would be limited to a few weeks without resupply. This could diminish the intensity of combat after a few weeks, but would not necessarily bring an end to hostilities.

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